


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# THE CONTEST WITH ROME :

A CHARGE TO THE CLERGY  
OF THE ARCHDEACONRY OF LEWES,  
DELIVERED AT THE ORDINARY VISITATION IN 1851 :

WITH NOTES,  
ESPECIALLY IN ANSWER  
TO DR NEWMAN'S RECENT LECTURES :

BY JULIUS CHARLES HARE, M.A.

LONDON :  
JOHN W. PARKER AND SON, WEST STRAND :  
SOLD BY MACMILLAN, CAMBRIDGE.

1852.

It is not only the difficulty and labour which men take in finding out of truth, nor again, that, when it is found, it imposeth upon men's thoughts, that doth bring lies in favour, but a natural though corrupt love of the lie itself.—The same truth is a naked and open daylight, that doth not shew the masks and mummeries and triumphs of the world half so stately and daintily as candlelights.—BACON, *Essay of Truth*.

TO THE CLERGY  
OF THE ARCHDEACONRY OF LEWES.

MY DEAR BRETHREN,

WHILE I was preparing this Charge for publication, in compliance with your wishes, I felt that, if it was to be of real use in helping any one to see through the delusions, by which so many persons of late years, and not merely the weakminded, have been deceived and fascinated, and seduced from our Church to that of Rome, the various arguments contained in it ought to be worked out more fully in their details. This has led me into a somewhat elaborate examination of the pleas in behalf of the Church of Rome, brought forward by her recent apologists, on which the greatest stress has been laid; and in carrying this out I have naturally taken Dr Newman as her chief representative and champion, at least in her relations to the present English mind. I have not purposed to give anything like a general exposure of the errors of Romanism. This has often been done by English divines in former ages, by some of them with consummate ability. My own aim has been more directly practical, to tear off the last mask she has put on, and to strip her of the newfangled gaudy

drapery in which her diseased and deformed limbs have been enrobed.

Polemical theology is now become a necessity. We cannot defend our Church, without attacking our assailants. We cannot uphold the truth, unless we expose the errors which mimic and would supplant it. May God enable us to do so without violating the Law of Love!

Your affectionate Brother,  
JULIUS CHARLES HARE.

HERSTMONCEUX,  
June 2nd, 1852.



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THE CONTEST WITH ROME :

A CHARGE TO THE CLERGY

OF THE ARCHDEACONRY OF LEWES,

DELIVERED AT THE ORDINARY VISITATION IN 1851.



## THE CONTEST WITH ROME.

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MY REVEREND BRETHREN,

How shall I speak to you, what shall I say to you, at this our Annual Meeting? How shall I discharge what on such occasions I have always deemed the duty of my office, to call your attention to the principal events whereby our Church has been affected, whether beneficially or hurtfully, in the preceding year, and to offer you such help as I can toward forming a calm and right judgement upon them, and determining the line of conduct which they seem especially to demand from us. I have been compelled, as you are aware, by illness, to defer this Visitation to a later season than usual; and I am afraid this may have been inconvenient to some of you, and still more perhaps to some of the Churchwardens, who are summoned along with you to give account of the condition of their parishes. Should this be so, I must beg those who feel this inconvenience, to excuse a delay which has in no degree been caused by my will. As soon as my health, under God's blessing, was sufficiently restored for me to indulge the hope of being able to meet you, my first act was to fix on the earliest day for our Meeting. For I felt that it was of more than ordinary importance this year, that all who are entrusted with any office of exhortation or teaching in our Church, should be diligent in saying

and doing whatever the Spirit of God may enable them to say and do, in order to clear up and disperse those dismal delusions, under the influence of which so many members of our Church, nay, so many of her ministers, have been forsaking her in the last eighteen months, and have been throwing themselves into the arms of Rome. As in a time of danger, when the enemy is drawing near, every officer will long to be at his post, and will be doubly distressed by any hindrance that keeps him away from it, so must the officers of the Church feel, when her enemies are assailing her. They must long to employ their gifts, whatever they may be, in defending her against her assailants.

These feelings were not indeed unmixt. There were other causes, which made me shrink more than ever before from the task this day imposes upon me. There was the difficulty of the task itself, the need of wisdom and sound judgement and learning and practical knowledge to discharge it worthily and usefully. There was the consciousness of grievous deficiencies in all these essential requisites. There was the exceeding delicacy of the task, from the feverish state of men's minds, the fear lest one might do harm instead of good, lest one might offend and irritate where one meant to soothe and heal, lest one might weaken our sacred cause by the feebleness of one's arguments in support of it. Moreover there are personal circumstances which render my position peculiarly painful. For we in this Diocese, when we are speaking this year of those who have abandoned their spiritual mother, to give themselves up to the Romish Schism, are not speaking of strangers, are not speaking of those who are personally indifferent to

us. Alas! by a mysterious dispensation, through the dark gloom of which my eyes have vainly striven to pierce, we have to mourn over the loss, we have to mourn over the defection and desertion, of one whom we have long been accustomed to honour, to reverence, to love,—of one who for the last ten years has taken a leading part in every measure adopted for the good of the Diocese,—of one to whose eloquence we have so often listened with delight, sanctified by the holy purposes that eloquence was ever used to promote,—of one, the clearness of whose spiritual vision it seemed like presumption to distrust, and the purity of whose heart, the sanctity of whose motives, no one knowing him can question. For myself, associated as I have been with him officially, and having found one of the chief blessings of my office in that association,—accustomed to work along with him in so many undertakings, to receive encouragement and help from his godly wisdom, and, notwithstanding many strong differences and almost oppositions of opinion, to take sweet counsel together, and walk in the house of God as brothers,—I can only wonder at the inscrutable dispensation by which such a man has been allowed to fall under so withering, soul-deadening a spell, and repeat with awe to myself, and to my friends, *Let him who thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall.*

I have allowed myself to say thus much on a matter, which some may think of too personal a character for this public occasion. But it is not so. The tie which bound me to my late brother Archdeacon, was connected with all the duties of my office. It was especially connected with the duties of our Annual Visitation. You too, my Brethren, must feel that the loss is not merely that

of a personal friend; though there are not a few amongst you who feel that also, in a greater or less degree: for our lost brother is a man whom it is scarcely possible to know without loving him. But you will also feel that the loss is one which the whole Diocese must needs deplore. It is the loss of one who has been among the principal authors of divers good works amongst us, as he has been the fosterer of every good work: and the approaching anniversary of our Diocesan Association recalls to our minds that he was one of the most active assistants of our revered Bishop Otter in founding it, as he has ever since been one of its most energetic supporters, and the encourager and promoter of all the good it has been allowed to effect. Nay, our whole Church cannot but mourn over the loss of one of the holiest of her sons, over one who seemed to have a special gift for winning hearts to God. The thought that such a man,—of whom it might have been expected that he would be specially secured by the gifts both of nature and of grace from the blindness which surrenders the reason and conscience to the corruptions and tyranny of Rome,—has yet become a victim to the pestilence which has been stalking through our Church,—while it convinces us how terrible the power of that pestilence must needs be,—should at the same time withhold us from judging too severely of those who have deserted us along with him. It may increase our horror of the pestilence itself: it may strengthen our conviction of the necessity of guarding against its deadly fury: but it should at all events teach us that we ought not to impute evil motives or absolute silliness to those who have fallen into the selfsame error with Henry Manning.



From what I have said already, you will perceive that the main point to which I purpose to call your attention today, is the increase of the Romish Schism in our land. This, it seems to me, is the most momentous, as well as the most disastrous, among the events of the last two years. Indeed, were it not for this, our other evils might be borne more easily; nay, we might hope and feel assured that, through God's help, we should overcome them. I do not mean to deny that there are many other evils, great evils, and formidable, and pernicious, in the social condition of England at this day, evils which it requires all the might of Faith and of Hope and of Love to contend against, and against which even these heavenly powers will be almost powerless, unless the Spirit of God animate them continually. This however is only the great and arduous struggle in which the Church is always engaged, in which it has fought against the world from the beginning, and will have to fight against the world until the end. But that which in all ages has rendered us so weak and inefficient in this warfare, has been our divisions,—that we have had evermore to fight, not only against our avowed enemies, but against our brethren,—not only against the barefaced servants of sin, but against many who profess to be the servants of Christ. Or at all events, if we have not to fight openly against them, we have to keep watch continually, lest they smite us privily in the side: we cannot trust in them; we cannot reckon confidently on their aid in our contests against God's enemies. Moreover, though among the occurrences of the last two years there have been several which, from one cause or other, have troubled and distress our

Church, still, from whatever side these may have proceeded, the reason which has rendered them so troublesome and distressing, has been this our want of union, this our mutual distrust, this waste of our strength in internal dissensions and quarrels. Yet the history of our land, like all history, is full of warnings against the evils of such divisions. Twice has England fallen under the yoke of the foreiner by reason of them. It was by reason of our internal dissensions and divisions that the Saxon made himself master of Britain. It was the same wretched source of weakness, that rendered the Saxon powerless against the Norman. Nor is our early history devoid of admonitions that union supplies the strength, which disunion destroys. For it was hence that Alfred and Athelstan drew the power, which enabled them to repel the Dane. May God avert the omen! May He preserve us from falling, as our fathers of old fell, by reason of our divisions, under the crushing tyranny of the stranger! To that end may He unite the English Church, heart and soul and mind and strength, to resist and repel the emissaries of that tyranny!

But why are we to resist and repel them? why are we to hope and pray that God may enable us to resist and repel them? Why are we not to prostrate ourselves before them, and to welcome them, as Augustin was welcomed, and to implore them to take possession of us? Alas! that there should be occasion at this day to moot such a question in England! yea, to moot it in the bosom of the English Church! yea, to moot it among the ministers of that Church! We have seen indeed, during the last winter, that the great body of the English nation do not regard this as a questionable

matter,—that their minds are made up on the point: and for this we have good reason to give thanks. It has been asserted, I am aware, by the ablest and bitterest of those who have turned their former love for our Church into hatred, that the hostility of the English nation to Rome rests on vague, uncertain tradition, and is founded upon fables (A). To understand this extraordinary assertion, we must call to mind that this writer has employed a large portion of his time and of his ingenuity in the twofold process of transmuting fable into history, and history into fable, until he seems to have almost lost the perception that there is any real, abiding distinction between them, and to fancy that they become one or the other at the touch of a sophist's wand (B). Of course it will be conceded to him that no national feeling, which takes possession of a people, can be grounded on a critical investigation by each individual concerning the facts out of which it has sprung. Even when it is a contemporaneous feeling, it will not be so. Even then there will ever be much of exaggeration, much of error, mixt up with it. A nation has not the means of examining into the details of facts: and when a feeling is strong enough to take possession of it, that feeling will be inconsistent with the calmness and impartiality requisite for critical and judicial enquiries. Yet the feeling may on the whole be righteous, may have adequate causes, may bear witness that *vox populi* is not seldom an expression, though a rude and boisterous one, for *vox Dei*. In the present instance there unquestionably are certain huge facts, staring out from the surface of history, which the English mind, according to the measure of its cultivation, would point to in warrant of its

prejudice. It would point to the Marian persecutions, to the fires in Smithfield, to the attacks on the English Crown and State by the Spanish Armada and the Gunpowder Plot, to the ignominious reign of King John, to the monstrous claim of a right to depose sovereigns and to absolve subjects from their allegiance. These and other like recollections have become mixt up with the historical traditions, with the ancestral faith of the English people: similar records from foreign countries have been combined with them,—the persecutions of the Waldenses,—

“ the slaughtered saints, whose bones  
Lie scattered on the Alpine mountains cold,  
Even they who kept God’s truth so pure of old,”—

the massacre of St Bartholomew,—the murder of Henry the Third and Henry the Fourth,—the crimes of the Inquisition: and we have not yet allowed the sophist’s wand to transmute all these evils and crimes before our eyes into blessings and acts of virtue. The conceptions of these facts will doubtless be incorrect in divers particulars; and yet they will be substantially true. Herein they differ essentially and altogether from the notions entertained concerning Protestantism and Protestants in Romish countries; where, were it not for the contradictions presented by our travelers, we should be lookt upon as little better than ogres and cannibals, and, even as it is, are generally supposed to be sheer atheists. Hence it would be singular that our adversary should bring forward such an accusation against us, were it not well known that sophists, as is seen in every other page of the Platonic dialogues, have a happy trick of cutting their own fingers. For, if his

accusation is to have any force, it should imply that Romish countries are advantageously and honorably distinguished from Protestant ones by the fidelity of their conceptions concerning Protestants. Yet ours, when divested of their distortions and exaggerations, have a solid basis of historical truth, which we have received from the traditions of our fathers: theirs, on the other hand, are mere fictions, derived from wilful, conscious, flagrant falsehoods.

I express my regret just now, that there could be any occasion for asking in an assembly of English clergy, why we are to reject and repel the emissaries of the Church of Rome. It may be replied that the clergy, above other men, should be ready at all times to give a reason for every particular of their faith concerning Christ and His Church,—that they, of all men, should not allow themselves to be carried away by blind, unreasoning prejudices. Most true: it is our special obligation and privilege to give a reason for our faith. Others may rest mainly,—the bulk of mankind needs must do so,—on tradition and the authority of others, even in matters of the deepest concernment. But we are especially bound to give clear, full, explicit, satisfactory reasons for that which in the first instance we too must have received from tradition and authority. Still, while it behoves us to give reasons for our faith, it is of far greater moment that we should hold that faith clearly, decidedly, unhesitatingly. It is a sad time, a most sad time, for a Church, when any of her ministers can feel it a questionable matter whether they shall abide with her, or forsake her, and join her enemy,—when they can dare to contemplate the remotest possibility of being

led to forsake her, when they do not feel an inmost conviction that they are united to her for better, for worse, and that nothing but death shall part them. True, there have been, and may again be, critical epochs, revolutionary epochs, in the history of the Church,—as there have been such in the political history of nations,—when the strongest, most sacred ties burst and are dissolved; even as the marriage tie is burst and dissolved by adultery. But nothing less than such a total corruption of the moral life, such a violation of the primary principle of the union, which binds men, whether to the government of their State, or to their Church, nothing less than a political or ecclesiastical adultery, can furnish a warrant for such a disruption: and the very possibility of such a thing no righthearted man will dare to contemplate, any more than he would dare to contemplate the possibility of his wife's committing adultery. When the shock of the earthquake comes, it may rend the house or the temple in twain. But we must not anticipate such a crash. To live in constant fear of it, listening for its approach, looking out for it, trying to avert it, cannot but mar all moral energy, as well as all peace and happiness. By a merciful dispensation we cannot do otherwise than rely stedfastly and undoubtingly on the permanence of the laws of nature: and it is a disastrous condition of society, when people have not a like stedfast, undoubting reliance on the permanence of the moral laws which regulate the constitution of their State and Church.

This seems to me one of the most deplorable symptoms in the present aspect of our Church, that there should have been persons amongst us, who could dare to speak

of it, or even to think of it, as a thing possible, that they might be induced to leave her, to desert her, and to fly from her to Rome. More safely may a man brood over the thought of committing suicide: some outward shock may startle him out of this morbid delusion. But he who ogles and flirts with another Church, he who looks at her to lust after her, has already committed adultery with her in his heart. He has broken his faith with his own Church: he is standing on the verge of spiritual suicide. Yet we know that there have been many instances of such double-minded and doublehearted men amongst us of late years. God grant that there may be none such any longer! If there are, may they seek to become single-minded and singlehearted, to regain their first love, and to be purged from the vagrant affections which have led them astray!

To those who remember the feelings and thoughts with which the Romish Church was regarded by the whole body of our own Church during the first quarter of the present century, it must needs seem one of the most extraordinary, among the many extraordinary instances of the mutability of human opinion, that the last five years in its second quarter should be marked by the desertion of near a hundred of her ministers, —one or two of them among her brightest ornaments,—to join what was then deemed an effete, decrepit, worn-out, exploded, crumbling superstition, which no man could embrace without forfeiting his claim to be accounted a reasonable being. If any prophet thirty years ago had ventured to prognosticate such an event, he would have had to encounter the fate of Cassandra.

Even if he had told of the wonders which have been wrought since then by the help of steam and of electricity, he would not have found a more incredulous audience. That these deserters from our Church have proceeded in the main out of that school of theology, which, for the sake of brevity, though averse to everything like a nickname, I will designate by its common appellation of Tractarian, is a fact which no one can deny. Indeed, though several of them have come primarily out of the opposite school, their course has lain mostly through Tractarianism, which has helped them forward on their way. Nor will any reasonable man now dispute that the tendency of the doctrines, on which the Tractarian School laid the chief stress, is toward Rome, at all events, when they are brought forward prominently and exclusively. In fact, the leader of that school,—after maintaining for years that he was occupying the true ground, and the only tenable ground, of the Church of England, the only ground from which it was possible for her to repel the attacks of Rome, — having himself followed out his own principles step by step, till he found himself almost unconsciously in the middle of the Roman camp, fighting for Rome against his late associates,—has asserted and urged, with his own wonderful subtilty, and with that logical power by which he himself has so often been led captive, that the only consistent issue of Tractarianism is Romanism (c). The contest against him on this score is not one I feel any call to engage in. Assuredly so it is. The principles which the Tractarian School made it their chief business to enforce, if worked up into a system, and carried out



exclusively to their utmost consequences, do lead and must lead their champions, or rather their blind victims, to Rome.

This however is the very error by which men have perpetually been led astray, in speculation times without number, and very often in practical life, the determination to follow out a single principle, or a one-sided set of principles, to their ultimate issue. What! are we not to follow out our principles to their ultimate issues, no matter what their consequences may be? There is a delusion here lurking under the equivocal word *principle*, which has a wide range, and many shades of meaning. The consideration of personal consequences to ourselves ought not to withhold us from carrying out our principles honestly and consistently and boldly, whenever Wisdom bids us do so. But the due consideration of our own weakness, of the narrowness of our minds, will ever check our confidence in the absolute correctness of those principles, or at least in their universal applicability under every variety of circumstances; and so will a due consideration of the order of the world. For that order is not simple, but complex. It does not result from the uncontrolled action of a single force, but from the harmonious co-operation of several forces, which check each other's excesses. Where would the order of the universe have been, if each particle of matter had surrendered itself to the absolute impulse of the centrifugal force? or to that of the centripetal? It is by the concordant operation of the two, under a number of modifications, that this order is generated. So too, in the political and moral world, it is not by the absolute, unchecked

expansion of any one single principle that a right, harmonious order is produced. Man, in the narrowness of his selfwill, is ever desirous of converting the temporary rule of his own mind into the law of the social system to which he belongs. He refuses to recognise and appreciate the coordinate rules and principles, by which other minds are regulated, and which it is their special task to enforce. If it be in the political frame of society, he would have an absolute monarchy, or an absolute aristocracy, or an absolute democracy; and it is only through the teaching of a higher Wisdom than his own, guiding him through a series of generations, that he discovers how a combination of these three principles may be wrought out into a constitution incomparably better than any single one of them could give birth to. So too in the Church we find the champions of the absolute Papacy, and of an absolute Episcopacy, and of an absolute Presbytery, and those who would merge every other power in the absolute supremacy of the Congregation. Whereas very few recognise how, according to the true idea of a Church, the Congregation, as well as the Presbyterate and Episcopate, ought all to have their proper expression and development. The same remark applies to the other principal controversies in the Church. The self-willed enforcement of a single, insulated truth, of a peculiar, partial view, to the disparagement of different and opposite truths, has ever been the character and the cause of heresy, as the very name implies: and on the other hand the Church, who by her assumption of the name Catholic has declared herself to be above these singularities, and free from these partialities, has

often, in her hostility to peculiar, dominant forms of heresy, recoiled into the opposite, attempting to bottle up the free, living, ever-flowing atmosphere of spiritual truth into a set of positive, exclusive dogmas.

Now they who can carry their minds back to the first origin of that which was subsequently called Tractarianism, will remember that the founders of that School came forward, not as teachers of the great body of Christian truth, but as the asserters of a certain number of specific propositions, which they held to have fallen into undue neglect, and as the impugners of that system of Christian doctrines and practices, which they deemed unduly predominant. From the first they had a twofold purpose, both a positive and a negative one. Hence, as through our narrowmindedness ever happens to persons who come forward with such purposes, they at once forgot the true limits of their own particular truths, and the degree of truth which lay in the views they were impugning. Their whole course is full of exemplifications how "Vaulting Ambition doth o'erleap itself, And falls on the other side." For instance, in contending against certain Antinomian perversions of the doctrine of Justification by Faith, they did not take up their stand in the true, Scriptural, central position, where both Justification by faith and Justification by works are seen in their mutual bearings and coordination, but rusht over to the assertion of Justification by works, and the denial of Justification by faith. Again, in vindicating the power of the sacraments to confer grace, they lapst into the denial of all spiritual influences, except as conferred by a sacramental ordinance. Again, in urging the importance of tradition, under its

various forms, as a help and guide to a right interpretation of the Scriptures, they grew to rail against private judgement, identifying its exercise with its worst abuses, and seemed at last almost to speak as if the corruption of man's nature lay in his having the gift of reason and a conscience (D). In all these assertions, it will be seen, they started with having an important and neglected truth to uphold: but by exaggerating its importance, and denying the opposite, coordinate truth, they fell into the system of Rome; the Romish Church having through a series of centuries been guilty of the same exaggerations, and the same denials. For as the spirit of ancient Rome was never speculative, but solely practical, that of modern Rome has been no less so, and practical under the narrowest forms, imperial and imperious, not winning men's minds by the power of reason and love, but issuing its commands and decrees, and enforcing submission to them by all the artifices of diplomacy, and all the terrors of excommunication, embodied finally in its two great weapons, Jesuitism and the Inquisition.

Tractarianism, I have been saying, from the first, had a strong tendency, a strong bias toward Rome. It set itself to assert those portions of Christian truth, which the Church of Rome especially asserted and upheld: and as the Church of Rome had asserted these truths for centuries, in their exclusiveness, to the disparagement of the opposite half of Christian truth, thereby exaggerating them into falsehoods, so Tractarianism undertook to vindicate the same truths from neglect, to assert them in contradistinction and opposition to the complementary body of Christian doctrine, and

thus, from its very position and circumstances, became prone to fall into the same exaggerations. Of course it was not allowed to carry on its work without notice. It came forward controversially: it was actively, restlessly, provokingly polemical. But the opposite truths were not left without their champions; and thus a controversy, a warfare sprang up, by which our Church has been grievously distracted during the last eighteen years.

For myself, as some of you may perhaps remember, ever since I first had to appear publicly amongst you, and during the whole of my official connexion with you, while I have endeavoured on the one hand to assert and uphold those portions of Christian truth, which Tractarianism, as it seemed to me, unduly disparaged, and while I contended against what I deemed the exaggerations and corruptions in its views, I have also earnestly desired to recognise those portions of truth which it had rescued from neglect. For it has ever appeared to me to be the special duty of those who are entrusted with any office of authority in the Church, to do what in them lies for the preservation of her peace and unity,—not to espouse any party, but to contend against the spirit of party, against exaggeration, from whatsoever side, against every form of exclusiveness. Authority should ever be candid and catholic. Thus alone will it be just, with a higher justice than the strict and literal. Even as the Creative Power manifested itself by reducing the discordant, contentious, pugnacious elements into order and harmony and concord, such should be the aim of all to whom is committed the slightest effluence from that power, of the Father in

his family, of the Magistrate in his district, of the Sovereign in his kingdom, of the Bishop in the Church. I have desired, you will remember, to defend our brethren from the charge of Romanism; but I have also desired still more strongly to arrest them in their progress toward Romanism. I have desired to shew that the truths which they hold, so far as they are true, may be held in due coordination with the opposite truths, and in subordination to the one great body of the faith, within our Apostolical Church.

Alas! the course of events has not corresponded to my wishes. In the seventeenth century similar opinions had been held by a number of our chief divines, men of great learning, of great piety, distinguisht by divers eminent intellectual gifts. But the memory of the crimes of the Church of Rome, of her tyranny, her corruptions, was then too fresh and vivid, for the members of our Church to dream that they could find rest or truth in her arms. Besides the fashion of men's minds has changed since those days. They have become more critical, more sceptical, more uncontrollable, more self-confident and self-willed, more revolutionary. Their movements are rapider: they are readier to distrust and reject all establisht notions, every kind of authority. Even those who came forward with the profest purpose of contending against the critical, sceptical spirit of the age, were themselves infected with it, and borne along by it. In their very attempts to restore the reverence for authority, they were combating against the recognised authorities of their own time: and this it was that gave such a zest to their enterprise, and made them engage in it so busily and zealously. In attacking the

exercise of private judgement, they were merely exercising their own private judgement; with this difference however, that, while the use of private judgement which they condemned was that under the controll of reason and laborious reflexion, their private judgement acknowledged no guide except their own casual impulses and caprices. Thus, as their reading expanded, they shifted their ground, first from the so-called Anglo-catholic divines to the early Fathers,—then to the Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries; then, as they could find no restingplace suited to their likings here, they came down to the Schoolmen: and at length, when this ground also gave way under their feet, when they had sent out their spirit to roam over the earth, and it came back to them with no olive-leaf in its mouth, in a fit of despair they threw out an anchor, and tried to fasten themselves on the infallibility of the Pope. Yet in so doing they merely verified the Eastern tale, where the storm-tost mariners think they have reacht a place of safety, and landed on a rock, but find anon that they are standing on the back of a huge sea-monster, whose heavings and tossings and plungings ere long threaten them with destruction.

This, I think, my Reverend Brethren, many of you will agree with me, has been the course by which not a few of the deserters from our Church have gradually been drawn away from her, — at first unconsciously and involuntarily,—till they found themselves on a sudden at the very gates of Rome, her captives in heart and mind. They had no such intention at starting. There is no ground for doubting that they were thoroughly sincere in the love which they then profest for the

Church of England, that their main desire and aim was to uphold her, and to set her claims on what they deemed an impregnable foundation. They wisht to defend her, at once against Rome, and against the Protestant Dissenters, but chiefly against the latter, whom they regarded as at the moment her more formidable enemies. In contending against these, they naturally laid great stress on the advantages which she derives from her reverence for ancient tradition. The temperate wisdom, which characterized our Reformers, manifested itself in this respect, as in others, by trying to combine the two truths, the excesses of each of which could only be moderated beneficially by the action of the other. While they asserted the rights of Reason and of the Conscience, without the recognition of which the Reformation would have been untenable; at the same time they acknowledged the value of tradition, as a chart to guide the vessel of the Church, when voyaging through unknown waters (E).

But it is ever perilous to engage in asserting a truth with a polemical purpose, or in any other spirit than the pure love of truth. The truth will soon be twisted about and distorted, to suit that purpose. We connect our own reputation with it. Our passions cling to it. It swells out to a huge bulk, and absorbs all other truths, or hides them from our view. Thus the partisan is deluded in course of time by his own exaggerations, and grows to believe his own lies. From contending against the extravagances of private judgement, our brethren got to fancy that the only effect of man's intellectual gifts is to lead him into error. From insisting continually upon the value of authority, they



got to pine after some absolute authority, which might preserve them from the buffetings of their own loose, vagrant thoughts. They began to long for an infallible Church. Hereupon, as so often happens, the wish was father to the thought, that such a Church must needs exist. Then a step further, and he who had thus blinded his intellectual eyes, tumbled down the precipice, and fell into the jaws of the dragon at the foot of it. Thus we have heard it argued, that, as the Church must needs be infallible, and as the Romish is the only Church which lays claim to infallibility, the Church of Rome must be the true one.

This argument, or rather this bewildering defiance of everything like reason and common sense, has been one of the chief means whereby the deserters from our Church have been seduced into surrendering themselves to the Romish usurpation: and if, as is too probable, there are still any persons in our Church wavering whether they shall not take the same course, some form of this flimsy fallacy will doubtless be buzzing about in their restless, incoherent minds. For while the dread of evil, in its twofold form of sin and error, is the fear which swallows up every other fear in the healthy, soundminded Christian, this fear in the weak and morbid and timid assumes the form of a dread of personal responsibility, both moral and intellectual. Their desire is not to be freed from sin, but from being called to account for their sins,—not to be delivered from error by knowing the truth, but to be saved from having to answer for their errors, and from the labours and uncertainties involved in the search after truth. Give them falsehood, telling them that it

is truth; and they will be ready to accept it as such. They want to make over their conscience and their reason to some one who will take care of these troublesome, brittle pieces of furniture for them. As these weak longings have ever been the support and the fuel of the most abject superstitions, the Church of Rome has craftily come forward with a promise to relieve both these wants, not by the purification of the reason and the conscience, as Christ through His Spirit relieves them, but by a twofold imposture, holding out her absolution as a nostrum for the one want, and her infallibility as an opiate for the other. By these two baits she lures the silly sheep into her fold, and beguiles them into fancying that they shall find rest and peace there.

The Church of Rome, it is argued, is the only Church that lays claim to infallibility; and therefore it must be the true one. A sounder logic would infer, that, because the Church of Rome lays claim to infallibility, therefore it cannot be the true Church, seeing that it lays claim to what nothing human has, or can have. Vaunting, highflown, tumid pretensions, whether in the mouth of the Mahometan or the Mormonite impostor, — to take the first names that come across my mind, — or whether in Ancient Pistol, have never been deemed sufficient to establish their own validity. Divers previous questions need to be askt. Have we reason to expect that any Church will be endowed with the gift of absolute infallibility? At all events the whole analogy of Nature, the whole order of the universe, is against such a presumption. It is not enough to say, that, because we are very fallible, very apt to err

and go astray, and therefore want an infallible guide, the existence of this want assures us that it will be appeased. There are indeed certain innate wants, which form the grounds of a presumption that, in the Providential order of Nature, some means will be found for supplying them. But until we know the manner in which, according to that Providential order, they are to be supplied and satisfied, we should scarcely divine it by any guesses of our own, at all events unless we had the guidance of an extensive analogy. Nay, without some such aid, we shall very imperfectly understand the nature and purpose of the wants themselves. It requires training and discipline to understand the purpose and objects even of our physical appetites, much more of our social and moral appetites. How long, how many thousand years, would man, without a higher teaching, have been in making out the object and purpose of those appetites, which find their end and satisfaction in the divine ordinance of marriage? Would he ever have discovered this? Millennium after millennium has rolled over the heads of the Asiatic nations; and they have not discovered it down to this day. Greece, with all her philosophy, with all her poetry, with all her wonderful instinct for beauty and for speculative truth, never discovered it. Even after the original revelation had been renewed by the Son of God, the Gnostics rejected that revelation; Mahomet rejected it; the largest portion of the Church for a thousand years has refused duly to recognise it. The same dimness of vision is peculiarly conspicuous in all our notions concerning the remedies required by the various infirmities of our nature. We are ready

to assume that the blood of bulls and of goats will take away sin. We cannot conceive how the blood of Christ can take it away. We jump at the thought that we can take it away by our own good works, by self-imposed penances, by pilgrimages, by telling rosaries, and mumbling ave-maries. We are reluctant to believe that a living faith will take it away. Nor is it otherwise with regard to our ignorance. We shrink from the narrow, laborious path by which God has appointed that it shall be remedied. We exult at the prospect that it can be remedied, without any exertion on our part, without any energy, moral or intellectual, by placing our understandings, like a pail, for an infallible teacher to pour his dogmas into them; although uniform experience shews that such understandings are like the vessels of the Danaids, and that no living truth can abide in them.

A number of pretended analogies are indeed brought forward by Romish Apologists, with the intent of shewing that, according to the Providential order of the universe, we may reasonably expect the guidance of an infallible Church. In every stage of human society, it is contended, we are not left to ourselves to find out our duties, but are placed under authority,—children under their parents, pupils under their teachers, servants under their masters, a whole people under its rulers. Nor are we allowed to question the authority under which we are placed, but are bound to submit to its decrees. Thus, it is urged, we are also bound to submit to the decrees of the rulers of the Church; who therefore, by a sophistical sleight of mind it is argued, must be infallible. Surely it is marvellous that any one

should be imposed upon by such a bare trick; and yet numbers are so. The whole force of the analogy in fact bears entirely the other way. Children are to believe and to obey their parents; and yet the parents are not infallible; though a humble child will for a time almost suppose that they are so. In like manner a humble pupil will for a while have a sort of belief in the infallibility of his teacher; and it is often a shock of pain, when we are constrained to recognise that he is fallible: yet so he is. So too are masters. So too, as all history shews, are rulers and governors of nations, although they are the ordinance of God, and although their subjects are bound to honour and obey them. By leaning on these supports we are to be trained gradually for walking without them. The outward law fades away before its manifestation as the law written on the heart. The scaffolding of ordinances is removed, in proportion as the soul is built up of living principles, and able to stand without it. This truth, which our Lord declares in his discourse with the woman of Samaria, the Church of Rome has never been able to understand (F).

In brief, the argument from analogy stands thus. Children need guides, and have fallible ones. Pupils need guides, and have fallible ones. Servants need guides, and have fallible ones. Nations need guides, and have fallible ones. In like manner the members of Christ's Church need guides; and therefore, according to this analogy, their guides will be fallible ones. *Stop*, says the sophist: *when you get into this region, things veer round. Topsyturvy is the order of the day. Yes becomes No, and No becomes Yes. The*

*way in which we follow analogy, is by running against it. All other guides are fallible; therefore the guide of the Church is infallible.*

The analogy of our moral nature leads to the same conclusion. For, if we need truth, we have no less need of purity and holiness: and as truth is granted to us, so are purity and holiness, in an ever increasing measure, to him who seeks them diligently. Yet impeccability is unattainable by man; and so is infallibility. In fact, whatever analogy we examine, whatever part of the order of Nature we consult, it rejects the Papacy, and all its fictions. If we are seeking for arguments in favour of the Papacy, we must look for them beyond the sphere of God's Providence. The order of Nature rejects it, even as History does. Catholic as both these are, they are no less decidedly, vociferously Protestant.

How brightly does the meek and temperate wisdom of our Reformers shine forth with regard to this point, when contrasted with the audacious assumptions of Rome! The Church, they laid down in the 20th Article, "hath authority in controversies of faith." From these words some persons have attempted to deduce that we also assert the infallibility of the Church: else how can she rightfully have authority in controversies of faith? For her having authority implies that her members are bound to abide by her decisions (g). Even if there were no other declarations militating against such a supposition, we might legitimately argue that, as a father has authority to decide disputes among his children, and they are bound by his decision, yet he is not infallible,—and

as judges and legislators have authority in controversies of law to decide cases and frame new enactments, and the whole nation are bound by their decisions, as long as they stand, while yet both the judges and the legislature are notoriously and acknowledgedly fallible,—so in the Church likewise, it being requisite for the sake of peace and order that means should be provided for settling controversies on points of faith, there is a moral necessity for entrusting that authority to some supreme tribunal, whose decisions must be binding on her members. Even if this declaration stood alone then, we might reasonably hold that it implies nothing essentially different from that judicial and legislative authority, which inhere in all modes of government, but against the abuses of which, from the knowledge how frail and fallible man is, even in his highest estate, political wisdom is ever devising checks and preservatives. The same 20th Article however goes on to declare how the Church is bound in the exercise of this her authority; and the language of the declaration clearly implies that those who framed it conceived she might err in that exercise. “And yet it is not lawful for the Church to ordain anything that is contrary to God’s word written; neither may it so expound one place of Scripture, that it be repugnant to another.” These words shew that the Church was not regarded as being preserved by any inherent infallibility from ordaining anything contrary to God’s word, or from expounding Scripture contradictorily. We do not waste words in declaring that a person must not commit an offense, which he cannot commit.

Besides the 19th and 21st Articles are still more

explicit. In the former it is declared that, "as the Church of Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Antioch have erred, so also the Church of Rome hath erred, not only in their living and manner of ceremonies, but also in matters of faith." In like manner the 21st Article declares that General Councils, "forasmuch as they be an assembly of men, whereof all be not governed with the Spirit and word of God, may err, and sometimes have erred, even in things pertaining to God." Attempts have indeed been made, as you are aware, to evade and distort these plain words; for, when the sophist has cast off his allegiance to reason and truth, there are no forms of words by which you can bind him (H). But I am not purposing to engage in a controversy on this point. I merely cite these passages to shew how strongly and plainly our Church in her Articles disclaims and repudiates the notion of her being infallible. She confesses herself fallible; and therefore she may be a true Church. The Church of Rome on the contrary, by asserting that she is infallible, proclaims herself to be an impostor, to be assuming that which God has not given to man. She does think it robbery to be equal with God; she thinks it a thing to be coveted and snatcht at; and in the spirit of a robber she assumes that equality.

The difference between the two Churches in this point is connected with the difference between the views they take of human nature. The Reformation regards man as a reasonable being, who, having been called to a participation in Christ's redemption, and grafted into His Church, is to work out his own salvation with the help of the Spirit of God. The Church of Rome,



on the other hand, would fain persuade men that she alone can work out their salvation for them, and that, if they will submit implicitly to her, and do just as she bids them, she will land them safe in heaven (1). No wonder that her conveyance picks up all manner of wayfarers, who are glad to be carried in this way to their journey's end. This however is not God's mode of dealing with His human creatures. In the whole scheme of our redemption, the help which is granted to us, is to elicit a corresponding energy within us. The eye drinks in the light, and puts forth its faculty of seeing. So every truth communicated to the mind is the awakener and stimulator of an intellectual energy. Thus, and thus alone, truth becomes power. We are not supplied with leading-strings to draw us blindfold to the truth. But we have every help, each according to his need; and if we make a right use of what we have, and seek for more, under the guidance of God's Spirit, meekly, patiently, diligently, we shall assuredly have more and more of the truth made manifest to us. Let us trust in this Divine guidance, and seek for it, without looking aside for a conjuror or sophist, for an infallible Church, or an infallible Pope, to spare us the trouble of the search.

I have said thus much on this point, because the infallibility claimed by the Church of Rome, utterly baseless as it is, and out of harmony with the whole order of God's dispensations for the salvation of mankind, has exercised, and is daily exercising, a delusive fascination on many of the weak, the fainthearted, the cowardly, who desire, according to the usual character of human wishes, to reach the end *per saltum*, without

passing through the means. The time will not allow me to enter into any examination of the Scriptural arguments by which the claim has been propt up. Indeed there is no need of doing so. They are so futile, so utterly irrelevant, they might as reasonably be brought forward to demonstrate the law of gravitation, as the infallibility of the Pope (j). The authority of a General Council rests of course on very different grounds. Such a Council, lawfully assembled and rightfully constituted, we might trust, would be guided by the Spirit to the truth, if it allowed itself to be so; that is, if it sought the truth with singleness of purpose, and sought the help of the Spirit in that search,—if its members did not suffer themselves to be swayed by any personal or party motives, by any prejudices, by any interests. But as such a Council cannot well be brought together,—as the Councils which have been collected have mostly had an abundant portion of human infirmities and frailties,—our Article most rightly pronounces that they are not exempt from the possibility of error (k); although their authority is very different from that of the Bishop of a single see, which at a critical time may have such occupants as Leo the Tenth, and Julius the Second, and Alexander the Sixth.

In fact the passages of Scripture which are brought forward to bolster up this claim, have merely been pickt out from the Sacred Volume to support a foregone conclusion; as is the case moreover with all the texts cited in defense of the Papacy and its various corruptions. In no instance, I believe, has the proposition to be establisht been derived even from a misunderstanding of the Scriptural text, as a number of sectarian

errors have been. But, as the Tempter could quote Scripture, so can the Papacy; and with a like aim of frustrating and defeating the purpose and end of Scripture. This assumption of infallibility, which is of comparatively modern origin, and which has been a subject of much controversy even latterly among Romish theologians (L), was a part of the Papal usurpation of the rights and privileges of Councils, a usurpation analogous to that by which the rights and privileges of the Aristocracy, and of the Parliaments or National Assemblies, were swallowed up by the absolute monarchies in so many countries of Europe. By degrees too, that which had been conceded symbolically to the supreme power, in order to denote its absolute earthly supremacy, was asserted to belong literally to the Papacy, in the fullest sense of the term designating it. The most zealous among the new champions of the Papacy, in his recent apology for it, has introduced a pretended attack on our political Constitution for the sake of shewing how the best things may be painted in the most odious colours. In this invective, which, as a piece of buffoonery, as a parody of Exeter-Hall oratory, is singularly clever and amusing, — a supposed Russian declaims against the monstrous blasphemy of ascribing *omnipotence* to Parliament, and of asserting that the Sovereign *can do no wrong*, and *never dies*. The writer's evident intention is hereby to excuse and justify the ascription of infallibility to the Papacy. But here again, without being aware of it, he has cut his own fingers. For everybody knows that these expressions are merely legal fictions, — that the *omnipotence* of Parliament is an exaggerated designation for its absolute, uncontrolled, legislative power, —

that the Sovereign's *doing no wrong*, and *never dying*, are fictions, by the first of which we not only declare that there is no earthly tribunal for him to give account to, but divest him, in his royal character, of all personal responsibility for any political acts, transferring that responsibility, and by consequence his power also, to his ministers; while his *never dying* denotes that, though the individual occupant of the throne dies like other men, the throne does not thereby become vacant, but is immediately, without any interval, taken possession of by his successor, to whom his whole prerogative is instantaneously demised. If this were all that is implied by Papal infallibility, if it merely meant that the Bishop of Rome, during the suspension of Councils, is the supreme judge in theological controversies,—it would still be a question whether it is expedient to vest such a supremacy in a single Bishop; but the revolting imposture of the claim would then vanish, as would the prestige whereby it fascinates the weak and unstable. The Pope would merely stand in the place of the supreme tribunal of doctrine, however constituted, in other Churches, and would be no more infallible than they are; only that they, in their more scrupulous regard for truth, refrain from such a pretension (M).

Here it may be remarkt, that, though the supreme power may rightfully demand the submission of our will and of our conduct, it cannot in like manner demand the submission of our thoughts and of our reason. An Act of Parliament may command us to do this or that; but it cannot command us to think this or that. Ten thousand Acts of Parliament would not add one tittle

of certainty to anything that is true without them; nor could they take away one tittle of certainty from it. In this province Reason has more of omnipotence, than all the Governments upon earth. Hence he who would claim authority in matters of opinion, must take Reason into his Councils. There are various degrees of Wisdom; but the highest has always been the first to acknowledge its own fallibility. When Reason speaks to us intelligibly, we cannot refuse to go along with her. When Authority usurps her place, we are constrained by the laws of our minds to rebel against her (N).

Another delusive vision, by which some persons of late years, as well as in former ones, have been drawn toward Rome, is the notion that in the Church of Rome they shall find something like a realization of that Unity, for which our Lord so fervently prayed, and for which every one animated by His Spirit must therefore long. But the Unity for which our Lord prayed, the Unity which St Paul sets before us in several passages of his Epistles, is totally and essentially different from the only unity which can be promoted by the self-exaltation of the Papacy. The Unity for which our Lord prays, is that which arises from the indwelling of His Spirit. In St Paul's representation of the Church, the Unity of the one Body springs from the Unity of the indwelling Spirit, from the one Lord, who is the sole Head of His Church, from the one Faith, whereby it is united to Him, from the one Baptism, which is the initiation of that union, and from the one universal God and Father, who rules over all its members, and pervades them, and abides in them. In like manner, when St Paul is speaking of

the manifold diversities of gifts and offices, and pointing out the necessity of these diversities, he at the same time declares that at the root of all these diversities there is a ground of Unity, in that they are all the gifts and ordinances of one and the same Spirit. Here everything is spiritual; and when acting under this her heavenly Guide, the Church will preserve the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace. St Paul does not say a word, nor is there a word in any part of Scripture, about the unity of a temporal Head, which in fact would turn the Church into a monster, like the hundred-handed giants of ancient fable. With him the one Divine Head is the Source, whence the spirit of life flows through all the members, animating them all in their countless diversities of form and function (o). In fact Rome is, and ever must be, so long as she asserts her present claims, the chief outward obstacle to the Unity of the Church, and renders all attempts to promote that Unity ineffectual. The Papacy has always been too richly endowed with the wisdom of this world, not to have learnt the maxim of the Roman Commonwealth, *Divide and Rule*. Even the marriage-tie it deemed a hindrance to its purpose, and therefore stript the Janizaries and Mamelukes, who were to be the main instruments in spreading its empire, of their natural affections, and turned them into insulated units, that should have no bond except that to their chief. Thus that which was the ground of the true greatness of Pagan Rome, was rejected by Papal Rome. In other respects, as the Roman Empire, after crushing the resistance of those whom it vanquish'd, trod out their life, so that their growth into a living nation

became impossible, in like manner the Papacy has rather tried to crush and extinguish the spiritual life of its subjects, than to foster and cultivate it. During the Middle Ages, it is true, the influence of Christianity was mighty in developing the peculiarities both of individual and of national character; but so far as this influence was affected by the Papacy, it was checked: and since the Reformation, wherever Rome has retained her dominion, she has operated as a blight; beneath which, if the mind of man attempted to rise and expand, it rankled into infidelity. If we would discern what the efficacy of the Papacy has been in promoting unity, let us look at the history, and at the present condition of Italy and of the Italians; who alone among the European nations have never been able to coalesce into a national unity, not merely through the political efforts of the Papacy to foment divisions among them, but still more because they have always been severed by mutual distrust,—because the constant, familiar spectacle of a faith which was no faith, which was merely a hypocritical juggle,—the dismal consciousness of which has tainted so large a portion of Italian literature (p),—has rendered it difficult for any man to feel confidence in his neighbour,—because, when that which ought to be the central seat of Truth is known to be falsehood, the very notion of Truth as dwelling in man becomes extinct. Every way it is manifest that those who are bound together by chains, or by any other outward compulsion, are not united. Unity is of the heart and mind, presupposes Freedom, is the offspring of Love.

On some other fallacies, by which men's minds have

been beguiled of late years into thinking too favorably of Rome, I have spoken in former Charges; and the time will not permit me to recur to them today. But before I turn away from this subject, it behoves me to give some sort of brief general answer to the question which I propounded above: Why are we to resist and repell those who desire to draw us into the Church of Rome? why are we not to hail them as our benefactors, and to bow our necks thankfully beneath the yoke which they would impose on us?—Because it is a yoke, and not an *easy* one, like that Divine yoke, which we are bid to take upon us, but a heavy and oppressive human yoke; whereas we are commanded to call no man master upon earth, seeing that we have One Master in heaven, who has called us all to be brethren and servants one to another. Because the dominion of Rome is a usurpation, founded upon no divine right, upon no human right, repugnant to both rights, destructive of both, destructive of the national individualities which God has markt out for the various nations of the earth, and which can only be brought to their perfection when the nations become members of His Kingdom. Because history shews, what from reflexion we might have anticipated, that the sway of Rome is degrading and corruptive to the spiritual and moral, and even to the political character of every nation that submits to it. Because the pretensions of Rome are built upon a primary imposture; and such as the foundation is, such is the whole edifice that has been piled upon it in the course of centuries, imposture upon imposture, falsehood upon falsehood. Because the evangelical truths, of which, from its portion in Christ's



Church, it has retained possession, have been tainted and corrupted by its impostures, and thus have been prevented from exercising their rightful influence upon the moral growth of its members. Because it has gone on debasing the religion of Christ more and more from the religion of the Spirit into a religion of forms and ceremonies, substituting dead works for a living faith, the nominal assent to certain words for the real apprehension of the truths express by them, interposing all manner of mediators between man and the One Only Mediator, changing God's truth into an aggregation of lies, and, at least in its practical operation, worshipping the creature more than the Creator. Because so many of its principal institutions are designed, not so much to promote the glory of God, and the wellbeing of mankind, as the establishment and enlargement of its own empire, no matter at what cost of truth and holiness; because its celibacy is anti-scriptural and demoralizing, baneful to the sanctity of family life, and a teeming source of profligate licentiousness (q); because its compulsory confession taints the conscience, deadens the feeling of sin, and breeds delusive security (r); because its Inquisition enslaves and crushes the mind, stifling the love of truth (s); because its Jesuitism is a school of falsehood; because it eclipses the word of God, and withdraws the light of that word from His people.

Therefore, because of these and divers other evils, inherent in, and almost inseparable from the system of the Papacy,—evils, each of which has bred an untold mass of sin and misery, accumulated through centuries, and which have grievously hindered the saving and sanctifying

power of the Gospel,—therefore did our ancestors at the Reformation, under God's guidance, cast off the yoke and bondage of Rome, and deliver the State and people of England from it. Therefore has the protest against that yoke and bondage been maintained by the heart and mind of England for three centuries. Therefore, notwithstanding the softening influences of Time, has the protest been handed down from father to son for nine generations; and each generation has renewed it with determined, unflagging zeal. Therefore, as has been seen in the last winter, is it still the fixt purpose of the English heart and mind to reject the advances and to repel the assaults of the Papacy. Therefore too do we trust that, under God's blessing, we shall still have the heart and mind to repel them, yea, that, with His help, we shall repel them successfully, and shall preserve that pure treasure of Evangelical Truth, which He has so graciously committed to our keeping.

Hitherto I have been speaking mainly of that which seems to me the most distressing feature in the present condition of our Church,—the delusion, or rather the complication of delusions, by which so many of our brethren, both lay and clerical, have been drawn into the arms of Rome. Unless this delusion be checkt and dispelled, its effects cannot be otherwise than very disastrous. The Church must needs mourn over every one of her sons and daughters who forsakes the truth he has learnt from her, to embrace the superstitions and the idolatrous corruptions recommended by the practice, if not directly inculcated by the authoritative teaching, of her subtile, insidious adversary. Still more bitter is the sorrow, when those abandon her, who have been

ministering for years at her altars, and whom she has loved as among her most loving and dutiful children. At such a time a general distrust takes possession of men's hearts. We scarcely know on whom we can rely. Even the members of the same family suddenly find that a wide gulf of separation has burst open betwixt them: child is severed from parent, brother or sister from brother, husband from wife,—in some cases without the slightest notice or anticipation of such a calamity: so stealthily has the deceiver come upon them; so craftily has he laid his snares, undermining all openhearted confidence, poisoning the very sources of truth in the heart and the conscience. Among the evil effects of such a state of things, is, that many become disheartened in their work. They know not what their neighbours will do. How then can they unite, how can they cooperate with persons who in a few months may perhaps be found in the ranks of the enemy? Thus all public efforts flag; joint enterprises are abandoned or neglected. Hence springs a fresh crop of woes. The best remedy for the fainthearted is ever to unite with the more vigorous in active exertion. When the line is marching onward, they are borne along by it; and their hearts kindle at the touch of their comrades. But, when a retreat is sounded, each one begins to think how he can save himself. In this depression, they who see their brethren falling away around them, begin to doubt about their own standing: they fancy that the ground is slipping away under their feet: they feel uncertain where they may be in another year: they hardly dare ask themselves: they resign themselves to the guidance of events. If everything in the Church goes on exactly

as they wish, they think they shall probably stay where they are. But if anything happens to annoy or offend them,—if the Crown, if the Parliament, if the Ministry, if the Bench of Bishops, if the body of Deans, if the Archdeacons, if the Clergy in their neighbourhood, do not all do just what they think right and fitting,—if any one of these persons has the presumption to hold an opinion at variance with those of the waverer, and to act upon it,—then what can he do but quit his house and home, his Church and people, and join the Romish Schism? In this morbid, inflammatory state of mind, every gnat-bite is enough to put him into a fever, and to drive him, like Ió in the Greek tragedy, a vagrant from land to land. In this state, as we are told by one who well knew the perversities of human nature, “trifles light as air Are confirmations strong As proofs of Holy Writ.” Hence it is not to be wondered at, if certain recent events in our Church, of considerable importance in themselves, have had that importance greatly magnified, have been viewed with eyes which could not help discolouring and distorting them, and have produced an excitement far beyond their real significance.

I am referring, you will perceive, principally to the agitation by which our Church was distracted last year through its whole length and breadth, in consequence of the decision pronounced by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the Appeal brought before them in a case involving the doctrine of the efficacy of infant Baptism. Of course I am not about to renew the controversy on that subject, in which, as many of you, my Reverend Brethren, are probably aware, I took

some part at the time, from an earnest desire to do what I could toward calming the agitation, by drawing people to consider the real purport and effect of that decision. For, owing to the feverish state of men's minds, it seemed to me to be strangely misinterpreted; and all my subsequent reflexion, as well as my examination of what has been written by others, has only confirmed this view. They who were unfamiliar with the strictness and precision of our judicial procedure, and knew not how our judges shrink, whenever it is possible, from laying down any general principle, confining themselves as closely as they can to the immediate facts proved in evidence before them, assumed that they had taken upon themselves to determine the doctrine of our Church concerning Baptismal Regeneration. Although the Judges themselves declared that they had not determined any doctrinal question, and that they had studiously abstained from doing so, knowing they had no jurisdiction for such a purpose, any more than they have for determining the law of the land,—their office being solely to determine the bearing of the existing law, whether of the land or of the Church, on the specific cases brought before them,—it was asserted that the Judges did not understand the meaning of their own sentence; and a cry past from one end of England to the other, that a body of laymen were taking upon themselves to determine the doctrines of the Church, that the Government, which might consist of Jews, Turks, Heretics, and Infidels, was usurping what belonged of right to the successors of the Apostles, and that the Church of England was on the point of forfeiting her position and privileges as a branch of Christ's Holy Catholic Church.

Nay, even this was not enough. To magnify and aggravate the offense of the Judgement, it was declared to contravene an Article of the Nicene Creed. Thus it became of a sufficiently gross and palpable nature to furnish fuel for a popular cry. It mattered not that no reference, no allusion had been made to this Article of the Creed in the long, minute, exhaustive examination to which the appellant had been subjected,—that no reference, no allusion had been made to it in the pleadings on either side before the Court of Arches, or in the very able and elaborate Judgement delivered in that Court,—that no reference, no allusion had been made to this argument, which, if it had been supposed to have any real validity, would of course have been brought forward from the first in the front of the case, till just before the close of the speech of the last counsel before the Court of Appeal. There could not indeed well be a stronger presumptive proof that the bearing of the Article of the Creed on the case was very remote and impalpable, than that so many acute and ingenious divines and lawyers should have been searching during a twelvemonth for all the arguments by which they could support their cause, and yet had not discovered this bearing. Nor, whatever may be conceived to be the meaning of the Article by the theological mind, which is habitually exercised in educing the utmost quantity of meaning from a very few words, would any person trained to the precision of our judicial logic have dared to lay down that this Article defines the mode in which the remission of sins is connected with the Baptismal Act. All this however was overlookt. When this point had once been taken, it served the purpose of agitation

too well to be let drop : and in the clamour which arose, the principal, ever-repeated complaint was, that an Article of the Nicene Creed had been contravened, and that our Church was thereby forfeiting her Catholicity. Alas ! I am afraid that even now there are many, who do not recognise the fallaciousness of this complaint, who do not discern that, in consequence of the principles which regulate our whole judicial procedure, the Article of the Nicene Creed could not have any force in swaying the opinions of the Judges, and therefore that it could not be contravened by their decision (T). Doubtless, as has often been asserted, the whole body of our faith may be said to lie in the germ in the Apostles Creed. But a Court of Law would not hold that even the Arian hypothesis was excluded thereby ; and the Church herself evinced her conviction of this by laying down more precise and fuller determinations of her doctrine in this and other cases, as the need of them occurred. On the other hand we may observe that, among those who were foremost in complaining of this contravention of our faith, several, having since gone over to the Romish Church, have themselves contravened that very Article in the directest manner by submitting to a second Baptism. For, even admitting the absurdly extravagant notion that the Church of England did forfeit her Catholicity by the decision of last year, this decision could not act retrospectively, and invalidate the Baptism they had received from her hands thirty or forty years before. Thus we see how the most solemn arguments in the most solemn matters are merely taken up to serve the purpose of the moment, and may be cast away the next moment, and trampled underfoot.

Another complaint, which had more of plausibility in it, was against the constitution of the tribunal by which the cause had been decided. For it is clearly desirable and right that the final decision on ecclesiastical causes, in which doctrinal questions are involved, should not rest wholly with a body of secular judges, who have no specific theological training, many of whom have little, if any, knowledge of theological doctrine, or of the meaning of theological terms, and with regard to whom there was no security for their even being members of our Church. It is desirable and right that, while the judicial calmness and precision of the proceedings are ensured by our having a certain number of persons in the tribunal, who have been disciplined by the practice of our law-courts, it should also comprise an adequate number of divines, familiar with the course and bearings of theological and ecclesiastical controversies. Still, if the complainants had been in a state of mind to exercise a sober judgement, they must have perceived that, though they might have urged this plea, not without reason, before the Court came to its decision, they were barred from it after the decision had been pronounced. If they themselves had not discovered the unfitness of the tribunal, before it gave its decision, they could not afterward legitimately condemn the Court, or any one else, for not having found this out. It is quite clear that the Act, by which the present Court of Appeal was constituted, was not framed with the slightest purpose of wronging the Church, or usurping any controul over her doctrines. No appeal, in which doctrine was concerned, having occurred for more than a century, the framer of the Act, as he himself has



stated, had no intention or thought of its bearing on such appeals, and, not contemplating such cases, made no special provision for them.

Hence this part of the jurisdiction of the Court was a mere accident, whereat no reasonable man can feel indignant. In fact a Bill for remedying this oversight had already been brought before Parliament in three successive Sessions; and though its enactment had been postponed, partly from the usual dilatoriness of our legislative proceedings, and partly from the desire that it should be well considered before it became law, there seemed to be no reason for doubting that we should soon have a Court of Appeal rightly constituted. What then, in such a state of things, was the conduct befitting the faithful, loyal, dutiful sons of the Church? Nay, what was the conduct befitting reasonable, sober-minded men? Surely an irregularity of this kind, which arose out of a mere accident, out of an inadvertence on the part of the representatives of the Church in the Legislature, and which, there was ample ground for hoping, would soon be corrected, could not afford a plea for any one, who was not already labouring under a morbid irritability, to cry out either against the Church or the State, against the State as tyrannizing over the Church, or against the Church as giving up to Cesar the things which are God's. The plain course of duty was manifestly to petition the Legislature to correct the anomalies in the constitution of the Court of Appeal. Had this course been adopted, had such an alteration been urged with calm, judicious earnestness, the evil would probably have been redrest before now.

I do not forget that the Bill, which was brought

before the House of Lords for this purpose in the month of June last year, was rejected. But it seems to me that the Church has reason to be very thankful to the House of Lords for rejecting that Bill. Had the scheme for the constitution of the Court of Appeal proposed in it resembled that of the preceding Session, or that which was brought in at the beginning of the same Session, to form a tribunal in which a certain number of Bishops and eminent divines should sit along with a certain number of the most eminent Judges, the fate of the Bill would probably have been different. But unfortunately a notion had got into vogue, that the determination of all questions, even legal questions, connected with doctrine ought to be entrusted exclusively to the Episcopal Bench, as belonging to them indefeasibly by a Divine ordinance; and this assumption the House of Lords rejected, most rightly, as it seems to me; and judging wisely for the welfare of the Church (v). For consider, my Reverend Brethren, what the consequences would have been. A casual majority of the Episcopal Bench, a majority which might be only of one, and might often be inferior to the minority in wisdom and learning and piety, would have been invested with the authority of determining points of doctrine, in a manner binding on the Law Courts, and on the whole Church. Who, in such a state of things, could have felt safe? The majority might be on one side this year, and on the opposite side the next, or a few years later. Imperfect as the constitution of our Convocation is, the Upper House is held in check by the Lower; and both, if they entered upon any injudicious, precipitate course of legislation, might be

arrested by the Crown, as the representative of the Laity, either proroguing them, or refusing its sanction. But the decision of the projected Court was necessarily to be hasty, and was to be peremptory. Moreover it appeared far from improbable that many of the Bishops,—as might be expected from persons with no legal training, and little accustomed to submit their convictions to positive outward rules,—would be apt to regard the question propounded to them as a matter which they were to decide, not merely according to the Articles and Formularies of our Church, but rather according to abstract principles, and to the authority of the Bible. Nay, the likelihood of such a result became the greater in proportion as a Bishop attacht a paramount importance to what he, in his own mind, regarded as the true exposition of Scriptural truth; whereby endless controversies would have been engendered (v). Hence the rejection of this Bill was no legitimate ground for the Church to murmur against the State, but rather to be thankful. Still, though the last Session, from being almost entirely occupied by the discussion of a single measure, has been allowed to slip away without any attempt to reform the Court of Appeal, we may hope that, if a Bill, analogous in the main to that of 1849, be brought forward next Session, it will pass into law without much opposition. Only let our conduct be that of reasonable, practical men, who desire specific remedies for specific grievances, not that of vague dreamers, or of revolutionists, who grumble and clamour against the whole establisht order of things, and desire to change and remould it in conformity to their own momentary fancies.

On another very important and difficult question, which arose out of this controversy, or rather was brought forward more prominently in consequence of it,—concerning the nature and extent and limits of the Royal Supremacy,—I can only allow myself to touch very briefly. But I cannot pass it over altogether; since this has been one of the chief complaints made against our Church of late years, not only by her enemies from without, but also by her wavering members,—that she allows the civil, secular power to exercise an undue authority with regard to spiritual matters. Of course this question cannot be otherwise than very intricate; as all questions touching the primary rights of the great powers in the State and Church, and the relations between them, needs must be. For these rights and relations were never defined and determined with precision, any more than you can have a straight line of demarcation between the land and the sea. Like the great powers of Nature, those which act upon each other in history, do not cut themselves off by rule and measure. The boundary between them bears the rugged marks of warfare, which continue during periods of mutual peace; and its evenness is broken by prominences and indentures, by jutting rocks and headlands, and by insinuating gulfs and bays. In the course of ages too this boundary will vary, from encroachments, probably on both sides. Even if the line of demarcation between the secular power and the spiritual had ever been distinctly defined, the lapse of centuries would have modified and changed it, not merely through their strife and reciprocal aggressions, but also from changes in the nature of the powers themselves, in that the

secular power is gradually more and more spiritualized, while the spiritual power grows secularized, in a good sense, it may be, as well as a bad. Thus the relation between Anselm and William Rufus is far from the same as that between Becket and Henry the Second; and immense was the change which had past over it, when we examine the position of the Church and of the Sovereins in the age of the Reformation. Nor did the change cease then; and of course it has been rapider in the nations which adopted the Reformation, and recognised the universal priesthood of Christians, and the right of all to a free access to God and to His word. In fact, as the whole community is brought more and more under the influence of the Gospel, the separation between its various classes tends to become less abrupt, to become a distinction of offices, rather than a difference of essence, according to the grand picture set before us in St Paul's Epistle to the Corinthians. Even within our own memory, he who can look back thoughtfully on what England was at the beginning of this century, and at the manifold wonders of its progress, will perceive that enormous, incalculable changes have been wrought in the relations of the various classes of society, from the highest to the lowest, not merely by positive laws, such as the Reform-Bill, but still more by the silent working of all manner of social, economical, moral influences. Nor are these by any means confined to our secular relations: they are of scarcely inferior moment within the Church. Thus, at every point in history, these relations are not what they were determined to be by some positive enactment concerning them, it may be centuries before:

they are a combination resulting from two distinct elements, what they have been in the past, and what the heart and mind of the Nation or Church deem at the time they ought to be. For, while the past has its rights, and ought to retain them, the present also has rights of its own, which, unless they are recognised voluntarily, will make themselves recognised by force. With regard to our immediate question, it seems to me that the discussions which took place last year, lead on the whole to results, which are no way inconsistent with the rightful claims, either of the State, or of the Church ; at least unless we suffer ourselves to be deluded by the notion, which, though perpetually disclaimed nowadays, may perpetually be detected exercising a mischievous influence, not seldom upon those who are unconscious of it, nay, who loudly disclaim it,—that the Church is synonymous with the Clergy. Whereas it is made up of the whole body of its baptized members, and, in a higher sense, of the whole body of its communicants ; while there cannot be a grosser perversion of the truth, than to confine it to its ministers, to those who are specially ordained to be the servants of the congregation. The baneful effects of this error may be traced through the whole history of the Church, in the demoralization and despiritualization of the Clergy, no less than of the Laity. Indeed I know not whether any error has ever done half so much evil to mankind : and the chief propagator of this error, and of the evil consequences that flow of it, has ever been the Papacy (w).

Here it seems as if I could hardly pass on without alluding to a paper, which was circulated very generally

among the Clergy last year, and which most of you, my Reverend Brethren, must doubtless have seen,—containing a declaration with regard to the nature and limits of the Royal Supremacy. This declaration was promulgated by three of the most eminent among our brethren in the ministry; and it was supposed that on the assent of the Clergy to it would probably depend whether the propounders would continue in our Church or not. Some of you may perhaps have sent answers to this paper: many of you, doubtless, took no notice of it. In fact it did seem an extraordinary assumption, for a trio of persons, however eminent individually, if such was indeed their purpose, to require the whole body of the Clergy to adopt their view on this very intricate and complicated matter, and to express that view in a certain definite form of words, with the resolution of quitting the Church, if the answers were not conformable to their wishes. This would be another deplorable instance of the manner in which persons set up their own private judgement, not as the rule of their own conscience and conduct, but as the law of the Church and State; as though a man were to say, unless Parliament passes such or such a law, I will throw off my allegiance, and become a Frenchman, or an American. Moreover the very mode in which the declaration was drawn up, involving an express condemnation of the proceedings in the recent Appeal, and founded, as it seems to me, on a total misconception of those proceedings, must have prevented many from adopting it. Had the declaration been worded simply and plainly, and confined itself to the one essential point, whether the Royal Supremacy implies that the Crown has authority to determine the

doctrines of the Church,—though many might still have declined to sign it, whether from deeming it an indecorous assumption, or from other motives,—at all events I feel sure than one consistent response would have risen from the hearts of the whole body of the Clergy, from ninety-nine out of a hundred, that no such authority is, or ever has been, involved in the Supremacy of the Crown,—that they never did, and do not, recognise such an authority,—that the Crown itself has never laid claim to it,—and that the only body which has any real authority to determine the doctrines of the Church, is the Church herself acting through her lawful Councils or Synods (x).

These words lead me to congratulate you that the prospect of a rightly constituted Synod of our Church seems so much nearer now, than when I last address you from this Chair. Having repeatedly on these occasions given utterance to my earnest wishes for such an assembly, and having endeavoured, in a Note to my Charge for 1842, to reply to the chief objections which at that time were urged against it, I will not enter into any argument on the subject today. But I cannot refrain from expressing my satisfaction that the desire, in which ten years ago few joined with me, has now become so prevalent, and still more that the right of the Laity to an important share in such an assembly has already obtained so general a recognition. It was with exceeding pleasure that I heard our excellent Bishop declare at the Visitation last year, that it was not only his own conviction, but that of all his Episcopal Brethren, without a single exception, that, if a Synod of the Church is to be convened, it ought to contain



a large admixture of laymen. Indeed, without such an admixture, the Synod would be inefficient and powerless. In this, as in all things, we greatly need the help of our lay brethren. We need the help of their good sense, of their sober, practical judgement. We need colleagues who will not be carried away by speculative notions, by ecclesiastical theories, who will not look at questions from a clerical point of view, who will counter-balance any exaggerated reverence on our part for the traditions or the dogmas of former ages, by their vivid consciousness of the wants of the present time, by their greater familiarity with the thoughts and feelings which are now stirring and agitating the world, and which, while they cannot be calmed and brought into order except by the power of the Gospel, often need some new form and utterance of Evangelical Truth to still them. In the Note just referred to, I have set before you a considerable body of evidence shewing that in early ages the Laity bore part in the Synods; as they do now, with much benefit, in those of the American Church. In course of time indeed the Clergy deprived them of this, as of so many other rights; but, as is mostly the case with usurpers, they themselves were ultimately the chief sufferers from the usurpation, both socially and morally. For we can hardly injure others, without injuring ourselves. During those centuries indeed, when almost all the learning of the age was confined to the Clergy, there was less impropriety in their constituting themselves the sole judges with regard to matters, for the cognisance of which some degree of learning is indispensable. But when learning and knowledge became more widely diffused, and clerkly

acquirements were found in others beside the Clergy, the exclusive system could no longer be upheld. In truth this was among the principal causes of the discontinuance of the Convocation, and of other like assemblies, not in England only, but also in the other countries of Europe. The secular mind had outgrown the tutelage of the ecclesiastical; while the latter, relying on its superiority of position, had almost fallen asleep, and had neglected to strengthen that superiority by a superiority of knowledge. Moreover our Convocation was a very inadequate representation of the Clergy themselves, in addition to its total exclusion of the lay element of the Church. To maintain this exclusion in our days would be impossible, at least in Protestant countries, where the clerical monopoly of the Scriptures can no longer be enforced. If a Synod is to have any authority in the Church, the religious Laity must have a voice in it. We may well be thankful to learn that this necessity is recognised by the whole body of our spiritual rulers; and with this assurance we may entertain a reasonable confidence that, when a Synod is allowed to meet, it will exercise a real and salutary influence. Of course there will be sundry difficulties in settling its constitution; and a number of jealousies may probably be aroused. But what great work can be accomplit, without many difficulties to surmount? If we set to work heartily and unitedly, we shall soon overcome them (γ).

But, though I strongly desire, and, notwithstanding all the dissensions and contentions in our Church, can look foaward hopefully to the assembling of a rightly constituted National Synod, even as likely to promote

peace, I am far from feeling the same confidence with regard to a measure, which many persons, I believe, view with favour, either as a preparative for such an assembly, or as a less hazardous substitute for it. The recent Meeting of the Exeter Diocesan Synod, which appears from all accounts to have been conducted with great ability and moderation, has inclined many to believe that the disorders in our Church may be quieted, and her wants relieved, by such Synods, with less risk than by one to which our whole Church should send deputies. This inference however does not appear to me well grounded. I should rather draw a different conclusion, even from the proceedings of that Synod; the unanimity displayed at which was in some degree fallacious, inasmuch as it seems to have arisen in great measure from the Synod's being constituted almost entirely of the representatives of a single party in the Church, the Clergy of the opposite party having generally declined to vote at the elections for it (z). Thus this unanimity merely shews how zealously the members of one party could work together, and certainly with no spirit of supererogatory indulgence or conciliation toward those who differed from them; so that, if the latter had taken part in the Meeting, there would probably have been a formidable collision. Besides that Meeting was mainly swayed by the influence of a single powerful mind. But should other similar Synods assemble, as that did, with the notion that they represent the Church, and are entitled to exercise the authority of the Church in pronouncing dogmatically upon doctrinal questions, what result can be anticipated, except a battling of contrary currents, and an ever-bursting storm of confusion?

Throughout the history of the Church it has been seen, that one of her chief perils arises from the dogmatizing spirit, which is inherent in human nature, springing from our narrowmindedness and ignorance, pampered by and pampering our self-will. Few visions are so flattering to our vanity, as that of establishing the correctness of our own judgement by imposing our opinions upon others, by compelling all nations to worship the image which Nebuchadnezzar the king has set up. If the Papacy has been the curse of the Church, the Pope is only the huge symbol of what is found within every breast. Every man has the spirit of the Papacy within him. Everybody would fain be a Pope in his own circle, and would stretch out that circle as widely as he can. It is only from godly wisdom, from pondering the lessons of history, from Christian meekness and sobermindedness, that we learn to distrust ourselves, and to respect our neighbours. If we may look forward hopefully to the assembling of a National Synod, it is because we may trust that, under God's guidance, the members elected to represent the Church in it would in the main comprise the persons who are most eminent for godly wisdom and sobermindedness both among the Clergy and among the Laity; because it would not be under the predominant influence of any one single mind; and because, even if it should allow itself to be carried away into any indiscreet proceedings, the right of pro-roguing it would be vested in the Crown. But in a Diocesan Synod we have none of these securities. Even if there were a due proportion of laymen in it, still it would always be liable to be swayed by its Bishop, especially in theological discussions; whereas in the

ancient Synods, even in the provincial ones, there were ever a large number of Bishops, whose position would ordinarily betoken an approved intellectual or moral superiority, and who stood on the same level. Nor would a Diocesan Synod be less prone to issue hasty dogmatical decisions, because it would seldom happen that there were more than half a dozen or a dozen persons in a Diocese, at all qualified by their character, their temper of mind, and their familiarity with speculative divinity, and with ecclesiastical history, for such a task. In nothing was the wisdom of the great early Councils more apparent, than in the earnestness with which they tried to check and bridle the dogmatical spirit, even so far as to issue anathemas against any one who should presume to add to the Articles of the Creed (AA). Such caution is not likely to be found in a Diocesan Synod, least of all in seasons when theological controversies are raging. Each Synod would deem itself thoroughly competent to settle all the controversies in the Church; and its confidence would probably increase in an inverse ratio to its real competence. An active, energetic Bishop, with strongly marked opinions, would often be able to carry his Synod along with him. Thus the Church would perpetually be harassed with new dogmatical decisions, not seldom contradicting one another; and there are symptoms which threaten that these decisions might ere long be enforced by a volley of anathemas. The very want of authority to impose their decisions would lessen the feeling of personal responsibility, which arises within us when others are to be materially affected by our deliberations and our acts. They who play at soldiers, knock down their mimic

armies far more rapidly than they fall in actual war. In a word, if every Diocese were to have its Synod, meddling with the doctrines of the Church, the results would hardly be more satisfactory, than if the work of legislation were transferred from Parliament to our County-Meetings.

Doubtless, if Diocesan Synods were precluded from attempting to legislate upon doctrinal questions, if their discussions were restricted to the practical wants of the Diocese, and to practical measures for its improvement, they would not do the same harm, and might become very beneficial; more especially if a scheme were devised by which a certain number of lay members should take part in them. Otherwise in this respect they would be far inferior to our Diocesan Associations, though in other points they would have advantages of their own.

Much of what I have just been saying will apply still more forcibly to those newfangled bodies, which have recently been setting themselves up, with no slight pretensions, in various parts of England, under the name of Church-Unions; a name very inappropriate, seeing that, in the instances which of late have come most before the public eye, they have consisted almost exclusively of the members of a single party in the Church, bound together by some party shibboleth, and combined to effect certain purposes, to which they knew that a large portion of their brethren were strongly opposed: so that they might more aptly be termed Church-Disunions. These associations are embodiments of that impatience and selfwill, which are such prominent elements in the spirit of the age, even in those who are

loudest in declaiming against them. Everywhere, we find, people will not wait for the ordinary, legitimate modes of carrying their purposes into effect, in a manner consistent with the established order of things, with the constitution of the Church, by reasonable persuasion. Everywhere the revolutionary spirit peeps out behind the mask, even of those who are inveighing against it. This spirit, and every form of party-spirit, are inevitably fostered by these so-called Church-Unions. They who combine and assemble for a party-purpose, strengthen each other in their prejudices, in their persuasion of their own exclusive rectitude and wisdom, in their repugnance and scorn toward those who differ from them. This has been seen for instance in the Trades-Unions, in which even well-meaning, conscientious men, by brooding over their grievances, and talking of them continually with their associates, have become so inflamed as to be ready for every form of crime. In like manner these combinations in the Church, fashioned as they are after the model of factious and seditious combinations in the State, can hardly fail to increase and aggravate the evils of our condition; more especially when the opposite party, as is the natural, legitimate consequence of such combinations, combine to resist them; whereby dissensions must needs be exasperated and prolonged. You will observe too, that the party which now resorts to these associations for effecting its aims, is the very party which a few years back strongly condemned the various Religious Societies, which had been formed for benevolent and religious purposes, because they had taken upon themselves to do this without the sanction of the proper ecclesiastical authorities. In so many

respects do we find the severest condemnation of their present practices in the principles which they formerly profest.

Here it behoves me to say a few words on a personal matter. On two occasions, since I last address you from this chair, a wish has been entertained by a considerable number of the Clergy of the Archdeaconry that I should summon a public Meeting; and on both occasions I have declined complying with this wish. The first was in the month of June last year, when the Church was so agitated by the decision of the Court of Appeal with reference to the Baptismal Question. The second occasion was in the autumn, when the whole people was stirred up to resist the aggression of the Pope on the Crown and Church of England. The wish for a public Meeting on the latter occasion was, I believe, strongest on the part of the opponents of those who had been the most desirous of taking some step to protest against the judgement of the Court of Appeal. Thus it is plain, at all events, that my refusal did not arise from any leaning toward one party more than toward another. But it has never seemed to me that any benefit to the Church has accrued from Meetings held to debate questions on which the Church is much divided; whereas the evil of such a public display of our contentions must ever be great. On the Baptismal Question, though I did not know with certainty which way the scales would turn, I did know that there would be a strong, probably a violent collision, by which nobody would be edified. For, while I was well aware that a very large majority of you, my Reverend Brethren, hold the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration, and are convinced



that it is the doctrine of our Church, I knew also that many among the holders of that doctrine were very thankful, as I myself was, that the Judgement of the Court of Appeal had arrested an attempt, whereby so many of the most pious and zealous among our brethren in the ministry would have been driven out of it. By some persons indeed I may be thought chargeable with inconsistency, in objecting to Public Meetings of the Clergy, while I desire to see a Synod of the Church. But the very reasons which induce me to wish for the latter, make me deprecate the former. In a Synod I should hope to see a solemn, orderly assembly of the gravest, most pious, discreetest members of our Church, acting under fixt rules, with the consciousness of a deep responsibility. But what is there of this kind in a Public Meeting? in which the most violent are usually the loudest, and often carry their partisans along with them. The late Anniversaries of the National Society have shewn what such Meetings tend to become. What good our Diocese would have derived from such, I know not. In truth one main benefit of a Synod would be, that it would silence such irregular expressions of irritation; even as the Meeting of Parliament is so often powerful in stopping the irregular expressions of political feeling (AB).

On the former of the two occasions referred to, knowing that the minds of the Clergy were very much divided, I did not propose any measure for your adoption, thinking it better to leave each Rural Deanery to act as it judged meet. With regard to the Papal Aggression there was not the same ground for hesitation. Here one might feel sure of finding a general agreement,

at least unless one chose to run foul of some rock of controversy. But here again it seemed to me that a Public Meeting would supply an opportunity, which divers persons might be ready to seize, for vehement condemnation of those among our brethren, whose opinions have been so lamentably proved to have a fatal bias toward Rome. Now the attack made by the Pope on the Church and Crown of England ought to be regarded, it appeared to me, as a warning sent to us by God, calling upon us all, upon all who love our Spiritual Mother, upon all who have not already apostatized from her in heart, to join heart and soul and mind in repelling the insolent assailant. Hence I could not but esteem it a counteraction of God's gracious purpose, a perversion of His gift, if, instead of uniting cordially together in defending our Mother, we were to take this occasion for rebuking and triumphing over our brethren; whom this attack from our common enemy ought to have brought nearer to us, while it opened their eyes to the perils of the path they had been walking in. Nor could I feel anything but the deepest pain in reading the accounts how Public Meetings in other Dioceses had been turned into scenes for railing accusations. On this subject however I was sure that you would almost all be desirous of giving utterance to your feelings. Therefore, with the kind help of the Rural Deans of the Archdeaconry, I drew up the addresses which they circulated among you; and I was very thankful to them, both for the alacrity with which, at a moment's warning, the chief part of them attended a Meeting convened for the purpose, and for their anxious care to avoid every expression which could

give offense to the most sensitive feelings, or present an obstacle to the unanimous concurrence of the Clergy of the Archdeaconry (AC).

I should have wisht to make a few observations on a couple of important questions, which have been debated during the last Session of Parliament; but the time compells me to pass over them (AD). Already, I doubt not, many of you, my Brethren, have been surprised that, though I have been speaking so long about the events of the last two years, I have made no direct mention till just now of that which you probably regard as the most important among them, the extraordinary attack made by the Pope on the English Church and Crown. Yet, I would fain believe, you must have discerned that, though I did not expressly mention that attack, it was standing before my eyes throughout in the dark back-ground of our present condition; inasmuch as I have been speaking throughout of the various causes which alone render it formidable. Were it not for the calamitous dissensions amongst us,—were it not for the Romanizing tendencies which have issued in so many deplorable apostasies,—were it not for the notion, which these and other causes may naturally have fostered, that the deserters, who have already gone over from our ranks, would be followed by a far more numerous body,—I can hardly conceive that the Papacy would have ventured on so audacious a measure. At all events, were it not for these favouring circumstances, its conduct would have provoked little beyond ridicule and scorn. If there is any real danger in that attack, the ground of the danger lies wholly in ourselves.

If we call to mind what the position of the Papacy

was, when I last address you here two years ago, the change seems like one of the lawless scene-shiftings in a dream. It was then a fugitive, an outcast, from the city, in which for a thousand years it has been a moral pestilence (Æ). It had taken refuge under a Government, which, above all others, bears witness what its moral influence is, and which has just been exposed to all Europe in its naked deformity, known long ago to all persons well acquainted with its workings, as reckless of every obligation, of every law, of every principle, standing with one foot upon perjury, upon cruelty with the other. Hence, after a while, the Papacy returned, borne in by foreign bayonets, and only protected by the same from the hatred of the people who have had the experience of a thousand years to teach them what it is. The present wearer of the triple crown, having vainly attempted to extricate his subjects and himself from the evils and miseries which they have had to bear, in consequence of their city's being the abode of the so-called Vicar of Christ, was compelled to surrender his own better desires and aims to the iron bondage of the system which placed him there: for, a curse to all under it, it is so above all to him whom it sets on its throne, and to whom, as to Kehama in Southey's poem, the cup of divine honour and power becomes the cup of helpless weakness and woe. Yet at this very time, in the midst of this abject fall, the Papacy, by some mysterious, inscrutable dispensation, has been rising to greater power than it had wielded for centuries. The nations of Europe have been falling down and worshipping it. Under the panic produced by the revolutionary movements of the last years, they have fancied they should find help from the old magician, who

had been so successful in stifling the mind of man, wherever the word of God was not held up to baffle his spells: and, in order to obtain his aid, they have voluntarily given up the securities, by which their more prudent fathers fenced themselves against his encroachments. But that the wheel of time never goes back, one might almost deem that the age of Hildebrand and of Innocent was about to return. It was in the midst of her pride, elated by these unlookt for triumphs, that the Romish Church hurled her defiance against England, almost expecting, as it would seem, that England would join the rout of Governments who were falling prostrate before her. To this defiance however, as we know, the people of England have made answer with united heart and voice, that they will not bow down to Rome,—that, with God's blessing, they are resolved to maintain that inheritance of Truth which they have received from their ancestors, and to stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ has made them free.

Of the measure by which our Legislature has repelled the aggression of the Papacy, I need not speak. You have all heard it canvast, and have canvast it yourselves, over and over and over again, until you must be weary of the subject. In judging of it, we should bear in mind that the difficulties of Parliament arose in great measure from the righteous resolution to adhere to those principles of toleration, which have been graven of late years on the front of our Constitution. While the attack of the Papacy was twofold, on the Crown of England, and on the Church, the former was the only part of it with which it behoved Parliament to interfere. Now this consisted mainly in the assumption of a right to parcel out England

into Dioceses, as though it were a Heathen country, and to bestow territorial titles on certain intruders of its own appointment, without seeking the permission of the Crown,—a right which it would not have dared to usurp in any other State in Europe. The special duty of Parliament therefore was to declare these titles unlawful, and to prohibit their assumption. Whether the measure which has been adopted will effect this purpose, time will shew (AF).

For us, my Reverend Brethren, there remains a different, a more arduous, but a godlier and more blessed task: and in this task you too, my Lay Brethren, you especially who have come as Churchwardens to this Visitation, are equally called to bear part. Your name designates you as *wardens* or guardians of the Church, immediately indeed in your own parishes, and with reference to the preservation of the fabric of your churches, and to other parochial matters, but also with reference to the great principles of Christian truth, which our Church and our churches are set up to maintain. For what would be the worth of all the petty details of parochial administration, what would be the worth of our churches themselves, why should we repair and beautify them, unless all these things were subordinate and instrumental to the upholding of Christian truth and order? This act of the Papacy is an open declaration of war against us, a declaration of internecine war. It involves a denial of our very existence as a branch or portion of Christ's Church. For near three hundred years the Papacy has refrained from such an extreme measure. It has been reserved to be the closing act of the first half of the nineteenth century. Now, when a

person's existence is denied, the best refutation of such a denial is, not by words and arguments, but by actions. Therefore, it having been denied by the Papacy, before God and man, that we are a part of Christ's Church, let us, my Brethren, come forward in the sight of God and of man, and prove, God helping us, by our actions, by our faith, by our zeal, by our love, that we are so. We are all and each of us called upon to prove, in our several spheres, before God and man, that we are Christians, that we are members of Christ's holy Church, and not in name only, but in power, yea, that the spirit of Christ dwells in us.

In this age of universal competition, we are specially called to a competition in good works. Our rivals are compassing us about: we know not where they may be lurking, where they may suddenly start up, not even whether it may not be unawares in some bosom friend, in a brother. Even on the hearts of our own families we cannot count with certainty; even they may be wrested from us, secretly, stealthily. One of the best features in our English character, a truly Protestant feature in it, is the repugnance to all underhand proceedings, the desire that everything should be above-board, as the phrase is. Let this then be our course in contending with our subtle enemy. While he would outwit us by his hidden arts and disguises, let us outwit him by our constant frankness and straightforwardness. The victory will be with the day, not with the night. God has committed His truth to our keeping. Of this we feel, and ought to feel, an undoubting assurance. Let us bear witness of the truth in our whole conduct: let us shew that the truth animates us, rules in us: let us defend

the truth in every way, but above all by manifesting it in our lives.

An infinite field of work lies spread out before us, in which we are called to labour, the hearts and souls and minds of the whole people of England. All these are to be won from the devil, to be won for God. They are to be brought to a living knowledge of God, to a living faith in Him: they are to be trained for lives of holiness and love. Their vices are to be subdued; their affections are to be cultivated; their social condition is to be bettered. If we are slothful or careless then, it will never be for lack of work,—nor for lack of motives to stir us up to it, even without the fresh motive supplied by our Romish rivals. Nor shall we be slothful for lack of help. It is most true, the mighty works to which we are called, can only be accomplished by God Himself; even as He alone can pour out the light from its fountains, and can turn the wheel of the seasons, and can send out the sun on his course, and can bid the moon keep her watch in heaven. But in the application of that which these elementary powers effect, for the sustenance of human life, and the increase of human comforts, we are chosen to be God's instruments, yea, in a manner to be fellow-workers with Him. So are we in everything pertaining and conducive to the social welfare of mankind. No social good, no improvement is effected without man's instrumentality, without the help of man's thought and energy and goodwill. But we have also a still higher work appointed for us, a divine work, which angels might desire to share with us: we, my Reverend Brethren, are especially called to be God's instruments,



yea, His fellow-workers, in the spiritual regeneration of our brethren, in the redemption and salvation of mankind.

Does Rome desire to take part with us in this blessed, this divine work? Let her do her best in it. Provided she perform her work honestly, faithfully, lovingly, we will not grudge it to her. If she will labour at saving souls, without ensnaring them into deadly errors and corruptions, we will not hinder her work by any outward impediment. Only let us be diligent in performing our part, and in seeking God's help that we may do so more diligently. He desires that this work should be done. He has especially appointed us to do it. Therefore we may be assured that He will help us, that He will help and bless our weakest efforts, if they are indeed made in faith and love.

Among other things, seeing that we have an undoubting belief that the 'truth is on our side, let us strive to spread the knowledge of the truth among all classes, by a diligent cultivation of the faculties whereby man receives it. Let it be one of our chief aims to render the education of all classes of the English nation a Christian education, to train up the young of all classes in the knowledge and service of God.

Here I cannot refrain from referring for a moment to one of the few bright spots which have shone out from the darkness of the past year: I mean the foundation of the great School for the Middle Classes at Hurstpierpoint. I was allowed to take part in the proceedings on that occasion; and no event in the last twelvemonth has given me so much pleasure, though there have been a few others also of hopeful promise.

If we desire to uphold our Church, the most effectual mode of doing so, under God, must be to train up her children, and especially those of the Middle Classes, who must needs exercise a mighty influence over the future mind and character of the English Nation, in her faith and worship, as dutiful, loving members of her communion. This is the special purpose of that institution, the purpose which its noblehearted founder, as our Bishop, when laying the foundation stone, repeatedly called him, most earnestly desires to accomplish,—to which he has solemnly pledged and bound himself,—and to which he has dedicated himself and everything that he has, being himself a most dutiful, loving son of our Church, animated with a righteous hatred of the falsehoods and corruptions of Rome. Should similar institutions multiply and prosper, they promise to be among the most efficient means for promoting the moral wellbeing of the people of England, and for gathering the whole nation under the wings of the Church (AG).

In this, my Brethren, and in all things, let us bear in mind, what we are especially admonisht of by the Gospel of the week, that this is the time of the Visitation of our Church, and that the attack of the Papacy upon us is among the tests whereby we are to be tried. Our enemies are gathering round us, are starting up in the midst of us. But they cannot harm us, unless we are false to ourselves. If we are faithless, if we shew no proofs of the boasted superiority of the light vouchsafed to us, that light will be taken away: our enemies will overcome us, will trample our Church in the dust; and the fate of Jerusalem will be hers. But, if we are

faithful, if we are dutiful, if we are diligent, if we shew forth the fruits of faith in our lives, if we preach the truth, and do it, if we are zealous in love and good works, then, we may trust, our Church will ere long hear words like those which were written to the Church of Smyrna: *Fear none of those things which thou shalt suffer: ye shall have tribulation ten days: be thou faithful unto death; and I will give thee a crown of life.* So be it: Amen.



## NOTES.

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NOTE A : p. 7.

THE problem which Dr Newman has set himself in his recent Lectures *On the present Position of Catholics in England*, is certainly one of no ordinary difficulty. "I am going to enquire (he says, p. 1) why it is, that, in this intelligent nation and in this rational nineteenth century, we Catholics are so despised and hated by our own countrymen." To a Protestant indeed, who knows anything about history, many answers to this query will suggest themselves. But what can a Romanist say? Dr Newman however is not a person to shrink from difficulties. He rather seems to love a problem the more, in proportion to the ingenuity he has to spend in solving it. In the present instance he has undertaken to shew that "Tradition is the sustaining Power of the Protestant View of the Catholic Church,"—that "Fable is its Basis,"—that "True Testimony is unequal to it,"—that it is "logically inconsistent,"—that "Prejudice is its Life,"—that "Assumed Principles are its Intellectual Instrument,"—and that "Want of Intercourse with Catholics is its Protection." In vigour of style these Lectures are perhaps even superior to any of the author's previous writings. His humour, which on other occasions he has manifestly reined in, has been allowed a free course. In ingenious combinations they are rich, and in feats of his peculiar logical dexterity. No Chinese juggler, no Indian tumbler can surpass him. He will whirl round like a wheel, and then balance himself on his little finger. But, as pieces of reasoning, the Lectures are disjointed and arbitrary

throughout, and often quite flimsy ; and they must be felt to be unsatisfactory, I should think, by most of the intelligent even among those whose cause he is advocating. They abound too in logical quicksands, on which if one tries to stand, one is in great risk of being swallowed up.

To go through all the fallacies in these Lectures would require a volume as large as they form. But it may not be altogether useless to point out a few of them, by way of warning to the incautious reader, lest he be deluded by their plausibilities, and to shew the kind of arguments that the ablest champion of Rome is driven to resort to.

I will begin with the first Lecture, in which the author undertakes to prove the groundlessness of our English prejudices against Rome in the following manner. "It happens every now and then (he says, p. 11) that a Protestant, sometimes an Englishman, more commonly a foreiner, thinks it worth while to look into the matter himself ; and his examination ends—in his confessing the absurdity of the outcry raised against the Catholic Church, and the beauty or the excellence—of those very facts and doctrines which are the alleged ground of it." He then proposes to shew by "the testimony of candid Protestants, who have examined into" her history and teaching on three points, that "the bulk of the English nation are violent because they are ignorant, and that Catholics are treated with scorn and injustice simply because—they have never patiently been heard."

Here Dr Newman has the whole field of history and doctrine open to him. He may pick out the grossest misrepresentations he can find, and may search through the whole of Protestant literature for refutations of them. With such an amplitude of choice, one might fancy he could hardly fail to make out a specious case. What is it ?

In the first place, he draws a highly coloured representation of the Protestant view of the Romish Church during the Middle Ages ; and then, to refute that view, he professes (p. 14) to quote, "what that eminent Protestant historian, M. Guizot, who was lately Prime Minister of France, says of the Church in that

period, in which she is reported by our popular writers to have been most darkened and corrupted." In a passage cited just before from the Homilies, this period is said to extend "by the space of above 800 years" before the Reformation, that is, from the sixteenth to the eighth century: so, to shew the injustice of this representation, Dr Newman brings forward an assertion of Guizot's, that, "*at the close of the fourth, and the commencement of the fifth century, the Christian Church was the salvation of Christianity.*" Nay, though this irrefragable testimony, bearing so immediately on the point, with only a gap of three or four hundred years, might be supposed to settle the whole question about the abuses and corruptions of the Church during the ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, he resolves to strengthen his case still more by quoting what Dr Waddington, in his Ecclesiastical History, observes to the same purport: "At this crisis, when the Western Empire was overthrown, and occupied by unbelieving barbarians, it is not too much to assert, that the Church was the instrument of heaven for the preservation of the religion." Thus the Lecturer persuades his credulous audience that he has parried his adversary's attack, whereas in fact he has been lunging out in a totally different direction. But doubtless it will ever be found to be the most convenient way of vindicating the Papacy, to talk about what the Church was and did before the Papacy existed, or at all events before it grew up to that highth of power, when it absorbed the evil spirits of the world into itself, and shed them abroad in a blighting mildew over the Church. After the words just cited from Dean Waddington, Dr Newman adds: "And then he goes on to mention six special benefits which the Church of the Middle Ages conferred on the world." Here the interpolation of the words, *of the Middle Ages*, gives an incorrect notion of what Dr Waddington has said. The passage occurs at the close of his thirteenth Chapter, and refers to the period which intervened between the destruction of the Western Empire and the reign of Charlemagne, that is to say, which preceded what are especially termed the Middle Ages, as well as what we have just seen defined to

be the calamitous period of the corruptions of the Papacy. In like manner it has been asserted that Nero was a very amiable and beneficent sovereign : but, when the grounds of this assertion were examined into, it was found to rest mainly on his having been popular in his youth for the sake of his grandfather, Germanicus. This kind of testimony in behalf of the antenatal beneficence of the Papacy will hardly prove that, as Dr Newman boastfully asserts (p. 16), while “the nursery and schoolroom authors are against” Rome, “the manly and original thinkers are in her favour,” or that they confess that “the Church in the Middle Ages was the mother of peace, and humanity, and order.” It must be a drowning cause that catches at such a straw.

Dr Newman’s second attempt to rebut an evil report of his Church is certainly less infelicitous. In opposition to the common tradition and rumour concerning the Jesuits, he cites Blanco White’s favorable account of their influence in Spain : though, to be sure, one cannot well see how this account takes the sting out of the *Lettres Provinciales*, or refutes the charges which induced so many Governments in the last century to expell the Jesuits from their dominions, and the Pope himself to abolish the order.

On the other hand, his third attempt of the same kind is just fit to run in harness with the first. In order to shew the erroneousness of the Protestant notions of monks and monachism, he quotes (p. 19) what “the very learned, and thoughtful, and celebrated German historian, Dr Neander,—a deep-read student, a man of facts, as a German should be,” says about the institution of monachism, and about the habits and practices of the monks, in the time of Chrysostom and Augustin and Basil. May we not expect ere long to hear him rebuking the ignorance and folly of the sanitary reformers, who complain of the pollution of the waters of the Thames at London Bridge, because, when it rises in the Cotswolds, the rill is very clear and pure ?

Among the paralogisms of most frequent occurrence in these Lectures, one is that of arguing from a part to a whole ; another is that of converting an effect into a cause. Where a general



strong aversion, like that of the English people to Popery, exists, there will ever be a proneness to believe reports injurious to the objects of this aversion; and with regard to the appetite for slander, it is most certain that the demand will soon produce a plentiful supply. In the third Lecture, the object of which is to prove that Fable is the basis of the Protestant view, Dr Newman again says (p. 92), that he is "going to put his finger on three small fountain-heads of the Tradition. The first shall be a specimen of the tradition of literature, the second of the tradition of wealth, and the third of the tradition of gentlemen." Here we may remark, in the first place, that the existence of spurious coin does not destroy or impair the value of the genuine: nor did Ishmael's being the son of a concubine invalidate the legitimacy of Isaac. All history would have to be cast to the dogs, if we may not believe any portion of it with which erring tradition and fable have been mixt up. But assuredly the first body that would then tumble to the bottom of the pit, would be the Church of Rome. Doubtless the English aversion to Romanism has given birth to a number of fables, to many gross exaggerations and misrepresentations: but England has also produced a series of eminent men, who have desired to speak the truth about Rome, and have spoken it,—who have carefully investigated the grounds of her pretensions, and have examined her system of doctrines, their origin and their development,—who have turned them round and round, scanning them on every side, and have found the truth overgrown by manifold errors, and corrupted by large admixtures of falsehood, the moral life denaturalized, and tainted with all manner of evil.

The first of the three traditions which Dr Newman selects, to make examples of them, for the sake of proving that Fable is the Basis of the popular Protestant view of his Church, is the misrepresentation of the sermon of Eligius, which had already gained considerable notoriety from its exposure by Mr Maitland, in one of his learned and entertaining Essays on the Dark Ages. In that series it had an appropriate place, more so than when occupying ten pages of Dr Newman's Lecture. For, though it

is a remarkable instance of the carelessness with which even celebrated authors go on repeating one another, without taking the trouble of looking into the grounds of their assertions, it can hardly be conceived to have had much influence on the popular view of Romanism. Its interest is chiefly as an example how still, as of old, *ἀταλαίπωρος ἡ τῆς ἀληθείας ζήτησις*, a remark which certainly does not apply less to Rome than to other communions.

Here however it may be observed that, though the history of this misrepresentation proves that Protestant authors, as well as Romanist, will receive and repeat stories without taking the trouble of ascertaining their correctness, it also proves that among Protestants, at all events, there are laborious and conscientious lovers of truth, who will search after it, and will be zealous in proclaiming it, even when it makes for their adversaries. How many such men are to be found among the Romish saints, or their canonizers, or their historians, is not recorded.\*

\* In this instance, at least, Dr Newman has not shewn that he has any right to reprehend Mosheim. The wrong done to Eligius consists in this, that by Maclaïne, Robertson, Jortin, and Mr Hallam, he is reported to have taught that Christianity consisted in paying ecclesiastical dues, and divers ceremonial observances, making no mention of the love of God, or of our moral duties. This latter negative feature in the account originates entirely with Maclaïne. There is not a word of the sort in Mosheim; who merely says, in his account of the seventh century (Part II. cap. iii.); “*Illi (antiquiores Christiani) Christum morte ac sanguine suo peccata mortalium expiassè docebant: Hi (qui hoc sæculo Christiani dicebantur), parum aberat, quin decernerent, nulli, qui sacrum ordinem seu ecclesiam muneribus ditaret, coeli fores oclusas esse.*” To these words he subjoins the extract from Eligius, without any observation upon it. He quotes it solely to bear out this particular assertion, as it does, especially by the words, *Redimite animas vestras de poena, etc.*, and *Da, quia dedimus*, which bring out the contrast to the expiation through the blood of Christ. Whereas Dr Newman, exulting in the victory gained over half a dozen Protestant historians and divines, not by himself but by two Protestants, says (p. 98): “Now let us proceed to the first father of Mumpsimus, the Lutheran Mosheim himself:—(To enliven his anecdotal Lecture he had prefaced his story of Eligius by Bentley’s celebrated one about *Mumpsimus*.)—His words run thus in his Ecclesiastical History: ‘The earlier Christians, . . . taught that Christ had made expiation for the sins of men by his death and his blood; the latter (those of the seventh century) seemed to inculcate that the gates of heaven would be closed against none who should enrich the clergy or the church

Dr Newman's other two stories relate to our own days ; and, after tearing them to pieces elaborately, he adds (p. 119): "And now I will state my conviction, which I am sure to have confirmed by every intelligent person who takes the trouble to

with their donations. The former were studious to maintain a holy simplicity, and to follow a pure and chaste piety, the latter place the *substance* of religion in *external rites and bodily exercises.*' And then, in order to illustrate this contrast, which he has drawn out, between the spirituality of the first Christians and the formality of the Papists, he quotes the famous passage which has been the matter of our investigation." Here Dr Newman misrepresents Mosheim, whose quotation, as we have seen, is appended to the former sentence, not to the latter. It is introduced to substantiate that particular assertion, which it does substantiate ; and this is apparent also in Maclaine's Translation. But, as Dr Newman's version of these words differs from Maclaine's, he probably made use of the original ; and, if so, he is utterly unjustifiable in imputing any portion of the blame to "the Lutheran Mosheim," who had a Lutheran love of truth, and exhibited it wonderfully in his *Institutes of Ecclesiastical History*. Still less does the excellent Chancellor of Göttingen deserve my friend, Dr Waddington's, vehement abuse, which Dr Newman takes pleasure in repeating, and for which there is not the slightest ground. Nay, there seems to be a fatality about this passage, that they who come near it shall run foul of it ; for even Mr Maitland, one of the most accurate of men, who, in his second Letter to Mr Rose, has pronounced so high a eulogium on Mosheim's wonderful learning and accuracy, has joined here in condemning him, pronouncing (p. 113) that the Sermon of Eligius "seems to have been written as if he had anticipated all and each of Mosheim's and Maclaine's charges, and intended to furnish a pointed answer to almost every one." Mr Maitland does indeed notice one inaccuracy in Mosheim's text (p. 109), that, though he "printed the passage in such a way as to shew that there were *some* omissions, he did not indicate *all*." But the most vigilant correction of the press will not secure an author from these inaccuracies, least of all in such a book as Mosheim's.

For myself, I became acquainted with the history of these misrepresentations accidentally five and twenty years ago. When Southey was engaged on his Vindication of his *Book of the Church*, he wrote to my Brother, then resident at New College, and begged him to look in the Bodleian at the Sermon of Eligius, which Mr Butler and Dr Lingard had accused Mosheim of misrepresenting. In telling me of this, my Brother said he had found that the Sermon was a very good, pious, practical one ; but that, amid much excellent moral exhortation, it contained a few sentences about ceremonial and ecclesiastical matters ; that these Mosheim had extracted, very correctly for his purpose, but by so doing had misled his Translator into supposing that these sentences formed the substance of the Sermon ; and that this unwarranted assertion of Maclaine's had been repeated by Robertson and others. This information, which he sent to Southey, was incorporated in Southey's Letters to Mr Butler, published in 1826 (pp. 59—62); where he speaks in a mild and sensible tone about the matter, advantageously

examine the subject, that such slanders as I have instanced are the real foundation on which the Anti-Catholic feeling mainly rests in England, and without which it could not long be maintained." Surely this is something like putting the cart before the horse, as the phrase is, or rather like making the column

contrasted with that of the other writers on it. "I should express myself (he says) not less indignantly than you have done, if upon due examination I had not perceived that it was evidently unintentional, and in what manner it had arisen. It originated with Mosheim, an author whose erudition it would be superfluous to commend, and to whose fidelity, as far as my researches have lain in the same track, I can bear full testimony.—The passage from Eligius is strictly in point to the assertion in the text; and Mosheim cannot justly be accused of garbling the original, because he has not shewn that these exhortations were accompanied with others to the practice of Christian virtues. To have done this would have been altogether irrelevant; but by not doing it he has misled his translator, who, supposing that St Eligius had required nothing more than liberality to the Church from a good Christian, observes that he makes no mention of any other virtues. The misrepresentation on his part was plainly unintentional; and it was equally so in Robertson, who followed him; and however censurable both may be for commenting thus hastily upon an extract, without examining the context, Mosheim is clearly acquitted of all blame." How often do we see that an ounce of common sense is worth pounds, nay, hundredweights of learning and logic! But if Dr Newman had taken this reasonable view of the matter, what would have become of his Lecture? What would have become of his denunciations against Protestant fictions and fables? What would have become of his argument, if he had not produced any fable in that Lecture anterior to 1851, to account for the origin and growth and spread of the English aversion to Rome?

As to Dr Newman's burst of indignation, when he winds up his story by saying (p. 102) that, he "knew enough of the Protestant mind, to be aware how little the falsehood of any one of its traditions is an effectual reason for its relinquishing it," and that accordingly in the new edition of Mosheim, published in 1841, the text with Maclaine's observation is left standing, "without a word of remark, or anything whatever to shew that a falsehood had been uttered, a falsehood traditionally perpetuated, a falsehood emphatically exposed,"—it really looks like an assumed bluster to impose upon his hearers. It must be by a slip of memory, by a transfer of the present to the past, that he charges his former co-religionists with retaining their traditions, notwithstanding the exposure of their falsehood; and surely there is a very simple way of accounting for the retention of the error in the new edition of Mosheim. Without having the least notion who the editor may be, I feel sure he was not aware that Maclaine's statement had been shewn to be erroneous.

A like petty, almost paltry, imputation, utterly unworthy of Dr Newman, occurs in the next Lecture, where he tells us (p. 137) that Blanco White's *Poor Man's Preservative against Popery*, used to be on the catalogue of the

stand on the cobwebs which are spun round its capital. At least two of his three stories, since they belong to the year 1851, can hardly have had much hand in producing the excitement of last autumn ; however powerfully the supposititious Sermon of poor Eligius may have contributed to inflame it. But who knows ? if we wait a while, may we not be told that they were among the causes which brought about the Reformation ? Chronology has divers uses ; and not the least of them is, that it will now and then pull in those who are running riot in manufacturing history out of their own brain.

Dr Newman however admits that these and similar stories do not form the one sole ground of the English hatred of Rome. "Doubtless," he says, with exemplary candour, "there are arguments of a different calibre, whatever their worth, which weigh against Catholics with half-a-dozen members of the University, with the speculative church-restorer, with the dilettante divine, with the fastidious scholar, and with some others of a higher character of mind ; whether St Justin Martyr said this or that ; whether images should be drest in muslin, or hewed out of stone ; what criticism makes of a passage in the prophets,—questions such as these, and others of a more serious cast, may be conclusive for or against the Church in the study or in the lecture-room, but they have no influence with the many." Now, since Dr Newman, in his prior state of being, spent so many years at Oxford, and took an active part in the theological controversies there, he must be a thoroughly competent witness, both as to the points on which those controversies turned, and as to the number of persons who took part in them. Therefore, in some future

Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, but that, on enquiring after it recently, he was told it was out of print. Hence he infers that it can never have been popular, because it was too temperate, and adds (p. 166), "Truth is not equal to the exigences of the Protestant cause ; falsehood is its best friend." But surely there was ample reason for the withdrawal of that work from the Society's Catalogue, in its author's subsequent notorious infidelity. This motive Dr Newman suggests, (p. 138) but rejects. It would not serve his purpose ; therefore it could not be true. We may feel some satisfaction, when we see our enemy reduced to use such brittle weapons against us.

Romish History of England, it will be recorded as an irrefragable fact, resting on the most indisputable testimony, even that of the greatest controversialist in Oxford, that in the twelve years from 1832 to 1844 there were just "half-a-dozen members of the University" who had anything to urge against Rome of greater weight than mere flagrant forgeries,—and that these weightier arguments were, whether Justin Martyr said this or that,—whether images should be drest in muslin, or hewn out of stone,—and what criticism makes of a passage in the prophets. This is a sample of the history we may expect, when Protestant fictions and fables are swept away, and Romish truth has no longer any one to check its flight over the subject universe. Or, should some solitary surviving Protestant, who had spent his life in learned enquiries, presume to contradict this assertion, saying that in a secret corner of the Bodleian he had discovered a unique copy of certain *Lectures on Romanism and Popular Protestantism*, which were delivered at Oxford during that very period, in the year 1837, and in which a totally different line of argument was taken against Romanism, and one of great depth and power, he will be held to be utterly confuted, when he produces the book and exhibits the name on the titlepage; as it will be deemed a palpable impossibility that the author of the above-mentioned statement could have forgotten his having written such a work; which our unfortunate Protestant will therefore be pronounced to have forged, and the guilt of which he will have to expiate by a lifelong imprisonment in the dens of the Holy Office.

It is true, Dr Newman does just allow that there are also other questions "of a more serious cast," which "may be conclusive for or against the Church in the study or in the lecture-room." These words may embrace his own *Lectures on Romanism*. They may be meant to comprise all that has been said against Rome by Jewel and Hooker and Field and Andrewes and Bramhall and Jackson and Taylor and Chillingworth and Stillingfleet and Barrow. These men have brought forward certain arguments "of a more serious cast," which must needs "weigh against" Romanism with a portion of the afore-mentioned "half-a-dozen

members of the University." By this rhetorical artifice the author preserves himself from saying what is absolutely false. I do not mean to accuse him of intending to deceive his readers. But it appears always to have been almost a law of his mind, to see hardly anything but what he can colour with his own opinions and feelings. The objects and facts which seem to make for him, he multiplies and magnifies: those which are adverse, he diminishes till they are almost imperceptible: and thus, by exaggerating the common practice of marshaling a host of Brobdignagians in opposition to a few scattered Lilliputians, he leads the unwary reader to believe that his victory is certain and decisive. This process, exemplified more or less in all Dr Newman's writings, has never been carried to such a highth as in these last Lectures, in which almost everything is out of place, out of keeping, out of sequence, out of proportion; his logical kaleidoscope giving a semblance of harmony to objects, which in themselves have neither significance nor connexion.

If we ask what Dr Newman has effected by these two Lectures, the first and third, toward explaining the causes of the English hostility to Popery, the answer is, *Nothing*. Of the story of Maria Monk, about which he speaks in the fourth Lecture, I am ignorant. If the statement, that above two hundred thousand copies of it have been circulated in the last fifteen years, be correct, it must needs have inflamed many prejudices. But as to the stories I have referred to, you might as reasonably assert that the wheel is impelled by the mud which flies off from it. The great fact remains just as it was, unexplained, unaccounted for. Doubtless, it has been fostered by traditions; but these, as I have said in the Charge, are great historical traditions, such as brought about the Reformation, not only in England, but in many other regions of Europe, and would have done so more widely still, if it had not been suppress by the sword of the civil power. If we would trace the origin of these traditions, we may search in the records of the Councils of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, we may search in the histories, and in the literature of the Middle Ages. Both before and

since the Reformation, the great adversary to the Papacy has not been Fable, but History.

NOTE B: p. 7.

I HAVE already had occasion to shew, in my Vindication of Luther, that Dr Newman's conception of the great German Reformer, as exhibited in his *Lectures on Justification*, was no more like him than it was like the man in the moon. In his subsequent writings, whenever he speaks of Luther, the same fabulous shadow reappears. This however is no more than an instance of a practice which has been growing upon him, that of substituting the creations of his own mind for the realities of history. In the very singular confession and retractation prefixt to his *Essay on Development*, he has himself avowed that he was wont to do so. After quoting some of the strongest passages condemnatory of Rome from his earlier writings, he says: "If you ask me how an individual could venture, not simply to hold, but to publish such views of a communion so ancient, so wide-spreading, so fruitful in saints, I answer that I said to myself, 'I am not speaking my own words, I am but following almost a *consensus* of the divines of my Church. They have ever used the strongest language against Rome, even the most able and learned of them. I wish to throw myself into their system. While I say what they say, I am safe. Such views, too, are necessary for our position.'"

Now in this passage, I am persuaded, Dr Newman grievously wronged his former self. He had not said to himself, "I am not speaking my own words, I am but following a *consensus* of the divines of my Church." He had not said to himself, "While I say what they say, I am safe." He had not said to himself, "Such views are necessary for our position." He can never have been guilty of such a flagrant violation of a writer's highest, most sacred duty, as to bring such conduct distinctly before his conscience, and to set up such an excuse for it. Still doubtless,



though his words caricature, they do in some measure represent his practice. He had done what he here charges himself with, though he cannot have cheated his conscience with such a paltry excuse for it. In fact we are all too apt to do so, more or less. When we have to speak, even on the most solemn and awful subjects, instead of endeavouring earnestly and laboriously to ascertain the truth, and to speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, we too often merely give utterance to what we seem to perceive from our casual point of view, under the dominant feelings of the moment, and often merely echoing the voices of others. Nevertheless the evil of such a practice has its gradations; and it will be worse, in a calm, meditative, self-conscious, self-analysing mind, like Dr Newman's, which is accustomed to watch its own movements, as is implied in his confession. Even in this practice we may discern a nascent tendency Rome-wards, both in the setting up of authority instead of and above truth, and in the aptness to throw the responsibility of his actions upon others. Thoroughly Romish too is the notion, *While I say what they say I am safe*,—a motive avowed by a number of our Romanizers,—as though the purpose of man's mission here on earth were to cry *Sauve qui peut*, and to be the first in following his own cry. Dr Newman might call these the germs of his subsequent development, the indications that Rome was his destination: and such indications and germs there are in all men, unless the Spirit of God enables us to overcome and crush them.\*

\* Since these paragraphs went to the press, I have met with Dr Newman's attempt to explain and vindicate his Retraction, in the *Lectures on Anglicanism*, p. 117. But I do not find any reason in it for altering what I have written. Indeed I myself had tried to defend his former self against him. He now says that what he meant to apologize for was, not his holding, but his publishing his opinions hostile to Rome. "He spoke what he felt, what he thought, what at the time he held, and nothing but what he held, with an internal assent; but he would not have dared to say it, he would have shrunk, as well he might, from standing up, a sinner and a worm, an accuser against the great Roman communion, unless in doing so he felt he had been doing simply what his own Church required of him, and what was necessary for his Church's case." With regard to these last words I still feel inclined to question the correctness of his memory. A hired advocate

Of course, in proportion as he approximated to Rome, this habit of mind grew stronger. When a Church sets up herself as the Truth, she must needs cease in time to perceive that there is any essential difference between truth and falsehood. Both are regarded as dependent on her will; and such a will is soon tempted to disport itself, and to display its absolute authority, by decreeing each to be the other. He who would usurp God's place, as is set forth in a number of mythological fables, makes himself over to the Evil One.

Similar notions concerning historical truth are express in the Advertisement prefixt to the second number of the *Lives of the English Saints*; about the authorship of which little doubt could be entertained, even without the initials subjoined to it. "The question," it is there said, "will naturally suggest itself to the reader, whether the miracles recorded in these narratives—are to be received as matters of fact; and in this day, and under our present circumstances, we can only reply, that there is no reason why they should not be. They are the kind of facts proper to ecclesiastical history, just as instances of sagacity and daring, personal prowess or crime, are the facts proper to secular history. And if the tendency of credulity or superstition to exaggerate and invent creates a difficulty in the reception of facts ecclesiastical, so does the existence of party spirit, private interests, personal attachments, malevolence, and the like, call for caution and criticism in the reception of facts secular and civil. There is little or nothing then, *primâ facie*, in the miraculous accounts in question to repel a properly taught, and religiously disposed

does indeed consciously ask himself what is necessary to make out his client's case. But a divine's business is not to make out a case. He has to speak the truth; and when he has duly convinced himself that what he desires to say is true, he has only two questions to ask himself, first, *Is it desirable under the present circumstances that this particular truth should be uttered? and in what manner?* and secondly, *Am I the right person to utter this truth? shall I be able to utter it wisely, soberly, in such manner that it shall exercise the healing, saving power of Truth? or ought I to leave it for some one better qualified to be Truth's spokesman and prophet.* Dr Newman's temptation however is not to make out a case, except for his own system. He builds up that; and to that, as in Joseph's dream, the sun and the moon and the eleven stars have to make obeisance.

mind ; which will accordingly give them a prompt and hearty acquiescence, or a passive admission, or receive them in part, or hold them in suspense, or absolutely reject them, according as the evidence makes for or against them, or is, or is not of a trustworthy character.”

Here thus much may readily be granted, that a wise lover of Truth, will not take upon himself to pronounce absolutely *a priori* against any of these *ecclesiastical facts*, as Dr Newman terms them. In judging of them, he will be guided by the same principles of criticism, which determine his decision with regard to facts of secular history, modifying those principles, so far as may be required by the nature of the subject matter. For in secular history the main facts are on a large scale, are wrought before the eyes of the world ; and the whole nation in a manner takes part in them and witnesses them. Of that which is anecdotal, and merely personal, the judicious historian will be sparing ; and, when he introduces it, he will exercise a strict scrutiny of the evidence. But these *ecclesiastical facts* are mostly anecdotal ; and their evidence is usually of the vaguest, meagrest kind, a mere rumour, a tradition proceeding from a witness incapable of judging, and apt to be imposed upon ; and this tradition is ever found to grow more marvellous in proportion as it recedes from the fountain-head. If Dr Newman, and his associates in the *Lives of the Saints*, had resolved to exercise the strict principles of historical criticism on their facts, those Lives would have remained unwritten, or would have shrunk up into mere fragmentary skeletons. But they have lulled their consciences, by saying to themselves, “ These are the kind of facts proper to Ecclesiastical History ; and in this day, and under our present circumstances, we can only say that there is no reason why they should not be true. When the race of Protestant cavilers is extinct, it will be otherwise. We shall then be able to speak out more boldly.” Yet surely an ecclesiastical historian ought to be quite as scrupulous about the correctness of his facts as a secular. Religion gives no license for lying. Ought he not to lay down the good old rule for himself ? οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος

πυρθανόμενος ἠξίωσα γράφειν, ὄνδ' ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει, ἀλλ' οἷς τε αὐτὸς παρῆν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀκριβεῖα περὶ ἐκάστου ἐπεξελθών. Ought he not also to keep diligent watch against and to reject the temptation, that ἐς μὲν ἀκρόασιν τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες αὐτῶν ἀτερπέστερον φανεῖται ;

That τὸ μυθῶδες exercises a mighty fascination on the mind of Dr Newman and his followers, is seen far too clearly in those *Lives of the English Saints*. Another extraordinary instance of it occurs in his Sermon on the Establishment of the Romish Hierarchy, last autumn, in which, after speaking of the conversion of the Anglosaxons, he says : “ The fair form of Christianity rose up and grew and expanded like a beautiful pageant from north to south ; it was majestic, it was solemn, it was bright, it was beautiful and pleasant, it was soothing to the griefs, it was pleasant to the hopes of man, it was at once a teaching and a worship ; it had a dogma, a mystery, a ritual of its own ; it had an hierarchical form. A brotherhood of holy pastors, with mitre and crosier, and hand uplifted, walked forth and blessed and ruled the joyful people. The crucifix headed the procession, and simple monks were there with hearts in prayer, and sweet chants resounded, and the holy Latin tongue was heard, and boys came forth in white, swinging censers, and the fragrant cloud arose, and mass was sung, and the saints were invoked ; and day after day, and in the still night, and over the woody hills, and in the quiet plains, as constantly as sun and moon and stars go forth in heaven, so regular and solemn was the stately march of blessed services on earth, high festival, and gorgeous procession, and soothing dirge, and passing bell, and the familiar evening call to prayer ; till he who recollected the old pagan time, would think unreal what he beheld and heard, and conclude he did but see a vision, so marvellously was heaven let down upon earth, so triumphantly were chased away the fiends of darkness to their prison below.”

This page out of a Della-Cruscan novel,—who could suppose that it was intended to describe a portion of real history ? Who, remembering what he may have read in other books concerning

the Anglosaxon Heptarchy and Monarchy, would imagine that this could be a representation of that period? To be sure, it will do for that period, as well as for any other, and seems rather designed for the Elysian fields, or the Islands of the Blessed. Perhaps it may be deemed very beautiful by those who can conceive Beauty as existing apart from Truth. Others it will rather remind of the painted dolls, robed in pink muslin, with spangles and beads, that are set up to be worshipt by the devotees of the Virgin. To others it may seem that the Author has described his own vision best in calling it "a beautiful pageant." After a few more sentences, we are told that, "as time went on, the work did but sink deeper and deeper into the English nature."—The English did indeed "become a peculiar, special people,—I will say a bold thing,—in its staidness, sagacity, and simplicity, more like the mind that rules, through all time, the princely line of Roman pontiffs, than perhaps any other Christian people whom the world has seen." From which sagacity, and which simplicity,—the simplicity of the serpent,—may God ever preserve us! A very *bold thing* indeed the writer has here said, with far more of boldness, than of truth,—nay, a thing which could not be true. What would a nation be, with a heart and mind like that of the Popes, like that which is imposed upon the Popes by their training and their awful position? "And so (the Sermon proceeds) things went on for many centuries. Generation followed generation; revolution came after revolution; great men rose and fell: there were bloody wars, and invasions, conquests, slavery, recoveries, civil dissensions, settlements." But all the while "boys came forth in white, swinging censers; and the fragrant cloud arose." And so things went on down to the time of the Reformation. Then people grew tired of all these pretty playthings,—as children will grow tired of sugarplums and lollipop. "They preferred the heathen virtues of their original nature to the robe of grace which God had given: they fell back—upon their worldly integrity, honour, energy, prudence, and perseverance:" wherein they were not far wrong, if there was nothing more real and living in their previous state than processions "with mitre and crosier," and

chants in "the holy Latin tongue," and "boys in white, swinging censers."

I will quote another example, shewing how, in this mode of painting, black becomes white, and white becomes black, just as the artist's momentary fancy dictates. In the *Essay on Development*, having composed a picture of the early Church, by a kind of mosaic, out of the reports of Heathen writers, the Author sets himself to shew how closely this corresponds with the present aspect of the Church of Rome, desiring hereby to establish the identity of the one with the other. The paragraph in which this is done, is quite a prodigy of rhetorical ingenuity. "If there is a form of Christianity now in the world which is accused of gross superstition, of borrowing its rites and customs from the heathen, and of ascribing to forms and ceremonies an occult virtue; a religion which is considered to burden and enslave the mind by its requisitions, to address itself to the weakminded and ignorant, to be supported by sophistry and imposture, and to contradict reason and exalt mere irrational faith;—a religion which impresses on the serious mind very distressing views of the guilt and consequences of sin, sets upon the minute acts of the day, one by one, their definite value for praise or blame, and thus casts a grave shadow over the future;—a religion which holds up to admiration the surrender of wealth, and disables serious persons from enjoying it if they would;—a religion, the doctrines of which, be they good or bad, are to the generality of men unknown, which is considered to bear on its very surface signs of folly and falsehood so distinct that a glance suffices to judge of it, and careful examination is preposterous; which is felt to be so simply bad, that it may be calumniated at hazard and at pleasure, it being nothing but absurdity to stand upon the accurate distribution of its guilt among its particular acts, or painfully to determine how far this or that story is literally true, what must be allowed in candour, or what is improbable, or what cuts two ways, or what is not proved, or what may be plausibly defended;—a religion such, that men look at a convert to it with a feeling which no other sect raises, except Judaism, Socialism, or

Mormonism, with curiosity, suspicion, fear, disgust, as the case may be, as if something strange had befallen him, as if he had had an initiation into a mystery, and had come into communion with dreadful influences, as if he were now one of a confederacy which claimed him, absorbed him, stripped him of his personality, reduced him to a mere organ or instrument of a whole;—a religion which men hate as proselytizing, anti-social, revolutionary, as dividing families, separating chief friends, corrupting the maxims of government, making a mock at law, dissolving the empire, the enemy of human nature, and a ‘conspirator against its rights and privileges;’—a religion which they consider the champion and instrument of darkness, and a pollution calling down upon the land the anger of heaven;—a religion which they associate with intrigue and conspiracy, which they speak about in whispers, which they detect by anticipation in whatever goes wrong, and to which they impute whatever is unaccountable;—a religion the very name of which they cast out as evil, and use simply as a bad epithet, and which from the impulse of self-preservation they would persecute if they could; if there be such a religion now in the world, it is not unlike Christianity as that same world viewed it when first it came forth from its Divine Author” (pp. 240—242).

This marvellous sentence might suggest many remarks. I will merely observe, that, if it is to be regarded as anything more serious than a feat of rhetorical skill, the proof of identity is not to be found in similarity of outward aspect at distant periods, but in similarity of spirit and principle. Indeed it may be said to be a moral impossibility that any living power on this changeful earth should exhibit the same aspect at two periods, with an interval of eighteen hundred years between them. The aspect of dead things, such as the pyramids, may change but little; but no man at seventy can look like what he was when a boy: he who came nearest to it would be a dwarf. The child is the “father of the man:” he is not the man. Yet the full-grown man is more like the boy, than a dwarf would be. Nor can a nation, after a millennium, present the same form and features. If the Church, after eighteen hundred years, during

which nation after nation has been gathered into her, during which the kings of the earth have bowed down to her, during which generation after generation has been proclaiming her doctrine by word and action, still appears in the eyes of those who have watcht and traced her progress, as, when she first emerged from Judea, she appeared in the eyes of those who knew nothing of her, and merely hated her as an alien intruder, what must have become of all the power with which she was entrusted for the regeneration and purification of the world? Has she been wrapping it up in a napkin, and burying it in the ground? Has she been unable to make it apparent in any way that the Kingdom of God is come upon earth? Such powerlessness could only have proceeded from the fact, that the Prince of this world had gained dominion within her, and over her; whereupon he would triumph by trampling her in the dust.

But my purpose in citing this passage was to shew how rapidly, when it suits the rhetorician's purpose, everything is changed. He waves his wand; and a totally different vision starts up. In his recent Lectures, as we have seen, Dr Newman undertakes to explain how it has come to pass that the Church of Rome is regarded with such scorn and hatred in England. Now, if there were any truth in the picture we have just been contemplating, if this were the aspect that she presents, the explanation would be ready at hand. If the idea and presence of Christianity is still as strange and alien in all the nations of Europe, as it was in the time of Tacitus, no wonder that it should still be termed and treated as "a pernicious superstition." But, as I have just said, the rhetorician waves his wand; and what do we see now? "Considering, what is as undeniable a fact as that there is a country called France, or an ocean called the Atlantic, the actual extent, the renown, and the manifold influence of the Catholic religion,—considering that it surpasses in territory and in population any other Christian communion, nay, surpasses them all put together,—considering that it is the religion of two hundred millions of souls, that it is found in every quarter of the globe, that it penetrates into all classes of the social body, that it is received



by entire nations, that it is so multiform in its institutions, and so exuberant in its developments, and so fresh in its resources, as any tolerable knowledge of it will be sure to bring home to our minds,—that it has been the creed of men the most profound and the most refined, and the source of works the most beneficial, the most arduous, and the most beautiful ; and, moreover considering that, thus ubiquitous, thus commanding, thus intellectual, thus energetic, thus efficient, it has remained one and the same for centuries,—considering that all this must be owned by its most virulent enemies, explain it how they will ;—surely it is a phenomenon the most astounding, that a nation like our own, should so manage to hide this fact from their minds,—as habitually to scorn, and ridicule, and abhor, the professors of that religion.—Was there ever such an instance of self-sufficient, dense, and ridiculous bigotry, as that which rises up and walls in the minds of our fellow countrymen from all knowledge of one of the most remarkable phenomena which the history of the world has seen ? This broad fact of Catholicism, as real as the continent of America, or the Milky Way, which they cannot deny, Englishmen will not entertain ; they shut their eyes, they thrust their heads into the sand, and try to get rid of a great vision, a great reality, under the name of Popery ;—they will not recognise, what infidels recognise as well as Catholics, the vastness, the grandeur, the splendour, the loveliness of the manifestations of this time-honoured ecclesiastical confederation” (pp. 41, 42).

If there were truth in the preceding picture, all this perplexity would vanish. It is not to be wondered at that Ulysses was not recognised when he came to his home in rags, after twenty years of absence. Our poet however has here chosen to strip off his rags, and to exhibit him in his majesty and beauty. Were the latter picture a whit truer than the former, the recognition must needs be instantaneous : but I am afraid the resemblance in Rome hardly extends beyond her desire to inflict summary justice on her enemies.

If we desire to account for these strange incongruities, a clue is supplied to us by what Dr Newman has said, in his *Essay on*

*Development*, concerning ideas. Ideas with him are not the objects of intellectual intuition, but judgements formed by comparison, contrast, abstraction, generalization, adjustment, classification (p. 30). This peculiarity of his intellectual vision manifests itself in all his writings from the very first, and has had a powerful influence in determining the whole course of his life. It may even be said to have carried him to Rome. If he had ever had an intuition of a Divine idea, of a Divine truth, he could never have gone to Rome. But this was wanting; and therefore, with all his wonderful power of logical combination, and with all his wonderful subtilty of analysis, he has gone on receding further and further from the Truth. In fact this is the Romish habit of mind; and therefore, whenever during the Middle Ages men gifted with the power of intellectual intuition arose, they were apt to stray away, or at least to diverge, from the Church, and fell under her censure. They who had seen the Truth as a living Presence, could not be content to receive it swathed up in a multitude of dogmatical decrees. They knew that there is a higher criterion of truth than any human authority; and they could not submit to the latter, when it impugned the former.

The whole practice of the *Catenae Patrum*, by which the Tractarians from the first tried to establish their propositions, arose from the same intellectual want. When ideas are merely the results of comparison, and abstraction, and generalization, and classification, we need a multitude of witnesses to help us in constructing them. But what would the Duke of Wellington have said to a man who brought him a *Catena* of Generals to tell him what he was to do? or what would Shakspeare have made out of a *Catena* of Poets and Critics? The intuitive mind proceeds at once to the truth, and bursts the *Catenae* by which Authority would bind it. Nay, Dr Newman himself had too much life in him to submit permanently to this bondage. In his *Essay on Development* he has burst all his old *Catenae* asunder; though, from not knowing what better to substitute for them, not knowing that the Truth makes us free, and that this freedom is its

own divine law, he has taken shelter from the waywardness and frowardness of his own understanding by girding himself with the chain of an absolute authority. Yet in this Essay also the old tendency displays itself. In every part of it he tries to establish his propositions by scraping together every kind of authority with which his great reading will supply him; and these are often constrained to bear witness to propositions they never dreamt of. For he rejects all the processes of ordinary criticism. He seldom thinks of cross-examining his witnesses, of asking what they meant to say, what in their position, intellectual and moral, they could not but say; though very often he puts his own meaning, not seldom a very incongruous one, into their words. Indeed this mode of dealing with history, and with the writers of former times, is that which is habitual among Romanists, as any one familiar with their writings must be aware. They rake up whatever they can find that appears to favour their purpose. Whether it be really favorable, they do not enquire. They repudiate criticism as uncatholic, as Protestant. Their canons are, that all opinions held by their Church must be true, and that everybody who ever spoke the truth, must have said what their Church says. This is their mode of obtaining what they call a Catholic *consensus*. This process, in another region of literature, is exemplified continually, and often very beautifully, in *the Broad Stone of Honour*, and still more in the later writings of its Author.

Let me cite a curious instance of this procedure, which happened just now to strike me. In page 263 of the *Essay on Development*, Dr Newman argues that, the Bishops of the Church "were not mere local officers, but possessed a power essentially ecumenical." Among a number of sayings and facts, real or imaginary, alledged to prove this, he says, "The see of St Hippolytus, as if he belonged to all places in the *orbis terrarum*, cannot be located, and is variously placed in the neighbourhood of Rome and in Arabia." Now this is a very strange statement, which stands quite alone, and is at variance with all we know of ecclesiastical history; wherefore a man who cared about the

accuracy of his statements, would have taken some pains to ascertain its validity. But what is the fact? Hippolytus, as has just been proved most convincingly by my friend, the Chevalier Bunsen, was Bishop of Portus, near Rome; and the notion of his having been a Bishop in Arabia is a mere blunder of certain ecclesiastical historians, as has also been shewn in the clearest manner. Yet Dr Newman has caught hastily at this blunder, and bearing it in his hand has jumped to the conclusion, that Hippolytus "belonged to all places in the *orbis terrarum*."

That such a method, if method it can be called, is altogether lawless and chaotic, that it may be made to favour any arbitrary result, is plain. Take a sentence or two here and there from this Father, and a couple of expressions from another, add half a canon of this Council, a couple of incidents out of some ecclesiastical historian, an anecdote from a chronicler, two conjectures of some critic, and half-a-dozen drachms of a schoolman, mix them up in rhetoric *quant. suff.*, and shake them well together,—and thus we get at a theological development. But who except the prescriber can tell what the result will be? and may not he produce any result he chooses? Yet this is held out as the method by which we are to be preserved from drawing false inferences from the words of Scripture.

NOTE C: p. 12.

EVERYBODY who has any acquaintance with the theological literature of the last eighteen years, must be aware that, at least during the former half of that period, it was continually asserted by the writers of the Tractarian school, that their position supplied the only sure ground for resisting the arguments of Rome. Protestantism they derided: it had no power of coherence, no consistency, no deep roots, no ancient foundations; it was capricious, variable, ephemeral, the creature of wilfulness, depending on each man's private judgement. But, as for themselves, they were planted on the rock of Antiquity, upheld by the

concurrence of ages, with the whole learned body of Anglican Divines to form their main line, and the Fathers, as their triarians, in the rear. With such a host at their back, how could they fail to conquer? In the confident assurance of success, they rusht on so impetuously as ere long to leave the Anglican Divines far behind; and several of the foremost fell into an ambush, and were made captive.

When he who was the chief leader of the Movement, delivered his *Lectures on Romanism and Popular Protestantism* in 1837, his aim was to mark out this very ground. Protestantism, or the bugbear which he called by that name, he disliked and despised. The main purpose of his Lectures is to strengthen his position against Rome; and he tries hard to persuade himself and his readers that he has done so effectually. For instance, at the end of the Lecture on Antiquity (p. 98), he writes: "Enough has been said to shew the hopefulness of our own prospects in the controversy with Rome. We have her own avowal that the Fathers ought to be followed, and again, that she does not follow them; what more can we require than her witness against herself, which is here supplied us? If such inconsistency is not at once fatal to her claims, which it would seem to be, at least it is a most encouraging omen in our contest with her. We have but to remain pertinaciously and immovably fixed on the ground of Antiquity; and, as truth is ours, so will the victory be also. We have joined issue with her, and that in a point which admits of a decision,—of a decision, as she confesses, against herself. Abstract arguments, original views, novel interpretations of Scripture, may be met by similar artifices on the other side; but historical facts are proof against the force of talent, and remain where they were, when it has expended itself. How mere Protestants, who rest upon no such solid foundation, are to withstand our common adversary, is not so clear, and not our concern. We would fain make them partakers of our vantage ground; but since they despise it, they must take care of themselves, and must not complain if we refuse to desert a position which promises to be impregnable,—impregnable both as against Romanists, and

against themselves." Again he says (p. 25): "At this day, when the connexion of Protestantism with infidelity is so evident, what claim has the former upon our sympathy? and to what theology can the serious Protestant, dissatisfied with his system, betake himself, but to Romanism, unless we display our characteristic principles, and shew him that he may be Catholic and Apostolic, yet not Roman? Such, as is well known, was the service actually rendered by our Church to the learned German divine, Grabe, at the end of the seventeenth century, who, feeling the defects of Lutheranism, even before it had lapst, was contemplating a reconciliation with Rome, when, finding that England offered what to a disciple of Ignatius and Cyprian were easier terms, he conformed to her creed, and settled and died in this country." So again, in p. 253, he writes: "These distinctions — are surely portions of a real view, which, while it relieves the mind of those burdens and perplexities which are the portion of the mere Protestant, is essentially distinct from Romanism."

Other passages to a like effect might easily be adduced; but it is needless. He who ought to know the strength and worth of these opinions, better than any one else, now declares that they are utterly strengthless and worthless. He not only rejects them, but scouts and spurns them. His chief business at present is *to build again the things which he destroyed.*

Quod petiit spernit, repetit quod nuper omisit,  
Diruit, aedificat, mutat quadrata rotundis.

The main object of his Lectures on the Difficulties of Anglicanism is to shew the feebleness and untenableness of the opinions of which seventeen years ago he was the main promulgator and champion. Nothing can exceed the contempt, the scorn, with which he speaks of those opinions. To all other modes of opinion he can be indulgent. "I can understand (he says, p. 128), I can sympathize with those old-world thinkers, whose commentators are Mant and D'Oyly, whose theologian is Tomlin, whose ritualist is Wheatly, and whose canonist is Burns. — Those also I can understand, who take their stand upon the Prayerbook; or who

honestly profess to follow the *consensus* of Anglican divines, as the voice of authority and the standard of faith. Moreover I can quite enter into the sentiment, with which members of the liberal and infidel school investigate the history and the documents of the early Church.—But (he adds, turning to his own *quondam* associates and followers), what a Catholic would feel so prodigious is this,—that such as you, my brethren, should consider Christianity given from Heaven once for all, should protest against private judgement, should profess to transmit what you have received, and yet, from diligent study of the Fathers,—from living, as you say, in the atmosphere of antiquity, should come forth into open day with your new edition of the Catholic Faith, different from that held in any existing body of Christians, which not half-a-dozen men all over the world would honour with their *imprimatur*; and then, withal, should be as positive in practice about its truth in every part, as if the voice of mankind were with you, instead of against you. You are a body of yesterday; you are a drop in the ocean of professing Christians; yet you would give the law to priest and prophet; and you fancy it a humble office forsooth, suited to humble men, to testify the very truth of revelation to a fallen generation,—which has been in unintermittent traditionary error. You have a mission to teach the National Church, which is to teach the British Empire, which is to teach the world. You are more learned than Greece; you are purer than Rome; you know better than St Bernard; you judge how far St Thomas was right, and where he is to be read with caution, or held up to blame.” By these, and similar stinging words he lashes his credulous admirers, if so be he may again prevail upon them to follow him whom they have found so unerring a leader. The objections, which others have frequently urged against the Tractarian doctrines, but which were repelled with indignation, he himself brings forward in the most cutting form. He tells them that they “have an eclectic or an original religion of their own” (p. 132), that their rule of faith is “their own private judgement.”

For the sake of effecting some sort of reconciliation, or rather

compromise, between these and his former opinions, and of accounting for their gross apparent inconsistency, much contemptuous abuse is poured upon the Church of England, which is called throughout by the degrading name of *the Establishment*, and is asserted to have developed its Erastian character more and more during the last twenty years; so that, though it might be mistaken for Catholic and Apostolic by the profoundest and most sagacious divines, when Tractarianism entered upon its mission, no intelligent man can suppose it to be such now. "During the last twenty years (he says, p. 58)—the National Church *has* changed and *is* changing with the Nation." As to this fact there cannot be a question. Perhaps twenty years never pass over a Nation, unless it be the Chinese, without some kind of change in it. At least it has never been so in Christendom, since Christianity introduced the great spring of all improvement, of all progress, into humanity. What indeed must be the condition of a Church, if it makes no advance in twenty years? Of the Church, above all, as of our spiritual life generally, may it be said, that *non progredi est regredi*. Nor could the Church remain unaffected by the ever increasing, almost multiplying velocity in every other sphere of human action. The only question therefore is, What is the nature and character of the changes that have taken place in the Church during the last twenty years? Nor, I think, can any candid man, who has observed what has been going on, and who has any information as to what was the state of things twenty, thirty, forty, fifty years ago, hesitate a moment in replying, that, under God's blessing, the condition of our Church has been continually improving during the last half century. The information with which my official position supplies me, enables me to state that the improvement in this Archdeaconry has been very considerable during the last ten years: nor have I any reason for supposing that we have been more favoured than other parts of England. It may be that the increase in the power of the world, in the power of Mammon, during the same period, has been still greater, and that both parties have been gathering their forces for some great and



terrible conflict. This however is a different point. If our Church had a claim to the love, the zeal, the devotion of her children twenty years ago, she has a still stronger claim now, which is only heightened, not lowered, by the increase strength of her enemies. In the general character of our pastors the improvement has been great, in their zeal and love for their people, in their attention to the education of their flocks. To speak of outward, visible, and tangible facts, the multiplication of churches and schools, the institution and erection of Training Schools, bear witness that the Church is not forgetful of her pastoral office. The large increase of our Colonial Episcopate, and of the ministry under it, the addition to our Episcopate at home, which, we may trust, is only the first step toward a further increase, are facts that claim our gratitude. Dr Newman indeed speaks derisively of these facts. Ascribing almost everything that has been effected to his own party, he says (p. 93): "The movement succeeded in gaining an increase in the number of Episcopal sees at home and abroad:" but, to impair the value of this fact, he adds: "If the Apostolical Movement desired to increase the Episcopate, it was with a view to its own Apostolical principles: it had no wish merely to increase the staff of Government officers in England or in the Colonies, the patronage of a ministry, the erection of rural palaces, and the Latitudinarian votes in Parliament." This merely exemplifies his usual trick of giving every fact whatever shape and hue he chooses, by bringing out and exaggerating its accidents. He ought to have known that the number of Episcopal votes in Parliament has not been increased. As to the ordinary adjuncts of an Episcopal See, they who wish to see an increase of the Sees, can hardly have been such visionaries as not to have known that those adjuncts would accompany the increase.

With regard to doctrine also we may say, with hearty thanksgiving to God for the grace vouchsafed to us, that an immense, ever-widening improvement has taken place since the beginning of the century. The Socinian leaven has almost disappeared from our pulpits. The meagre moral essays with which our

fathers were so poorly dieted, are hardly to be heard. The distinctive doctrines of our faith are brought forward, more or less prominently, in almost every church. At the same time the Antinomian extravagances, which were not uncommon at the first revival of Evangelical preaching, are become rare; and a better appreciation of the Church, and of her rites and ordinances, has been gaining ground among the disciples of that School. The strange, perplexing fact is, that, while our Church, through God's blessing, has in this manner been putting on her strength, and girding herself with her apparel, so many of her ministers, and those too who profest to love her most, have been casting away their love for her, and joining her enemies and revilers. Such is the power of wilfulness in our days: *If thou wilt not do everything that I bid thee, I will throw myself into the arms of the harlot.*

This extraordinary inconsistency has been pointed out with his usual force by the Bishop of St David's in his recent admirable Charge: "The Church of England (he says, p. 19) stands at this moment in a very peculiar situation; one, I believe I might say, without example in her own history, or in that of any other Church. At no previous epoch, since the recovery of her purity and her independence, has she displayed more evident signs of life, vigour, and energy. Whether we look abroad, or at home,—whether we consider the increasing zeal, activity, and success, with which she has been carrying forward her vast missionary work, the new and enlarged provision which she has made for its future progress, both in her domestic institutions, and in the great number of completely organized Colonial Churches which she has planted within the course of a very few years,—or—observe the efforts which she has been making to supply the wants of her growing population, the rapid multiplication of churches and schools and training institutions, the exertions of the societies which collect and dispense a large part of her resources for pious uses, the examples of selfdenying charity and munificence exhibited by her individual members, the ready and liberal answer which is made to every

appeal on her behalf, the lively interest which is manifested in every question that affects her welfare, the earnestness and ability with which her cause is maintained at every disputed point of theological controversy,—look whichever way we will, we find sure tokens of health and strength, from which it might seem safe to augur, not only lasting stability, but increasing prosperity. These are not the exaggerations of partial friends, but indisputable facts, attested by the reluctant admission of her adversaries. To whatever degree her system may be justly charged with defects or abuses, at least it cannot be said that there is any want of will to investigate and correct them. It would of course be quite consistent with such a state of things, that the Church should, at the same time, be assailed by the most violent attacks from without. But the strange thing is, that in the midst of all these grounds of thankfulness, hope, and confidence, there should be heard from many quarters within the language of alarm and despondency, gloomy forebodings of impending disasters, complaints as of men labouring under almost intolerable evils, which must either drive them out of our communion, or force them to seek a remedy in organic changes of indefinite extent, and of very uncertain and perilous issue."

We say not these things boastingly: God forbid! We know and confess that what has been done is but a small part of what ought to have been done by a Christian people, on whom such wonderful blessings have been bestowed. But when our Church is reproached and reviled, as she is perpetually, we may allowably appeal to these signs that God has not deserted her, nay, that He is stirring her up to the performance of those great works for which her position as the Church of England marks her out.

Dr Newman himself is constrained to acknowledge these tokens of vitality in our Church, though he tries to render his admission as depreciatory as he can. "If life (he says, p. 40) means strength, activity, energy, and well-being of any kind, in that case doubtless the national religion is alive. It is a great power in the midst of us; it wields an enormous influence; it represses a hundred foes; it conducts a hundred undertakings. It attracts

men to it, uses them, rewards them : it has thousands of beautiful homes up and down the country, where quiet men may do its work and benefit its people : it collects vast sums in the shape of voluntary offerings ; and with them it builds churches, prints and distributes innumerable Bibles, books, and tracts, and sustains missionaries in all parts of the earth. In all parts of the earth it opposes the Catholic Church, denounces her as antichristian, bribes the world against her, obstructs her influence.—If this be life,—if it be life to be a principle of order in the population, and an organ of benevolence and almsgiving toward the poor,—then doubtless the National Church—overflows with life. But the question has still to be answered, Life of what kind ? Heresy has its life ; worldliness has its life. Is the Establishment's life merely national life ? or is it something more ? Is it Catholic life as well ? Is it a supernatural life ?” To these questions we answer confidently, *Yes*. Knowing whence every good gift cometh, and how poor in herself human nature is, we answer, that it is “supernatural life.” Inasmuch as we hold the Creeds of the Church, and have been realizing them more and more of late years in our teaching, while we reject all unwarranted, uncatholic additions to them, we answer that it is “Catholic life.” But when Dr Newman goes on to put another test, whether the life of our Church is “congenial with those principles, which the movement of 1833 thought to impose or to graft upon it ?” we refuse the test ; we deny the authority of that Movement to impose or graft its principles upon our Church : we bid that Movement abide by its professions of receiving its principles from the Church : we repudiate the pretensions of such a Papal Directory to give the law to the Church, which God has set up in England, and has purified, and has maintained in its purer form for three centuries, and which He has of late been so signally blessing.

Dr Newman indeed has a strange course to pursue in dealing with his former associates and disciples, a course which needs all the subtilty of his tortuous understanding. While on the one hand, as we have just seen, he speaks of them in language of unmeasured scorn, on the other hand he represents them as

having been sent by God to revive the truth in our Church. When he was with them, they were the latter: when he left them, they became objects of scorn. "It is scarcely possible to fancy (he says, p. 81) that an event so distinctive in its character as the rise of the so-called Anglo-Catholic party in the course of the last twenty years should have no scope in the designs of Divine Providence. From beginnings so small, from elements of thought so fortuitous, with prospects so unpromising,—it suddenly became a power in the National Church." It would be strange,—were it not for his peculiar faculty of seeing just what he likes,—that a person, so well acquainted with the contagiousness of heresies, should urge the rapid spread of Tractarianism as a proof of its having "a scope in the designs of Divine Providence." In a certain sense doubtless this argument might be admitted; only in that sense it would apply equally to Mormonism. But in the sense which Dr Newman intends, how are we to discriminate between them? why are we to concede that to Tractarianism, which we deny to Mormonism? Yet he will not allow the same argument, though incomparably stronger, to prove the Divine mission of Lutheranism, or that of the English Church. The Reformers, both here and in Germany, brought forward primary truths, which had been neglected, violated, trampled upon. God stirred the hearts of His chosen, of those who were appointed to be heirs of the Truth, in England and in Germany: they listened to the sound of the heavenly trumpet, and heard the truth gladly, and received it, and handed it down under God's guidance to their children: and so it was transmitted from generation to generation, and is preserved amongst us at this day. Yet this Dr Newman pronounces to be contrary to God's purpose. He is not silly enough to fancy that our Church can have forfeited her Catholicity by the consecration of Dr Hampden to his see, or the institution of Mr Gorham to his living. "No sober man (he says, p. 44), I suppose, dreams of denying that, if the National Church be impure and unapostolical now, it has had no claim to be called 'pure and apostolical' last year, or twenty years back, or for any part of the period since the

Reformation ;"—not even in the age of the Nonjurors ; not even in that of the Anglo-catholic divines. The Anglo-catholic divines themselves are now pronounced to be uncatholic. It is well to have the sentence drawn out in all its length and breadth, in all its arrogance and outrageousness. When we read the sacred words, *No man cometh to the Father, but by Me*, we recognise the miserable weakness which compels us to need this Mediation, and we bless the Divine Mediator, who came down to bring us to the Father. But when the Papacy applies these words to itself, or its minions do so for it, our hearts and souls and minds revolt at the blasphemous usurpation, and cry *Thou, Lord, Thou alone art the Way, the Truth, and the Life. Thou, in Thine infinite lovingkindness hast called us to Thee : to Thee we come, and will not give Thy glory to another.*

Dr Newman's main argument however, which runs through the whole series of Lectures, is, that his *quondam* followers, who adopted the original principles of his School, are bound to follow them out to their logical consequences. Logic is ever his favorite weapon, his Harlequin's sword, with which he works whatever transformations he pleases. Now Logic, it is well known, or rather the abuse and perversion of Logic, has ever been a fruitful source of all manner of errors. By logical deductions from an abstract conception, which can never at the utmost be more than a shadowy ghost or a skeleton of a living idea, the physical philosophy of Antiquity and of the Schoolmen was led into those extravagances from which Bacon delivered it. By logical deductions from premisses imperfectly apprehended, all the heresies by which the Church has been troubled, sprang up ; as a very little reflexion will prove to us with regard to the Arian, the Unitarian, the Nestorian, the Pelagian, the Manichean. Thus, even in speculative matters, Logic is a mere Cyclops, one-eyed, looking straight before it. But still more delusive is its guidance in practical life. If you put one foot forward, the logical inference would be, that you are next to put the other foot forward. But what if you have put the first foot forward in a wrong direction,? what if the right path turns aside

at the next step? what if the next step would be down a precipice? These are things concerning which Logic cannot enlighten us; and they are to be decided by the exercise of our other faculties: which are to be consulted continually, at every step, not merely at the first and the second, but again at the third, and again at the fourth. For we do not live in a vacuum, but amid the living fulness of the world, where at every step we may meet with some fresh obstacle bidding us halt or turn aside. Dr Newman speaks now and then as if he were the slave of logic, as if he were in its bondage, in its chains, and must go onward whithersoever it drives him. In the *Essay on Development* he says (p. 29): "That the hypothesis here to be adopted accounts not only for the Athanasian Creed, but for the Creed of Pope Pius, is no fault of those who adopt it. No one has power over the issues of his principles; we cannot manage our argument, and have as much of it as we please and no more." But we may re-examine our hypothesis: we may analyse and resolve it into its elements, and find out how to modify and regulate its application. We do so in all the applied sciences. The arrow would fly on to infinity, if the force of gravity were not acting upon it at every moment to bring it back to the earth; and so, with regard to the issues of our principles, we have all manner of practical considerations, above all we have a moral gravitation, to keep them in bounds. We are not forced to say B, because we have said A; we may say D, or C, or X, or Z. The great use of our dialectic faculty is to serve as a corrective for the logical, as we see continually in the Platonic dialogues. The Sophist rushes on from one proposition to another, "over hill, over dale, over park, over pale," sometimes like a hunter hearing the sound of the horn, sometimes like a mad bull: for madmen are often very logical; and this is the method in their madness. But how does Socrates by his dialectical power compell them continually to exhibit the fallaciousness of logic, often by letting them run on from proposition to proposition till they fall into some gross absurdity, often by denying their premisses, specious as they may seem, and constraining them to sift these thoroughly!

“Logic is a stern master,” Dr Newman says in another place (*Difficulties of Anglicanism*, p. 28), speaking of our modern Pantheistic infidels; “they feel it; they protest against it; they profess to hate it, and would fain dispense with it; but it is the law of their intellectual nature. Struggling and shrieking, but in vain, will they make the inevitable descent into that pit from which there is no return, except through the almost miraculous grace of God, the grant of which in this life is never hopeless.” He writes here as having himself felt the sternness of the same master, though in another direction. It drove him to Rome; and under its spell, as its slave, he is using all the powers of his mind to force others to follow him. Robespierre acted under a like spell: he too was the slave of Logic, which had him guillotine two millions of his countrymen. In fact, it is the Jacobinical principle, which throws everything else overboard. But surely even Robespierre might have checked himself, might have laid hold on some affection, on some principle, on some habit, on some conventional practice or decorum, to break his fall: and still more so may every one who has been called to the liberty of the Gospel. The absolute tyranny of Logic has no more place than any other in the Kingdom of Heaven.

Among the opinions and principles held by the Tractarians, from which Dr Newman would infer the necessity and duty of their following him to Rome, how many were exaggerated, how many erroneous, distorted, drawn from other ages and circumstances, and ill-suited to the present! How many errors has he himself confessed to! and is he quite sure that these are the only ones which he or his party committed? The very things to which he devoted his whole intellect, his whole heart, he now tells us he entirely misunderstood,—that our Church is something totally different from what he then believed her to be,—that Rome is totally different,—that the testimony of the Fathers is totally different. Surely, even logically, it is a strange inference, *You followed me formerly when I was utterly wrong; therefore you ought to follow me now.* Moreover, if he was so mistaken about the things which he had studied the most and loved the best, is it not probable



that he was at least as grossly wrong with regard to things which he had never studied, which he had always viewed with disgust, about which he had nothing but blind prejudices.

Therefore I would earnestly entreat his *quondam* followers to give no heed to his logical war-cry. If there be any extravagance of private judgement, it would be this. This is Rationalism in its baldest, wildest form. God has placed them where they are. He has given them the duties of their calling. He has girt them round with affections, that they may take root where they are, and not be blown about by every wind of Logic. Some outward necessity may indeed come, as it came to our ancestors at the Reformation, some revolutionary force, which may compell them, without their own act and deed, to quit their immediate position, or to make some material change in its relations. In such a case, of which however I cannot see a likelihood, it would behove them to yield to the necessity, which they cannot change. We must not violate our conscience; we must not do what our conscience declares to be wrong. But so long as this lord of our being continues inviolate, we may bid Logic mind its own business, and content ourselves with doing our duty in that state of life to which it has pleased God to call us.

The same arbitrariness, which in the last Note we have seen manifested by Dr Newman in his selection and representation of facts, is equally prominent in his Lectures on Anglicanism. Thus, in a very eloquent and highly wrought passage, he professes to draw a contrast between the Church of Catholic antiquity and our present Establishment; and, as a sample of the former, he selects the dispute at Milan between Ambrose and Valentinian (p. 47)—as a sample of the latter, the riot at Exeter seven years ago, occasioned by the attempt to preach in a surplice, or, as he curiously terms it (p. 53), "*because only the gleam of Apostolical principles, in their faintest, wannest expression, is cast inside a building which is the home of the National Religion.*" This is just as fair a parallel as if he had pickt out Hector for the pattern Trojan, and Thersites for the pattern Greek. The squabbles and conflicts at Constantinople under the Empire,

and many of those in Rome itself, would have furnished less inappropriate materials for a comparison. But, even with regard to these, we should have to bear in mind that distance veils over what nearness vulgarizes: and one of the consequences of the progress of order and civilization is, that great social questions are not decided now by such majestic movements as the Secession of the Plebs to the Sacred Mount, or the war of the Parliament against Charles the First, and that mere riots are meaner, both in their origin and their conduct.

## NOTE D : p. 16.

As I am merely stating these matters historically, without any thought of discussing them, or entering into an argument on the subject, there does not seem to be any necessity for citing specific passages in support of these statements. Their correctness will hardly be disputed by any person conversant with the controversies of the last seventeen years; and he who wishes for particular proofs, will find such collected in the principal attacks on the Tractarian theology.

## NOTE Da : p. 19 : l. 23.

I have been somewhat amused, in reading over Dr Newman's *Lectures on the Difficulties of Anglicanism* for the sake of these Notes, to find that he has used this same image in nearly the same manner, though with an opposite purpose. After speaking of the way in which his party tried to support their opinions, first by the Anglican divines, and then by the Fathers, he adds (p. 124): "Their idea—was simply and absolutely submission to an external authority: to it they appealed, to it they betook themselves; there they found a haven of rest; thence they looked out upon the troubled surge of human opinion, and upon the crazy vessels which were labouring, without chart or compass,

upon it. Judge then of their dismay, when, according to the Arabian tale, on their striking their anchors into the supposed soil, lighting their fires on it, and fixing in it the poles of their tents, suddenly their island began to move, to heave, to splash, to frisk to and fro; to dive, and at last to swim away, spouting out inhospitable jets of water upon the credulous mariners who had made it their home." Only, in this application of the image, it seems to me, he has yielded to the common delusion of travelers, who transfer their own motion to the objects around them. For the Anglican divines, whose opinions have been stored up in bulky folios for the last hundred and fifty or two hundred years, could not well take to heaving, and splashing, and frisking about; not to mention that this was not much their fashion when they were composing those folios. This habit is far more like the theological pamphleteers of our days, who, when their boats rebounded from their rash impact on our old divines, began fancying that the divines had run away from them. Yet Dr Newman half implies that this notion was confined to himself and a few others. "If only one (he says), or a few of them, were visited with this conviction, still one was sufficient to destroy that cardinal point of their whole system, the objective perspicuity and distinctness of the teaching of the Fathers." Here it is difficult to pronounce which is the strangest hallucination, the original assumption, or the abandonment of it on such a ground.

I may take this opportunity of answering a question which Dr Newman puts to me in the same Lectures: After quoting a couple of sentences from my Letter to Mr Cavendish (in p. 39), with a courtesy for which I return him my thanks, he asks, what I mean by faith? whether I do not mean something very vague and comprehensive? whether I do not mean, as I might say, "the faith of St Austin, and of Peter the Hermit, and of Luther, and of Rousseau, and of Washington, and of Napoleon Bonaparte?" Why he has strung together this odd medley of names, I know not. I might reply by referring him to my Sermons on the Victory of Faith, where I have attempted to set forth my own conception of Faith, expressly distinguishing it from that which

he had laid down in his *Lectures on Justification*. But he does not seem to have much acquaintance with my writings, since he merely quotes me as a writer in *the Record*. Nay, I should have thought that the very combination in which I use the word, "personal faith and holiness," when taken in connexion with the rest of his quotation, might shew that it is not a quality in which Rousseau and Bonaparte had much share. But I may as well state that I certainly do not mean by faith, what Dr Newman means, as he has expounded his view in his ninth Lecture. "Faith (he says, p. 39) has one meaning to a Catholic, another to a Protestant." God be thank't that it has, that we have been delivered from the miserable debasement of the Romish notion. Of the Protestant conception Dr Newman, here as elsewhere, proves himself to be strangely ignorant. "Protestants (he says p. 223) consider that Faith and Love are inseparable: where there is Faith, there, they think, is Love and Obedience; and in proportion to the strength and degree of the former, is the strength and degree of the latter. They do not think the inconsistency possible of really believing without obeying; and, where they see disobedience, they cannot imagine the existence of true faith." From what sources Dr Newman derived this representation of the Protestant view, I know not. It certainly is different from that of the chief Protestant authors. They hold indeed that, whenever Faith is real and lively, it must manifest itself in some measure by love and good works. Thus we read, in the Apology for the Confession of Augsburg, at the beginning of c. 3, *De dilectione et impletione legis*, "Quia fides affert Spiritum Sanctum, et parit novam vitam in cordibus, necesse est, quod pariat spirituales motus in cordibus. Et qui sint illi motus, ostendit Propheta, cum ait: *Dabo legem meam in corda eorum*. Postquam igitur fide justificati et renati sumus, incipimus Deum timere, diligere, petere, et expectare ab eo auxilium, gratias agere et praedicare, et obedire ei in afflictionibus. Incipimus et diligere proximos, quia corda habent spirituales et sanctos motus." I quote these words, because they may be regarded as the most authoritative exposition of the

Protestant view. Faith, we hold, a living faith, a faith which is the work of the Holy Spirit, cannot be utterly inactive, must begin at least to manifest its divine power, must shew that it does really believe in God, our Creator and Redeemer, and in the Sacrifice offered up for our sins, by loving Him who so mercifully gave His Only-begotten Son for us. A faith, unaccompanied by any such motions of love, we regard as a mere belief, such as the devils themselves may have. As Melancthon says, when we have faith, *Incipimus Deūm timere, diligere, — incipimus et diligere proximos.* There must be a beginning of such love; or our faith must be dead, as St James declares. But St Paul's words, 1 Cor. xiii, 2, are quite enough to convince us that we may have a high degree of faith, without much true love. Nor am I aware of any Protestant author of note, who denies the possibility of the case here put by St Paul. "Hic locus Pauli (says Melancthon, a little further on in the same chapter, § 98) requirit dilectionem: hanc requirimus et nos.—Si quis dilectionem abjecerit, etiam si habet magnam fidem, tamen non retinet eam." A living faith, we maintain, ought to produce love and obedience, and, if it be really living, will produce them. But, since the miserable disruption of our nature by the Fall, we know too well that what God has joined together, man perpetually rends asunder.

At the same time we do altogether reject the Romish notion of faith, which Dr Newman expresses in these words: "Catholics hold that faith and love, faith and obedience, faith and works, are simply separable, and ordinarily separated in fact; that faith does not imply love, obedience, or works; that the firmest faith, so as to move mountains, may exist without love, that is, true faith, as truly faith in the strict sense of the word as the faith of a martyr or a doctor. In fact it contemplates a gift which Protestantism does not imagine. Faith is a spiritual sight of the unseen; and Protestantism has not this sight; it does not see the unseen; this habit, this act of the mind is foreign to it; so, since it keeps the word, faith, it is obliged to find some other meaning for it; and its common,

perhaps its commonest, idea is, that faith is substantially the same as obedience; that it is the impulse, the motive of obedience, or the fervour and heartiness which attend good works. In a word, that faith is hope or love, or a mixture of the two. It does not contemplate faith in its Catholic sense; for it has been taught by flesh and blood, not by grace." Here, as in other places, the lessons which Dr Newman ascribes to Divine Grace, are not those which rise above, but those which sink below humanity. A still more subtle logician, Bayle, in his account of Caligula, says of that monster, "A l'imitation du Diable, il croyoit qu'il y a un Dieu, et il en trembloit; et néanmoins il vomissoit des blasphêmes épouvantables contre la Divinité. Il usurpa fièrement tous les honneurs de la Religion; et il n'y avoit aucun crime qu'il fit conscience de commettre." Bayle, when he penned these words, was perhaps thinking of some of the Popes: but he who reads Dr Newman's attempt, in the ninth Lecture, to maintain the coexistence of the divine gift of faith with habitual immorality and profaneness, will find what might almost have served as an apology for Caligula.

Now to this conception of faith, we reply in the words of St James, that faith without love, that faith without obedience is *dead*; and as we do not call a dead body a man, so we do not call dead faith, faith, but merely belief. This is no dispute about words: the consequences of this distinction run through the whole of theology, and are most momentous. The awful consequences which Dr Newman deduces from it, will come before us in Note I. As to the impertinences which he here pours out on Protestants, they are utterly groundless, and mere Romish fictions. Faith, according to the Protestant conception, is not indeed a magical gift, to which there is nothing corresponding, no analogon, in the natural man. As spiritual love has its counterpart, its fore-shadowing, in the various modes of human love, so has spiritual faith in moral faith. But, in all its manifestations, faith, we assert, is the apprehension of the unseen, of the invisible. Without faith no great human work was ever accomplished. As to religion, without faith it cannot exist at

all. It is only by faith that we apprehend the Unseen, Invisible God. It is by faith that we apprehend His Only-begotten Son, His Incarnation, His Crucifixion, His Exaltation, His constant Intercession for the Church. It is by faith that we receive and apprehend the sanctifying influences of the Spirit. It is by faith that we behold and receive the Body and Blood of our Lord in the Holy Communion. We do not, we dare not, transubstantiate them into the visible elements of bread and wine. In fact this is why we are separated from Rome, who, indulging and pampering the carnal tendencies of our nature, is ever bringing the visible, yea, the ornate, and even the tawdry, before the eyes of her people, in order to supply them with visible substitutes for the Unseen, in which they cannot believe. Doubtless there have been many persons of heroic faith in the Church of Rome; but in that which is peculiarly and distinctively Romish, we mostly find some mode of idolatry or superstition, each of which is ever a mere *caput mortuum* of faith.

## NOTE E: p. 20.

In the very first Act of the reign of Elizabeth, the original Act of Uniformity, it is ordered (§ 36), that the Court which shall be appointed to try cases of heresy, "shall not in any wise have authority or power to order, determine, or adjudge any matter or cause to be heresy, but only such as heretofore have been determined, ordered, or adjudged to be heresy, by the authority of the Canonical Scriptures, or by the first four general Councils, or any of them, or by any other general Council wherein the same was declared heresy by the express and plain words of the said Canonical Scriptures, or such as hereafter shall be ordered, judged, or determined to be heresy by the High Court of Parliament of this Realm, with the assent of the Clergy in their Convocation." Here we find a solemn recognition of the authority of the early Church. It was of great importance that the Court of Heresy should have some clue to guide them in

determining the legal meaning of Scripture, with reference to the cases brought before them. Nor was it of less moment thus from the first to declare the connexion and continuity between the doctrine of our Church and that of the first ages. This clause was also of much value, in that it imposed a limit on the construction of heresies, which were previously multiplied at will by the temporary rulers of the Church. We must bear in mind too that this Act was past eleven years before the final legislative enactment of the Articles, which then became the authoritative rule "for the avoiding of diversities of opinion, and for the establishing of consent touching true Religion." After this the previous criterion was of less moment; and hence no mention is made of it in subsequent Acts bearing on the same matter. From that time forward the Articles, along with the Liturgy, became the authoritative criterion of heresy, a far plainer and more definite than the former one.

One of the most remarkable instances of deference for Antiquity is Jewel's challenge, in his famous Sermon at Paul's Cross, which led to his controversy with Harding, and thus became an important act in the history of our Church. In this sermon he recites a number of propositions,—ultimately they amounted to seven and twenty,—with regard to which he declares that, "if any learned man of all our adversaries, or if all the learned men that be alive, be able to bring *any one sufficient sentence out of any old catholic doctor or father, or out of any old general council, or out of the Holy Scriptures of God, or any one example of the primitive Church, whereby it may be clearly and plainly proved that there was any private mass in the whole world at that time, for the space of six hundred years after Christ,—or that, &c. &c. &c.—if any man alive were able to prove any of these Articles by any one clear or plain clause or sentence, either of the Scriptures, or of the old doctors, or of any old general Council, or by any example of the primitive Church,—I promised then that I would give over and subscribe unto him.*" The boldness and confidence of this pledge were startling: as Jewel himself expresses it, "I said, perhaps boldly, as



it might then seem to some man, but, as I myself, and the learned of our adversaries themselves do well know, sincerely and truly, that none of all them that this day stand against us, are able, or shall ever be able, to prove against us any one of all those points, either by the Scriptures, or by example of the primitive Church, or by the old doctors, or by the ancient general Councils." The establishment of this proposition was one of the greatest services ever rendered to our Church by a single man, proving that we are the faithful transmitters of the tradition of the early Church, that, as Jewel himself well said in his answer to Dr Cole's Second Letter, "we have the old Doctors Church, the ancient Councils Church, the primitive Church, St Peter's Church, St Paul's Church, and Christ's Church; and this ought of good right to be called the Apostles Church."

An official recognition of the authority of the Fathers is contained in the often quoted Canon of 1571, drawn up by the same Convocation which issued the forty Articles then for the first time confirmed by Parliament. With regard to *Concionatores*, that Canon lays down, "Inprimis videbunt ne quid unquam doceant pro concione, quod a populo religiose teneri et credi velint, nisi quod consentaneum sit doctrinae Veteris aut Novi Testamenti, *quodque ex illa ipsa doctrina Catholici Patres et veteres Episcopi collegerint*. Et quoniam Articuli illi Religionis Christianae, in quos consensum est ab episcopis in legitima et sancta Synodo, jussu atque auctoritate serenissimae principis Elizabethae convocata et celebrata, haud dubie collecti sunt ex sacris libris Veteris et Novi Testamenti, et cum coelesti doctrina, quae in illis continetur, per omnia congruunt; quoniam etiam Liber Publicarum Precum, et liber de inauguratione archiepiscoporum, episcoporum, presbyterorum, et diaconorum, nihil continent ab illa ipsa doctrina alienum;\* quicumque mittentur

\* Archdeacon Wilberforce, in his History of Erastianism, says (p. 15), that the Canons of 1603 "were plainly a turning point in the history of the Church of England; for they first required the Clergy to give their assent to the Book of Common Prayer (by Canon 36), which, having been composed and employed under Royal order, was now for the first time accepted by the Spiritual Body."

ad docendum populum, illorum Articulorum auctoritatem et fidem, non tantum concionibus suis, sed etiam subscriptione confirmabunt."

If we attend to the wording of this Canon, in connexion with the time when it was drawn up, we shall perceive that its immediate purpose, like that of the clause on the determination of heresies, was negative and restrictive, as is evident on the face of it. A main part of our controversy with Rome was, that Rome had added a number of Articles, which she enjoined as Articles of Faith, but which were without any warrant in Scripture, or in the teaching of the ancient Church. The refutation of these spurious additions to the Faith had been Jewel's great work, both in his Reply to Harding, and in the Defense of the Apology, the second enlarged Edition of which was published in 1570. Hence it seems plain that the Canon of 1571 was specially designed to forbid the inculcation of these spurious Articles of Faith. This too is the reason why Grotius, in his treatise *De Imperio Summarum Potestatum circa Sacra* (c. vi. § 9), when he is protesting against the multiplication of dogmas, extolls this Canon: "Non possum non laudare praeclarum Angliae Canonem." In the rudimental state of our Church at that time, it was very expedient to lay down this rule, and hereby to mark out the great principle which had been followed in our Reformation, as on the whole in the Lutheran also. For in that too the protest was chiefly against the later additions and corruptions of Rome. Herein they both differed from that brought about under the direction of Calvin, in whom the systematic, dogmatic spirit was predominant. In 1603, on the other hand, when we had had an

He seems to have overlooked the mention of the Common Prayer in this Canon of 1571. In the Canon of the same Convocation about Deans, it is also enjoined that they shall take care "ne qua alia forma observetur in canendis aut dicendis sacris precibus, aut in administratione sacramentorum, praeterquam quae proposita et praescripta est in Libro Publicarum Precum." The Chancellors also are to take care that all persons under their jurisdiction "observent ordines et ritus descriptos in Libro Publicarum Precum, tam in legendis Sacris Scripturis, et precibus dicendis, quam etiam in administratione sacramentorum, ut neve detrahant aliquid, neve addant, neve de materia, neve de forma."

adequate experience of the sufficiency of our own formularies, the rule laid down for preachers, in the 51st Canon, is much simpler and more definite, and therefore better, not to "publish any doctrine, either strange, or disagreeing from the word of God, or from any of the Articles of Religion agreed upon in the Convocation-house *anno* 1562, or from the Book of Common Prayer."

In the Dedication of Jewel's Works to James the First by Bishop Overall, the coincidence of our Canon with the Apology is noticed. The principal end of Jewel's writings, he says, is to shew, "that this is and hath been the open profession of the Church of England, to defend and maintain no other Church, faith, and religion, than that which is truly Catholic and Apostolic, and for such warranted, not only by the written word of God, but also by the testimony and consent of the ancient and godly Fathers. For further proof whereof, the Church of England in a Synod, *Ann.* 1571 (soon after the second impression of the Defense of this Apology), did set out, together with the Articles of Religion repeated and confirmed again by subscription, this canon—for the direction of those which were preachers and pastors, viz: '*That they should never teach anything as matter of faith religiously to be observed, but that which is agreeable to the doctrine of the Old and New Testament, and collected out of the same doctrine by the ancient fathers and catholic bishops of the Church.*' Whereby the public profession of our Church for consent with antiquity, in the articles of faith and grounds of religion, doth plainly appear; howsoever particular men may have otherwise their private opinions, and take some liberty of dissenting from the ancient Fathers, in matters not belonging to the substance of faith and religion, and in diverse expositions of some places of Scripture, so long as they keep themselves within the compass of the Apostle's rule of the proportion of faith and platform of sound doctrine."

On this point Jewel himself speaks excellently, among other places, in his *Treatise on the Holy Scriptures* (Vol. iv. p. 1173). "But what say we of the Fathers, Augustin, Ambrose,

Jerome, Cyprian, &c? What shall we think of them, or what account may we make of them? They be interpreters of the word of God. They were learned men, and learned Fathers; the instruments of the mercy of God, and vessels full of grace. We despise them not, we read them, we reverence them, and give thanks to God for them. They were witnesses to the truth; they were worthy pillars and ornaments in the Church of God. Yet may they not be compared with the word of God. We may not build upon them: we may not make them the foundation and warrant of our conscience: we may not put our trust in them. Our trust is in the name of the Lord. And thus are we taught to esteem of the learned Fathers of the Church by their own judgement.—St Augustin said of the doctors and fathers in his time: *Neque—quorumlibet disputationes, quamvis catholicorum et laudatorum hominum, velut scripturas catholicas habere debemus; ut nobis non liceat—aliquid in eorum scriptis improbare aut respuere, si forte invenerimus quod aliter senserint quam veritas habet. Talis sum ego in scriptis aliorum: tales esse volo intellectores meorum.*—Some things I believe; and some things which they write I cannot believe.—Cyprian was a doctor of the Church; yet he was deceived. Jerome was a doctor of the Church; yet he was deceived. Augustin was a doctor of the Church; yet he wrote a book of Retractations; he acknowledged that he was deceived. God did therefore give to His Church many doctors, and many learned men, which all should search the truth, and one reform another, wherein they thought him deceived. St Augustin saith: *Auferantur de medio chartae nostrae: procedat in medium codex Dei: audi Christum dicentem: audi Veritatem loquentem.*—In this sort did Origen, and Augustin, and other doctors of the Church speak of themselves, and of theirs, and the writings of others, that we should so read them, and credit them, as they agreed with the word of God. *Hoc genus literarum non cum credendi necessitate, sed cum judicandi libertate* [that is, with the exercise of private judgement] *legendum est.*—The Fathers are learned: they have preeminence in the Church: they are judges: they have the gifts of wisdom and understanding; yet

they are often deceived. They are our fathers, but not fathers unto God. They are stars, fair, and beautiful, and bright; yet they are not the sun: they bear witness of the light; they are not the light. Christ is the Sun of Righteousness: Christ is the Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world.”\*

Surely this is a reasonable, intelligent, and sufficient recognition of the worth of the Fathers. The value of their testimony is indeed of a twofold kind, that which they may have as witnesses of the general belief of the Church in their age, and that which they derive from their individual gifts. In the latter respect they differ greatly, according to the diversity of their gifts. Chrysostom and his School have their value, Origen and Jerome theirs, Athanasius and Basil theirs, Augustin, Ambrose, Hilary theirs. As usual too, their peculiar gifts often become their peculiar temptations; as we see most conspicuously perhaps, or at all events with the greatest regret, in Augustin, the worth of whose writings, were it not for this, would be doubled. Herein however the Fathers do not differ essentially, nor even

\* Jewel, it is notorious, was a special object of dislike and invective to the flippant railer, of whom Dr Newman says (*Lectures on Anglicanism*, p. 32) that he, “if any, is the author of the movement altogether.” He, whom Hooker (II. vi. 4,) calls “the worthiest divine that Christendom hath bred for the space of some hundreds of years,” was insolently termed “an irreverent dissenter.” In an Article in *the British Critic* for July 1841, ascribed to a minister of our Church who some time after quitted us for Rome, where his heart had long been, an attempt is made to justify Mr Froude’s abuse. That Article was one of the first announcements of the purpose of *unprotestantizing* our Church (p. 45); and Jewel’s chief sin is his being a Protestant, and agreeing with the Protestants abroad; of whom the writer seems to know about as much as the rest of his School. For one charge against Jewel is, that he past nearly the whole period of Mary’s reign “in close and confidential intercourse with Peter Martyr, as well as with Bullinger, Zuingli, and the rest of the congregation at Zurich” (p. 34). Now Zuingli was killed at the battle of Cappel in 1531, whereas Jewel did not go to Zurich till 1556; so that, his intercourse with the living Zuingli can hardly have been more intimate than that of the Reviewer with Zuingli’s writings or life. This is a blunder into which a person, having the slightest knowledge of the Swiss Reformation, could not have fallen. But it is not a very unfair sample of the learning with which the Tractarians thought fit to arm themselves for their warfare against the foreign Protestants. Ignorance often stands us in stead, by keeping us from knowing how ignorant we are. Polyphemus, when his eye was out, could not even see his own misses.

specifically, from the divines of later ages, from Luther and Calvin, from Jewel and Hooker. The divines of the seventeenth century also have their own gifts; and so, scanty as they may be, have those of the eighteenth. On each of these his peculiar gifts have been bestowed by one and the same Spirit, dividing to each severally as He will; and they all work together under His direction for the edifying of the Church.

The English good sense, and respect for that which is and which has been,—the desire, so signally exemplified through our whole history, to connect that which is with that which has been,—our preference of the real and practical to the abstract and theoretical, as they have been the regulating principles of our Church in all things, have also determined our mode of dealing with the Fathers. In this matter there has been a remarkable agreement among all our writers who have any claim to the name of theologians. As Field expresses it (B. IV. c. 16), “Touching the interpretations which the Fathers have delivered, we receive them as undoubtedly true, in the general doctrine they consent in, and so far forth esteem them as authentical; yet do we think that, holding the faith of the Fathers, it is lawful to dissent from that interpretation of some particular places, which the greater part of them have delivered, or perhaps all that have written of them, and to find out some other not mentioned by any of the ancients.” Of course too this liberty has increast along with the wider range and improved method of Philology.

In like manner Jeremy Taylor, in the *Dissuasive from Popery* (P. 1. c. 1. § 1), proves the identity of our Church with the primitive. “The religion of our Church is therefore certainly primitive and apostolic, because it teaches us to believe the whole Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, and nothing else, as matter of faith; and therefore, unless there can be new Scriptures, we can have no new matters of belief, no new Articles of Faith. Whatsoever we cannot prove from thence, we disclaim it, as not deriving from the fountains of our Saviour. We also do believe the Apostles Creed, the Nicene, with the additions of

Constantinople, and that which is commonly called the Symbol of St Athanasius : and the four first general Councils are so entirely admitted by us, that they, together with the plain words of Scripture, are made the rule and measure of judging heresies amongst us : and in pursuance of these it is commanded by our Church, that the Clergy shall never teach anything as ‘matter of Faith, religiously to be observed, but that which is agreeable to the Old and New Testament, and collected out of the same doctrine by the ancient Fathers and Catholic Bishops of the Church.’ This was undoubtedly the faith of the primitive Church. They admitted all into their communion that were of this faith.—That which we rely upon, is the same that the primitive Church did acknowledge to be the adequate foundation of their hopes in the matters of belief : the way which they thought sufficient to go to heaven in, is the way which we walk : what they did not teach, we do not publish and impose : into this faith entirely, and into no other, as they did theirs, so we baptize our catechumens : the discrimination of heresy from Catholic doctrine which they used, we use also ; and we use no other ; and in short we believe all that doctrine which the Church of Rome believes, except those things which they have superinduced upon the old religion, and in which we shall prove that they have innovated. So that, by their confession, all the doctrine which we teach the people as matter of faith, must be confest to be ancient, primitive, and apostolic ; or else theirs is not so. For ours is the same ; and we both have received this faith from the fountains of Scripture and universal tradition ; not they from us, or we from them, but both of us from Christ and His Apostles.”

In the second part of the *Dissuasive* (B. 1. § 2), Taylor shews that the rule adopted by our Church is also the rule laid down concurrently by the Fathers of the third and fourth centuries : and unless the passages which he alledges are proved to be fallacious,—which they never have been, and cannot be,—his conclusion as to the identity of our Church with the primitive must stand fast, and cannot be shaken. In fact he is merely the

spokesman of the whole body of our divines down to our times. One after another, they have taken up their parable, and have demonstrated this same truth ; which indeed is so manifest and palpable, that all attempts to rebut it have been utterly futile. This too at first was the position taken up by the Tractarians, the position which Dr Newman himself tried to maintain in his Lectures on Romanism, as is apparent even in the passage quoted above in p. 97.

At present, on the other hand, he asserts the very contrary. Nay, in the last of his Lectures on Anglicanism, he tells us that it was by the study of the Fathers that he was led to Rome. How was this revolution brought about ? In my Vindication of Luther, when touching on this change, I have cited a prophetic passage from Coleridge's *Remains*, where that great intuitive philosopher foretells, that students of the Fathers, who have no deeper philosophy than that of our ordinary English systems, are almost sure of falling into the arms of Rome ; and I have tried to suggest some explanation why this should be so. In fact, even in Dr Newman's most confident assertion of the impregnableness of his original position, we may discern the germs of his subsequent development. As he has shewn so much skill in developing, not opposites out of opposites,—which would be in conformity to an ordinary law of Nature,—but contraries out of contraries, so in his own life he had just been doing the same thing. He allowed the enemy to enter by a mine into his impregnable position, as Camillus entered into Veii ; and then he surrendered at discretion.

From the first, as I have observed in the Charge, the party, who afterward obtained the name of Tractarians, set themselves to maintain what they regarded as the peculiar position of the English Church, against two opposite enemies, on the one side against the Church of Rome, on the other against our English Dissenters ; and in doing the latter they laid a special stress on that portion of her characteristics whereby she is chiefly distinguished from our Dissenters, her discipline, and her respect and deference for Antiquity. With this view they extended the



application of the clause in the Act of Uniformity concerning Heresies, and of the Canon of 1571, somewhat beyond their original purpose ; which, as we have seen, was mainly negative and restrictive, to prohibit the enforcement of any doctrine as necessary, and the condemnation of any as heretical, except where such a decision was confirmed by the consent of the early Church. Dr Newman, on the other hand, and his followers, try to make these rules positive and directive, as repressive of private judgement, and enjoining the teaching of all that the early Church taught. Thus in the *Lectures on Romanism* (p. 322), where he cites both these enactments, he says that we, unlike both the Romanists and the mere Protestants, “consider Antiquity and Catholicity to be the real guides, and the Church their organ.” Now, after what has been said above, it will easily be seen that the prohibition, *You must not inculcate any doctrine as an Article of Faith except what the early Church teaches*, is by no means convertible into the injunction, *You must teach whatever the early Church teaches*: not to mention that both these rules were omitted, and, as it were, dropt by our Church, when she had drawn up her own Formularies to supersede them, the Canon of 1571 in the collection of 1604, and the clause concerning Heresies in the subsequent enactments on the same subject. Still less can we recognise the true spirit of our Church in what Dr Newman said in the next page: “Explicit as our Articles are in asserting that the doctrines of faith are contained and must be pointed out in Scripture, yet they give no hint that private persons may presume to search Scripture independently of external help, and to determine for themselves what is saving. The Church has a prior claim to do so ; but even the Church asserts it not, but hands over the office to Catholic Antiquity. In what our Articles say of Holy Scripture as the document of proof, exclusive reference is had to *teaching*. It is not said that individuals are to infer the faith, but that the Church is to prove it from Scripture ; not that individuals are to learn it, but are to be taught it.—It does not say what individuals may do, but what the Church may not do.—The question whether individuals

may exercise a right of Private Judgement on the text of Scripture in matters of faith, is not even contemplated." But surely it is a complete misapprehension of the nature of laws, to require that they should be distinctly and specifically permissive. A law does not say, *You may do this*: the rule for its interpretation is, *Quod non prohibetur permittitur*. Surely too our Church did assert her right to search Scripture,—not indeed "independently of external help," but making use of such help as she could obtain, though without fettering herself thereby, or resigning her right to exercise her own judgement upon that help, under the guidance of the Spirit of Truth,—by her own act, when she drew up her Articles and Formularies, and when, having proved their sufficiency, she cast aside her previous leading-strings. Moreover, by laying down that it is not lawful for her "to ordain anything contrary to Scripture," or "to enforce anything besides Scripture," she in a manner challenges the examination of her teaching, and almost invites her members to ascertain its congruity with Scripture. She never feared this test, never shrank from it. She durst not contradict her Lord's exhortation to the Jews to search the Scriptures; nor did she doubt that, if those of the Old Testament would be found on a careful examination to testify of Him, a like testimony would be derived from those of the New Testament by every conscientious enquirer. She did not conceive that the Apostolic precepts, to *prove all things*, to *try the spirits*, to *give a reason for our faith*, were to be translated, for the great body of the faithful, into commands, under pain of excommunication, to prove nothing, to take all things upon trust, and to give up our reason blindfold into the hands of a self-styled infallible guide. By taking this view of our position, and by his vehement repudiation of Private Judgement, Dr Newman shewed from the first, that he was likely to quit the ground of our Church, and to migrate to Rome: and as these tendencies in his writings involved him and his partisans in severe controversies, which are mostly bitterest when among the members of the same household, while Romanists rather welcomed such hopeful auxiliaries, they became

stronger and stronger, according to the wonted effect of controversies, while the estrangement from the whole Protestant side of our Church became more complete.

A similar tendency may also be observed in the passage quoted above in p. 97, where he says: "Abstract arguments, original views, novel interpretations of Scripture, may be met by similar artifices on the other side; but historical facts are proof against the force of talent, and remain where they were, when it has expended itself." The shallowness of this passage might be deemed marvellous, as proceeding from so acute a logician; were it not continually found that the logical faculty is totally distinct from the apprehensive and the intuitive, and often subversive, or at least perverse of them. It is not easy to say which member of the foregoing sentence implies the greatest number of fallacies. Is it not the old rigmarole against Copernicus and Kepler, against Galileo and Newton, that *abstract arguments, original views, novel interpretations of Nature, may be met by similar artifices on the other side? but physical facts are proof against the force of talent, and remain where they were when it has expended itself.*—Do you not see that the sun moves? do you not feel that the earth stands still? So argues the Church of Rome. *These are plain facts, simple facts, palpable facts, facts proof against the force of talent; and in spite of all your mathematics they remain just where they were.* Therefore Copernicus, Galileo, Newton are to be condemned, or, at the utmost, allowed to pass as clever dealers in "abstract arguments and original views." Has Dr Newman never felt that there is a truth in philosophy, in ethics, in religion, nay, in history, and even in poetry, of a totally different character from "abstract arguments," and "original views," a truth in which the old and the new blend into one, in which fact and idea become identified? Is it indeed the case, that, as has been reported, Dr Newman believes that the Ptolemaic and the Copernican system of the world are both true? or that one of them is true one day, and the other the next, in ever-recurring alternation, much like Anglicanism and Romanism? Or how could any man, who has reflected for an hour on the

course of his own life, on the processes of his own mind, on the manifold transitions from the thoughts of the child to those of the man, or on the events which have been going on in the world around him,—not to speak of those which have been the objects of the continually ebbing and flowing controversies of historians,—pronounce that “historical facts are proof against talent, and remain where they were, when it has expended itself.” True, the objective facts do so remain; but what is he speaking of here, except the subjective view of those facts, the view which he had previously taken, and which has now been superseded by a directly contrary view? This abjuration of Reason, this confounding of Reason with abstract arguments and original views, and this setting up of arbitrary conceptions of facts, of pseudo-miracles and imaginary saintship, as the tests of truth, are essential characters of Romanism; and when we meet with them in the adversary of Romanism, they portend that, if he is not mercifully preserved from following the tendencies of his own mind, he will ere long become its captive. In sooth what do we know of a fact, beyond the conception which we form of it, and which is subject to all manner of influences? or how is it possible to draw any inference whatsoever from a multitude of facts, such as is presented by the writings of the Fathers, and the traditions of the early Church, except so far as the dead sticks, which lie scattered about, are pickt up and gathered into a fagot, or organized into a structure, by the ecclesiastical historian?

How far historical facts are from being “proofs against the force of talent, and remaining where they were when it has expended itself,” Dr Newman must have found out long ago. For this is the main topic and argument of his *Essay on Development*; in which he takes the self-same materials as in his *Lectures on Romanism*, professes to draw his arguments from the Fathers, and comes to a directly contrary conclusion. The Fathers, he said in 1837, are against Rome, and with us: but now they have veered round: East is become West, and West East: the Fathers reject us, and recognise Rome as their lawful

offspring. Still, after all, we have this plain advantage: the direct testimony of the Fathers is in our favour; and it is only when they have been submitted to sundry processes of development, that evidence in behalf of Rome can be extorted from them. Therefore, in spite of this modern apology for Romanism, we may still maintain, as confidently as ever, that our Church is one with that of primitive Antiquity. What we used to call Romish additions are now termed developments by their own champion, and thus admitted to be novelties; and, even if they could be shewn to be legitimate developments; this would not prove them to be necessary. Hence the rule of the early Councils condemns and rejects this augmentation of the Articles of Faith.

In the last *Lecture on Anglicanism* indeed Dr Newman assumes a bolder tone, and pronounces (p. 296) that "no candid person who has fairly examined the state of the case can doubt that, if we (the Romanists) differ from the Fathers in a few things, Protestants differ in all, and if we vary from them in accidentals, they contradict them in essentials." Here the distinction, if it be relevant to his argument, ought to be between the Church of England and that of Rome: but in that case his assertion would be too glaringly false, too gross a contradiction to his own former teaching. Therefore he uses the indefinite, comprehensive term, *Protestants*, which must here be meant to comprise the Church of England; and thus a charge is insinuated against her, which he has himself shewn to be directly contrary to truth.\* He then complains that our controversialists

\* Professor Butler has pointed out (p. 86), that one of Dr Newman's rhetorical artifices in his *Essay on Development* is his "vividly describing infidelity, and calling it Protestantism, and under the Protestantism so described covertly leaving to be included the Catholic Church of England." Now I do not in the slightest degree mean to disclaim the title of Protestant in its application to our Church, if only it be rightly understood. Our Church is Protestant, in that it protests against the usurpations and the corruptions of Rome. Nor is it a name to be ashamed of, under the fancy that Protestantism is a mere negation. Every prophet, every preacher of truth and righteousness from the beginning, has been a Protestant, has had to lift up his voice in protesting against the vices and follies of his contemporaries. The false prophets, who cry peace where there is no peace, are not Protestants: but he who cries that there is no peace to the wicked, is, in so doing, a Protestant. The Law, with its imperative *Thou shalt not*, is Protestant.

call upon the Romanists to shew why they differ at all from the Fathers, "though partially and intelligibly, in matters of discipline and in the tone of their opinions;" and adds that Jewel "tries to throw dust in the eyes of the world," by making "an attack on the Papacy pass for an Apology of the Church of England; and more writers have followed his example than it is worth while, or indeed possible, to enumerate. And they have been answered again and again; and the so-called novelties of modern Catholicism have been explained,—at the very lowest—as far as to shew that we have a *case* against them." The names of our apologists, as well as of the Romish answerers, he prudently omits: they would have indicated too plainly which scale had kickt the beam, and what sort of a *case* has been made out against us. For does he mean Harding's answer to Jewel? or Brerely's to Field? or Smith's and Serjeant's to Bramhall? or the same doughty Serjeant's to Jeremy Taylor, and to Stillingfleet? or Knott's to Chillingworth? in most of which combats the Romish champion gained much such a victory as the famous one of Goliath over David, like to it not only in the issue, but also in the meekness of the tone which preceded it. Or was he perchance rather thinking of his own answers to his previous censures of Rome? in which he certainly is very forbearing and indulgent toward his opponent,—a happy exception therein to the ordinary fulminations of Romish polemics,

So too is the Gospel, in that the *light shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehendeth it not*. There is a mode of Protestantism indeed, which is a mere negation: but true Protestantism is only that assertion of the truth, which involves a denunciation of the opposite errors, that proclamation of the light, which not only diffuses the light, but drives away the darkness. Dr Newman, in his former state, took the lead in dressing up Protestantism as a scarecrow, at which he and his followers took fright; and for a time they were continually exclaiming that they were not Protestants, but Anglicans. Now however, in trying to lure those whom he deserted to follow him, he tells them (*Lectures on Anglicanism*, p. 132) that "nearly all our divines, if not all, call themselves Protestants." Doubtless so they do, even Laud, on the most solemn occasions, in his speeches both before the Lords and before the Commons, and in that on the scaffold. The strange thing is, that a person should have had any acquaintance with our divines, and not have found this out. This is the way in which talent is proof against facts.

—while he reserves all his severity for the Church he has forsaken : and yet even in these skirmishes, we may maintain, the advantage, if there be any, is oftenest on our side. Doubtless however the Romanists have a *case*. But who has not? Judas Iscariot has had his apologists; and we have just seen a *case* made out in defense of Louis Bonaparte's atrocious crimes. Dr Newman seems to hold that no victory can be decisive, unless the adversary is driven from his position, and confesses it. This however can rarely be effected in intellectual warfare, where practical interests are concerned. The Byzantine Empire lingered on for centuries after its moral life was almost extinct: and so may it be with the Papacy. At all events so it has been with several of the Eastern branches of the Church. But in fact the *Essay on Development* is a virtual abandonment of the long-contested position.

As to the assertion that our divines charge Rome with differing from the Fathers, "partially and intelligibly, in matters of discipline and in the tone of her opinions," it is true that a large part of Jewel's twenty-seven propositions relate to circumstantial details connected with Transubstantiation and the Adoration of the Host; these having been the most prominent points in the disputations which preceded the martyrdom of Cranmer and his companions. But his *Apology* takes a wider ground; and if we turn to Jeremy Taylor's *Dissuasive*, we find that the first chapter treats of the controverted Articles in which the doctrine of the Roman Church "is neither catholic, apostolic, nor primitive;" and, to look only at the table of its various sections, he exemplifies this with regard to the power of making new Articles claimed by Rome, and in the Roman Doctrine of Indulgences, the Doctrine of Purgatory, the Doctrine of Transubstantiation, the Half-Communion, the denial of Public Prayer to the Common People in a language they understand, the Veneration of Images, the Pope's Universal Bishopric, the Invocation of Saints, the Insufficiency of Scripture without Traditions, &c. Now will Dr Newman dare to assert, that these innovations, with which we charge Rome, are "partial and intelligible, in matters of

discipline, and in the tone of her opinions?" He dares not assert it directly; but he does assert it indirectly. Who then is it that "tries to throw dust in the eyes of the world?" His excuse must be, that he had previously thrown it into his own eyes, so as to blind his understanding, and almost to blind his conscience.

To discuss the *Essay on Development*, and to point out its numerous fallacies, would be inconsistent with the scope of these Notes, and would require a separate volume, which is hardly needed. For its utter hollowness was exhibited in the most convincing manner, as it seems to me, soon after its publication, by my brother-in-law, Professor Maurice, in the Preface to his *Lectures on the Hebrews*; and its principles were subjected to a searching analysis, which detected all manner of fallacies, by the late Professor Butler, in a very able series of Letters, which were printed in *the Irish Ecclesiastical Journal*, and have now been collected. Several years ago, in Note G to *the Mission of the Comforter*, I made some observations on the necessity of progressive developments in the expansion of Theology, and on the regulative principles by which they must be determined; and the correctness of those observations does not seem to have been invalidated by Dr Newman's subsequent Essay, or by the Replies to it. Hence I cannot take the ground of denying his first principle, that Theology is a science designed, like other sciences, to be developed gradually under the influence of those circumstances which determine the expansion of the human mind. But, this being conceded, two important questions remain. Are Dr Newman's developments legitimate? and I think nothing can well be more arbitrary and confused than the process by which he elicits the main part of them: they are rather accretions, than developments. Besides, even if this were not so, if his developments were indeed legitimate, there is still another question: Are they of such a kind, of such manifest truth, of such primary moment, so clearly derivable from Scripture, and so essential to the entireness of our Christianity, as to justify the Church in imposing them as additional Articles of Faith, or in insisting on their practical reception?



Whereto we may reply with the utmost confidence, that they are not. In fact most of them are contrary to primitive truth, contrary to purity of faith, contrary to holiness of life.

After what has been said in this Note, we may fairly pronounce that Dr Newman's assertion, that "Protestants differ from the Fathers in all things," and "contradict them in essentials,"—if by Protestants he means the Church of England, as exhibited in her formularies and in the teaching of her chief doctors,—is directly contrary to the truth, as he well knows, having himself proved it in his *Lectures on Romanism*: and assuredly this is one of the historical facts, which remain just where they were, after all the resources of controversial ingenuity have been expended upon it. Yet, among the gross delusions by which the deserters from our Church have been drawn away, one is, that she is not a legitimate successor of the Apostolic Church, that she is not connected with the Apostolic by any continuous tradition,—nay, that she is the creature of the sixteenth century. The impudent old question, — *Where was your religion before Luther?*—is still askt; and though the assertion implied in it has been refuted a thousand times over, it is still able to gull some of those who have distorted their intellectual vision by poring over ecclesiastical and theological controversies. As Jeremy Taylor well replies (*Dissuasive*, c. 1. § 12), "It is much more easy for us to shew our religion before Luther, than for them to shew theirs before Trent. And although they can shew too much practice of their religion in the degenerate ages of the Church, yet we can and do clearly shew ours in the purest and first ages; and can and do draw lines, pointing to the times and places where the several rooms and stories of their Babel were builded, and where polisht, and where furnisht.—When almost all Christian princes did complain heavily of the corrupt state of the Church, and of Religion, and no remedy could be had,—then it was that divers Christian kingdoms, and particularly the Church of England,—being ashamed of the errors, superstitions, heresies, and impieties, which had deturpated the face of the Church, lookt in the glass of Scripture and pure Antiquity, and

washt away those stains with which time and inadvertency and tyranny had besmeared her, and, being thus cleansed and washt, is accused by the Roman parties of novelty, and condemned because she refuses to run into the same excess of riot and deordination. But we cannot deserve blame, who return to our ancient and first health, by preferring a new cure before an old sore."

As to the argument which Mr Newman has brought forward several times over in his recent writings under one form or other,—that the Church of Rome is the only Church now existing which resembles that of the Fathers, and that, if any of them were to visit the earth, they would own it as their communion,—it has been excellently answered by Professor Butler in his Seventh Letter; with a few extracts from which I will wind up this Note. Both Athanasius and Augustin, he says (p. 278), when they have any point to establish, do not appeal to the decision of Rome; but "go to work with their Bibles in the most unequivocally Protestant fashion, and appeal to the common belief of their predecessors, like simple Catholics, who knew no better. Their Scripture texts are not confirmations, but principles. The Syrian exegetics,—were never declined by—Chrysostom, or Cyril of Jerusalem, or Ephrem, or Basil. There is no one of the dogmatic treatises of those times, (allowance made for peculiarities of style and incidental allusions—) which might not have been the production of our Hammond, or Pearson, or Taylor. There is not one of them,—that could by any possibility be conceived written, as it stands, by Romish divines." Further,—after some remarks on the exterior resemblance arising from identity of climate and race,—he adds (p. 296) that, were Athanasius and Ambrose to come to Oxford, as Dr Newman supposes, he should not be "confident of a verdict, if the illustrious strangers were forced to a decision within an hour after their arrival. But Athanasius and Ambrose were both men of distinguisht intellectual powers; and with a reasonable time for enquiry I should have no doubt at all of the issue. And even as regards the first immediate aspect of

Romanism, Mr Newman will never persuade me that St Athanasius would have joined 'the unlettered crowd before the altar,' when he heard that crowd utter the prayer of enthusiastic devotion to creatures,—to *himself*,—he who has so emphatically declared that 'Angels themselves are not worshipt, but worshipers, and God alone to be adored,' and built on the exclusiveness of the right the proof of the Divinity of his Lord; or that Ambrose, who proclaims that 'the Church knows no such idle forms of images,' would have willingly bowed his mitred head to the drest and painted statue of a holy woman. -But—an appeal lies to mightier authorities still. Ambrose and Athanasius vail before Paul. I conduct the Apostle from an English country church, with its noble and intelligible Liturgy, and the expressive simplicity of its ritual, and the chastened ardours of its Communion, to the procession of the Host, and the incensing priests chanting in *an unknown tongue*, and the crowd of worshipers prostrate before the God beneath the canopy,—and I confidently ask, which communion would he take for his own?"

## NOTE F: p. 25.

WE have just been witnesses of the hugest act, and one of the hugest facts, one of the most saddening and dismal in the whole history of the world. Seven millions of men, almost the entire mass of a mighty nation, of a nation that boasts of standing at the head of all civilization and culture, and that has been striving and panting and grasping after Liberty, and wading through fire and through blood, through every mode of death and of crime, for the last sixty years in pursuit of it, have just been exercising the privilege they have thus acquired,—and for what purpose?—to cast away their liberty, and to set up a master, who shall rule over them with absolute, despotic sway. And who is the man whom they have set up for such an end? to make a constitution for them, to order and renovate the whole fabric of their state, to dispose of their families, their

wives, their children, their possessions, according to his arbitrary, uncontrolled will. The Spartans of old, we read, set up Lycurgus for such a work,—the Athenians, Solon,—their wisest, justest, most faithful, most upright, most generous, most temperate and sober-minded, most patriotic citizen, of whom they knew that he loved his country better than himself, that he would seek no selfish aim, but only justice and the public good, that for these he would joyfully sacrifice himself. This however was in barbarous, heathen times. We, in this nineteenth century of the Catholic Church, and of modern civilization, have learnt a different lore. The nation now is to be sacrificed to the lusts of the Prince, whose claims to his exaltation are founded on triple perjury, and on the massacre of thousands of his peaceful fellow-citizens, and the pledges and prognostics of whose legislation are to be sought in the seizure, imprisonment, transportation, murder, of whomsoever he, or any of his officers, chooses thus to honour, and in the suppression of every utterance, whether by writing or speech, except of such as are willing to lick the dust at his feet. So inveterate a part is it of man's weak, corrupt nature, to desire to be ruled by a master, and to dread and shrink from the dangers of liberty and personal responsibility.

As an appropriate accompaniment of this most dismal fact, we have seen the governors of that Church, which in like manner abhors liberty, and crushes personal responsibility, ready and eager to applaud the most outrageous crimes, and to fraternize with the most atrocious criminals, if they will seek her favour by varnishing over their crimes with a coating of religious hypocrisy. And is not this huge act, which has just taken place in France, a sort of parallel to what has been going on in England of late years, and in Germany during the earlier part of the last half century? Of the excuses which the deserters from liberty and truth may have found in the latter country, from the previous licentiousness of a shallow, all-confounding rationalism, I will not here speak. But surely, if we marvel at the zeal with which the French nation are

bending their necks under their new yoke, it is still more marvellous that, in the present state of the English nation and of the English Church, her sons, without any such excuse, should be rushing over to a somewhat similar despotism, beseeching it to put out their eyes, and to manacle their reason, and to gag their conscience. So singular is the analogy between these facts, that every other newspaper furnishes us with some fresh illustration of it. No one is to print, no one is to speak, no one is to think, save what the political Pope wills and commands. Already the process has commenced of castrating the literature of former times, lest any manly voice from better days offensive to the new Hierarch should be heard among the people. Meanwhile the Church looks on, and smiles, and blesses the holy work.

One lesson imprest on us by these events, a lesson confirmed by the whole of history, is, that freedom, whether political or intellectual, cannot exist, except in union with moral temperance and selfcontroll. The repugnance to freedom, the wish to be rid of it, arises in most cases from the conscious want of self-controll. Men know not what to think; their loose thoughts drive them to and fro; they hesitate, and doubt, and falter, and slip about; and hence they crave after infallibility, to fasten and pin them down, and tell them what they are to think, and what they are to do. It is in this morbid craving for a master, for a rule, for something that shall deliver us from the burthen of exercising our own reason and will, that the claim of Papal infallibility finds its main support.

This claim, as asserted specifically for the Bishop of Rome, is notoriously of comparatively recent origin. No trace of it whatsoever is to be found for many centuries, no hint of a notion that there was any infallible guide, by whose wisdom the difficulties and perplexities of the Church, in her innumerable harassing controversies with all forms of heresy, might be set at rest.\* There was no *bos locutus* even at Rome itself. The

\* Barrow urges this argument repeatedly. "Why did not the Council of Trent itself, without more ado, and keeping such a disputing, refer all to his

oracles were dumb ; or rather there was one oracle, one infallible Guide, to which all the teachers of the Church resorted, which Athanasius and Chrysostom and Basil, and Ambrose and Augustin and Hilary consulted, with equal diligence and patience and submission, and from which they had a sure and certain hope that, under the guidance of the Spirit of God, they should learn the truth. Afterward, when the mind of the old world had burnt out, and that of the new, modern world was yet in its infancy, and through the centuries during which it continued in its nonage, it received the lessons it was taught, with implicit, unquestioning credulity, after the manner of childhood, and did not think of examining into the grounds or limits of the authority of its teacher. It was during these centuries that the Papacy grew up, and, being the chief possessor of religious truth, and wielder of religious power, absorbed that power without difficulty more and more into itself. How easily might Hildebrand, might Innocent, looking abroad from his spiritual watch-tower on the world around him, and beholding the selfishness, the cruelty, the reckless ambition of the princes and lords, and the blindness and misery of their subjects and vassals,—feeling in himself too that he was called to alleviate and remedy these evils and miseries, and to establish the majesty of Truth and Righteousness upon earth,—how easily might he

oracular decision?—Concord was maintained and controversies decided without him in the ancient Church,—in Synods, wherein he was not the sole judge, nor had observable influence.” p. 650. “The ancients—in case of contentions, had no recourse to his judgment ; they did not stand to his opinion ; his authority did not avail to quash disputes. They had recourse to the holy Scriptures, to Catholic tradition, to reason : they disputed and discussed points by dint of argument. Ireneus, Tertullian, Vincentius Lirinensis, and others, discoursing of the methods to resolve points of controversy, did not reckon the Pope’s authority for one. Divers of the Fathers did not scruple openly to dissent from the opinions of Popes ; nor were they wondered at or condemned for it.” p. 736. “The ancients knew no such pretender to infallibility ; otherwise they would have left disputing, and run to his oracular dictates for information. They would have only asserted this point against heretics. We should have had testimonies of it innumerable. It had been the most famous point of all,” p. 738. The facts being indisputably such, Barrow’s argument is quite unanswerable. It has been well put by Professor Butler, pp. 277–281.

grow to regard himself as charged with a divine mission to overthrow the tyranny of the Prince of this world, and to set up Christ's Kingdom in its stead! How much of truth was there in this belief! and how easy was the transition, how manifold the temptations, to conceive that, in the warfare, which he almost alone was waging against the powers of earth and hell, he was Christ's vicegerent, empowered to use all the weapons of His spiritual armory, and to conquer armies by anathemas. That this was an erroneous view of the nature of Christ's Kingdom, and of the means whereby it was to be spread,—that it was beset by a number of almost irresistible temptations,—that he who entertained it would be prone to exalt himself inordinately, and to open his heart to the very spirit he was combating,—we now know. Still more certain was it, that successors of a less grand type of character would abuse and pervert the power thus acquired, and, instead of devoting themselves to the holy work of bringing mankind into the Kingdom of Christ, would employ the weapons of that Kingdom in setting themselves up as lords over the earth. To their rule however the mass of the people submitted, not unwillingly. The dominion of the crook was milder than that of the sword. Men's thoughts were scarcely out of the shell, their desires narrow, their knowledge next to nothing. They were ready to believe what they were told by God's messengers and priests. Even if a Bible had been procurable, and they had had the power of reading it, how could they dare to take it in their hands, to turn over its magical pages, to frame notions of their own about its mystic words? The use of a learned language, different from that of the people, was itself an effectual mode of keeping off the profane vulgar, of making religion a thing of distant wonder and awe. As to those whose understandings had been trained to habits of reflexion, the philosophy of the Middle Ages led them rather to spin notions about things, and to build up castles in the air, than to take hold of them, and look at them, and search into them, and interrogate them. They who scarcely condescended to look at outward objects, except when seen in

Aristotle's mirror, were readily contented to seek for revealed truth in the canons of Councils and the decretals of Popes. Or, if any soul was kindled by a living spark from the altar, there were divers means of quenching and extinguishing it, which were used without scruple.

These remarks may help us in accounting for the fact that the claim of Papal infallibility was not distinctly asserted until the dawn of the Reformation. The supremacy of the Popes had rather been exercised in disciplinary and ritual matters, which pertain more appropriately to such a tribunal, than on questions of doctrine. But the transition from the former to the latter was easy, and almost unavoidable; and how dazzling are the temptations of an empire, which is to be wielded over the hearts and souls of men, which is to make their reason, their conscience, the innermost springs of the will, bow down to it! When the first gleams of the Reformation began to break through the darkness, the relations between the various classes of society, between the secular power and the spiritual, between secular and spiritual knowledge, were entering upon a great change; which has been going on ever since. The modern world was coming of age, was no longer to be in the same manner *under tutors and governors*. Self-consciousness was awakening, and asserting its awful, its terrible rights. Men were becoming more alive to the sense of their own personality, of their own individuality, and, as involved therein, of their own responsibility. When the blessed art of printing multiplied the copies of the Bible, and the revival of ancient literature, and the growth of philology enabled persons to study it, they began to feel that it was no longer allowable to take religion upon trust, that it was their duty to go to the fountain-head, to search the Scriptures, which God had so graciously thrown open to them. Hereby the authority, which had previously been submitted to unquestioningly, was shaken to its base. It could no longer uphold itself by a bare *Ipse dixit*. It had to seek for some ulterior support, for that of Reason,—if Reason could be enlisted to support it,—if not, for some plausible substitute.



Everybody assumes that, what has long been his *de facto*, is his *de jure* also. The possibility of an abuse, when our prescriptive rights are called in question, does not enter our heads. Thus it may not have been a very wide step,—yet it was a very bold one,—one of the most audacious ever taken by man,—to assert that the authority in doctrinal matters, which the Papacy had hitherto exercised during the intermission of Councils, on the strength of its supremacy, belonged to it by an inherent, divine right on account of its infallibility. Seldom has a grosser imposture been practised, never a cleverer, or one which shewed a more piercing insight into the weaknesses of the human heart. How must the Italians have laughed in their sleeves, when they asserted the infallibility of the Pope! How, above all, must the Popes themselves have laughed in their sleeves, when they proclaimed their own infallibility! Hildebrand may have believed himself inspired; Innocent may have believed himself inspired; but what faith could Alexander the Sixth, or Julius the Second, or the classical voluptuary, Leo the Tenth, or the tortuous politician, Clement the Seventh, have in his own infallibility with regard to things spiritual and divine? If they did not deem Christianity itself a lie,—as no small number of the Popes must have done,—to be upheld for the sake of their own power or pleasures, or, at best, for the sake of social order and morality, at all events they assuredly knew themselves to be mere lies, lies in all things, above all in the pretension to an infallible discernment of religious truth. Surely it is a terrible thought, that a man,—it may be a good man,—should be doomed to spend his whole life in acting out such an imposture. Of all the snares of the Papacy this has been the most delusive, of all its plagues the most pernicious. Its tendency has been to eradicate the very idea and principle of truth from the soul. They who live under its influence lose the faith that anything is true in itself, lose their faith in that Reason, which God has given us as an organ for the discernment of Truth. Truth becomes dependent on the *fiat* of a mere man. Hence in nations, over which the Papacy has exercised an

uncontested sway, the love of truth has faded from the conscience; and a sort of indifference to truth, as such, has become a characteristic of Romanism, as contradistinguished from Catholicism, especially of the Jesuit order, constituted as it was for the sake of asserting and vindicating the unlimited claims of the Papacy.

What an awful example of this is afforded by the manner in which the Church of Rome has dealt with Physical Science! The infallible Pope, under the bondage of his infallibility, compelled Galileo to recant. Probably the Pope himself was well aware that he was compelling him to lie: but what mattered one more lie, in a world the very element of which was falsehood? At all events Galileo knew that he was betraying the truth, which he had been chosen to proclaim to mankind. Had he been a German, had he been an Englishman, he could not have done so: even if he had tried to utter the words, they would have "stuck in his throat." But, having been bred up as an Italian, in an atmosphere of falsehood, he solaced himself with that bitter jest, which ought to have wrung his heart's blood from him, *e pur si muove*. Must he not have felt, when he said this, as though the very foundations of the world were out of course, as though something still more solid than the earth were tottering under his feet? and what must have been his thoughts of God, whose archpriest had forced him to utter this absolute falsehood? of a God who was to be propitiated by lies about His works? We know too that this was not an insulated act, but a sample of a system, a link in a chain of falsehood, if such a chain or system can be. With good reason then might Barrow, who felt the preciousness of Truth, both scientific and religious, declare (vol. I. p. 641, ed. 1716): "The greatest tyranny that ever was invented in the world, is the pretense of infallibility. For Dionysius and Phalaris did leave the mind free, pretending only to dispose of body and goods according to their will: but the Pope, not content to make us do and say what he pleaseth, will have us also to think so, denouncing his imprecations and spiritual menaces if we

do not." Can any one look at the declaration by which the Jesuit editors of Newton disclaim any participation in his theories, without feeling that he has entered into the dominions of the Father of lies?

Yet this is the region into which our Romanizers are rushing back; and this is the charm that fascinates them. They will not follow the divine music of the Orpheus who calls them into the upper realm of spiritual light and truth. The light is too painful to their eyes; *Can this be truth*, they exclaim, *so unlike what I supposed it to be?* They look back, and are lost. Nay, like the Dunolly eagle in Wordsworth's sonnet, they fly back out of the light "into the castle-dungeon's darkest mew." The new converts to Romanism are hugging their chains more, and drawing them tighter, than those who had grown up under them. They rejoice in the bondage which delivers them from the rationalism and scepticism of their own minds. They wanted an authority to tell them what they were to think, an infallible authority, lest they should have the trouble of examining the rectitude of its decisions. *Bind my eyes, and lead me, or drag me along, that I may not have to exercise my private vision in deciding where I shall walk:* so cries the Romanizing fledgeling. *How can I find out my own way, when there are so many paths, and so many puddles in the paths, and so many ditches and pitfalls beside them, into which I may slip; or my feet may get wet, and I may catch cold! What a pity it is that God gave us eyes to see for ourselves with! How happy shall I be, when I get where there are no puddles, and no mud, and no ditches or pitfalls, and where an unerring priest will carry me on his back into heaven!*

The complaint of the want of guidance in our Church resounds on every side, and becomes louder every year. Dr Newman himself set it up long ago, when he was amongst us, by complaining of the "stammering lips" of our Formularies. That blessed providence, which, by means of a singular combination of political and ecclesiastical sagacity, preserved our Church, in the midst of a dogmatizing age, from the snares of the

dogmatizing spirit, and threw her gates wide open, as wide as those of the New Testament itself, became an object of reproach. *Block up those huge archways!* was the cry, *as big as those of Peterborough Cathedral; and make a private door in the side for me and my followers.* Divers parties had taken up this cry in generation after generation; and now at last it was taken up by those who called themselves Catholics. They too betrayed their affinity to Rome, by clamouring that their brethren ought to be compelled to think just as they did.

For this, after all, we mostly find, is the guidance which people really desire,—to be bid to follow their own will, and to have the power of making others follow it. This came out prominently a year and a half ago in the correspondence between Mr Maskell and the Archbishop of Canterbury. If Mr Maskell's wish had been to be guided by the Primate of his Church, to know what are the principles of her teaching, the Archbishop's answer would have supplied him with hints for the purpose. But his wish was to be told that he might impose his own opinions upon his neighbours, nay, upon our whole Church. His spirit was the Tridentine spirit: *Qui secus dixerit, anathema sit.* Dr Newman, in his *Lectures on Anglicanism*, p. 8, cites the Archbishop's answer, in a passage where he asserts that our Church, "as a thing without a soul, does not contemplate itself, define its intrinsic constitution, or ascertain its position;" that "it has no traditions; it cannot be said to think; it does not know what it holds, and what it does not; it is not even conscious of its own existence."\* As though it were essential to the existence of a soul, that it should be busied in defining its intrinsic constitution, and ascertaining and circumscribing its position. As though it were not the constant characteristic of an energetic, genial soul, that it pours itself out in action

\* It is somewhat curious that ten years ago, in his Letter to Dr Jelf, Dr Newman himself contended strongly in behalf of the proposition, that our Church "allows a great diversity in doctrine, except as to the Creed," supporting himself by quotations from Bramhall, Stillingfleet, Laud, and Taylor. In fact however the liberty he then desired to establish was all on his own side. For even then he complained of the stammering lips of our ambiguous Formularies.

upon the world around, without wasting its time in defining its intrinsic constitution, or ascertaining its position. As though this itself were not indicative of a checkt, repress action. Is it not the grand and blessed peculiarity of our political Constitution, that all our institutions, all our liberties, have grown out of particular emergencies,—that we have never set ourselves down, like our neighbours on the other side of the Channel, to define our intrinsic constitution, and ascertain our position? Yet for this very reason do we understand our position better; because we know it practically, from acting in it,—not speculatively, from theorizing about it. Nay, was not this the spirit and principle of the whole Catholic Church in its best ages? as it continued more or less until the Anticatholic Council of Trent set about defining its intrinsic constitution, and ascertaining its position, and building circumvallations around it, wall beyond wall, and bastion beside bastion, with batteries of anathemas mounted upon them, desolating the country round. Our Reformers cared for truth, cared for Scripture. They knew the perils that environ all attempts to construct systems out of words, and aimed at correctness, rather than completeness. They were very scrupulous too not to go beyond Scripture in any of their assertions. They desired that the Church should be what it had been from the beginning: they only wanted to demolish the walls and lines by which it had been turned into a castle, and to throw the anathemas down into the abyss from which they had risen. I can never look into the Canons of the Council of Trent, without thinking of the contrast to our own Articles, and blessing God that I was made a member of the English Church, and not of the Roman Castle, with its perpetual cannonade of anathemas. If this is, “not to know what we hold, and what we do not,” we may well be content with such ignorance; and we may thank God that He endowed our Reformers with that rare and exemplary wisdom, which was content to be assured from His word that they were right, without drawing the presumptuous inference that all such as differed from them were wrong,—which

knew that difference is not opposition, and that opposition is not contrariety.

That Mr Maskell's questions to the Archbishop were addressd to him with any purpose of being guided by his answer, no one can suppose. His own decision was made up. If the Archbishop's had coincided with his, he would have accepted it: as it differed, he repudiated it, and the Church of which he was the metropolitan, because it did not agree with what he, by his own private judgement, had determined ought to be the doctrine of the Church. This inconsistency pervades the conduct of our seceders. They invey against private judgement, and then exercise it in the most momentous act of their lives. I do not blame them for exercising it. They cannot help doing so. But how can one do otherwise than blame those who forsake their Church for admitting of private judgement, to be exercised soberly and reasonably, when they themselves are exercising it intemperately and unreasonably, in order to be rid of it once for all, by jumping into the gulf, where their private judgement blindly promises them they shall find an infallible teacher?

Dr Newman himself has written concerning infallibility from opposite sides, first as its strenuous adversary, and latterly as its advocate. If we compare the two arguments, we may be tolerably well satisfied: for our champion is decidedly superior to the Roman, and has unhorst him more than once by anticipation. Of the *Lectures on Romanism* the two ablest are employed on this topic. After admitting (p. 102), as he was bound to do, that "in Romanism there are some things absolutely good, some things only just tainted and sullied, some things corrupted, and some things in themselves sinful," he adds: "but the system itself so called, as a whole, and therefore all parts of it, tend to evil. Of this evil system the main tenet is the Church's infallibility."\* He then sets forth a number of the mischiefs

\* These Lectures were publisht in 1837. In 1841, in his Letter to Dr Jelf, the author exprest the same conviction no less strongly (p. 14). "Is its infallibility a slight characteristic of the Romish, or Romanistic, or Papal system?—Is it not—that on which all the other errors of its received system depend?"

which result from this evil source ; and though there are divers symptoms of those partial and erroneous views which characterize his works, though one finds indications of the harm which the exaggerated admiration and misapplication of Butler's *Analogy* have done to so many of our modern divines, I know few portions of his writings, unless it be among his Sermons, more valuable than these two Lectures.

On the other hand, in the *Essay on Development*, Dr Newman has found out that this central evil of Popery, "the main tenet of this evil system," is a necessity ; as it may be for the upholding of that "evil system," although utterly incompatible with a sound state of Christianity. He maintains that it is indispensable for the consolidation of his whole scheme of Developments, that there should be a Developing Authority ; and this Authority, he pronounces, must be infallible ; though it would rather appear as if by the word *infallible* he did not mean that it really is so. But on this point I shall have to speak in Note M. The fallaciousness of the reasoning by which this proposition is supported, has been very ably exposed by Professor Butler in his last three Letters. I myself on a former occasion (in Note A to my Charge for 1842) have pointed out how Dr Newman in this argument gives a plausible appearance to his case by a couple of ordinary sophisms, by his indefiniteness in the use of the words *hypothesis* and *theory*, substituting them one for the other, as if they were equivalent, and by bringing forward two or three extravagantly absurd alternatives, as though these were the only means of escaping from the hypothesis he is defending. Some of the arguments in this section come before us in the shape of answers to objections urged by himself in his *Lectures on Romanism*, and are curious specimens of the diamond-cut-diamond mode of reasoning. The following, in p. 124, shews what a wrench a strong mind must undergo when it plunges into the Romish abyss.

"It must be borne in mind that, as the essence of all religion is authority and obedience, so the distinction between natural religion and revealed lies in this, that the

one has a subjective authority, and the other an objective. Revelation consists in the manifestation of the Invisible Divine Power, or in the substitution of the voice of a Lawgiver for the voice of conscience. The supremacy of conscience is the essence of natural religion; the supremacy of Apostle, or Pope, or Church, or Bishop, is the essence of revealed; and when such external authority is taken away, the mind falls back again upon that inward guide which it possessed even before Revelation was vouchsafed. Thus, what conscience is in the system of nature, such is the voice of Scripture, or of the Church, or of the Holy See, as we may determine it, in the system of Revelation."

In this passage there is a chain of sophisms by which we are led to the most revolting conclusions. The primary assertion, that "the essence of all religion is authority and obedience," is a partial truth, exprest with such vague generality that it may subserve to any amount of fallacies. All religion does indeed imply a relation, which in one sense must be that of authority and obedience. But it no way follows from this, as Dr Newman's argument would infer, that every relation of authority and obedience is, as such, religious. This will depend upon the nature and character of the authority; so that the very point on which the question hinges, is assumed in this way of stating it. When Eve obeyed the Tempter, it was not religious obedience. When our Lord resisted him, it was not an act of irreligious disobedience. Among the highest acts of faith, many have ever involved disobedience to some lawless, evil power. Nor are we destitute, as a Romanist might pretend, of the means of discerning when we ought to obey, and when to disobey. A conscience enlightened by the Gospel will guide a simple peasant aright, as was seen, for instance, in Tell. Again, though there is a sort of truth in the assertion that "Revelation consists in the substitution of the voice of a Lawgiver for the voice of Conscience," that truth, as is often the case with Romanism, stops short at the Mosaic dispensation. If the proposition is extended to the Christian, it is contradicted by the declaration that, while *the Law was given by*



*Moses, Grace and Truth came by Jesus Christ*,—Grace, the illumination of the Conscience by the Spirit, and Truth, which through that illumination it apprehends. What the beloved Apostle designates as the glory of the better Dispensation, Dr Newman casts back into the period of Natural Religion, whenever that may have been. Were it true, that “the supremacy of Conscience is the essence of Natural Religion, the supremacy of Apostle, or Pope, or Church, or Bishop, the essence of revealed,” we should be unable to withstand the argument of the Rationalist, that Revelation is a mere step in the development of Natural Religion. But the character of Christianity, as announced by the prophets, is just the reverse. The Law is not to be proclaimed by Pope or Bishop, but to be *written in the heart*; and all men are to know their Heavenly Lawgiver. The Truth was not to make us bondmen to the Pope, but *free*. When He who was the True Light of every man, and had been so from the beginning, came into the world, He *gave power to as many as received Him to become the sons of God*, that is, *to them that believed in His name*. He did not say, *I will set up My Light here, on the hill of Zion, or there, on the seven hills of Rome*. He said, *The hour cometh when neither on this mountain, nor yet at Jerusalem, shall ye worship the Father*,—neither here nor there, as if these were the only places upon earth set apart for His worship. *But the hour cometh, and now is, when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in Spirit and in truth*,—in all places, without distinction. Hence the antithesis in the last sentence of the passage just quoted ought not to be between Conscience and Scripture, or the Church, or the Pope, but between Conscience acting under the guidance of our own intellectual and moral faculties, assisted by the traditions of mankind, and Conscience with the superadded light of Scripture, and of the Church, and of the Spirit of God.

The difficulties, which, the Romanists are wont to urge, incapacitate the individual conscience for pronouncing judgement, are greatly increast by Dr Newman’s whole scheme of Development. His Essay manifests an eminent revolutionary capacity

for throwing all things into confusion,—a capacity not seldom found largely developept in a froward child ; but it does not bear witness to a similar faculty for restoring order and reorganizing. There is little light in it, except what the flints strike from being flung against each other. Hence, being utterly unable to untie the knots, which he himself has tied, he wants a developing Authority to do so. This is in keeping with the usual artifice of Roman controversialists, who, after exaggerating the difficulties presented by Christianity to the critical mind, assume that it must present the same difficulties to all minds, and thus make out a necessity for bringing in a *Deus ex machina*. At the bottom of these proceedings, as of so many others of the same Church, lies an erroneous conception of Faith, and the want of it. Confounding faith with belief, she lays down that a belief in every dogma is of the essence of Christianity, and that they must all be believed under pain of damnation. But, as the literal carrying out of this proposition would lead to consequences equally absurd and horrible, she has invented the makeshift of an implicit faith in all that she may teach ; whereby such as surrender their reason and conscience to her keeping shall obtain a ticket of free admission into heaven. What however is there in all this, but a dreary want of faith in spiritual realities? Dr Newman, in the passage quoted in p. 113, and elsewhere, taunts Protestants with the want of Faith, in the sense of “a spiritual sight of the unseen.” In the Notes on *the Mission of the Comforter* I have had frequent occasion to remark how the want of that spiritual sight of the unseen is a peculiar characteristic of Romanism ; for instance in pp. 198, 342, 349, 435, 473 (2d Edit.). The same conviction forced itself upon me in my Vindication of Luther, when replying to Dr Newman’s censures of him. In like manner, if we examine the arguments which are brought forward to establish the infallibility of the Church, or of the Pope, we can hardly fail to perceive that they imply a deplorable want of faith in the gift of the Spirit, as granted to all who earnestly and devoutly seek His illumination to guide them to the truth. He who

sincerely desires to find help, that he may be enabled to discover the way of salvation, will find it, according to his need, in our Church, quite as sure, quite as infallible, or rather far more so than in the Church of Rome. For, even if the Papacy were infallible, he could not benefit by that infallibility: he could not have access to the Pope, so as to propound his private difficulties for the decision of the oracle. His own minister would be to him, as with us, the interpreter of the voice of the Church. The main difference would be, that with us he would be allowed and exhorted to train and refresh his mind and spirit by the constant study of the Book of Life; while Rome would interdict his reading what, she knows, if freely examined, must ever prove fatal to her pretensions.

In fact the faith of the Romish Church, so far as it differs from ours, is not in spiritual powers and acts, but in magical. A spiritual power acts upon the will and the conscience, and through them. A magical power produces its changes arbitrarily, independent of the will and conscience. Such is the belief which Dr Newman calls faith, and which he supposes to manifest itself by outward acts, by the repetition of prayers by rote, without any renewal of the spirit. Such is the baptismal change of nature, as substituted for the new birth. Such is the belief of a string of propositions on the authority of another, without any inward personal conviction of their truth. Such is the infallibility ascribed to Popes, without any reference to their moral and spiritual condition. The Pope is nothing but a hierarchal Archimagus.

## NOTE G: p. 26.

IN the third volume of Coleridge's *Remains* (p. 17), there is the following remark on the twentieth Article. "It is mournful to think how many recent writers have criminated our Church in consequence of their own ignorance and inadvertence, in not knowing, or not noticing, the contradistinction here meant

between power and authority. Rites and ceremonies the Church may ordain *jure proprio*: on matters of faith her judgement is to be received with reverence, and not gainsaid, but after repeated enquiries, and on weighty grounds.”

This seems to have been written in 1831, when the ecclesiastical current, which had so long been ebbing away, was just flowing back with springtide force. During the last twenty years, if this Article has been deemed unsatisfactory, the complaint has rather been that it does not sufficiently magnify the authority of the Church; and attempts have been made to strain its words into a meaning very different from that which its authors put into them. Thus the simple wisdom of our great Christian philosopher, which stood out almost alone during the neap-tide, has since been submerged by the rush of the waters. But that rush will pass away; and then his simple wisdom will be seen to express the true sense of our Article, marking out the right boundary between the undue depreciation and the inordinate exaggeration of the authority of the Church.

Here again Dr Newman, in his *Lectures on Romanism*, though he denounced the Romish doctrine of the infallibility of the Church with much logical as well as rhetorical power, yet prepared the way for the inculcation of the same doctrine with regard to our own Church. “In the 20th Article (he says, p. 226) we are told that the Church has ‘*authority* in controversies of faith.’ Now these words certainly do not merely mean that she has authority to enforce such doctrines as can historically be proved to be Apostolical. They do not speak of her power of enforcing truth, or of her power of enforcing at all, but say that she has ‘*authority* in controversies.’—But how can she have this authority, unless she be certainly true in her declarations? She can have no authority in declaring a lie.”

Now surely it is marvellous that so expert a logician should have presented us with such a dilemma,—that he should not have discerned how there are a number of intermediate alternatives, between declaring the truth with absolute certainty, and declaring a lie. May we not have a strong, a very strong

presumption that the Church, after a patient, devout consideration of the controversies of faith, will be enabled to pronounce rightly concerning them? although this presumption may fall short of absolute certainty. Yet it may be sufficient to warrant her in interposing her decision for the sake of peace, when controversies of faith are raging among her ministers: and this is why, in claiming that authority, she defines its application to "controversies of faith." Hence, in drawing up her Articles, she declared them to be "for the avoiding of diversities of opinions, and for the establishing of consent touching true religion." In this also she followed the practice of the early Church, not laying down a scholastic system of doctrine, like the Tridentine, but confining the exercise, and even the assertion of her authority to those doctrines which had become the subject of controversies. Moreover her earnest desire not to fetter the individual conscience was manifested in this, that her Articles were not designed to be Articles of Faith, or terms of Communion; nor did she invent any such fiction as Implicit Faith, to salve over the wide-spread sore of general ignorance and unbelief: she merely desired to keep her appointed teachers from preaching the prevalent errors of Rome, and from running after the extravagances which the shock of the Reformation had let loose. So long as she put forth her authority thus judiciously, her ministers might bow to it, at least in silent submission, with perfect conscientiousness, provided no essential doctrine was involved; or, if they felt their own sense of truth trencht upon, they might retire into lay communion.

The other arguments used by Dr Newman in the same Lecture may be refuted by the same simple remark. While he claims certainty for the decisions of the Church, our Article implies nothing more than a high degree of probability. "To say the Church has authority (he argues in p. 227), and yet is not true, as far as it has authority, were to destroy liberty of conscience." Yes: *to say it is not true*. But who says that? We say, that we have very strong grounds for trusting that her decisions will be true, though still there is a possibility of her

erring. Nor does this fallibility invalidate her authority, any more than that of parents and other governors, as I have pointed out in the Charge.

In his views on this point there seems to have been no little confusion. The passage just cited is not easily reconcilable with all that is urged so strongly in the previous Lectures against the infallibility claimed by Rome. In a subsequent Lecture (pp. 320—324), on the other hand, he maintains that our Church, in claiming authority, does not claim it as a judge, but as a witness of primitive truth; and he tries to support this assertion by the Canon of 1571, which we have discust above in Note E. That Canon however was not laid down as an absolute rule for the Church, but merely for the guidance of individual preachers, in a time of intellectual convulsions: and even for them it is merely negative and limitary. In the 20th Article the Church, in the consciousness of her spiritual privileges, does not recognise any absolute rule for her own direction, except that of Scripture; though, when we turn to the Canon, we may feel convinced that, in forming her judgement, she will gladly take advantage of whatever help may be afforded by the teaching of Antiquity. The Article does not state that the primitive Church alone had authority in controversies of faith, but that in every age, as controversies arose, the Church, by her lawful organs, has authority to decide them; and the only condition prescribed for the exercise of this authority is, that it must be in conformity to Scripture. How the Church is to interpret Scripture, the Article does not define, further than that she must not “so expound one place of Scripture that it be repugnant to another.” All beyond this is left open: and why should it not be so? In every age, we may trust, the Spirit will teach the Church, what use she is to make of her various human helps.

Without engaging in the dispute about the manner in which the first sentence of the 20th Article obtained a place in it, I may here remark, that, in determining the meaning of that Article, we should bear in mind that this first sentence is a later addition, whether made in 1562, or in 1571. In its original

form, this Article, like many of the others, was merely negative and restrictive, laying down the limits of the authority of the Church, — that it is not lawful for her to ordain anything contrary to God's word written, or to expound one place of Scripture so that it be repugnant to another, or to enforce anything, besides what is derived from Scripture, to be believed for necessity of salvation. Thus it was meant as a protest against the Papal assumption of a right to fabricate new Articles of Faith, and to impose them as necessary to salvation. This was one of the main principles of our Reformation; and therefore it is also asserted in the 6th Article, and again in the 21st. In the course of the controversy occasioned by Tract XC, it was contended that the insertion of these words, "*necessary to salvation,*" in the 21st Article, was indicative of a compromise, and of a purpose to leave it an open question, whether General Councils might not be infallible with regard to such truths as are not necessary to salvation. But, if we look at them rightly, in connexion with the circumstances of the age, they merely shew that our Reformers here also were acting with their wonted selfcontrol, and confined themselves to the assertion of that which was requisite for the deliverance of the Church from the bondage of human, arbitrary Articles of Faith. They did not indulge themselves in laying down general propositions concerning matters that were not requisite for their immediate purpose: but surely, if they did not hold General Councils to be preserved from the possibility of error with regard to truths necessary to salvation, they can never have had any intention of implying that such Councils might have an immunity from error with regard to other less momentous truths. At the same time, in the very act of drawing up the Articles, they were exercising authority in controversies of faith; and when this authority became a matter of dispute, it was clearly expedient and right that it should be distinctly asserted, as well as the power of decreeing rites and ceremonies; which was so vehemently impugned, that one of Hooker's main purposes in writing his great work was to vindicate it.

In this assertion however, while there certainly was not the slightest thought of claiming infallibility,—as the 21st Article, by itself, would suffice to prove,—I am equally unable to discern any pretension to a right of binding consciences ; which indeed, strictly speaking, could not exist, unless it were accompanied by infallibility. Authority may require the obedience of our actions ; but no human authority, as such, can demand more than the deference of our thoughts : nor can we really render more without betraying our humanity. It was with a wise recognition of this truth, that our Reformers did not draw up their Articles as Articles of Faith, but merely as Articles of Peace, “for the avoiding of diversities of opinions.” This distinction is pointed out by Bramhall, in his *Replication to the Bishop of Chalcedon* (Vol. ii. p. 201), where he contrasts our practice with that of Rome : “Pius the Fourth did not only enjoin all ecclesiastics—to swear to his new Creed, but he imposed it upon all Christians, as *veram fidem Catholicam extra quam nemo salvus esse potest*.—We do not hold our Thirtynine Articles to be such necessary truths, *extra quam non est salus*,—nor enjoin ecclesiastic persons to swear to them, but only to subscribe them as theological truths, for the preservation of unity among us, and the extirpation of some growing errors.” When Dr Newman, in his Letter to Dr Jelf, urged this important distinction, and supported it (in pp. 18—23) by the testimonies of some of our chief divines, he, for once, was contending for a great Protestant liberty.

Hence I cannot adopt, what Archdeacon Wilberforce, in his *History of Erastianism* (p. 29), calls “the ancient principle,” which he strenuously maintains, “that the interpretation of doctrine as given by authority has a claim upon the conscience ;” if the claim is to anything more than to respectful deference and consideration. In fact our Church herself expressly denies such a claim, unless it be enforced by the clear testimony of Scripture.

In the Sermon on *the Principle of Church Authority* subjoined to this *Sketch of Erastianism*, the excellent writer tries to vindicate his view of that principle by a comparison between the processes by which we acquire the knowledge of natural and that



of spiritual things. The conception was a happy one; and, if he had worked it out more closely and distinctly, he would have arrived at different, and, as it seems to me, correcter results. After speaking of the great importance ascribed by philosophers, ancient and modern, to the common consent of mankind, as a testimony to the truths for which it vouches, he tells us that, in the sphere of revealed truth, the place of this common consent is occupied by the authority of the Church. Undoubtedly: but, precious as is the value of this common consent, so far as it expresses the deep, hidden consciousness of humanity in behalf of moral truths, it not seldom misunderstood itself, was often tainted and perverted by errors springing from the inherent sinfulness of our nature, seldom attained to more than a semi-consciousness of its own meaning, and needed some spokesman or interpreter, some heaven-sent prophet, to give it utterance. This was the office of the great lawgivers and moral teachers of Antiquity, nay, of every man in whom the voice of Conscience spake out and delivered its messages, whether by word or by deed. Among these prophets of the Heathen world, the first place by general accord is granted to Socrates, whose great work was to give utterance to the truths of man's innermost consciousness; and in whose life we see how the common consent of his age had become encrusted with a number of traditionary and dogmatical errors, so that it required the death-plunge of an immortal spirit to burst through it. Now it is very certain that in the written word of God we have an incomparably clearer, distincter enunciation of moral and spiritual truth, than that which the common consent of Antiquity had to bear witness and give utterance to. But, as the power of Sin, although it had been overcome once for all, has still been awfully mighty, even in the Church of Him who overcame it, so has it been with Error, which from the first has always been its correlative, its inseparable Siamese twin. All forms of error, both traditionary and dogmatical, have been perpetually springing up and spreading through the Church; and divers of these have been taken up from time to time by the common consent of particular ages,

through the elective affinities of Sin, until some new witness or witnesses to the Truth, as declared once for all in the word of God, have been called up to establish it, often by their martyrdom. Doubtless the truths of revealed religion have been apprehended from time to time more distinctly, and have been express in definite propositions with more or less of scientific order, by those who have exercised authority in the Church; even as the truths of our moral consciousness were apprehended and enunciated by the ancient sages: but in neither case has the human liability to error been wholly excluded. Though the Spirit would assuredly have directed the Church to the truth, if the Church had allowed herself to be directed by Him, yet in this, as in so many other instances, the Divine promise has been more or less baffled, not from any slackness on the part of the Giver, but through the manifold obstacles opposed by the recipients. Still, in the main, the Spirit did so far prevail over the reluctances of man's carnal, sinful nature, that the primary principles of Christian truth, those which are embodied in the Creeds, have obtained a catholic recognition in the Church. With regard to these then she is a sure witness and a safe guide to the truth; and of this we may feel a confident conviction, in that she proves her declarations to be in accordance with Scripture. So far as she does this, and so far as she awakens a response in the heart and mind of the individual believer, so far her authority is binding on his conscience; but no further, that is, with regard to points of faith. In ritual and ceremonial matters, and all things indifferent, he will owe her obedience: but in faith he cannot render such, except so far as his own spirit is awakened and aroused to receive what she would pour into it. If the Church would bind the conscience, she must do so, according to St Paul's method (2 Cor. iv. 2), *by manifestation of the truth.*

Hence I cannot but regret that Archdeacon Wilberforce, in the same Sermon, should have given his sanction to the hankering, the morbid hankering, it seems to me, after leading-strings, which has been beguiling so many persons of late to listen

to every bold pretender, whether he would lead them to Rome or to the land of the Mormons. His Sermon being on St Paul's declaration, that *he who is spiritual judgeth all things, yet he himself is judged by no man*, he warns us that these words must be received with great caution, inasmuch as they are a favorite text with enthusiasts and impostors : and then, after citing the analogous verses of St John,—*Ye have an unction from the Holy One ; and ye know all things :—the anointing which ye have received from Him abideth in you ; and ye need not that any man teach you :—*he adds (p. 126) : “Such expressions harmonize with that longing for some principle of guidance, which is deeply rooted in the heart. We can classify and catalogue the material treasures of mankind.—And is the higher region of thought and intellect to be vext for ever by unsatisfying contentions ? are systems of belief to follow one another like the waves of the deep, without umpire and without end ? Is there no test of moral and religious truth,—no criterion for interpreting God's word ?”

This umpire, and test, and criterion, he bids us seek and find in the authority of the Church. Yet the more I examine the passages here cited, along with the context, the clearer it seems to me, that both St Paul and St John are not speaking of the authority of the collective body, or of the Church, but of the personal, individual illumination vouchsafed by the Spirit to every faithful Christian, who seeks His holy communion. This is the *prima facie* meaning of these passages ; and it is confirmed by the whole tenour of St Paul's Epistle, one main topic of which relates to the various gifts of the Spirit bestowed on individuals : *To one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom ;* and so on. It is only by foisting in considerations which are quite alien from these passages, that we can wrest them from this meaning. One of the worst mischiefs of that which is called the Sacramental System, is, that its advocates are apt to disparage and lose sight of all spiritual influences, except such as are conveyed ecclesiastically through some sacramental ordinance. A like tendency, I have had occasion to remark in the Notes on

*the Mission of the Comforter*, is often found in the divines who belong to what is called the Anglicatholic School. I am not urging this as an argument against that system,—a question far too large for this place: I readily concede that the evils which may result from the perversion and misapplication of a truth, do not impeach it. But in like manner we have a right to demand that the evils alledged to result from false pretensions to a spiritual illumination must not be allowed to weigh against the reality of such illuminations. If the abuse of a thing disproved its use, man would long ago have forfeited every blessing that God has granted him.

I cannot admit therefore that these texts refer, as Archdeacon Wilberforce contends (p. 137), “not to the individual, but to the collective Christian.” Assuredly they do refer to the individual Christian, not indeed in his frail, sinful, erring individuality, but, as some would say, to the ideal Christian, to that ideal Christian who is one and the same with the real Christian, to the individual, so far as he avails himself of his Christian privileges, and fulfills his Christian character, so far as he lives, not by his own selfish, insulated life, but by the spirit of Christ dwelling in him. It is true, St Paul “does not mean that each man may believe what he chooses for himself.” But who ever did mean this? Who can ever have asserted anything so grossly and glaringly absurd? The wonder is, that anybody should ever have set up such a man of straw to knock down, that anybody should ever have identified this absurdity with the claim to the exercise of private judgement. No one in his senses can ever have maintained “that each man may believe what he chooses for himself” in theology, any more than in any other branch of knowledge. In all branches our conceptions must be regulated and determined by their objects. Nor is such a proposition implied in the denial of our being bound to believe what others choose for us. Will and choice have nothing to do with the matter; except so far as the will may be needed to suppress the interference of personal likings and prejudices, and to make us submit our minds obediently to

that which is appointed for our belief by the various laws of thought.

But, though St Paul does not mean "that each man may believe what he chooses," he is just as far from meaning, what Archdeacon Wilberforce (p. 137) imputes to him, "that each man is safe, while he holds that which is accepted of all." This is a miserable modern notion, a miserable modern anxiety, this vexing and worrying ourselves about what it is *safe* for us to believe and to think. This phrase,—for surely it is nothing else: even those who make use of it cannot really mean what they say,—is brought forward perpetually nowadays, even by those who talk grandly about an objective system of Truth, and boast of having set up this to supersede the merely subjective views of the last generations. Yet, if the divinity of our fathers was too apt to pass by many of the deepest truths of Christianity, and to fix its attention too exclusively on those which bear immediately on our own personal salvation, it was left for their successors to make this the test of truth. When St Paul exhorted us to meditate on whatsoever things are true and honest and just and pure and lovely and of good report, he omitted to mention whatsoever things are safe. This omission must seem unaccountable to our new divines, who, passing over all the other grand and glorious objects of contemplation, set whatsoever things are safe before us as the one class we are to think on. Yet assuredly, if we seek what is true, honestly and earnestly, with such helps as God has given us, and if we believe and act up to the truth which we may thus find, we shall be safe. Whereas, if our main purpose is merely to find out what we may believe with safety to our own puny selves, we shall miss the truth, and our safety along with it. In no point of view is it more certain, that he whose anxiety is to save his life will lose it, and that he alone who is ready to lose his life will save it. When we read St Paul's stirring account of the manifold perils he had past through, we there see how he saved his life, and won it. Had he shrunk from them, he would have lost it. To us indeed it is not granted to walk in the footsteps

of that great Apostle, who trod, so to say, from pinnacle to pinnacle, from mountain-top to mountain-top, in the spiritual world : but the rule of our walk ought to be the same as his.

I have already had occasion to cite another instance of this perversity in p. 85 ; and I have said thus much on it here, because this notion, that we are not to seek after that which is true, but merely that which is safe,—akin, as it is, to the Romish disbelief of any real truth, and to the intellectual despotism of the Papacy, — is a fosterer of those delusions which lead people to despair of ascertaining any truth for themselves, and to bow their hearts and minds under any dogmas that Rome may impose on them, deeming themselves safe if they can but get quit of their own personal responsibility. Archdeacon Wilberforce seems to think that, by thus putting on the yoke of authority, we may be delivered from the unsatisfying contentions which are “for ever vexing us in the higher region of thought and intellect.” But surely, if he had followed out his own comparison with the processes of thought concerning physical objects, he would have perceived that, so long as systems and dogmas and traditions were held to be authoritative, Science was full of contentions, and impregressive ; but, since it has cast off all bondage except that which is imposed upon it by the laws of thought,—in other words, since it has become free,—its progress has been immeasurable, subjugating new worlds one after another, and yet on the whole with a wonderful consent and unity. This consent and unity have not resulted from the authority of Academies, but from the power of Truth, and from the longing of the human mind to know and acknowledge it. The last summer ought to have taught all nations, though the Governments have blinded their eyes to the lesson, that the freest nation is also the most orderly, and the readiest to recognise the majesty of Law.

Here I may suggest an answer to a question, which has been put by Archdeacon Wilberforce, as well as by others before him, with reference to the declaration in our Articles, that the decisions of the Church are not valid, unless they are agreeable to

Scripture. "By whom (he asks, p. 144) is Scripture to be interpreted?" Who is to determine whether this agreement exists or not? Ultimately, no doubt, the Church herself, by whom alone her authoritative decision can be authoritatively modified or set aside; just as an Act of the Civil Legislature can only be modified or set aside by a subsequent Act of the same. As to the tribunal by which the decisions of the Church are to be interpreted, I shall have to speak of it in Note U. But in that the Church appeals to the test of Scripture, and disclaims all authority, except as derived from Scripture, she herself authorizes her individual members to examine her decisions by that test. She does not foreclose enquiry, but invites it. Hence, as in Science the common consent of philosophers, however firmly established it may appear, is not held to debar gifted thinkers from questioning any of the propositions which that common consent has recognised, if a sufficient cause for doing so is shewn, so may he, who has the proper spiritual gifts, if he perceives any defects in the teaching of the Church, point out what seems to him erroneous. How far this may be done consistently with the obligations incurred by the exercise of a ministerial office, must be determined by the conscience in each particular case: but, if such objections are brought forward in a right spirit,—a spirit of reverence toward the Church, but of still higher reverence for Truth,—religious truth will be promoted thereby, even as scientific truth is by the ever-renewed researches of competent enquirers. Thus we return to the proposition of Coleridge's, which stands at the opening of this Note.

This assertion of the rights of the individual Christian no way implies, as the impugnors of private judgement are wont to assume, that every man may set about building up a scheme of religion and theology for himself out of the Scriptures; any more than every man of science begins constructing a new system of Natural Philosophy. To maintain that each man may be guided by the Spirit to the truth, is not inconsistent with, but on the contrary involves the recognition that the faithful in all ages have had the same Divine guidance vouchsafed to them;

and he who truly desires and seeks that guidance, and feels its constraining power, should be the first to look with childlike reverence for every manifestation of His working in the history and teaching of the Church,—with a reverence like that of St Paul for the prophetic lessons of the Old Testament. Nor does our conviction that no philosopher who ever lived was infallible, prevent our having a reasonable certainty with regard to the great body of the knowledge stored up for us,—a certainty fully adequate for all the practical wants of life, and which we ourselves, if duly qualified, shall not hesitate to make use of as the groundwork for further discoveries.

Several of the questions toucht on in this Note, and in some of the preceding ones, have been treated by Jeremy Taylor with admirable logical power, and with his own wonderful eloquence, in his *Dissuasive from Popery*, especially in the first Sections of the second Part. In this, as in his other later writings, his eloquence has risen from that of imagery to that of thought. He no longer spreads out his plumage, after the manner of young writers, to display its bright and gorgeous colours, but uses it to soar and fly through the air to the truths he desires to reach. An abridgement of this work, if well executed, omitting such portions of it as bear mainly on the specific controversies of his own time, and supplying the most important quotations, might be of much service in dispersing the delusions of our days. Many of them are so thoroughly exploded here, that one might have deemed they could never have lifted up their heads again, more especially as the opposite truths are set forth so vividly and forcibly. But England has still many blessings to receive from her great writers of former ages. They will still help her to confound and scatter modern follies ; and, alas ! she needs their help.



## NOTE H : p. 28.

Among the most curious phenomena of inconsistency, it may be recorded, that the very persons who were continually striving to exalt and exaggerate the authority of the Church, to claim a *quasi*-infallibility for her, and to make it binding on consciences, were at the same time exercising all the arts and artifices of logic to evacuate her decisions of their meaning, and to turn them into mere strings of nerveless words. Thus palpably did they betray that their purpose was, not to establish the authority of the Church, but their own, not to render the decisions of the Church, but their own opinions, binding on the consciences of their brethren.

In the notorious Tract, which terminated the series of *the Tracts for the Times*, there are divers attempts to enervate our Articles; of which the most sophistical is perhaps the one brought to bear on the 21st,—that “General Councils may not be gathered together without the commandment and will of princes; and when they be gathered together, forasmuch as they be an assembly of men, whereof all be not governed with the Spirit and Word of God, they may err, and sometimes have erred, even in things pertaining to God.” That this is a plain, direct denial of the infallibility of General Councils, I cannot see how a reasonable man can question. The Article does not assert that every General Council has erred: it contents itself with asserting that no such Council had an absolute gift of infallibility: and it gives the sufficient reason which prevented Councils from having that gift, that their members were “not all governed by the Spirit and word of God,”—a fact, the truth of which is grievously established by ecclesiastical history. Well! the ingenious author of the Tract, to get rid of this obvious meaning, expounds the Article thus: “General Councils may err, [*as such* ;—may err], *unless* in any case it is promised, as a matter of express supernatural privilege, that they shall *not* err;

a case which lies beyond the scope of this Article, or at any rate beside its determination." This, forsooth, is the way in which the authority of the Church is to be binding on the conscience! binding it to fraud by fraud! What form of words can have real force, if we are allowed to destroy that force by such a tacit restriction? *I will obey the King,—unless the Pope bids me not do so.—I will be a dutiful subject,—unless it will promote the interests of the Church to blow up King, Lords, and Commons.* I cannot believe that Mr Newman himself ever subscribed our Articles with such a mental reservation. He cannot at that time have been,—I trust he is not now,—such an adept in the school of Loyola. But why did he suggest such a fraud to others? Could there be a better preparation for Rome? Nor does the case which he contemplates, "lie beyond the scope of the Article," or even "beside its determination." The clause in which it is said that the members of Councils are "not all governed by the Spirit and word of God," contains a plain and direct reference to the promise of the Spirit, by whom, if they had been so governed, they would have been led to the truth.

The sophist continues: "Such a promise however *does* exist, in cases when General Councils are not only gathered together according to 'the commandment and will of princes,' but *in the Name of Christ*, according to our Lord's promise. This Article merely contemplates the human prince, not the King of Saints." But, though the Article speaks of the human prince, with reference to a point which was sanctioned by ancient and almost universal practice, assuredly it did contemplate at the same time that the Council was to be assembled in the Name of Christ. Nay, what else could it mean? What could a General Council be, which was not professedly assembled in Christ's name?

Further: "While Councils are a thing of earth, their infallibility of course is not guaranteed: when they are a thing of heaven, their deliberations are overruled, and their decrees authoritative. In such cases they are *Catholic* Councils.—Thus Catholic or Ecumenical Councils are General Councils, and something more. Some General Councils are Catholic, and others

are not.—If Catholicity be thus a *quality* found at times in General Councils, rather than the *differentia* belonging to a certain class of them, it is still less surprising that the Article should be silent about it.” What purpose is answered by the logical terminology here, except that of throwing dust into people’s eyes? When a person talks about the *differentia*, it is supposed he must understand what he is writing about; but very often he is only mystifying himself as well as his readers. The phrase *General Councils* in the Article is evidently used in its comprehensive sense, as distinguished from Provincial or Diocesan, but assuredly with no intention of excluding the Catholic or Ecumenical Councils. Had there been any such purpose, it would have been express. Indeed what would the Article mean, according to this interpretation? Of course there is one exception implied in it, but only one, the case, if any such there ever was, in which the great majority of the members were truly governed by the Spirit and word of God.

To confirm the interpretation of this Article, the opinion of Gregory Nazianzen is referred to, who, the writer says, “well illustrates the consistency of this Article with a belief in the infallibility of Ecumenical Councils, by his own language on the subject on different occasions.” Now Gregory’s often quoted words,—“My mind is—to keep clear of every conference of bishops; for of conference never saw I good come, or a remedy so much as an increase of evils: for there is strife and ambition; and these have the upperhand of reason:”—do indeed fully justify the statement in the Article, that the members of General Councils “are not all governed by the Spirit and word of God.” But as to the expressions cited in the Tract from his 21st Oration, his speaking of “the Holy Council in Nicea,” and “that band of chosen men whom the Holy Ghost brought together,” they no more imply a belief in the infallibility of that Council, than a like belief is implied in the addresses prefixt by St Paul to his Epistles, for instance, in the first verses of that to the Ephesians.

In the controversy occasioned by Tract XC, other sophisms,

of no greater cogency, were brought forward for the same purpose of destroying the force of this Article, by some of those zealous worshipers of Antiquity, whose laborious researches into Antiquity had hardly extended beyond the writings of the illustrious Fathers, Mr Newman and Mr Froude: but there is nothing in them to call for a specific refutation.

NOTE I: p. 29.

I have already had several occasions to refer to Dr Newman's Lectures *On the Difficulties of Anglicanism*. His object in those Lectures is twofold. In the first seven he presents his former disciples, whom he has forsaken, and whom he tries to lure after him, with a highly coloured, exaggerated picture of the difficulties of their position in the English Church, difficulties the chief part of which they have brought upon themselves by following his misguidance. In the last five Lectures he attempts to remove certain objections, which, he thinks, even after he has done all he can to disgust them with the Church of England, may still keep them from joining him in the Church of Rome. Thus the aim of the eighth Lecture is stated to be, to prove that "the political state of Catholic countries is no prejudice to the sanctity of the Church,"—that of the ninth, to prove that "the religious character of Catholic countries is no prejudice to the sanctity of the Church." One might have expected that he would have entered into a like course of argument with regard to their moral state, either along with the other two, or in lieu of the former. But, though he may gain some advantages by speaking of this somewhat less directly, in part under the political, partly under the religious state, there would perhaps have been some awkwardness in treating it by itself: and we shall see presently that he is not a person to be deterred by any difficulties in his case, or to distrust the power of his logic to prove that black is white.

On the argument with regard to the political state of Romish

countries, I shall have to say a few words in a subsequent Note. In that on their religious state, the Author undertakes (p. 221) to apologize for the familiarity and coarseness, the levity and profaneness, as it seems to us, with which the most sacred objects are treated and spoken of in the Church of Rome. Now doubtless in this respect great allowances are to be made in consequence of the greater loquacity and externality of southern nations, their greater proneness to give utterance to their momentary feelings and impulses in words and gestures, as contrasted with our Northern, Teutonic inwardness and reserve. In truth such allowances, or rather recognitions, should be mutual. The Italian should not demand or expect his vivacity and exuberance of expression from us, any more than we should look for our suppression of our feelings in him. Dr Newman however rejects this plea. In fact it would not serve his purpose. "To no national differences (he says, p. 222) can be attributed a character of religion so specific and peculiar: it is too uniform, too universal to be ascribed to anything short of the genius of Catholicism itself; that is, its principles and influence acting upon human nature, such as it is everywhere found." He does not seem to have bestowed much attention on the modern speculations concerning the diversities and peculiarities of races. Indeed these are matters with which Rome meddles not, which she does not recognise. She only recognises herself, and her subjects, and her enemies: and all who are not her subjects, all who will not wear her livery, are her enemies. As Dr Newman observes, these characteristics of Romanism are not found in Southern nations merely, but to a large extent in Belgium, as they formerly were in England and throughout Germany. This however is easily accounted for from the Roman propensity to impose the same laws and manners, and even speech, on all nations, a propensity which the Church inherited from the Empire: and the insurrection of the Teutonic spirituality and individuality against this alien yoke was a main cause of the Reformation, as is shewn even by the limits of its success. It may be that, if Dr Newman had meditated more on that which is

accidental in Romanism, on that which has resulted from peculiar circumstances of time and place, he would not have desired to revive what is so uncongenial and repugnant to the English mind. At all events *the Essay on Development* exhibits a strange medley of mere accidents, which he tries to invest with permanence and necessity. Nor can it well be doubted, that many of these accidental peculiarities in Romanism have exercised a strong attraction on the lighter minds that have left us. For while our sturdy, homebred nationality rejects whatever is foreign and un-English with somewhat of insolent disdain, that dilettantism, which often intervenes between the exclusive exaltation of our own nationality, and the just estimation of other nationalities along with our own, is apt to find a charm in novelty, which it cannot discover in what is familiar, and to fancy it shall become religious all at once, if it can get where there are monks and nuns, and matins and vespers, and boys in white swinging censers, and priests to hear confession and give absolution.

However we certainly have no reason to complain that Dr Newman has thought fit to transfer the argument to another field. He has turned it on a point, which is not a mere accidental, but an essential difference between the two Churches; and with his wonted boldness he has chosen to assail our very strongest position. It is here that he introduces that contrast between the Protestant and the Romish view of Faith, which I have cited above in Note Da (pp. 112, 113), and the exaggerations and erroneousness of which I have there pointed out. Still, while we disclaim the doctrine "that faith and love are inseparable," as manifested in our fallen nature, we strenuously maintain that Faith, in its Scriptural sense, as the condition of salvation, as able to move mountains, as manifested in the heroic exploits recorded in the Epistle to the Hebrews, is a practical principle, which, if it be living and real, must shew itself forth in works, and which, without works, is dead. The assertion of this fundamental truth was the first great act of the Reformation: and this view has been that of all those among our divines, who have most fully imbibed and expressed the spirit of the Reformation.

When Dr Newman however said, that Protestants “do not think the inconsistency possible of really believing without obeying, and, where they see disobedience, cannot imagine the existence of true faith,” he must strangely have forgotten the favorite missiles of his party in their invectives against Luther for antinomianism. This exemplifies his aptness, in his logical vagaries, to assert any fact that may suit his argument, without pausing to ask himself whether it is correct or no. On the other hand, when he tells us that Romanists hold “that faith and love, faith and obedience, faith and works, are simply separable, and ordinarily separated in fact,—that faith does not imply love, obedience, or works,—that the firmest faith, so as to move mountains, may exist without love,”—we are tempted to ask, can this faith, which is able to move mountains, exist without works? To a large extent, though the hypothetical case put by St Paul is not necessarily a possible one, we know from experience, faith may exist without works of love toward our neighbours. But can it exist without any of those works which proceed from love toward God? Can we really have a living, strong faith in God, our Maker, our Father, our Guardian and Preserver, our Saviour and Protector, who gave His Only Son to live and to die for our sins?—can we have a real, living, strong faith in that Eternal Son, who came down from the bosom and the glory of the Father, to live as a Servant, and to die as a Criminal, for our sins, that we through His life and death might be redeemed from eternal death, and might inherit eternal life?—can we have this faith, firmly, strongly, livingly, without any of the stirrings, any of the works of love toward Him who has so loved us? And if we say that this cannot be, is this indeed a sign that, as Dr Newman taunts us, “Faith is a spiritual sight of the unseen; and Protestantism has not this sight?” that we do not “see the unseen?” whereas the proof, according to him, that Romanists have this sight, and do “see the unseen,” is, that it exercises no sort of moral influence over them. This too shews, he tells us, that we have been “taught by flesh and blood, not by grace.”

Doubtless we know very well, from the witness of our own consciences, as well as of the world around us, that we may entertain strong persuasions and convictions concerning many things, and so far may believe them, without their wielding any moral power over us. Flesh and blood will teach us this, without need of Divine grace; unless it be to grave the lesson on our hearts, and to make it bear fruit in our lives. As the devils believe and tremble, so may men; so have many men done; and there are a number of shades and degrees of this faithless belief. But this belief is not faith. To many persons indeed it may seem that this is little more than a dispute about words, that we use the word *faith* in one sense, and the Romanists in another, and that it is not worth while to argue about the matter. But, when we call to mind how great are the power and the blessings promised to faith by the Gospel, it surely is a question of the highest moment, whether that power and those blessings belong to a lifeless, inert, inanimate notion, or to a living, energetic principle. This is the great controversy between Romanism and Protestantism. Their stay is the *opus operatum*, ours *fides operans*, Faith, the gift of God, apprehending Him through Christ, renewing the whole man, and becoming the living spring of his feelings and thoughts and actions.

After such an outset, one cannot be surprised at any extravagances the champion of Rome may run into. Having endowed her people with this Divine gift of a faith, which seeing does not perceive, and hearing does not understand, and believing does not believe, he has little difficulty in explaining how they may fall into all manner of inconsistencies. "This certainty (we are told, p. 224), or spiritual sight, which is included in the idea of faith, is, according to Catholic teaching, perfectly distinct in its own nature from the desire, intention, and power of acting agreeably to it. As men may know perfectly well that they ought not to steal, and yet may deliberately take and appropriate what is not theirs; so may they be gifted with a simple, undoubting, cloudless belief, that, for instance,



Christ is in the blessed Sacrament, and yet commit the sacrilege of breaking open the tabernacle, and carrying off the consecrated particles for the sake of the precious vessel containing them." So that this Divine gift of Faith is just what might have been found in a worshiper of Hermes, and what a heathen moralist, being taught, as we are, by flesh and blood, would have condemned or derided as an impious mockery. According to the lessons of the same blind teachers, we should also hold that this "simple, undoubting, cloudless belief," if it could exist in such a person, would have awfully aggravated his crime. Nay, we should have fancied that this judgement is implied in the words, that *the servant who knew his lord's will, and prepared not himself, nor did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes*. But the infallible Church has overruled this, as well as so many other declarations of Him whom she professes to call her Lord. Of such a soul as that just described, Dr Newman says (p. 226), "There are certain remarkable limitations and alleviations in its punishment; and one is this, that the faculty or power of faith remains to it," to exhibit still further that it has no power. "Thus the many are in a condition, which is absolutely novel and strange in the ideas of a Protestant: they have a vivid perception, like sense, of things unseen, yet have no desire at all, or affection toward them." It has been imagined that, if Virtue could be seen, all men would be rapt by love for her; but this must be because they were not under grace. Still there is, "in spite of this moral confusion, in one and all a clear intellectual apprehension of the truth"\* (p. 228): which, one may think,

\* I know not on what evidence Dr Newman grounds his assertion, so often repeated in this Lecture, concerning the high religious knowledge of the lower orders in Romish countries. My own acquaintance with them is far too slight to warrant me in contradicting his statement; which however is at variance with the accounts given by almost every traveler, even by those who have resided many years amongst them. Hundreds of witnesses might easily be cited: I will merely cite one, whose veracity will hardly be impeached; and though his testimony refers to the condition of Ireland two centuries ago, I am not aware that there is any reason for supposing that the state of things in this respect is much

is far more than their apologist here evinces. "Just as in England, the whole community knows about railroads and electric telegraphs, and about the Court, and men in power, and proceedings in Parliament,—so, in a Catholic country, the ideas of heaven and hell, Christ and the evil spirit, saints, angels, souls in purgatory, grace, the blessed Sacrament, the sacrifice of the Mass, absolution, indulgences, the virtue of relics, of holy images, of holy water, and of other holy things, are facts, by good and bad, by young and old, by rich and poor, to be taken for granted." In this enumeration there is an omission which may surprise us. No mention is made of Him, who, above all, ought to be in all our thoughts, and who will not give His glory to another. Nor is the omission accidental. It is forced upon the apologist by the fact, that in the Romish changed now. In fact the picture does not perhaps differ essentially from Dr Newman's.

Jeremy Taylor, in the preface to his *Dissuasive*, says: "We have observed, amongst the generality of the Irish, such a declension of Christianity, so great credulity to believe every superstitious story, such confidence in vanity, such groundless pertinacity, such vicious lives, so little sense of true religion and the fear of God, so much care to obey the priests, and so little to obey God, such intolerable ignorance, such fond oaths and manners of swearing, thinking themselves more obliged by swearing on the mass-book than the four Gospels, and St Patrick's mass-book more than any new one,—swearing by their father's soul, by their gossip's hand, by other things which are the product of those many tales are told them,—their not knowing upon what account they refuse to come to Church, but now they are old and never did, or their countrymen do not, or their fathers or grandfathers never did, or that their ancestors were priests, and they will not alter from their religion,—and, after all, can give no account of their religion, what it is,—only, they believe as their priest bids them, and go to mass, which they understand not, and reckon their beads, to tell the number and the tale of their prayers, and abstain from eggs and fish in Lent, and visit St Patrick's well, and leave pins and ribands, yarn or thread, in their holy wells, and pray to God, St Mary, and St Patrick, St Columbanus, and St Bridget, and desire to be buried with St Francis's cord about them, and to fast on Saturdays in honour of our Lady. These and so many other things of like nature we see daily, that we, being conscious of the infinite distance which these things have from the spirit of Christianity, know that no charity can be greater than to persuade the people to come to our Churches, where they shall be taught all the ways of godly wisdom, of peace and safety to their souls: whereas now there are many of them that know not how to say their prayers, but mutter like pies and parrots, words which they are taught, but they do not pretend to understand."

system His glory is given to others, not indeed to His Son, whom we exalt far more than they do, but to the Virgin Mary, and to saints, and to relics, and to images. The latter of course are not familiar notions with us ; because our Church has wisely rejected them, knowing from the unvarying lessons of Christian history, as well as of Jewish and Heathen, that these media ever intercept the Divine Vision from the eyes of weak humanity. These objects of a superstitious, idolatrous worship are familiar to the common Romanist, just as the grosser fables about their deities were to the Heathens in early ages, just as his Fetishes are to the African. Thus the creatures of superstition and idolatry have ever been treated with irreverence ; because the worshiper, after all, retains an unquenchable consciousness of his own superiority to them. But the name of God cannot be treated profanely by those who attach any living meaning to it. There must still be something analogous to the putting off our shoes, when we feel that the ground we are treading is really holy.

Soon after our apologist takes us into a church (p. 235). "There is a feeble old woman, who first genuflects before the Blessed Sacrament, and then steals her neighbour's handkerchief or prayerbook, who is intent on his devotions. Here at last, you say, is a thing absolutely indefensible and inexcusable. Doubtless ; but what does it prove ? Does England bear no thieves ? or do you think this poor creature an unbeliever ? or do you exclaim against Catholicism, which has made her so profane ? But why ? Faith is illuminative, not operative ; it does not force obedience, though it increases responsibility ; it heightens guilt ; it does not prevent sin ; the will is the source of action, not an influence from without, acting mechanically on the feelings. She worships and she sins : she kneels because she believes ; she steals because she does not love." Can it be that these words, "*an influence from without, acting mechanically on the feelings,*" are meant to be a description of Faith ? One should deem it impossible,—though I see not in what other way to interpret them,—were it not that the

whole passage seems to prove that Dr Newman's conception of Faith must be just this, and nothing else, a magical influence from without, acting mechanically on the feelings, having nothing spiritual in it, never touching the will, never reaching the conscience. *Illuminative* he terms it: but what does it illumine? It does not even make the poor creature's darkness visible. He does indeed allow that it heightens her guilt: this admission is extorted from him by the remnant of his Protestant conscience: but it does not amount to much: for a few pages afterward this very Faith, which has been violated and outraged through life, is represented as exercising a last magical influence mechanically on the feelings, and becoming the instrument of salvation, just as any charm might do in a fairy tale.

We are then presented with a description of the Protestant conception of Faith, some portions of which may perhaps be recognised by his own former associates, but which Luther and every Protestant would repudiate as a godless fiction. "I suppose it might be, as Luther said it was, had God so willed it,—that faith and love were so intimately one, that the abandonment of the latter was the forfeiture of the former (p. 239)." That this is utterly repugnant to Luther's teaching, all who know anything of it, must be aware. And what a mechanical conception of the moral order of the world is implied in those words, "I suppose it might be, had God so willed it!" as though the deepest essential truths were mere arbitrary ordinances. He continues: "Now did sin not only throw the soul out of God's favour, but at once empty it of every supernatural principle, we should see in Catholics, what is, alas! so common among Protestants, souls brought back to a sense of guilt, frightened at their state, yet having no resource, and nothing to build upon, [that is, no saintly intercession, no priestly absolution]. Again and again it happens, that, after committing some sin greater than usual, or being roused after a course of sin, or frightened by sickness, a Protestant wishes to repent; but what is he to fall back upon? whither is he to go? what is he to do?" Can it then indeed be, that, so long as Dr Newman was

in our Church, he was unable to answer these questions? Would he have hesitated a single moment about the answer he was to give. Then was it indeed time for him to go to Rome, if he had not yet learnt the very first principles of evangelical truth. Or rather it is not surprising that he should have gone thither: for there he will hardly learn them. Had he never heard of the Cross, until he began to worship the Crucifix?

Further: "But the Catholic knows just where he is, and what he has to do: no time is lost, when compunction comes upon him; but, while his feelings are fresh and keen, he can betake himself to the appointed means of cure. He may be ever falling; but his faith is a continual invitation and persuasive to repent." He goes to his medicine-chest, and takes his dose of magnesia, or his drachm and opium pill, and fancies himself well again. "The poor Protestant adds sin to sin; and his best aspirations come to nothing." He knows that he was shapen in iniquity, and conceived in sin; and he feels how awful all sin must needs be in the sight of Him who desires truth in the inward parts. But he also knows that there is a hyssop with which he may be washt, and One who will purge him therewith. On the other hand, "the Catholic wipes off his guilt again and again [just as he might wash his hands]; and thus, even if his repentance does not endure, and he has not strength to persevere, in a certain sense he is never getting worse, but ever beginning afresh." This is in direct contradiction to the whole experience of mankind, that a relapse is worse than the original disease, and that a succession of relapses becomes incurable. Dr Newman adds indeed: "Nor does the apparent easiness of pardon operate as an encouragement to sin; unless repentance be easy, and the grace of repentance to be expected, when it has already been quencht; or unless past repentance avail, when it is not persevered in." But this sentence seems hardly reconcilable with the one before it: and everything depends on what he means by "*repentance*" and "*the grace of repentance.*" We, who are "taught by flesh and blood," feel that real repentance is very difficult, and that the difficulty increases with every repetition of sin: but, if Dr

Newman's "*grace of repentance*," as his words seem to imply, is a mechanical outward thing, like his grace of faith, it may be no less easy and manageable.

It is the end however that proves all things ; and it is then that we are to find the real power and worth of Faith. It is then that the magical charm puts forth its virtue, to save him in whom it has been asleep and torpid all through his life. The Romanist "has within him almost a principle of recovery, certainly an instrument of it. He may have spoken lightly of the Almighty, but he has ever believed in Him : he has sung jocose songs about the Blessed Virgin and Saints, and told good stories about the evil spirit, but in levity, not in contempt : he has been angry with his heavenly patrons when things went ill with him, but with the waywardness of a child who is cross with his parents. They were ever before him, even when he was in the mire of mortal sin, and in the wrath of the Almighty, *as lights burning in the firmament of his intellect*, though he had no part with them, as he perfectly knew. He has absented himself from his Easter duties years out of number ; but he never denied he was a Catholic. He has laugh at priests, and formed rash judgements of them, and slandered them to others, but not as doubting the divinity of their functions and the virtue of their ministrations. He has attended Mass carelessly and heartlessly ; but he was ever aware what was before his eyes, under the veil of material symbols, in that august and adorable action. So, when the news comes to him that he is to die, and he cannot get a priest, and the ray of God's grace pierces his heart, and he yearns after Him whom he has neglected, it is with no inarticulate confused emotion, which does but oppress him, and which has no means of relief. His thoughts at once take shape and order ; they mount up, each in its due place, to the great objects of faith, *which are as surely in his mind as they are in heaven*. He addresses himself to his crucifix ; he interests the Blessed Virgin in his behalf ; he betakes himself to his patron Saints ; he calls his good angel to his side ; he professes his desire of that sacramental absolution, which for circumstances he cannot obtain ;

*he exercises himself in acts of faith, hope, charity, contrition, resignation, and other virtues suitable to his extremity.* True, he is going into the unseen world; but true also, that *that unseen world has already been with him here.* True, he is going to a foreign, but not to a strange place; judgement and purgatory are familiar ideas to him, more fully realized within him even than death. He has had a much deeper perception of purgatory, though it be a supernatural object, than of death, though a natural one. The enemy rushes on him, to overthrow the faith *on which he is built* [that faith which was an influence from without, acting mechanically on his feelings]: but *the whole tenour of his past life, his very jesting, and his very oaths, have been overruled, to create in him a habit of faith, girding round and protecting the supernatural principle.* And thus even one who has been a bad Catholic may have a hope in his death, to which the most virtuous of Protestants, nay, my dear brethren, the most correct and most thoughtful among yourselves, however able, or learned, or sagacious, if you have lived, not by faith, but by private judgement, are necessarily strangers."

In the last sentence of this astounding passage, there is an ambiguity, which would almost seem to be intentional, and which leaves it somewhat obscure what is the contrast really meant. They who have lived "*not by faith,*" might be supposed to be mere unbelievers, and, as such, to have no share in the promises of the Gospel. But even the expression, "*private judgement,*" would direct our view toward a peculiar mode of receiving the truths of Christianity; although there is no real contrariety between *private judgement* and *faith*: nay, faith, if it be living and powerful, involves an act of private judgement, an individual, personal recognition of the truths which it receives. The act of *proving all things* is not contrary, but the reasonable, legitimate antecedent to *holding fast that which is good.* Moreover, if the whole passage is to have any force, any meaning, the contrast in it must needs be between the deathbed of a Romanist and that of a member of the Church of England; and so far as one may venture to pronounce anything positive with regard to

such a complex of wild extravagances, the writer would seem by the words, "the most virtuous of Protestants," to refer to the Evangelical portion of our Church, and by "the most correct and thoughtful" of the persons he is addressing, to the Tractarians or Anglocatholics, for whom his Lectures are especially designed, and whom he would bribe to come to him by telling them that "a bad Catholic" may have a better hope in death than they can have.

Yet, even if Dr Newman had meant to speak of a conscientious, "virtuous" unbeliever, assuredly one might look with more of satisfaction, yea, with more of hope, on his death, than on that of the "bad Catholic," of whom he draws what he means to be an alluring, but what to a lover of truth and righteousness must be such a revolting picture. For observe: the contrast is not between him who has lived by faith, and him who has lived, "not by faith, but by private judgement:" it is between him who has lived by private judgement, correctly and virtuously, and him who, according to the supposition, having the Divine gift of faith, has lived in continual violation of it. Of such a man Dr Newman pronounces, that he may have a hope in his death, to which the most virtuous of Protestants, the most correct and thoughtful of Anglocatholics, are necessarily strangers. Observe the scale here: at the bottom stands the "virtuous" Protestant; he has the reality, and is therefore cast down in this world of phantoms and shams: next comes the "correct" Anglocatholic, with his formal morality: but the highest place is reserved for the "bad Catholic," who has neither the reality, nor the form. He knows what is right, and does it not; he knows what is wrong, and does it; and therefore he shall be saved. According to the principles of all law, the justice of which the conscience instantaneously recognises, and which the Gospel has repeatedly sanctioned, the light of knowledge is a grievous and terrible aggravation of sin committed under it and in despite of it. *If ye were blind, ye would have no sin: but now ye say, We see: therefore your sin remaineth.* Dr Newman, on the contrary, tells us that this light, in his bad Catholic, is "almost a principle



of recovery, certainly an instrument of it.—The Almighty,—the Blessed Virgin and Saints,—were ever before him, even when he was in the mire of mortal sin,—as lights burning in the firmament of his intellect.” The writer feels no hesitation in controverting that great law, according to which sin dulls and deadens our spiritual faculties, and bedims and darkens our spiritual perceptions. If ye will come and join me, if ye will fly for refuge to Rome, ye shall be angels and devils at the selfsame moment. Of yore those who knew God from the manifestation of His power and Godhead in the outward world, yet glorified Him not as God, were given up to a reprobate mind, and lost the knowledge they had abused ; but it shall not be so with you. Through the Divine gift of faith, even while you are lying in the mire of mortal sin, ye shall have the beatific vision ; and, though this revelation produces no effect on you, still it shall abide in the firmament of your intellect ; and, when the fear of death comes upon you, it shall enable you to see all that you are to do. When Dr Newman’s Catholic is told that he is to die, he immediately begins packing up his clothes for his journey : he knows just how many shirts and how many pair of stockings he shall want ; and he begs or borrows them of his patron saint. The same mechanical, formal course of thought, which we have seen in the former parts of this Lecture, reaches its consummation at the close, both in the account of the bad Catholic’s sins, and still more in that of the good deeds, by which he is to get a ticket of admission into heaven. All the mysterious powers and weaknesses of the heart and will, the agonies and the deadness of the conscience, the palsyng force of habit, the craft and subtilty of evil, are ignored and forgotten ; and he on whom the heavenly lights burning in the firmament of his intellect, while he was lying in the mire of mortal sin, produced no effect, except that of “overruling his very jests and oaths to create in him a habit of faith,” is so roused by the prospect of death, that he can all at once lay in a store of “acts of faith, hope, charity, contrition, resignation, and other virtues suitable to

his extremity." He blows his whistle, and anon collects a whole pack of virtues, which come at his calling, they who are wont to be so retiring, so reserved, they who grow up slowly even in the ground of an honest and good heart. But I mistake : it is not the virtues he collects : he merely "exercises himself in *acts* of faith, and *acts* of hope, and *acts* of charity, and *acts* of contrition, and *acts* of resignation." He who had been more or less of an actor all his life, becomes a consummate actor at the point of death, and puts on his last mask, for his last masquerade, and hopes thus to beguile and deceive Him who seeth the heart, and desireth truth in the inward parts. Verily, to a discerning eye, a deathbed tormented by the reproachful stings of conscience would be far less dismal and hopeless than such a theatrical daub, such a melodramatic pantomime.

The pernicious, demoralizing character of the Romish teaching on these subjects is forcibly represented by Jeremy Taylor in his *Dissuasive*, Part 1. c. 2. § 1. Having laid down the proposition, that "the Church of Rome, as at this day disordered, teaches doctrines, and uses practices, which are in themselves, or in their true and immediate consequences, direct impieties, and give warranty to a wicked life," he proceeds to illustrate this in the first instance by her doctrine of repentance. "For the Roman doctors teach, that, unless it be by accident, or in respect of some other obligation, a sinner is not bound presently to repent of his sin, as soon as he has committed it. Some time or other he must do it ; and if he take care so to order his affairs that it be not wholly omitted, but so that it be done one time or other, he is not by the precept or grace of repentance bound to do more. Scotus and his scholars say that a sinner is bound, viz. by the precept of the Church, to repent on holydays, especially the great ones. But this is thought too severe by Soto and Molina, who teach that a sinner is bound to repent but once a year, that is, against Easter. These doctors indeed do differ concerning the Churches sense :—but they agree in the worst part of it, viz. that, though the Church calls upon sinners to

repent on holydays, or at Easter, yet that by the law of God they are not tied to so much, but only to repent in the danger or article of death.—If it be replied to this, that, though God hath left it to a sinner's liberty to repent when he please, yet the Church hath been more severe than God hath been, and ties a sinner to repent by collateral positive laws; for, having bound every one to confess at Easter, consequently she hath tied every one to repent at Easter, and so by her laws he can lie in the sin without interruption but twelve months or thereabouts; yet there is a secret in this, which nevertheless themselves have been pleased to discover for the ease of tender consciences, viz. that the Church ordains but the means, the exterior solemnity of it, and is satisfied if you obey her laws by a ritual repentance; but the holiness, and the inward repentance, which in charity we should have supposed to have been designed by the law of festivals,—is not that which is enjoined by the Church in her law of holydays. So that still sinners are left to the liberty, which, they say, God gave, even to satisfy ourselves with all the remaining pleasures of that sin for a little while, even during our short mortal life: only we must be sure to repent at last.—

“But this, though it be infinitely intolerable, yet it is but the beginning of sorrows. For the guides of souls in the Roman Church have prevaricated in all the parts of repentance most sadly and dangerously. The next things therefore that we shall remark, are their doctrines concerning contrition: which, when it is genuine and true, that is, a true cordial sorrow for having sinned against God,—a sorrow proceeding from the love of God, and conversion to Him, and ending in a dereliction of all our sins, and a walking in all righteousness,—both the Psalms and the Prophets, the Old Testament and the New, the Greek Fathers and the Latin, have allowed as sufficient for the pardon of our sins through faith in Jesus Christ,—as our writers have often proved in their Sermons and Books of Conscience,—yet first the Church of Rome does not allow it to be of any value, unless it be joined with a desire to confess their sins to a priest,

saying that a man by contrition is not reconciled to God, without their sacramental or ritual penance, actual or votive; and this is decreed by the Council of Trent: which thing, besides that it is against Scripture and the promises of the Gospel, not only teaches for doctrine the commandments of men, but evacuates the goodness of God by their traditions, and weakens and discourages the best repentance, and prefers repentance toward men before that which the Scripture calls repentance toward God, and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ."

After touching on a couple of other points, Taylor concludes: "The sequel is this, that, if a man live a wicked life for three-score or fourscore years together, yet, if in the article of his death, sooner than which God hath not commanded him to repent, he be a little sorrowful for his sins, then resolving for the present that he will do so no more,—and though this sorrow hath in it no love of God, but only a fear of hell, and a hope that God will pardon him,—this, if the priest absolves him, does instantly pass him into a state of salvation. The priest with two fingers and a thumb can do his work for him; only he must be greatly disposed and prepared to receive it: *greatly*, we say, according to the sense of the Roman Church; for he must be attrite; or it were better if he were contrite; one act of grief, a little one, and that not for one sin more than another, and this at the end of a long wicked life, at the time of our death, will make all sure."

The groveling immorality of these speculations and calculations, this bargaining and chaffering with Almighty God in the spirit of an old market-woman, this attempt to trick the All-righteous into letting you into heaven with still more and more of sin upon your shoulders, this notion that you are helping and benefiting a soul by getting leave for it to continue so much longer in the hell-pools of sin,—these symptoms of an intellect that has been sharpened by casuistry until every moral perception has been rubbed away from it, and that deals with good and evil by the pound and the yard, trying to adulterate virtue with the foulest garbage of vice, and exulting in passing

it off as of the first quality,—these things are too gross for Dr Newman. No one who has had the education of an English gentleman, could dabble in such iniquity; still less a person who has been brought up in a Protestant Church, and has been an eminent preacher of holiness and righteousness therein. Nevertheless there is the same leaven in the passage last quoted from his *Lectures on Anglicanism*: the tendency of that passage is in the same direction, though it is not pushed to the same loathsome extremes. It shews us too how the same evil spirit is still active and dominant in the Church of Rome. We cannot however do her full justice, without calling to mind what Dr Newman was. Let a person turn to some of those glowing exhortations to holiness and godliness, which shine forth in his Sermons, and then judge between the two Churches. Here, in these Sermons, we find Mr Newman, the minister of the Church of England. There, in that Lecture, you see Dr Newman, the priest of the Church of Rome. *What!* you ask; *has a moral paralysis struck him?* Alas! so it must be. His intellect is keen and bright as ever. What then can have thus paralysed him? The gripe of Rome.

## NOTE J : p. 30.

Bellarmin (*De Romano Pontifice*, L. iv. c. 3), having laid down this proposition—that “the supreme Pontiff, when he is teaching the Church in matters pertaining to faith, cannot err in any case,” attempts to prove it by four texts of Scripture. The first is our Lord’s words to Peter (Luke xxii. 31, 32), *Simon, Simon, behold, Satan hath desired to have you, that he may sift you as wheat. But I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not: and when thou art converted, strengthen the brethren.* The second is the celebrated passage in St Matthew, xvi. 18: *Upon this rock I will build My Church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.* The third is the charge in St John, xxi. 16, *Feed My sheep.* The fourth is the ordinance in Exodus, xxviii. 30:

*Thou shalt put on the breastplate of judgement the Urim and the Thummim.* On these four texts he seems to fancy he shall drive his polemical chariot home to the goal, through the midst of the Protestant host : but, when we look at the wheels, we perceive that not one of them is really attacht to the chariot; and as soon as he tries to set it in motion, they drop down, and leave him on the ground.

To us, the more closely we examine these four texts, the clearer it appears that no one of them bears in the remotest manner on the proposition professedly deduced from them,—that in no one of them is there the slightest reference to any mode of infallibility,—that in no one of them is there any contemplation, direct or indirect, of the See of Rome, except so far as that See is comprised in the general body of the Christian ministry. In Bellarmin's application of these texts there are at least two audacious and wholly groundless assumptions,—first, that our Lord's words to St Peter involve the promise of infallibility to him personally ; and secondly, that the special gifts alledged to have been bestowed on St Peter were to be transmitted by him, as an heirloom, to his alledged successors in the See of Rome ; assumptions, in favour of which there is nothing even like an early tradition to be cited. In fact St Peter is the only Apostle, of whom it is recorded that he was mistaken on an important question, subsequently to the day of Pentecost ; so that in this case, as well as in that of the Virgin Mary, and in the direction that all shall drink of the Cup in the Lord's Supper, the writers of the New Testament seem to have been especially guided to warn and guard the Church against the corruptions which Rome after many ages was to introduce.

Hence one might deem it surprising that so able and clear-headed a thinker as Bellarmin should have supposed that there was any real force in such arguments. But in judging of his writings, and of those of others in a similar position, it behoves us to make large allowances for the force of inveterate prejudice, which is almost overwhelming in behalf of a proposition

regarded as well nigh axiomatic, nay, as a fundamental religious truth. That tendency to project itself into its objects, which accompanies all the operations of the human mind, belongs to its prejudices, quite as much as to its principles,—nay, far more; because its principles supply a corrective for their own aberrations; whereas the greater the aberration, the more fondly our prejudices cherish it. Thus we are enabled to understand the otherwise inexplicable inconsistency, when, as not seldom happens, especially in members of the Jesuit order, we find great holiness of life allied to a seemingly utter disregard of truth. As we all fancy that our senses perceive a number of things, of which they have no inkling whatsoever, so is it with our intellectual and moral perceptions, unless they have gone through a long and severe purgatorial discipline.

Accustomed as we are to look at the words of Scripture with the naked eye, to us it seems incontrovertibly clear, that our Lord's words to Peter, in the passage cited from St Luke, bear immediately and exclusively upon him,—except so far as they may be transferred by analogy to persons in a similar condition,—and that they relate directly to his denial of the Lord, and to the help which he was to receive through his Master's prayer that he might rise out of his sinful fall, and might shew forth the increase of strength derived from the knowledge of his weakness in calling others to accept the forgiveness which he himself had found. This is Augustin's interpretation of the passage, and Chrysostom's, and Theophylact's, as cited by Bellarmin himself. Nor do they give the slightest hint that any power of infallibility was conferred on St Peter by our Lord's words, or that they had any bearing on the See of Rome. Field, who, in his fifth Book *Of the Church* (c. 42), has an able discussion and refutation of Bellarmin's arguments, points this out especially with regard to Theophylact, who, he says, "doth not attribute the confirmation of the brethren by Peter, which he is commanded to perform, to his constancy in the true faith, and in the profession of it, but to the experience that he had of the tender mercy and goodness of God toward

him.—For who will not (as the same Theophylact fitly observeth) be confirmed by Peter in the right persuasion of the mercies and goodness of God toward repentant sinners, when he seeth him whom Christ had so much honoured, after so shameful a fault, and so execrable a fact, of the abnegation of his Lord and Master, the Lord of Life, not only received to mercy, but restored to the dignity of the prime and chief Apostle.”

No less manifest is it that our Lord's words in St Matthew contain no promise of infallibility to St Peter, of whose fallibility subsequently to that promise we have such proof,—still less to any branch of the Church, or even to the whole Church. Of the indefectibility of the Church we have indeed a full assurance in that promise: but this is a very different thing from infallibility, though the two are often confounded.

With regard to the charge by which St Peter is reinstated in his apostolical office, as Field says, “we know, and all that are in their right wits do acknowledge, that a man may be a pastor in the Church of God, and yet subject to error; and therefore Christ's requiring Peter to do the duty of a pastor, will not prove that the Pope cannot err.”

It is perhaps owing to Bellarmin's fourth text, that the later Roman apologists have been led to detect an anticipation of the Papal infallibility in the Jewish High-Priest. But the history of the Jewish Church furnishes no warrant for such a supposition, unless it be the unintentional prophecy of Caiaphas: and in this sense we might doubtless find many expressions of self-condemnation in the language of Popes, and many glimmerings of truths which they resisted, instead of following them out. In truth, as Thorndike remarks (Vol. II, p. 71), “he that from hence [from the prophecy of Caiaphas] concludes the Church infallible, must first maintain that Caiaphas erred not in crucifying our Lord Christ.”

The monstrous fallacy and imposture of identifying the See of Rome with St Peter, and of investing it with all the privileges which have been ascribed to St Peter, whether truly or falsely, has never been set forth more forcibly than by the Bishop of St



David's in his Sermon *On the Centre of Unity*, with an extract from which I will close this note. Preaching on St Paul's words 1 Cor. i. 12, 13, he says: "If it had been given to St Paul to pierce with prophetic eye through the long vista of ages which separates his time from ours, and to foresee in what sense, and under what circumstances, men would continue to say, *I am of Peter*, it is hard to determine which aspect of this mournful history would have filled his soul with deeper emotions of astonishment, shame, and grief. It would no doubt have appeared to him marvellous enough, that his brother Peter, Peter whom he had withstood to his face because he was to be blamed, Peter to whom he would not allow any degree of authority, which might not be as rightfully claimed by himself, Peter who had himself admonisht his fellow elders not to carry themselves as being lords over God's heritage, but being examples to the flock,—that Peter, I say, should ever be supposed, not only to have possest, but to have transmitted to others, a title to absolute dominion over the whole Church of Christ, that each of his pretended successors should receive divine honours, should be adored upon the altar, should be solemnly proclaimed Vicar of Christ, Ruler of the World, should be acknowledged as Lord of Lords, as the Almighty, the Infallible, as Vicegerent of God, as God upon earth, as our Lord God: this, I say, would have appeared to St Paul marvellous enough. And yet I venture to think that even this awful blasphemy would not have been the thing which would have excited in him the highest degree of amazement and horror. I believe that he would have shuddered still more, if he had contemplated the means by which this usurpt dominion was maintained and propagated, the manner in which it was exercised, and the ends which it was made to serve. And even among these would it have been the violence of persecution, the rivers of innocent blood, the dark and loathsome dungeons, the instruments of lingering torture, the manifold forms of agonizing death, by which this unrighteous sovereignty was enforced, from which he would have turned away with the deepest abhorrence? Or

would it have been that this cruel tyranny, exercised in the name of Christ, was employed to supersede Christ's religion by another Gospel, to set up other mediators in Christ's stead, to make Christ's word a dead letter, and to replace it with the traditions and inventions of men? to decree new articles of faith, to impose doctrines of which Paul never heard, and which, if he had known, he would have withstood even to the death? I believe not so. For he would have had before his eyes something still worse than this. He would have seen these attributes of Omnipotence assumed for still more unhallowed ends,—to do that which, with reverence be it spoken, God Himself could not do, even to subvert the first principles of truth and Justice, to confound the eternal distinctions of right and wrong, to sever the most sacred ties by which society is knit together, to stifle the voice of reason and conscience, to make evil good, and good evil, darkness light, and light darkness.”

The central principle of this evil system, the Bishop finds, even as Dr Newman did when he was amongst us, in the claim of infallibility. “Whatever changes” (he says,) “it may undergo in its outward aspect, whatever variety of forms it may develop, still, so long as the principle of an omnipotent infallible authority is retained,—and it was never asserted more boldly than at this day,—the spirit of the religion must continue the same; and each new addition is bound upon every conscience as tightly as any article of its original creed.”

NOTE K: p. 30.

I have spoken above (in Note H) of the extraordinary sophistry by which it has been attempted to prove that our 21st Article does not deny the infallibility of General Councils. Why the Tract-writer indulged himself in this exhibition of his logical dexterity, is not very clear. For our Article is in accordance with the opinions of Christian Antiquity, and is supported by the almost unanimous consent of our own divines.

A few pages will not be misemployed in establishing the latter point by the evidence of some of the chief amongst them.

One of the very first Acts of our Reformation is a Judgement pronounced by the Convocation of 1536, and printed by Lord Herbert, by Burnet, and by Collier. "As concerning General Councils, like as we, taught by long experience, do perfectly know that there never was, nor is anything devised, invented, or instituted by our forefathers more expedient or more necessary for the establishment of our faith, for the extirpation of heresies, and the abolishing of sects and schisms, and finally for the reducing of Christ's people unto one perfect unity and concord in His Religion, than by the having of General Councils, so that the same be lawfully had and congregated *in Spiritu Sancto*, and be also conform and agreeable—to that wholesome and godly institution and usage, for the which they were at first devised and used in the primitive Church;—even so on the other side, taught by like experience, we esteem, repute, and judge, that there is, nor can be, anything in the world more pestilent and pernicious to the common-weale of Christendom, or whereby the truth of God's word hath in times past, or hereafter may be, sooner defaced or subverted, or whereof hath and may ensue more contention, more discord, and other devilish effects, than when such General Councils have or shall be assembled, not Christianly, nor charitably, but for and upon private malice and ambition, or other worldly and carnal respects and considerations, according to the saying of Gregory Nazianzenus," already quoted in p. 167. Here, as in the Article, the value of the Council is regarded as dependent on the character of its members, without reference to any supposed infallibility.

Of Jewel it will not be expected that he should speak with any excessive reverence of General Councils. In his *Answer to Dr Cole's Second Letter*, he writes: "Whereas you say we could never yet prove the error of one General Council, I think your memory doth somewhat deceive you. For, to pass by all other matters, Albertus Pighius, the greatest learned man, as it is thought, of your side, hath found such errors to our hands:

for in his *Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, speaking of the Second Council holden at Ephesus, which you cannot deny but it was General, and yet took part with the heretic abbot Eutyches against the Catholic father Flavianus, he writeth thus : *Concilia universalia, etiam congregata legitime, ut bene, ita perperam, injuste, impieque judicare et definire possunt.*" In his Answer to Dr Cole's Third Letter, Jewel, after defending his previous remarks, adds : "When ye have sought out the bottom of your learning, I believe it will be hard for you to find any good sufficient cause why a General Council may not as well be deceived as a Particular. For Christ's promises, *Ecce ego vobiscum sum*, and *Ubicunque duo aut tres convenerint in nomine Meo, ibi sum Ego in medio illorum*,—are made as well to the Particular Council as to the General."

In his *Defense of the Apology* (c. ii. § 9) Jewel quotes the remarkable passage from Augustin's Treatise on Baptism against the Donatists (b. ii. c. 4) : "Quis nesciat Sanctam Scripturam Canonicam, tam Veteris quam Novi Testamenti, — omnibus posterioribus episcoporum litteris ita praeponi, ut de illa omnino dubitari et disceptari non possit, utrum verum vel utrum rectum sit quidquid in ea scriptum esse constiterit ; episcoporum autem litteras—et per sermonem forte sapientiore cujuslibet in ea re peritoris,—et per concilia licere reprehendi, si quid in eis forte a veritate deviatum est ; et ipsa concilia quae per singulas regiones vel provincias fiunt, plenariorum conciliorum auctoritate quae fiunt ex universo orbe Christiano, sine ullis ambagibus cedere ; ipsaque plenaria saepe priora posterioribus emendari, cum aliquo experimento rerum aperitur quod clausum erat, et cognoscitur quod latebat." Here there is no notion of a supernatural infallibility, but the very reverse, the fallibility and corrigibility which belong to human decisions.

Jewel also quotes the words of Panormitanus : *Plus credendum est uni privato fidei, quam toti concilio et Papae, si meliorem habeat auctoritatem vel rationem.*

In Hooker's excellent remarks upon General Councils (E. P. I. x. 14), we find a complete agreement with the Judgement of the

Convocation of 1536, but no intimation of their possessing any special privilege of infallibility. "As one and the same law divine is to all Christian Churches a rule for the chiefest things,—by means whereof they all in that respect make one Church, as having all but *one Lord, one Faith, and one Baptism*,—so the urgent necessity of mutual communion for preservation of our unity in these things, as also<sup>d</sup> for order in some other things convenient to be everywhere uniformly kept, maketh it requisite that the Church of God here on earth have her laws of spiritual commerce between Christian nations,—laws by virtue whereof all Churches may enjoy freely the use of those reverend, religious, and sacred consultations, which are termed Councils General: a thing whereof God's own blessed Spirit was the Author; a thing practist by the holy Apostles themselves; a thing always afterward kept and observed throughout the world; a thing never otherwise than most highly esteemed of, till pride, ambition, and tyranny began by factious and vile endeavours to abuse that divine invention to the furtherance of wicked purposes. But as the just authority of civil courts and parliaments is not therefore to be abolisht, because sometime there is cunning used to frame them according to the private intents of men over-potent in the commonwealth; so the grievous abuse which hath been of Councils should rather cause men to study how so gracious a thing may again be reduced to that first perfection, than in regard of stains and blemishes sithence growing be held for ever in extreme disgrace." He adds: "Whether it be for the finding out of anything whereunto divine law bindeth us, but yet in such sort that men are not thereof on all sides resolved,—or for the setting down of some uniform judgement to stand touching such things, as, being neither way matters of necessity, are notwithstanding offensive and scandalous when there is open opposition about them,—be it for the ending of strifes touching matters of Christian belief, wherein the one part may seem to have probable cause of dissenting from the other,—or be it concerning matters of polity, order, and regiment in the Church,—I nothing doubt but that

Christian men should much better frame themselves to those heavenly precepts, which our Lord and Saviour with so great instancy gave as concerning peace and unity, if we did all concur in desire to have the use of ancient Councils again renewed, rather than these proceedings continued, which either make all contentions endless, or bring them to one only determination, and that of all others the worst, which is by sword."

It was not however till the seventeenth century that this question was brought forward very prominently, and became one of the chief heads of controversy. The disputes in the sixteenth turned rather on the particular errors and corruptions introduced by the Church of Rome. Feeling their weakness, as they could not but do, on these points, the Roman apologists adopted the plan of laying the stress of their argument on the general, formal topics of the authority and infallibility and other attributes of the Church, which, they asserted, manifestly belonged to no Church except that of Rome. In the fifth book of Field's *Treatise Of the Church*, these questions are discust with great learning and sobriety of judgement, calmly and convincingly. In the 51st chapter, which treats "of the assurance of finding out the Truth, which the Bishops assembled in General Councils have," he writes: "There are that say that all interpretations of Holy Scriptures agreed on in General Councils, and all resolutions of doubts concerning things therein contained, proceed from the same Spirit from which the Holy Scriptures were inspired; and that therefore General Councils cannot err, either in the interpretation of Scriptures, or resolving of things doubtful concerning the faith. But these men should know that, though the interpretations and resolutions of Bishops in General Councils proceed from the same Spirit from which the Scriptures were inspired, yet not in the same sort, nor with like assurance of being free from mixture of error. For the Fathers assembled in General Councils do not rely upon immediate revelation in all their particular resolutions and determinations, as the writers of the books of Holy Scripture did, but on their own meditation, search, and study, the general assistance of

Divine Grace concurring with them.—Secondly, when we desire to have things made known to us by immediate revelation from God, we go not to them that are most learned, but to them that are most devout and religious, whether they be learned or unlearned, whether of the Clergy or the Laity, whether men or women ; because for the most part God revealeth His secrets not to them that are wiser and more learned, but to them that are better and more religious and devout.—But in Councils men go to them that are more learned and have better place in the Church, though they be not the best and holiest men. Therefore questions touching matters of faith are not determined in Councils by immediate revelation.—It is no way necessary to think that the Fathers are any otherwise directed by the Spirit of Truth in General Councils, than in Patriarchal, National, or Provincial ; seeing General Councils consist of such as come with instructions from Provincial, National, and Patriarchal synods, and must follow the same in making decrees, and consequently that they are not led to the finding out of the truth in any special sort or manner, beyond that general influence that is required to the performance of every good work. So that, as God assisting Christian men in the Church only in a general sort to the performance of the works of virtue, there are ever some well-doers, and yet no particular man doth always well ;—so, in like sort God assisting Christian men in the Church in seeking out the truth only in general sort, as in the performances of the actions of virtue, and not by immediate revelation and inspiration, as in the Apostles time, there are ever some that hold and profess all necessary truth, though no one man or company of men, do find the truth ever and in all things, nor any assurance can be had of any particular men, that they should always hold all necessary truths ; and therefore we may safely conclude that no man can certainly pronounce that whatsoever the greater part of Bishops assembled in a General Council agree on, is undoubtedly true.”

These propositions Field supports by the testimony of preceding writers and of facts, and then proceeds : “ Yet, when there

is a lawful General Council,—if there appear nothing to us in it that may argue an unlawful proceeding, nor there be no gain-saying of men of worth, place, and esteem, we are so strongly to presume that it is true and right, that with unanimous consent is agreed on in such a Council, that we must not so much as profess publicly that we think otherwise, unless we do most certainly know the contrary; yet may we in the secret of our hearts remain in some doubt, carefully seeking, by the Scripture and monuments of antiquity, to find-out the truth. Neither is it necessary for us expressly to believe whatsoever the Council hath concluded, though it be true; unless by some other means it appear to us to be true, and we be convinced of it in some other sort than by the bare determination of the Council only.—But concerning the General Councils of this sort that hitherto have been holden, we confess that, in respect of the matter about which they were called, so nearly and essentially concerning the life and soul of the Christian faith, and in respect of the manner and form of their proceeding, and the evidence of proof brought in them, they are and ever were expressly to be believed by all such as perfectly understand the meaning of their determination.” Then, after speaking of the first six Councils he concludes: “and therefore, howsoever we dare not pronounce that lawful General Councils are free from danger of erring, as some among our adversaries do, yet do we more honour and esteem and more fully admit all the General Councils that ever hitherto have been holden, than they do; who fear not to charge some of the chiefest of them with error, as both the second and the fourth, for equaling the Bishop of Constantinople to the Bishop of Rome, which I think they suppose to have been an error in faith.”

As among the arguments made use of in our days to convert the weak and unstable and vacillating, it is found that none is more impressive and effective than the promise that they shall have an infallible guide to save them from the perils and dangers of personal responsibility, so was it in the seventeenth century. Archdeacon Wilberforce, in a passage already quoted, speaks of “that longing for some principle of guidance, which



is deeply rooted in the heart." Now this longing, like every natural appetite, has its diseased, as well as its healthy condition. When it impells us to make use of our own intellectual faculties, diligently, soberly, orderly, and to take advantage of all the helps and means wherewith God has supplied us, it is healthy: but when it disposes us to shake off this labour and care and anxiety, to repine against the divine ordinance that in the sweat of our understanding and of our heart we must eat our bread, and to crave for some magical aid whereby we may be relieved from this labour, it is utterly morbid, no less morbid than the analogous longings for the philosopher's stone and the elixir of life. Assuredly an infallible guidance, if it be anything else than that illumination of the Spirit which is to be obtained by holiness and earnest prayer, is quite as visionary as these phantoms, by which so many in former ages were lured and deluded,—quite as visionary as the Mahometan paradise, by which the Arabian impostor fascinated his followers: and it is only by reason of our weakness and sinfulness that it exercises such a charm over us.

Hence this became the main argument in the controversy between Laud and Fisher, in which Laud, then Bishop of St David's, tried to rescue the Duke of Buckingham, as well as his wife and mother, from the clutches of the subtle Jesuit. We are told that, in some previous conferences between Fisher and White, afterward Bishop of Ely, "all the speech was about particular matters, and little or none about a continual, infallible, visible Church, which was the chief and only point in which a certain lady [the Countess of Buckingham] required satisfaction, as having formerly settled in her mind that it was not for her, or any other unlearned persons, to take upon them to judge of particulars without depending upon the judgement of the true Church." To this Laud replies (§ 3. 17): "If that lady desired to rely on a particular infallible Church, it is not to be found on earth." He argues (§ 10. 3): "Since you distinguish not between the Church in general and a General Council, which is but her representation for determinations of the

faith,—though I be very slow in sifting or opposing what is concluded by lawful, general, and consenting authority,—though I give as much as can justly be given to the definitions of Councils truly General,—nay, suppose I should grant, which I do not, that General Councils cannot err,—yet this cannot down with me that all points even so defined are fundamental. For deductions are not prime and native principles; nor are superstructures foundations:—Therefore nothing is simply fundamental because the Church declares it, but because it is so in the nature of the thing which the Church declares” (§§ 10, 7).—“For full Church authority is but Church authority; and Church authority when it is at full sea is not simply divine; therefore the sentence of it not fundamental in the faith; and yet no erring disputer may be endured to shake the foundation which the Church in Council lays. But plain Scripture, with evident sense, or a full demonstrative argument, must have room, where a wrangling and erring disputer may not be allowed it. And there is neither of these but may convince the definition of the Council, if it be ill founded” (§ x. 11). “Now Catholic maxims, which are properly fundamental, are certain prime truths deposited with the Church, and not so much determined by the Church, as publisht and manifested, and so made firm by her to us.—Where all that the Church doth is but that the same thing may be believed, which was before believed, but with more light and clearness, and, in that sense, with more firmness than before.—But this hinders not the Church herself, nor any appointed by the Church, to examine her own decrees, and to see that she keep the principles of faith unblemisht and uncorrupted. For if she do not so, but that new doctrines be added to the old, the Church, which is *sacrarium veritatis*, may be changed in *lupanar errorum*” (§ x. 15).—“The Church of England grounded her positive Articles upon Scripture; and her negative do refute there, where the thing affirmed by you is not affirmed by Scripture, nor directly to be concluded out of it” (§ xv. 1).

In the course of his argument Laud strenuously maintains, and proves, that the Church is not infallible, not even the

Church general, much less that of Rome. "Every assistance of Christ and the Blessed Spirit is not enough to make the authority of any company of men divine and infallible, but such and so great an assistance only as is purposely given to that effect. Such an assistance the Prophets under the Old Testament, and the Apostles under the New had; but neither the Highpriest with his clergy in the Old, nor any company of prelates or priests in the New, since the Apostles, ever had it" (§ xvi. 26). In the 25th section (4. 5), Laud shews that, though the whole Church cannot universally err in any point of faith simply necessary to salvation, yet it may err on points which are not fundamental, and that the passages of Scripture alledged to prove the infallibility of the Church, merely prove her indefectibility, and convey a promise of Divine assistance.—"To settle controversies in the Church, there is a visible judge and infallible, but not living; and that is the Scripture pronouncing by the Church. And there is a visible and a living judge, but not infallible; and that is a General Council, lawfully called, and so proceeding" (§ xxvi. 1).

In the 33rd section, the longest and most elaborate of the whole book, Laud enters into a full consideration of the arguments adduced to prove the infallibility of General Councils, and displays their utter untenableness and futility. When we examine these arguments, the work may seem not to be a difficult one; but it could not well be better executed; and, as far as reasoning is concerned, the victory is complete. The texts of Scripture alledged in behalf of their infallibility are shewn to be wholly irrelevant, the authority of the Fathers, and the evidence of history, to be adverse.

This argument is followed by some remarks on the still more groundless, and far more irrational and revolting assumption, which ascribes infallibility to the Pope. Of this he says: "I am persuaded, many learned men among yourselves scorn it at the very heart; and I avow it, I have heard some learned and judicious Roman Catholics utterly condemn it. And well they may; for no man can affirm it, but he shall make himself a

scorn to all the learned men of Christendom, whose judgements are not captivated by Roman power. For my own part, I am clear of Jacobus Almain's opinion: 'A great wonder it is to me that they who affirm the Pope cannot err, do not affirm likewise that he cannot sin. And I verily believe they would be bold enough to affirm it, did not the daily works of the Popes compell them to believe the contrary.' For very many of them have led lives quite contrary to the Gospel of Christ, nay, such lives as no Epicurean monster storied out to the world hath outgone them in sensuality or other gross impiety, if their own historians be true.—Yet these must be infallible in their dictates and conclusions of faith." To this argument the Romish apologists are wont to reply, that it is mere Protestant dulness to confound infallibility with impeccability, which is something totally different, being a moral gift, instead of an intellectual. So that here again we find the same rending asunder of the heart and mind, which characterizes the Romish conception of faith, a separation belonging to the region of sin, but which is to be overcome more or less in the Kingdom of Grace. Yet we have been taught by our Divine Master that the true way of attaining to the knowledge of religious truth is by living according to it. But in this respect also Romanism substitutes a magical for a spiritual power, and seems to regard it as derogatory to the arbitrary omnipotence of the Deity, if we speak of the illumination which ever goes along with purity of heart, of the wonderful discernment which is granted to godliness, and of the manner in which sin, under all its forms, darkens our spiritual vision. We hold these opinions, we are told, because we are taught by flesh and blood, not by grace. When we come under this higher teacher, we shall discover that this is one of the ways in which God shews that, in the distribution of His gifts, He is no respecter of persons, that, though according to the law of the natural world more is given to him who hath, in the spiritual world this law is reversed, and that the most signal demonstration of the Divine Omnipotence is, that the miraculous gift of infallibility is often bestowed upon those

who might otherwise have been supposed to have derived their conception of Christianity from the Gospel of Judas Iscariot.

Again, when Lord Falkland's mother tried to draw him over to the Church of Rome, the main argument of the controversy in which he had to engage, was the infallibility of that Church. It was to defend Lord Falkland's *Discourse*, that Hammond entered into the discussion, who, in the Preface to his Treatise, writes thus: "The sad effects of the present differences and divisions of this broken kingdom having made Peace and Unity and Infallibility such precious desirable things, that, if there were but one wish offered to each man among us, it would certainly be laid out on this one treasure, the setting up some catholic umpire or daysman, some visible, infallible definer of controversies, the pretenders to that infallibility, having the luck to be alone in that pretension, have been lookt on with some reverence, and, by those who knew nothing of their grounds or arguments, acknowledged to speak, if not true, yet seasonably; and having so great an advantage upon their auditors,—their inclinations and their wishes to find themselves overcome going along with every argument that should be brought them,—they began to redouble their industry and their hopes; and, instead of the many particulars of the Romish doctrine, which they were wont to offer proof for in the retail, now to set all their strength upon this one in gross,—the very gains and conveniences that attend this doctrine of theirs, if it were true, being to flesh and blood, which all men have not the skill of putting off, mighty topics of probability that it is so."

There is something very disheartening in the contemplation of the manner in which errors and fallacies, after having been in great measure suppressed, and apparently almost extinguished, at least within certain limits, will sprout up again, it may be, after centuries, as vigorous and delusive as ever. It is sad and disheartening to think how closely these words of Hammond's apply to what has been going on in our Church in these last years. The triumphant learning and reasoning of our great divines in the seventeenth century had so completely demolisht

all the arguments alledged in behalf of the infallibility either of the Pope or of Councils, that for a century and a half few voices ventured to lift themselves up in defense of such an exploded error in England. Yet now it is become rampant again, and is welcomed equally by weak and by over-subtile minds, by those who have not strength to grasp any truth, and by those who have undermined all truth. Only we have not the same excuse for this morbid craving in our days, which Hammond finds in the divisions and dissensions of his. On the contrary, while we have had such wonderful proofs of the power of Truth in establishing consentient conviction, not only in the whole old world, but also in so many new continents, of Science, there were also divers indications of an approaching reconciliation in the sphere of moral and political and social philosophy, and even in religion, when it was proclaimed anew at Oxford, that man has no faculty of discovering, or even of discerning and recognising moral and spiritual truth, and that the fallibility of Reason must be superseded by the infallibility of Authority; much as though a person should take disgust at the multitudinous complicated operations of the laws of Nature, and should call up Chaos, the "anarch old," to set things in order.

Hammond continues: "To discover the danger of this sweet potion, or rather to shew how far it is from being what it pretends, and so to exchange the specious for the sound, the made-dish for the substantial food,—allowing the Universal Church *the authority of an irrefragable testimony*, and the present age of the Romish Church as much of belief as it hath of conformity with the Universal of all ages, but not a privilege of not being able to say false whatsoever it saith,—and so to set us in the safer though longer way, thereby to whet our industry in the chase of truth, instead of assuring ourselves that we cannot err,—this Discourse of Lord Falkland's was long since designed; as also to remove the great scandals and obstacles which have obstructed all way of hope to that universal aim of all true Christians,—the universal peace of Christendom. For to this nothing is more unreconcilably contrary than pretensions to

infallibility in any part of it ; all such making it unlawful either for themselves to mend, or others to be endured, shutting out all possibility either of compliance or charity or reformation in their own, or mercy to other men's errors."

Dr Newman, in his *Letter to Dr Jelf in Explanation of Tract XC.* enumerates a variety of opinions, which had been held by some of our principal divines, and the lawfulness of which he had desired to vindicate ; and among these he deems it should be allowable "to hold with Hammond that no General Council, truly such, ever did, or shall err in any matter of Faith." No authority is cited for this statement, which, carefully as it is worded, may produce an erroneous impression ; for at the utmost it can only be correct under very strict limitations. In his *Vindication of Lord Falkland's Discourse* (c. xi. §. 2), Hammond says : "It being supposed that Councils are not deciders of controversies,—meaning thereby *infallible* ones,—they be yet of good *authority* and use in the Church, to help to decide them, and—be only denied by us the privilege of *infallibility*, not that other of being very useful and venerable in a lower degree, and,—such the Council may be,—even next to the word of God itself."

In his *Discourse Of Fundamentals* (c. xii.), speaking of "the doctrines that hinder the superstructing of good life on the Christian belief," he singles out "especially the infallibility and inerrableness which is assumed and inclosed by the Romish Church, without any inerrable ground to build it on, and, being taken for an unquestionable principle, is, by the security it brings along with it, apt to betray men to the foulest whether sins or errors, whensoever this pretended infallible guide shall propose them.—For of this we have too frequent experience, how hard it is to dispossess a Romanist of any doctrine or practice of that present Church, for which he hath no grounds either in Antiquity or Scripture, or rational deductions from either, but the contrary to all these, as long as he hath that one hold or fortress, his persuasion of the infallibility of that Church, which teacheth or prescribeth it. And indeed it were as

unreasonable for us to accuse or wonder at this constancy in particular superstructed errors,—whilst this great first comprehensive falsity is maintained, as to disclaim the conclusion, when the premisses that duly induce it are embraced. And then that other errors and guilts of the highest nature neither are nor shall be entertained by those that are thus qualified for them, must sure be a felicity to which this doctrine hath no way entitled them, and for which they can have no security for one hour, but by renouncing that principle which equally obligeth to the belief of truths and falsehoods, embracing of commendable and vicious practices,—when they are once received and proposed to them by that Church.”

But it is in the *Paraenesis*, the fifth Chapter of which treats on Heresy, that Hammond most fully discusses the various questions concerning the authority of Councils. To the first four General Councils he ascribes the highest authority (§. 7), “because, these being so near the Apostles times, and gathered as soon as the heterodox opinions appeared, the sense of the Apostles might more easily be fetcht from those men and Churches to whom they had committed it.” As to other General Councils, he shews (§ 13) that there is no scriptural ground for deeming them infallible, and that the texts alledged in behalf of such a notion,—Matth. xviii. 20, John xvi. 3, Acts xv. 28,—do not bear it out; and then (in § 14) he adds: “This then of the inerrableness of General Councils being thus far evidenced to be no matter of faith, because not founded in any part of Scripture or Tradition,—the utmost that can be said of it is, that it is a theological verity which may piously be believed. And so I doubt not to pronounce of it, that if we consider God’s great and wise and constant providence and care over His Church, His desire that all men should be saved and, in order to that end, come to the knowledge of all necessary truth, His promise that He will not suffer His faithful servants to be tempted above what they are able, nor permit scandals and false teachers to prevail to the seducing of the very elect, His most pious godly servants,—if, I say, we consider these, and some other such like general promises of Scripture, wherein this



question seems to be concerned, we shall have reason to believe that God will never suffer all Christians to fall into such a temptation, as it must be in case the whole Church representative should err in matters of faith, by way of ellipsis, define against or leave out of their Creed any Article of that body of Credenda, which the Apostles delivered to the Church, and therein find approbation and reception among all those Bishops and Doctors of the Church diffused, who were out of the Council. And though in this case the Church might remain a Church, and so the destructive gates of Hades not prevail against it, and still retain all parts of the Apostles *depositum* in the hearts of some faithful Christians, who had no power in the Council to oppose the decree, or out of it to resist the general approbation, yet still the testimony of such a General Council, so received and approved, would be a very strong argument, and so a very dangerous temptation, to every the most meek and pious Christian : and it is piously to be believed, though not infallibly certain, (for who knows what the provocations of the Christian world, of the Pastors, or the flock, may arrive to, like the violence of the old world, that brought down the deluge upon them ?) that God will not permit His servants to fall into that temptation." This is but a scanty measure of infallibility ; and thus much many might be ready to concede : yet after all it must remain questionable whether the proposition rejected by the General Council be indeed a fundamental point of faith. And who is to ascertain and determine this ? What will be the practical use of such an infallibility to the simple Christian ?

Hammond's greater contemporary, Jeremy Taylor, discusses the same questions concerning the infallibility of the Church, of General Councils, and of the Pope, very fully in the second Part of his *Dissuasive* (Book i. § 1), with his own wonderful brilliancy of logic and of wit, scattering the arguments of the opposite party like dust before a March wind. They had previously undergone a thorough process of pounding in Chillingworth's logical crucible.

Thorndike, one of the most strenuous champions of

ecclesiastical authority, treats of the same topics at large in the first Book of his *Epilogue to the Tragedy of the Church of England*; and he too is a master of reasoning. In the fourth Chapter he shews that there is no passage in Scripture containing anything like a promise of infallibility to the Church. The same subject is resumed in the 27th Chapter, where he writes (§ 7): "I say not that the Church cannot determine what shall be taught and received in such disputes as will divide the Church unless an end be put; but I say that the authority of the Church can be no reason obliging or warranting to believe that for truth, which cannot be reasonably deduced from the motives of our common faith." Again (§ 14), "Neither will it be strange that I allow not any Council, in which never so much of the authority of the present Church is united, to say, in the same sense and to the same effect as the Synod of the Apostles at Jerusalem, *It seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us*: though I allow the overt act of their assembling to be a legal presumption that their acts are the acts of the Holy Ghost, so far as they appear not to transgress those bounds upon which the assistance of the Holy Ghost is promised the Church." Further (§ 18), "Though, granting the Church to be subject to error, salvation is not to be attained without much difficulty,—and though division in the Church may create more difficulty in attaining salvation than error might have done,—yet, so long as salvation may be and is attained by visible communion with the Church, so long is Christ *with His*, nor do the *gates of hell prevail against His Church*; though error, which excludeth infallibility, though division, which destroyeth unity, hinder many and many of attaining it." See also § 25: "Suppose the Church, by the foundation of it, enabled to maintain both the truth and the sufficiency of the motives of faith against infidels, and also the rule of faith against heretics, by the evidence which it maketh that they are received; what is this to the creating of faith by decreeing that which, before it was decreed, was not the object of faith?—Surely the Church cannot be the pillar that sustains any faith but that which is laid upon it, as received from

the beginning, not that which it layeth upon the foundation of faith."

In the 28th Chapter he shews that this view of the authority of the Church is alone consistent with the general opinion of the Fathers; and here, among other things, he writes (§ 11): "I know nothing in all antiquity more peremptory against the infallibility of the Church, than that of Vincentius, denying that the rule of faith can ever increase, or Councils do any more in it than determine that expressly and distinctly, which was simply held from the beginning."

That the labours of our divines with regard to this question were not ineffectual, we learn from Pearson's Preface to Lord Falkland's Treatise, where he says: "The great defenders of the doctrine of the Church of England have, with more than ordinary diligence, endeavoured to view the grounds of this controversy, and have written, by the advantage either of their learning accurately, or of their parts most strongly, or of the cause itself most convincingly, against that darling *infallibility*. How clearly this controversy hath been managed, with what evidence of truth discusst, what success so much of reason hath had, cannot more plainly appear than in this, that the very name of infallibility, before so much exalted, begins now to be very burthensome, even to the maintainers of it; insomuch as one of their latest and ablest proselytes, Hugh Paulin de Cressy, in his Exomologesis, hath dealt very clearly with the world, and told us, that 'this infallibility is an unfortunate word,' that Mr Chillingworth 'hath combated against it with too, too great success,' so great that 'he could wish the word were forgotten or at least laid by,'—that not only Mr Chillingworth, but we, the rest of the poor 'Protestants, have in very deed very much to say for ourselves when we are prest unnecessarily with it.' And therefore Mr Cressy's advice to all the Romanists is this, 'that we may never be invited to combat the authority of the Church under that notion.' O the strength of reason rightly managed! O the power of truth clearly declared! that it should force an eminent member of the Church of Rome to retract so necessary, so fundamental

a doctrine, to desert all their schools, and contradict all their controvertists. But indeed not without very good cause: for he professes withal, that, 'no such word as infallibility is to be found in any Council: neither did ever the Church enlarge her authority to so vast a wideness: but doth rather deliver the victory into our hands when we urge her decisions.'—It cannot therefore be the word alone, but the whole importance and sense of that word infallibility, which Mr Cressy so earnestly desires all his Catholics ever hereafter to forsake, because the former Church did never acknowledge it, and the present Church will never be able to maintain it. This is the great success which the reason, parts, and learning of the late defenders of our Church have had in this main architectonical controversy."

This collection of testimonies might easily be enlarged: but it is already sufficient to prove that the great body of our eminent divines concur in holding that, neither in the reason of the thing, nor from any declaration of Scripture, direct or even implicit, is there the slightest ground for deeming that the Councils of the Church have been, or would be, endowed with any miraculous gift of infallibility; wherefore we may safely pronounce that the existence of such a gift is a fond and vain imagination. At the same time they hold that Councils rightfully convened may be regarded, according to the expression of our Article, as having authority in controversies of faith; though their decisions, to have legal force, require to be adopted by each particular Church. Moreover they deem that the first four General Councils have a special paramount authority, as witnesses of the faith committed by the Apostles to the first ages of the Church; and many would probably incline to believe, with Hammond, that the decisions of every lawful General Council would be so far overruled by that superintending Providence which watches over the welfare of the Church, as that they would not be allowed to contravene any fundamental article of faith.

## NOTE L: p. 31.

The denial of the absolute infallibility of the Pope is well known to be one of the main principles of the Gallican Church, set forth in the four Articles of their famous Synod in 1682. The second of those Articles is, that "the full power in spiritual things is so vested in the Apostolical See, in the successors of St Peter and Vicars of Christ, as that the decrees of the Holy Ecu- menical Council of Constance, approved as they have been by the Apostolical See, and confirmed by the use of the Roman Pontiffs, and of the whole Church, and having always been religiously ob- served by the Gallican Church, shall retain their full force, as they were enacted in the fourth and fifth Sessions concerning the authority of General Councils, and that the Gallican Church does not approve of those who would impair the force of those decrees, as though they were of doubtful authority, or referred solely to the period of the Schism." Now the most important of the decrees here referred to was a declaration that "the Assembly, being legitimately gathered together in the Holy Ghost, constituting a General Council, and representing the Catholic Church, has its power immediately from Christ, and that every person, of whatsoever state or dignity, even though it be the Papal, is bound to obey the Council in those things which pertain to faith, and to the extirpation of the said Schism, and the reformation of the said Church in its Head and members." This declaration of the Council of Constance, in which we see a kind of dawn of the Reformation, was adopted in the Gallican Church in its fullest sense: and the fourth Article adds, that, "in contro- versies of faith, the office of the Pope is the chief, and that his decrees pertain to all Churches; nevertheless that his judgement is not *irreformabile*, unless it is confirmed by the consent of the Church."\*

\* These Articles are of such importance that I will subjoin the original words. The Second is: "Sic autem inesse Apostolicae Sedi, ac Petri

If any doubt could exist as to the purport of these Articles, it would be removed by Bossuet, who took the leading part in the Synod where they were drawn up, and who spent a large portion of his subsequent life in composing an elaborate Vindication of them, perhaps the ablest and most valuable of all his works. The main object of the last seven books of this Vindication, which he went on correcting and improving down to his death, was to prove that the infallibility of the Pope was altogether a modern doctrine, that for many centuries it had never been held under any form, and that even down to the sixteenth century there were abundant proofs of its not having been regarded as an article of faith. He proves this by the decrees of Councils, by the testimony of Fathers, Doctors, and Schoolmen, by the declarations of Popes themselves,—among others, in the first book of the Appendix (c. xii.), by those words of that truly honest Pope, Hadrian VI. who, when he was professor at Louvain, wrote: “*Si per Ecclesiam Romanam intelligatur caput ejus, puta Pontifex, certum est quod possit errare, etiam in iis quae tangunt fidem, haeresim per suam determinationem aut decretalem asserendo ; plures enim fuere Pontifices Romani haeretici.*” These words sufficiently prove that the Pope cannot then have been generally regarded as infallible. The meaning of the

successoribus, Christi vicariis, rerum spiritualium plenam potestatem, ut simul valeant atque immota consistant sanctae oecumenicae Synodi Constantiensis a Sede Apostolica comprobata, ipsoque Romanorum Pontificum ac totius ecclesiae usu confirmata, atque ab ecclesia Gallicana perpetua religione custodita, decreta de auctoritate Conciliorum generalium, quae sessione quarta et quinta continentur; nec probari a Gallicana ecclesia, qui eorum decretorum, quasi dubiae sint auctoritatis ac minus approbata, robur infringant, aut ad solum schismatis tempus Concilii dicta detorqueant.” The fourth Article is “*In fidei quoque quaestionibus praecipuas summi Pontificis esse partes, ejusque decreta ad omnes et singulas ecclesias pertinere, nec tamen irreformabile esse judicium, nisi Ecclesiae consensus accesserit.*”

I will add the words of the Council of Constance: “*Primo declarat quod ipsa in Spiritu Sancto legitime congregata, concilium generale faciens, et ecclesiam catholicam repraesentans, potestatem a Christo immediate habet, cui quilibet cujuscumque status vel dignitatis, etiam si papalis existat, obedire tenetur in his quae pertinent ad fidem, et extirpationem dicti schismatis, et reformationem dictae ecclesiae in capite et in membris.*”

declaration that the Pope's judgement is not *irreformabile*, Bossuet explains (L. vii. c. 1) by saying that the word is taken from Tertullian: "Judicium illud *irreformabile* esse dicimus, quod *immobile, irretractabile, irrefragabile* ab antiquis, postremo denique aevo *infallibile* appellatum est."

Bossuet's view on this matter was maintained by Fleury, the Ecclesiastical historian, by Dupin, in the last generation by Cardinal Bausset, his biographer, and by the great body of the French Church, by all those who were especially called Gallicans. It has been impugned by De Maistre in his book *Du Pape*, a considerable part of which is employed in replying to Bossuet. Having explained his own conception of infallibility, on which I shall say a few words in the next Note, he remarks, that, from not having seized his principles, "des théologiens du premier ordre, tels que Bossuet et Fleury, ont manqué l'idée de l'infaillibilité, de manière à permettre au bon sens laïque de sourire en les lisant. Le premier nous dit sérieusement que la doctrine de l'infaillibilité n'a commencé qu'au concile de Florence; et Fleury encore plus précis nomme le dominicain Cajetan, comme l'auteur de cette doctrine, sous le pontificat de Jules II. On ne comprend pas comment des hommes, d'ailleurs si distingués, ont pu confondre deux idées aussi différentes que celles de *croire* et de *soutenir* un dogme. L'Eglise catholique n'est point argumentatrice de sa nature: elle croit sans disputer; car la *foi* est une *croyance par amour*; et l'amour n'argumente point. Le catholique sait qu'il ne peut se tromper; il sait de plus que s'il pouvait se tromper, il n'y auroit plus de vérité révélée, ni d'assurance pour l'homme sur la terre.—Mais si l'on vient à contester quelque dogme, elle sort de son état naturel, étranger à toute idée contentieuse; elle cherche les fondemens du dogme mis en problème; elle interroge l'antiquité; elle crée des mots surtout, dont sa bonne foi n'avait nul besoin, mais qui sont devenus nécessaires pour caractériser le dogme, et mettre entre les novateurs et nous une barrière éternelle." Pp. 11–13.

Now it will not be difficult to defend Bossuet against these objections. For, though I readily acknowledge the truth of De

Maistre's remark concerning social institutions, that it is not given to us to discern and trace the workings of the generative, assimilative, and expansive processes in society, any more than in nature, this applies only to those institutions which spring from the general instincts of human nature, not to those which are derived from an express positive *fiat*. De Maistre himself seems here to have been somewhat misled by the grand analogy which he detects between the infallibility of the supreme power in the Church, and that which he ascribes to human governments. In the Preface to the second edition he tells us that he had been charged with having too much humanized the infallibility of the Church; and he asserts that he had not been unmindful of its divine origin. This objection to Bossuet seems to prove that, for a moment at least, he did lose sight of it, being carried away by the fascinations of his theory concerning the analogy between the natural and spiritual world. For, if the claim of infallibility was really drawn from a certain number of verses in Scripture containing an express promise of it, we have a right to expect that an institution which proceeded from a distinct ordinance, and the authors of which therefore must have been aware of that ordinance and its bearings, should exhibit and express this consciousness. If it was infallible only because all governments are infallible, then it might be so without telling us; but if it was infallible, because our Lord promised St Peter that it should be so, then its ground can no longer have been hidden: it must have come distinctly before the consciousness: and the consciousness of it must have found an utterance. It cannot have continued in an intermittent state for fourteen centuries.

Moreover De Maistre's arguments seem to indicate that he cannot have read Bossuet's great work, or at all events that he had forgotten its contents. Perhaps he was writing during his exile in Russia, of which he speaks so beautifully in the *Soirées de Saint-Petersbourg*: at least he tells us (in p. 147), that he was unable to refer to it for the sake of verifying a quotation. His references are to Bausset's *Life of Bossuet*, from which he derives the statement he so strongly objects to, that the doctrine of papal



infallibility originated at the Council of Florence, on occasion of the quarrel between Pope Eugenius IV. and the Council of Basle. I have not observed any such express assertion in Bossuet; but that is immaterial. De Maistre's objection might have some weight, if Bossuet's argument had merely been, that we do not find any enunciation of the doctrine of infallibility anterior to the Council of Florence. But if De Maistre had reflected, he must have bethought himself that this merely negative argument, even in the hand of a much prolixer writer, could never have filled the main part of two portly volumes. In fact Bossuet's argument is a totally different one. He disproves the infallibility of the Pope, not merely by negative, but by a long and strong chain of positive evidence, by adducing a number of instances, as well as direct assertions, of his fallibility from generation after generation, by shewing from a large induction of facts that during a series of centuries he was regarded and treated as fallible, and never as otherwise than fallible, and that, when an opposite opinion began to gain ground, it arose mainly from the exercise of that authority, which belongs to a supreme power, and which De Maistre terms *infallibility*. This demonstration is so clear and cogent, nay, irrefragable, that, were it not for the cleverness and pertinacity with which the Jesuits have gone on mustering routed and scattered arguments, and filling their ranks with the skeletons of such as had been slain a dozen times over, the notion of the infallibility of the Pope must have been utterly exploded, even in his own Church, at least to the north of the Alps.

Here I will take leave at once to illustrate and to reinforce Bossuet's argument, by citing a witness who has recently been disinterred: I mean Hippolytus, bishop of Portus, and a presbyter of the Church of Rome, whom my friend, the Chevalier Bunsen, has proved, with a power of critical combination scarcely to be found except in Niebuhr and his disciples, to be the author of the recently published *Refutation of all Heresies*, ascribed by the Editor to Origen. Now it might easily have happened that, though Hippolytus does not say a word ascribing infallibility to

the Bishop of Rome, there might have been nothing in the work distinctly impugning his infallibility; as of course there would not be, if, according to our belief, no pretension to such infallibility had ever been brought forward. Let us see then what he actually does say, neither laying stress on the want of an express assertion, if what he says is consistent with the notion of such an infallibility, nor demanding the denial of a claim, which could not be disputed, unless it had previously been made. He lived as a Christian minister at Rome during the episcopate of Zephyrinus and that of Callistus, at the beginning of the third century: and in his ninth Book he treats of the heresy of Noetus. This, he says (§ 7), was brought by his deacon and disciple, Epigonus, to Rome, where it was adopted by Cleomenes, “at the time when Zephyrinus thought he governed the Roman Church, a rude and avaricious man (*ιδιώτης καὶ αἰσχροκερδῆς*), who, being induced by bribes, allowed such as chose to study under Cleomenes, and himself, being drawn away in course of time, adopted the same opinions, having Callistus for his counsellor and complice in his evil deeds.—During their episcopates the school continued growing and gaining strength from being patronized by Zephyrinus and Callistus, although I never gave way to them, but repeatedly withstood and refuted them, and compelled them to acknowledge the truth: which they confest for the moment through shame, and through the power of truth; but after a while they rolled back into the same mire (*ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν βόρβορον ἀνεκυλίοντο*).” This is the way in which a presbyter and bishop of the Roman Church speaks of two Bishops of Rome, two of our so-called *Infallibilities*: the writer’s official position is evident on the face of the book itself: what the Chevalier Bunsen has effected is to prove the identity of this Roman presbyter and bishop with St Hippolytus.

After giving an account of the opinions held by Noetus, and of their derivation, not from the Gospel, but from the doctrines of Heraclitus, our heresiographer proceeds: “This heresy was supported by Callistus, a man who was an adept in wickedness and crafty to deceive (*ἀνὴρ ἐν κακίᾳ πανοῦργος καὶ ποικίλος*

πρὸς πλάνην), and who was aiming at the episcopal throne. He prevailed on Zephyrinus, a rude, illiterate man, ignorant of ecclesiastical definitions, whom he could lead to do whatever he chose, and who was also a bribe-taker and money-lover, to excite a series of controversies among the brethren; and then, by cunning sleights, he contrived to win the favour of both parties, pretending in private that he agreed with the orthodox, and again with the followers of Sabellius. For when Zephyrinus was admonished by us, he was not obstinate; but as soon as he was alone with Callistus, the latter impelled him to incline to the views of Cleomenes, saying that he thought the same.—Bringing forward Zephyrinus publicly, he persuaded him to say, *I know one God Jesus Christ, and beside Him no other who was born and suffered*; and at other times saying, *The Father did not die, but the Son*, he thus maintained a ceaseless controversy among the people. When I perceived his thoughts, I did not assent to him, but confuted and resisted him in behalf of the truth: whereupon, being stung to madness because, while all others concurred in his pretenses, I withstood them, he called us ditheists, vomiting forth the venom hidden within him.”

Hippolytus next gives us a history of the strange and disgraceful adventures by which Callistus mounted from the condition of a slave to his high eminence,—his embezzling the money deposited in his master’s bank by Christian widows and brethren,—his flight on being detected,—his throwing himself into the sea,—his being picked up and condemned to the treadmill,—his exciting a riot in a Jewish synagogue,—his condemnation to the mines in Sardinia,—his escape from thence and return to Rome during the episcopate of Victor,—how, after Victor’s death, Zephyrinus made use of him in canvassing the Clergy,—and how, after the death of Zephyrinus, he obtained the object of his ambition. Hereupon, “being a conjuror and trickster (γόης καὶ πανούργος), he imposed for a time upon many. But, having the venom lying in his heart, and designing nothing straightforward, being moreover ashamed to speak the truth, because he had publicly taunted me with being a ditheist, and

was himself frequently accused by Sabellius of having abandoned his first faith, he devised the following heresy, saying that the Word was the Son, and also the Father, so called in name, but in fact one indivisible Spirit [we should probably read *ἐν δὲ ὄντα πνεῦμα ἀδιαίρετον*, instead of *ἐν δὲ ὄν, τὸ πνεῦμα ἀδιαίρετον*]; that the Father was not One, and the Son Another, but that they were One and the Same, that all things above and below were filled with the Divine Spirit, and that what became Incarnate in the Virgin was not another Spirit beside the Father, but One and the Same: and that this is what is said, *Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in Me?* for that the Visible Human Being was the Son, but the Spirit contained in the Son was the Father: for, he said, *I will not speak of two Gods, but One.* For the Father who was in Him, taking to Himself flesh, deified it, uniting it to Himself, so that One God was called Father and Son, and that this One Person could not be two, and that thus the Father suffered along with the Son. For he would not say that the Father suffered, and was One Person, desiring to avoid blaspheming the Father, the senseless trickster, tossing about blasphemies at random (*ὁ ἀνόητος καὶ ποίκιλος, ὁ ἄνω κάτω σχεδιάζων βλασφημίας*),—sometimes falling into the doctrine of Sabellius, sometimes into that of Theodotus. These things the impostor dared, and established a school over against the Church, where he taught thus: and he first devised the plan of allowing men to live as they pleased, saying that he could forgive their sins to all. For when a Christian of any other congregation committed a sin, his sin was not imputed to him, if he went over to the school of Callistus.—He decreed that, if a bishop committed a sin, even a sin unto death, he ought not to be deposed. In his time persons who had been married twice and even thrice, began to be ordained bishops, priests, and deacons.”

Hippolytus further speaks of the moral corruptions which gained entrance among the Christians through his laxity. It may be that the picture is somewhat too highly coloured from his antipathy to his theological opponent. But throughout the work the writer appears to be an honest man, desirous of speaking

the truth: and assuredly he could not have written as he did, if there had been the slightest notion that the mitre of the Roman See invested a man with infallibility, or with any of the extravagant endowments afterward ascribed to it. Zephyrinus and Callistus were simple bishops of Rome, just as liable to the worst moral failings and intellectual errors as the meanest of their brethren: and we see from this account what was the value of the canonization which they subsequently received. In the net of Romish saintship, which gathers together the bad as well as the good, there are no more worthless stockfish than these two bishops of Rome. At a time when so many restless, discontented spirits are opening their hearts fondly to the fascinations of the Romish imposture, it may be regarded as a providential gift, that this revelation of the state of the Roman Church at the beginning of the third century has been set before us. The more light we gain on the early centuries of the Church, the more complete will be the discomfiture of all the Papal claims to special privileges bestowed on the successors of St Peter.

Even Dr Newman himself, in his *Essay on Development* (p. 368), says: "To this day the seat of infallibility remains, I suppose, more or less undeveloped, or at least undefined, by the Church." In earlier and wiser days he had written, in his *Lectures on Romanism* (p. 61), illustrating the incongruity between the abstract system of Rome, and her practical teaching: "In the Creed of Pope Pius not a word is said expressly about the Church's infallibility: it forms no Article of Faith there. Her interpretation indeed of Scripture is recognised as authoritative; but so also is 'the unanimous consent of the Fathers.' But when we put aside the creeds and professions of our opponents for their actual teaching and disputing, they will be found to care very little for the Fathers, whether as primitive or as concordant; they believe the existing Church to be infallible; and if ancient belief is at variance with it, which of course they do not allow, but if it is, then antiquity must be mistaken: that is all." Again (p. 68): "There is this remarkable difference, even of theory, between them and Vincentius, that the latter is

altogether silent on the subject of the Pope's infallibility, whether considered as an attribute of his See, or as attaching to him in General Council. If Vincentius had the sentiments and feelings of a modern Romanist, it is incomprehensible that, in a treatise written to guide the private Christian in matters of Faith, he should have said not a word about the Pope's supreme authority, nay, not even about the infallibility of the Church Catholic. He refers the enquirer to a triple rule, difficult surely, and troublesome to use, compared with that which is ready furnished by Romanism. Applying his own rule to his work itself, we may unhesitatingly conclude that the Pope's supreme authority in matters of faith is no Catholic or Apostolic truth, because he was ignorant of it."

In Germany, where Truth is held to be the most precious of all possessions, even by members of the Catholic Church, the conviction of the mischiefs produced by the doctrine of the infallibility of the Pope is so strongly felt by many, that one of the greatest philosophers of the last generation, Baader, who was a zealous champion of Christian truth, and himself an earnest Catholic, used perpetually to repeat the pregnant words of St Martin, *Le Papisme est la faiblesse du Catholicisme; et le Catholicisme est la force du Papisme*: and one of his latest essays, published in 1839, was *On the Practicability or Impracticability of emancipating Catholicism from the Roman Dictatorship in reference to Theology*.

NOTE M : p. 32.

De Maistre's Treatise *Du Pape* opens with an argument professedly in maintenance of the infallibility of the Pope; but when we examine that argument, we find that it does not touch the real question at issue. Having laid down that "les vérités théologiques ne sont que des vérités générales, manifestées et divinisées dans le cercle religieux," he proceeds thus (p. 2): "*L'infaillibilité dans l'ordre spirituel, et la souveraineté dans*

l'ordre temporel sont deux mots parfaitement synonymes. L'un et l'autre expriment cette haute puissance qui les domine toutes, dont toutes les autres dérivent ; qui gouverne et n'est pas gouvernée, qui juge et n'est pas jugée. Quand nous disons que *l'Eglise est infaillible*, nous ne demandons pour elle—aucun privilège particulier ; nous demandons seulement qu'elle jouisse du droit commun à toutes les souverainetés possibles, qui toutes agissent nécessairement comme infaillibles ; car tout gouvernement est absolu ; et du moment où l'on peut lui résister sous prétexte d'erreur ou d'injustice, il n'existe plus. La souveraineté a des formes différentes, sans doute. Elle ne parle pas à Constantinople comme à Londres ; mais quand elle a parlé de part et d'autre à sa manière, le *bill* est sans appel comme le *fetfa*."

Now these last words shew the fallacy of the whole argument. In fact, in governments as well as in individuals, one of the first tokens of true wisdom is the conviction of our fallibility ; and the more we increase in wisdom, the stronger this conviction becomes. The laws of the Babylonians and Medes and Persians, whether enacted by the godless pride of Nebuchadnezzar, or elicited from the self-indulgent weakness of Darius, were accounted absolute and infallible and without appeal. On the other hand, though our laws, according to the principle of our Constitution, cannot be enacted without ample consideration by the two branches of the Legislature, which ought to comprehend a large portion of the wisdom of the nation, yet so strong is our conviction that our Legislature is not infallible, but fallible, that it is customary for our Acts of Parliament to have a clause added to them, providing that they may be amended or repealed within the same Session,—a clause especially honorable as containing an acknowledgement of human liability to error. So that the sovereignty which essentially belongs to government, is not identical with infallibility, as De Maistre says, but totally distinct from it ; though the identity is asserted by the lawless magnifiers of their own arbitrary will. There is indeed a necessity for governments to decide and to act, even as there is for individuals ; and their decisions, after

being preceded by mature deliberation, ought to be decisive : but, as wisdom ever involves a balancing of opposites, so of governments may it be said, that, while they ought to stand stoutly and boldly on the only true rock, that of faith in the principles which they endeavour to carry into act, they ought also continually to take heed lest they merely think they are standing, and so slip and fall.

Carrying on the same line of argument, De Maistre contends that in every judicial system we must come at last to a final Court of Appeal, "auquel on ne puisse dire, *Vous avez erré.*" That such a Court is not always attainable, we have had sad experience of late. Indeed its unattainableness is implied in the maxim, which so forcibly expresses the impossibility of measuring and adjusting the infinite varieties of moral being by any definite forms of words, *Summum jus summa injuria* : and it is to prevent the injustice which would result from adhering too closely to the letter of the law, as though it were infallible, that the higher power of mercy, which is a solemn recognition that God is the only Infallible Judge, is vested in the sovereign.

Moreover there is another weighty fallacy closely connected with De Maistre's argument, namely, that government, sovereignty, is a great and primary and indispensable want of the Church. The State does indeed need an ever active, ever vigilant government ; though even with regard to the State we are learning that its most important function is to set free the expansive instincts of society, and to protect them from obstructions and injuries. But this is far more the case in the Church. Thus the work of the Council of Jerusalem was to protect the Church from the usurpations of arbitrary, imperious will, from the bonds which that will would have imposed upon her. Seldom however has this principle been observed by subsequent Councils. Our Lord's warning, in those words which set forth the distinction between the civil and the spiritual Kingdom,—*The kings of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them, and they that exercise authority upon them are called benefactors ; but ye shall not be so,*— has been deplorably



forgotten. De Maistre thinks he can establish the necessity of the Papacy by a remark, which, he says (p. 16.), “ne souffre pas le moindre doute : *C'est qu'une souveraineté périodique ou intermittente est une contradiction dans les termes ; car la souveraineté doit toujours vivre, toujours veiller, toujours agir.*” Therefore, he argues, Councils are inadequate to govern the Church. But, not to speak of the contradictions to this proposition supplied by the history of all well-constituted nations,—in which, though an administrative sovereignty is entrusted to a permanent functionary, the judicial sovereignty is studiously separated from it, and still greater care is taken to preserve the legislative sovereignty from the fluctuations of individual caprice, vesting it mostly in impermanent bodies,—our Lord's words, which I have just quoted, seem to declare that the Church will not require anything like a permanent, regular government ; and if we examine the history of the Apostolic Church, as set forth in the Book of Acts and the Epistles, we see that, at a time when, above all, according to the calculations of human policy, a vigorous central government would have been needed, no example of such a government is exhibited ; but the Church is taught that, in times of urgent difficulty, the questions which agitate her are to be referred to the decision of a Council. Surely too, if we bear in mind that the dealings of Religion are with the heart and conscience, and only with outward acts, so far as they are the expression of the heart and conscience,—thus reversing the order of civil government, which has to regulate outward acts, and meddles not with the heart and conscience, except so far as they find vent in outward acts,—we must perceive that, in the spiritual kingdom, anything like an absolute, regulative authority must be out of place. When outward order is the primary consideration, the exercise of sovereignty is required, even though it may now and then be at the cost of individual rights and liberties : but when Truth stands before and above all things, it is impossible to admit a fictitious infallibility, such as de Maistre would set over us. Here the Reason and the Conscience are

God's only Vicegerents. Hence the dormancy of the legislative sovereignty for centuries in the Church, if it has in some respects been injurious, has not been fatal, as such a suspension would have been in a State.

I do not forget that, as was observed in the last Note, De Maistre declares, in the Preface to his second edition, that he believes in the divine origin of the infallibility of the Church. The objections I have been urging only refer to the political arguments by which he tries to justify it. The religious ones have been examined, as far as was needful, in previous Notes.

At the beginning of his 15th Chapter De Maistre complains that Protestants have magnified the idea of infallibility, so as to make a ridiculous scarecrow of it. Perhaps we have better reason for complaining that there is so much vagueness and indefiniteness and ambiguity in the Romish use of the word, that, if one tries to lay hold on it under one shape, it slips away, and rises up under another. Pearson, in the Preface cited above (p. 207), observes that, after Cressy had abandoned the notion of infallibility as untenable, he reasserts it under the form of authority. A like ambiguity runs through De Maistre's views on the subject. Dr Newman's definition, in his *Essay on Development* (p. 117),—"By infallibility I suppose is meant the power of deciding whether this, that, and a third, and any number of theological or ethical statements are true,"—admits of either interpretation. Thus, in order to bolster up the claim of infallibility by political analogies, it is identified with the power of giving a final, irreversible decision; and the ascription of infallibility to the tribunal is compared with that of *omnipotence* to our Legislature. Such an infallibility however would not serve the purposes of the usurping Church. It would have no more force or value than the *omnipotence* of Parliament; which is oftener mentioned in reproof of the extravagance of the expression, than for any other purpose. It would hold out no lure to weak minds tormented by doubts, and desirous of getting rid of their tormenters. Such an infallibility, which is none, is to be found in the Church of

England just as well as in the Church of Rome. Hence the bait held out to those who are to be caught in the Popish trap, is, that here they will find a real, true, perfect infallibility, which will enable them to feel quite certain about every momentous religious doctrine, whether it be the efficacy of a sacrament, or the breadth of a phylactery or of a pair of bands. All this they shall know, and everything else, if they will only come and bury their heads under the apron of the infallible Church.

It might have been thought that such openmouthed receptiveness for all the deceivableness of unrighteousness would hardly be found among educated Englishmen. But education does not deliver us from the proneness to set up our own idols and fetishes, and to bow down and worship the idols and fetishes, which we ourselves have set up. Dr Newman, in his *Lectures on Anglicanism* (p. 112), describing the progress of Tractarianism, says, "The principle of these writers [of whom he himself was the chief] was this: an infallible authority is necessary; we have it not; for the Prayerbook is all we have got. But, since we have nothing better, we must use it, as if infallible." Verily it was high time that Mr Carlyle should rise up, and preach a crusade against all shams, when the ministers of the God of Truth thought it beseemed them to promote His worship by setting up a sham Infallibility. Of course they who could take pleasure in thus imposing upon themselves, were ready to be snatcht up by the Arch Impostor, and to swell his ghastly procession. Nor is it a new thing to see the worshiper of idols break the idols of his own making, when they will not conform to his wishes.

NOTE N : p. 33.

One of the chief motives which actuated the founders of Tractarianism from the outset, was a vehement aversion to the exercise of the intellectual faculties, which they perpetually censured and condemned under the name of *Private Judgement*. Herein, as is so often the case, they were in the main rebuking

in others, what they had a morbid consciousness of in themselves. For seldom has speculation been more arbitrary and capricious than in some of them, especially in Mr Froude: seldom has it disported itself more wantonly in bidding defiance to received opinions. At the very beginning of the Introduction to his *Lectures on Romanism*, Mr Newman said: "Though enquiry is left partly open in order to try our earnestness, yet it is in great measure, and in the most important points, superseded by Revelation,—which discloses things which reason could not reach, saves us the labour of using it when it might avail, and sanctions the *principle* of dispensing with it in all cases. Yet in spite of this joint testimony of nature and grace,—we exult in what we think our indefeasible right and glorious privilege to choose and settle our religion for ourselves; and we stigmatize it as a bondage to be bid take for granted what the wise, good, and many have gone over and determined long before, or to submit to what Almighty God has revealed."

These last words are an eminent instance of that logical form, which is termed begging the question: for of course the very matter in dispute would be, what has Almighty God revealed? what is the meaning and purport of His revelation? When that has been made out clearly, we will gladly submit to it. As to "the wise, good, and many," the latter class have never been deemed the safest guides to Truth. Nor does it seem a very rational ground of complaint, if we in our days have to plow up the same fields, which our ancestors plowed up before us, or if, in doing so, we make use of modern improvements in husbandry, or if in this also it be our doom, that, unless we plow, we shall reap no harvest. The mind of man was not made to take truths for granted: when it does so, it will soon let them fall. It will come under the condemnation, that, *he who hath not, from him shall be taken away even what he hath.*

Again, what strange conceptions of Reason and Revelation are implied in the words, that Revelation "saves us the labour of using Reason,—and sanctions the *principle* of dispensing with it!" as though Revelation transported us into an intellectual

land of Cokayne, where the fruits drop into our mouths without our being at the trouble of gathering them. Here we see the germ of that passage in the *Essay on Development*, (quoted above in p. 148), where the special dignity and blessing of Revelation is represented as consisting in the substitution of the supremacy of a Pope or Bishop for that of Conscience. Is this then the lesson which Dr Newman has learnt from his intimate acquaintance with the history of the Church? Mahometanism dreads Reason, and supersedes it, and quenches it. So, more or less, do all corrupt forms of Religion. On the other hand, the whole history of the Christian Church shews that Christianity elevates the intellectual faculties, and raises them above themselves, and glorifies them with a glory beyond their own. Christianity does this; although Popery, as such, does the contrary, herein, as in so many other respects, betraying its affinity to Heathenism. In one sense indeed Christianity does "save us the labour" of using our Reason, by turning that labour into a blessing, by setting higher objects before us, and by helping us in mounting up to them, so that our labour may now be sure of attaining to its reward.

Where Mr Newman discovered that Revelation "sanctions the *principle* of dispensing with reason in all cases," he did not inform us. Did St Paul ever tell him so, in some Epistle which has escaped the researches of all other theologians? On this head a sufficient answer is supplied by the following words from Chillingworth's Preface (§ 12), where he addresses his opponent thus: "You say that, if the infallibility of the Church be once impeacht, every man is given over to his own wit and discourse: which, if you mean *discourse* not guiding itself by Scripture, but only by principles of nature, or perhaps by prejudices and popular errors, and drawing consequences, not by rule, but chance, is by no means true. If you mean by *discourse* right reason, grounded on divine revelation and common notions written by God in the hearts of all men, and deducing, according to the never failing rules of logic, consequent deductions from them,—if this be it which you mean by *discourse*, it is very meet and reasonable and necessary that men, as in all their actions, so especially in that of

greatest importance—should be left to it : and he that follows this in all his opinions and actions, and does not only seem to do so, follows always God ; whereas he that follows a company of men, may oftentimes follow a company of beasts. And in saying this, I say no more than St John to all Christians in these words, *Dearly beloved, believe not every spirit ; but try the spirits, whether they be of God or no : and the rule he gives them to make this trial by, is, to consider whether they confess Jesus to be the Christ, that is, the Guide of their faith and Lord of their actions.*—I say no more than St Paul, in exhorting all Christians *to try all things, and hold fast that which is good,*—than St Peter, in commanding all Christians *to be ready to give a reason of the hope that is in them ;* than our Saviour Himself in forewarning all His followers that, *if they blindly followed blind guides, both leaders and followers would fall into the ditch,*—and again in saying even to the people, *Yea, and why of yourselves judge ye not what is right ?* And though by passion, or precipitation, or prejudice, by want of reason, or not using what they have, men may be, and are oftentimes, led into error and mischief ; yet they cannot be misguided by *discourse*, truly so called. For what is *discourse*, but drawing conclusions out of premisses by good consequence ?—Therefore by discourse no man can possibly be led to error ; but, if he err in his conclusions, he must of necessity either err in his principles, or commit some error in his discourse ; that is indeed, not discourse, but seem to do so.”

Hooker also, in the 8th chapter of his third Book, asserts the rightful use of Reason in questions pertaining to Religion, with his own peculiar majesty of thought and language, against enemies who were assailing it from the opposite side, the fanatical decriers of all light, except that which glared through the fumes of their own ignorance, and which they confounded with the light of the Spirit.

But the Tractarian denunciations of private judgement, and of the exercise of the intellect in religious questions, were no less alien from the spirit of those whom they especially profest to follow, and whom they set up for the standards of Anglocatholic

divinity; as is sufficiently evinced by this extract from Laud's *Conference with Fisher* (§ xvi. 13), where he is arguing the question how we are to ascertain the Divine authority of Scripture. "The last way, which gives Reason leave to come in and prove what it can, may not justly be denied by any reasonable man. For, though Reason, without Grace, cannot see the way to heaven, nor believe this Book, in which God has written the way, yet Grace is never placed but in a reasonable creature, and proves, by the very seat which it has taken up, that the end it has is to be spiritual eyewater, to make reason see what by nature only it cannot, but never to blemish reason in that which it can comprehend. Now the use of reason is very general; and man, do what he can, is still apt to search and seek for a reason why he will believe; though, after he once believes, his faith grows stronger than either his reason or his knowledge.—The world cannot keep him from going to weigh it at the balance of Reason, whether Scripture be the word of God or not. To the same weights he brings the tradition of the Church, the inward motives in Scripture itself, all testimonies within which seem to bear witness to it; and in all this there is no harm: the danger is when a man will use no other scale but Reason, or prefer Reason before any other scale. For the word of God, and the book containing it, refuse not to be weighed by Reason. But the scale is not large enough to contain, nor the weights to measure out, the true virtue and full force of either. Reason then can give no supernatural ground into which a man may resolve his faith that Scripture is the word of God infallibly: yet Reason can go so high, as it can prove that Christian religion, which rests upon the authority of this book, stands upon surer grounds of nature, reason, common equity and justice, than anything in the world which any infidel or mere naturalist hath done, doth, or can adhere to against it, in that which he makes, accounts, or assumes, as religion to himself."

Thus the hostile attitude which the Tractarians from the first took up with regard to private judgement, set them in opposition to the whole body of our English divines. In

the fifth *Lecture on Anglicanism*, Dr Newman gives an account, half sad, half ludicrous, how they roamed about, like the children lost in the wood, searching after an authority that would deliver them from their homeless wanderings, how they were reduced to the dire necessity of setting up an authority for themselves, and how they were fain to invest this authority of their own choosing with an infallibility of their own making. "If you say (he remarks, p. 116) they were untrue to their principles, and—selected partially and on private judgement, so much the more for my purpose. How clearly must the principle of an ecclesiastical and authoritative, not a private judgement, have been the principle of the movement, when those who belonged to it were obliged to own that principle, at the very time that it was inconvenient to them, and when they were driven, whether consciously or not, to misuse or evade it!" A more legitimate inference would have been, that they, who had gone out in search of what could not be attained, except by a violation of the very principle they were trying to establish, had fallen into a wrong track from the outset, and that their so-called principle was not a reality, but a delusion. Dr Newman however (p. 111) finds a warrant for their procedure in the practice of Rome herself: "They had too much common sense to deny the necessary exercise of private judgement, in one sense or another. They knew that the Catholic Church herself admitted it, though she directed and limited it to a decision upon the organ of Revelation." That is to say, with regard to those passages of Scripture, where he who runs may read, and where a plain understanding and honest heart cannot go materially wrong, nobody must presume to exercise his own judgement. But on one of the most difficult, tangled questions ever proposed to man, requiring a combination of historical with theological knowledge, and a fine critical discrimination, to separate the true from the false, and to draw right conclusions from the mass of materials,—on a question which has occupied the most learned scholars and the ablest reasoners in Europe for three centuries, without having been brought to a conclusive determination,—on this



question everybody, wise or simple, learned or ignorant, is competent to pronounce. He who is warned against the audacity of attempting to swallow a gnat, is exhorted to swallow a camel; after the performance of which feat, his throat contracts again to its previous dimensions. In a passage already quoted (above, p. 110), Dr Newman tells us that the idea of his party was "simply and absolutely submission to an external authority: to it they appealed; to it they betook themselves; there they found a haven of rest." That they did not find a haven of rest, he himself adds immediately after. Nor could they; because they were seeking for that which is contrary to the order of the world, contrary to the course appointed by God for man,—because man was not made to be a limpet sticking to the rock of an outward authority. Our somewhat singular coincidence in applying the same image from the Arabian tale to them may be regarded as an indication that their desire was for something which is not to be attained, something which will slip away from us if we try to gain a footing upon it. In fact however Dr Newman's account of them proves that their idea was anything but "submission to an external authority." They started with impugning the prevalent authorities of their own times, and only betook themselves to the Caroline divines, in the hope of being supported in that attack.

If we look with any scrutiny at the *Catenas*, in which they profess to set forth the opinions of the chief Anglican divines, this becomes apparent. They are not chains of cogent argument, but ropes of sand with which the compilers have surrounded themselves. A person familiar with the writings of our old theologians will easily perceive that the extracts from them in the *Catenas* are very far from expressing their real, settled convictions. In fact the compilers of those *Catenas* did not set themselves to read through the authors from whom they gave extracts, with the view of making out what their mature, deliberate convictions were. This might have been a work of some use, but would have required painstaking, and thought, and fairness. They rather contented themselves with turning over the pages of the

old writers, and picking out such passages as favoured their own views, without heeding the limitations and restrictions under which those views had been exprest, or the passages of an opposite tendency by which they were often counterbalanced. Not seldom too, as is perpetually the case with regard to quotations from the Fathers, oratorical passages, in which a preacher strives to enforce the particular point he is urging with all the exaggerations of rhetoric, to the temporary disparagement of everything else, are brought forward as though they had a substantial, dogmatical worth. In this manner it came to pass that those who gave out all the time that they were following our Anglo-catholic divines, often ran far ahead of them, often diverged into devious paths, and thus found themselves anon rushing counter to them. In the *Lectures on Anglicanism* (p. 132), Dr Newman points out divers matters, where their simple and absolute submission to an external authority, which they had unhappily been forced to choose for themselves by an exercise of the evil spirit of private judgement, was thus transformed into opposition. "You dare not stand or fall (he says to them) by Andrewes, or by Laud, or by Hammond, or by Bull, or by Thorndike, or by all of them together. There is a *consensus* of divines, stronger than for Baptismal Regeneration or the Apostolical Succession, that Rome is, strictly and literally, an Antichristian power: liberals and Highchurchmen in your communion in this respect agree with Evangelicals; you put it aside. There is a *consensus* against Transubstantiation;—yet many of you hold it notwithstanding. Nearly all your divines, if not all, call themselves Protestants; and you anathematize the name." He adds some other special points, which, like the first two, seem to belong to the later phase of Tractarianism: but the aversion to Protestantism characterized it from the first, and, one may suppose, in so learned a body, must have arisen from their identifying Protestantism with Exeter Hall. At all events it is quite certain that almost all our old divines, as I have observed already (in p. 130), called themselves Protestants, and regarded our Church as united in a common cause with the Protestant

Churches on the Continent, though peculiarly favoured in matters of discipline. This negative principle of Tractarianism, drawing it away from those living fountains of Truth, which were reopened for the Church primarily and mainly by the German Reformers, drew them away also from the Anglican divines: and it was this repulse of their Anti-Protestantism, that made them fancy the Anglican divines had run away from them. The reasonable, conscientious exercise of private judgement, with its proper helps, and under its proper restraints, will naturally breed a loyal reverence for authority, proportionate to its rightful claims; but he who will not let his neighbours think for themselves, is likely ere long to grow impatient that his superiors or forefathers should have done so.

Of course the right of private judgement may be abused, as every other kind of liberty may. Like every other right, it may be perverted by man's exaggerations and exorbitancies into a wrong. But if liberty has its lawless excesses, so has rule; which are often still more pernicious, because apt to be more enduring, and more crushing to the moral character of such as live under it.

After all however the question is entirely misrepresented by being treated as a contest between Private Judgement and Authority. Science, in its dealings with the physical world, is not the antithesis to experience, but the synthesis of experience and of reflexion on the materials which experience supplies us with. It makes use of those materials, and discerns the laws by which they are regulated. In like manner there is no antagonism or antithesis between Reason and any Authority derived legitimately from the traditions and testimonies of former ages. Arbitrary, irrational Authority Reason rejects; but reasonable Authority it admits; and this will naturally be great in questions pertaining to history, and to the order of God's Providence as manifested therein. Every wise man, in considering what ought to be, will take count of what has been, and what is; though no wise man will be hasty in pronouncing that what has been, or what is, ought to be.

There are some good remarks on this question in Professor Butler's fourth Letter (p. 154). "From the very outset of Christianity, we observe in it the combination of two powerful principles, the duty of individual Obedience, and the duty of individual Enquiry. The accurate conciliation of these contrasted principles—is indeed a great problem.—If the New Testament abounds (as it amply does) with earnest admonitions to humility, obedience, subjection, and earnest denunciations of them that cause divisions, it is equally certain that the Lord of the Church has had the mingled multitudes who heard him *beware of false prophets*, personally testing and judging them *by their fruits*,—that He subjected His own doctrine to the standard of Scripture examined and applied by His Jewish hearers,—that He askt them with sorrowful indignation, *why even of themselves they judged not what was right*,—nay, that His whole mission and office consisted in an appeal against establisht ecclesiastical authority, against that very authority, of which it was said (what surely no so authentic voice from Heaven has ever said of Rome), *Thou shalt not decline from the sentence which the Priests and the Judge shall shew thee to the right hand nor to the left: thou shalt observe to do according to all that they inform thee*. It is certain that His Apostles, acting on the same principles, applauded those who individually *searcht the Scriptures daily*, and so decided *whether these things were so*,—that they hesitated not to exhort the whole mass of their hearers to *prove all things*,—that they besought them to *try the spirits whether they were of God*,—that they desired that every man should be *fully persuaded in his own mind*,—that they bad them *be ready to give an answer to every man that askt them a reason for their hope*, which necessarily implies a complete previous examination of all the intellectual grounds of faith." This is followed by proofs that the same principle was recognised by the Fathers. In a subsequent Letter Professor Butler rightly urges (p. 382): "The final decision of deliberate Reason in matter of Obligation is to be always obeyed, because, from the very nature and necessity of the case, there never can be

any higher standard of action : if any higher could be imagined, it would instantly enter into the calculation of Reason, and become only a new element in a new final decision of the moral Reason itself. Manifestly nothing can ever be higher than that which, in its own nature, is highest of all : nothing can claim authority to supersede that, which, by inherent and indefeasible prerogative, judges every other authority whatever."

Note O: p. 34.

De Maistre (*Du Pape*, p. 4) lays down the following proposition. "S'il y a quelque chose d'évident pour la raison autant que pour la foi, c'est que l'Eglise universelle est une monarchie. L'idée seule de *l'universalité* suppose cette forme de gouvernement, dont l'absolue nécessité repose sur la double raison du nombre des sujets et de l'étendue géographique de l'empire."

Seldom has a thinking man uttered a rasher defiance both of reason and of fact. In truth throughout this work, as well as through its two offsets, that on the Gallican Church, and that on the Inquisition, De Maistre seems to be walking in fetters. The freedom of his mind is cramped; and we find very few of those profound and genial thoughts, which refresh us so frequently in the *Soirées de Saint Petersbourg*. It is true, the idea of universality involves that of unity, of something whereby the multitudinous, manifold parts are combined into a whole; and this necessity is as it were a shadow cast by the unity of the Divine Author upon the minds of His creatures. But as this is no warrant for a universal monarchy in the temporal order of things, and as the ambition which aims at such a monarchy is one of the many modes in which man usurps the attributes of God, and would seat himself on His throne, so has it ever been a like audacious, godless usurpation, when attempts have been made to establish a universal monarchy in the spiritual world. The whole history of the Church refutes such a pretension. For every fresh effort to set it up has been suicidal, in a twofold

manner, — by driving large portions of the Church to cut themselves off from the unrighteous despotism, — and by the spiritual degradation of such as submitted to it. Nor does any analogy from the history of civil governments favour De Maistre's conclusion. Doubtless the largest empires that have existed upon earth, the Roman, the Chinese, the Spanish, the Russian, the English, have been monarchal, more or less, in form : but in all these instances, except the last, the curse of the monarchy has been felt in the abject degradation of the great mass of its subjects, and in the impossibility of their coalescing into a nation. On the other hand, if there is any prospect that the English Empire may be preserved from a like inward decay, this must rest on the hope that its various members may be allowed and encouraged to develop themselves freely, each according to its peculiar nature. This argument, I know, would not have much weight at Rome. The main aim of the Papacy has ever been "the number of its subjects, and the geographical extent of its empire." If it gains the surface, it cares for little else. The lower the moral and spiritual condition of its subjects, the more easily can it drive its car over them. That the vigour and energy of a great empire are no way dependent on its monarchal form, is proved by the history of those two States, which are the great storehouses of political ideas, the chief studies of every political philosopher. Under the Roman Commonwealth, so long as those who were subjected by conquest were incorporated into the nation, the Empire continued to expand, and became so vigorous, that its energy outlasted its liberties for two centuries. The power of the Empire was not the offspring of the Empire, but of the Republic : when the Republic expired, that power began to wane ; but such had been the energy of its life, that its slowly mouldering corpse cumbered the earth for half a millennium. In like manner the power and vigour of England have continually increased, and her empire has expanded, along with the expansion of her liberties, and in proportion as a larger part of her members has been incorporated into the governing body. Wherefore, if a type for

the government of Christ's Church is to be sought in any form of civil government that has hitherto existed, it should rather be in our present English Commonwealth, than in the Russian or Spanish despotism. This too accords much more nearly with the model presented to us by the history of the Church herself during the first five centuries, when, as has been well observed, we find a sort of example and prototype of a representative government in her Councils.

De Maistre asks indeed (p. 5): "Qu'est ce qu'une république, dès qu'elle excède certaines dimensions? C'est un pays plus ou moins vaste, commandé par un certain nombre d'hommes qui se nomment la république. Mais toujours le gouvernement est *un*; car il n'y a pas, et même il ne peut y avoir de république disséminée. Ainsi, dans le temps de la république romaine, la souveraineté républicaine étoit dans le *forum*; et les pays soumis—étoient une monarchie, dont le *forum* étoit l'absolu et l'impitoyable souverain. Que si vous ôtez cet état dominateur, il ne reste plus de lien ni de gouvernement commun, et toute unité disparaît."

Now, without discussing the question, which is of little concern to our argument, whether the nations under the Roman Republic were really in a worse condition than those under the Roman Emperors, or those under the Persian kings,—nay, even supposing it certain that they were so,—De Maistre entirely abandons his position, when he makes the Forum the sovereign or monarch of the Roman territories. This might supply a parallel for a government vested in a College of Cardinals, but overthrows the necessity of a unity embodied in an individual ruler. Besides, while we acknowledge and deplore the narrowness and selfishness which prevented the free development of the ancient Republics, we are no way compelled to admit that these vices are necessarily, still less exclusively, inherent in the republican form. Many of the selfish vices which are found in individuals, though not the worst of them, are also found in corporate bodies: and even granting that the reigns of the Antonines were on the whole,—which is exceedingly questionable,—more propitious to

the happiness of mankind than the times of the Republic, it is incontrovertible that the reigns of Caligula and Nero and Vitellius and Commodus were infinitely more pernicious. But it should not be forgotten that the Gospel,—in addition to everything else that it has effected for the purifying and humanizing and ennobling of human society,—has by its principles done away the wall of separation between nations, so that Greek and Jew, Roman and Barbarian, are no longer severed from each other by an insuperable national antagonism: and weak though the Gospel has hitherto been in eradicating national antipathies and animosities, we will not limit its future powers by the past, nor close our eyes to the various symptoms, which, in spite of all manner of disturbances and confusions, hold out the promise of a nearer, more intimate union among nations. If that national pride, and those national jealousies and repugnances, which find their main source and replenishment in our personal self-sufficiency and cupidity and hatred, were to be abated,—if they were to be subdued,—and why should we despair of such a result, when all the considerations of human morality, as well as of social expediency, are working in unison with the influences of the Gospel?—the principal hindrances, which have hitherto impeded the establishment of a Federal Commonwealth, would vanish.

De Maistre continues (p. 6): “Dès qu’il n’y a plus de centre, ni de gouvernement commun, il ne peut y avoir d’unité, ni par conséquent d’*Eglise universelle* (ou catholique), puisqu’il n’y a pas d’*Eglise particulière* qui ait seulement, dans cette supposition, *le moyen constitutionnel* de savoir si elle est en communauté de foi avec les autres.”

It seems really marvellous that a man, capable of reflecting, and who had reflected deeply on political institutions, should have attached any weight to the difficulty urged in this sentence; as if a score of modes might not be devised, by which the fact, that two independent Churches are in communion, may be satisfactorily ascertained! As if there had been any great difficulty in doing this during the first centuries of the Church! As if the



chief obstructions in the way of it had not arisen from the arrogant, exclusive assumptions of particular Churches, especially of the Roman! The assertion that there can be no unity, without a centre, or a common government, is only true, as I have already hinted, in a sense which no way helps De Maistre's argument. When St Paul is reproofing the divisions at Corinth, he does not set himself up as the centre of unity: nor does he tell them that they must seek a centre of unity in St Peter. He tells them that Paul is nothing, that Apollos is nothing, that Peter is nothing. But is his inference, like De Maistre's, that they are therefore left to hopeless divisions? He does not say that there is no foundation for them to rest on, nor that Peter is the foundation whereon the Church is to be built. He says merely that none can lay any other foundation than that which has been laid already, and that this Only Foundation is Christ. In truth this Romish inability to recognise the unity of the Church, without the help of a visible human centre, is only another instance of that miserable incapacity for faith in spiritual realities, which, we have repeatedly observed, is the pervading character of Romanism. As the Jews, under the old Dispensation, shewed their carnal-mindedness in asking for a king, *when the Lord their God was their King*, so does the sinful unbelief of Rome manifest itself in the demand for a visible Head and Centre of the Church, when Christ is its Head and Centre.

In fact, as the usurpation of the Papacy is the hugest, most monstrous example of that pride of our fallen nature, which inclines every man to set himself up as the lord and ruler of the universe, according to his conceptions of it, and which renders self-restraint, selfcontrol, one of the rarest and most difficult virtues,—so has it a counterpart in that intellectual infirmity, through which all men inevitably contemplate themselves as the centres of their own system of the universe, and according to which we are ever prone to conceive that the world was made for us, and that its whole order was framed and is regulated with a special adaptation to our own

personal wishes and wants. We are the centre of our own universe; and the most difficult of all things is to transfer ourselves from this our false centre to our true Centre in God. For even when our natural false centre is shaken from under us, we are apt to leap from it to some factitious centre, in which we ourselves are comprehended, and which therefore is a kind of expanded self. Every nation believes itself to be the leading, central nation of mankind. All men believe the earth to be the centre of the universe. So that Joseph's dream is only an expression of everybody's self-delusion. Nor is it unconnected with this tendency, that we are so prone to believe that some single proposition, especially if it be one with which we have in any way identified ourselves, contains the key to all the mysteries of knowledge. Our narrow, cramped, hidebound intellect shrinks with a kind of instinctive repugnance from the thought of the fulness of the Universe, from the infinite Fulness of the Godhead, from the infinite Fulness of Him in whom all Fulness dwells, and who filleth the Church, which is His Fulness. We are fond of systematizing, and schematizing, and formulizing everything, so that we may put it wrapt up and ticketed into one of the pigeon-holes of our understanding, to be taken out when we want it. Thus we lay down grand, sweeping propositions, like those of De Maistre's, which I have been examining: "S'il y a quelque chose d'évident pour la raison autant que pour la foi, c'est que l'Eglise universelle est une monarchie. L'idée seule de l'universalité suppose cette forme de gouvernement. — Dès qu'il n'y a plus de centre, ni de gouvernement commun, il ne peut y avoir d'unité, ni par conséquent d'Eglise universelle." Such propositions make us fancy we know a great deal, and enable us to pronounce positively and peremptorily, while in fact they only mislead us, and teach us nothing aright.

Here I will insert a passage from a greater philosopher, who teaches us a far higher lore, and had dived down far deeper to the principles of things, and whose speculative flights were regulated and directed by his strong, practical, English understanding. I have quoted the passage already in another work; but

it contains such a complete refutation of De Maistre's plausibilities about the unity and universality of the Church, that, at a time when so many are deluded by those plausibilities, it should be quoted again and again. Coleridge, in his invaluable *Treatise On the Constitution of the Church and State* (p. 128), lays down, as one of the essential characters of the Church of Christ, "the absence of any visible Head or Sovereign, and the non-existence, nay, the utter preclusion, of any local or personal centre of unity, of any single source of universal power. This fact (he says) may be thus illustrated. Kepler and Newton, substituting the idea of the infinite for the conception of a finite and determined world assumed in the Ptolemaic astronomy, superseded and drove out the notion of a one central point or body of the universe. Finding a centre in every point of matter, and an absolute circumference nowhere, they explained at once the unity and the distinction that co-exist throughout the Creation by focal instead of central bodies; the attractive and restraining power of the sun, or focal orb, in each particular system, supposing and resulting from an actual power, present in all and over all, throughout an indeterminable multitude of systems. And this, demonstrated as it has been by science, and verified by observation, we rightly name the true system of the heavens. And even such is the scheme and true idea of the Christian Church. In the primitive times, and as long as the Churches retained the form given them by the Apostles and Apostolic men, every community, or, in the words of a Father of the second century (for the pernicious fashion of assimilating the Christian to the Jewish, as afterward to the Pagan ritual, by false analogies was almost coeval with the Church itself), every altar had its own bishop, every flock its own pastor, who derived his authority immediately from Christ, the Universal Shepherd, and acknowledged no other superior than the same Christ, speaking by His spirit in the unanimous decision of any number of bishops or elders, according to His promise, *Where two or three are gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them.* Hence, the unitive relation of the Churches to each other, and of each to all, being equally actual indeed, but likewise equally

ideal, that is, mystic and supersensual, as the relation of the whole Church to its One Invisible Head, the Church with and under Christ, as a One Kingdom or State, is hidden; while in all its several component monads (the particular visible Churches I mean), Cesar receiving the things that are Cesar's, and confronted by no rival Cesar, by no authority, which existing locally, temporally, and in the person of a fellow-mortal, must be essentially of the same kind with his own,—notwithstanding any attempt to belie its true nature under the perverted and contradictory name of spiritual,—sees only so many loyal groups, who, claiming no peculiar rights, make themselves known to him as Christians, only by the more scrupulous and exemplary performance of their duties as citizens and subjects." The analogy here pointed out between the true idea of the Church and the Copernican idea of the universe is singularly appropriate; and one might almost fancy that some lurking semiconsciousness that her own fate is identified with that of the Ptolemaic conception, is among the causes which still keep the Church of Rome from giving up an exploded fiction, and acknowledging what the scientific researches of three centuries have determined with one voice to be the truth; though, to be sure, Truth, even in matters of Science, is one of the last things cared for at Rome.

So much importance is ascribed to De Maistre's arguments on the Unity of the Church, as involving the recognition of the Papacy, that it may not be useless to glance at two or three more of them. In p. 6 he says: "Soutenir qu'une foule d'Églises indépendantes forment une Église *une et universelle*, c'est soutenir, en d'autres termes, que tous les gouvernemens politiques de l'Europe ne forment qu'un seul gouvernement *un et universel*. Ces deux idées sont identiques; il n'y a pas moyen de chicaner." Yet it is very easy to shew the ineptitude of this parallel for proving what De Maistre would infer from it. Doubtless the Unity of the Church is in a very broken condition. But is there less imperfection in its other attributes, for instance, its holiness? The Apostolic Epistles teach us that both these qualities were miserably wanting, in the very first age of the

Church; and her whole history bears witness that, in her outward visible form, she has in all ages been very different from what she ought to have been. Therefore we do not, nor can we, say that the present outward aspect of Christendom exhibits a realization of the Unity of the Church: nor can Rome say that the Unity of the Church is realized in her Communion, except by an audacious disregard and denial of facts. Yet we contend that there is an inward, latent Unity among all Christians, who are really united by faith to the One Head and Centre of the Church,—that there is such, even though they may be unconscious of it, even though they may deny it,—and that this Unity would be much greater and more manifest, were it not for the grievous deficiency of all the other Christian graces in every branch of the Church. If her Unity is wanting, it is because her other attributes are still more wanting. Our divisions, like those at Corinth, prove that we are carnal. But assuredly, in despite of all the divisions and contrarieties, of which the Papacy is the chief breeder and fomentor, there is a unity in Christendom. Christendom is not a mere arbitrary abstraction, but implies an essential oneness, whereby it is distinguished from all the rest of mankind,—the oneness produced by our common bond to our One Lord, by the One Spirit given to all the members of His Body, by the One Hope of our calling, by our One Faith, by our One Baptism,—by our One God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in us all. What is the Roman Unity, resulting from a visible government, to keep the members in subjection, compared with this? except the unity of a fagot, compared with that of a tree. And what stark blindness to spiritual powers is involved in the assertion that all these mighty principles of unity are of no avail, unless you can stick the impress of a Papal head upon them!

Among the governments of Europe, on the other hand, viewed politically, there are no such principles of unity: and since governments deal with outward things, which exclude one another, they cannot coalesce in the same manner in which a

number of Churches coalesce into one Church. The purposes of each government are distinct and separate, bearing reference to the peculiarities of each nation : the purposes of the Church are the same everywhere, bearing on that which is essential in man, and upon his essential immutable relations. Yet attempts have been made to combine the states of Europe into some sort of federal union. This was the idea of the Empire in the Middle Ages, but was baffled in consequence of the incongruity between a number of independent sovereigns and a supreme Emperor over them : whence a variety of conflicting, clashing rights led to interminable struggles. A somewhat similar idea may in our own age have flasht across the minds of some of the statesmen who establisht what they called the Holy Alliance : only, from the condition of Europe at the time, that Alliance inevitably took a mere party character, and was converted into a kind of conspiracy of Governments to keep down the liberties of their subjects.

Surely however the world is not brought to such a pass, that we are compelled to pronounce that what has never been yet, can never be hereafter. The powers of creation and production and organization are not yet worn out. On the contrary, as the elements and conditions of society are undergoing changes every year, under the action of manifold economical, intellectual, moral, and religious influences, we may feel confident that the future, while it will bear divers analogies to the past, will also have differences and peculiarities of its own. Still less are we bound to limit the possibilities of the Kingdom of Heaven, even in its earthly manifestation, the Church, by any rules abstracted from the observation of what men have been and have done, in the political relations of nations, in which Might has mostly been regarded as the main constituent of Right, while Law, till latterly, has hardly been allowed to lift up her voice amid the contentious tumult of selfish passions. Hooker, after speaking of the evil of important differences among Churches, has well said (viii. c. 3. §. 5) : " The way to prevent it is not, as some do imagine, the yielding up of supreme power over all Churches

into one only pastor's hands,—but the framing of their government, especially for matter of substance, everywhere according to the rule of one only Law, to stand in no less force than the Law of Nations doth, to be received in all kingdoms ; all sovereign rulers to be sworn no otherwise to it, than some are to maintain the liberties, laws, and received customs of the country where they reign. This shall cause uniformity even under several dominions, without those woful inconveniences whereto the state of Christendom was subject heretofore through the tyranny and oppression of that one universal Nimrod who alone ruled all. And till the Christian world be driven to enter into the peaceable and true consultation about some such kind of general Law concerning those things of weight and moment wherein now we differ,—if one Church hath not the same order which another hath,—let every Church keep as near as may be the order it should have, and commend the just defense thereof to God, even as Judah did, when it differed in the exercise of religion from that form which Israel followed.”

Again De Maistre says (p. 7): “Si quelqu'un s'avisait de proposer *un royaume de France sans roi de France, un empire de Russie sans empereur de Russie*, on croiroit justement qu'il a perdu l'esprit ; ce seroit cependant rigoureusement la même idée que c'elle d'une *Eglise universelle sans chef*.” Here the fallacy is palpable to the dimmest perceptions. The idea of a kingdom implies its being governed by a king, or a queen ; that of an empire, in this sense, involves that of an emperor. But that of the Church does not contain the slightest hint with regard to its peculiar form of government. Or, if etymology is to have any force, that of *Eglise*, *ἐκκλησία*, points to a popular assembly.

Once more: “Il seroit superflu de parler de l'aristocratie ; car n'y ayant jamais eu dans l'Eglise de corps qui ait eu la prétention de la régir sous aucune forme élective ou héréditaire, il s'ensuit que son gouvernement est nécessairement monarchique, toute autre forme se trouvant rigoureusement exclue.” It is difficult to understand how De Maistre could overlook the analogy between an Aristocracy and the Episcopate, which for

several centuries was the only body exercising anything like an authority of government in the Universal Church.

I have not observed any other argument on this point, to which the Author himself attaches any weight.

On the other hand we need not hesitate to assert, on the strength of what we know of man, as his nature has manifested itself in all ages, whether individually, or in his social and political relations, that the assumption of a right to govern the whole Church must ever be destructive of its unity, and incompatible therewith; unless indeed the persons invested with the sovereignty were to be raised by a perpetual succession of miracles above all the weaknesses and frailties and narrownesses of humanity. Even if we were to take the most favorable supposition,—one which the whole history of the Papacy contradicts,—that a mode of electing the sovereign could be devised such as to ensure the choice of an unbroken series of men eminent for intellectual and moral energy, as well as for sanctity and earnest faith, still, unless they were all endowed with a superhuman wisdom, guiding their decisions in every question of discipline, no less than of doctrine, it cannot but be that the spiritual sovereign will desire to stamp the impress of his own mind, of that which he deems best and most expedient, on the whole body of the Church. But while human nature continues under its present limitations, it is no less certain that the most capacious intellect will never be able to comprehend and recognise the fitness of the innumerable modifications of human thought and feeling, expanding under the innumerable varieties of character, temperament, and circumstances, and fostered by the genial warmth of religion: and such a capacity seems always to be contracted, where there is a strong, resolute will, and where power elicits the action of that will. On the opposite side, in every branch of the Church there will ever be numbers of men holding strong conscientious convictions more or less at variance with those of the spiritual sovereign, who will also be convinced of the lawfulness of their convictions, and that it is their duty not to allow their Christian liberty to be infringed and violated,



but to defend their convictions even though by suffering martyrdom for them. Thus no Popes have inflicted greater breaches on the unity of the Church, than two of the greatest in the whole list,—Gregory the Seventh, and Innocent the Third: I do not mean especially by their conflicts with the temporal powers of their days,—but the former by his obstinate enforcement of celibacy and other disciplinary rules, the latter by his unrelenting persecutions. What then must happen when there is no security for the intellectual or moral character of the sovereign! when, as has been so often seen in the history of the Papacy, he may be taken from among those who are the scandals of human nature. History declares that every fresh attempt to extend the authority of Rome has been followed by a schism in the Church. The Greek Church separated from her a thousand years ago: half Europe asserted its Christian liberty at the Reformation: and yet Rome boasts that she is the only ground and support of the unity of Christendom.

## NOTE P: p. 35.

The proofs of this would furnish materials for a long and interesting essay, which would be a mournful illustration of the truth exemplified in the whole history of the Romish Church, that *corruptio optimi fit pessima*. Here I will only quote the following passage from Professor Maurice's Preface to his *Lectures on the Epistle to the Hebrews* (p. LXV): "When it was proclaimed in terms, 'Christ has given His authority to the chair of St Peter,' then did the hearts of the humble and meek begin more and more to utter the cry, *They have taken away our Lord from His universe; and we know not where they have laid Him*. That cry may be heard, not in the sixteenth century, not in Wittenberg, not in Geneva, but throughout the middle ages, from the most vehement,—modern Protestants would say, the most idolatrous Churchmen. We are worthily punished for our dishonesty in not doing justice to what was right and holy and noble in

those ages. The testimonies they bear on this subject, to those who will read them fairly, outweigh, it seems to me, all the tomes of anti-pontifical controversialists. Bishop Lowth, in his Prelections, speaking of the tyranny which was established in Rome after the death of Julius Cesar, and of the means by which it might have been checked, exclaims *Plus, mehercule, valuisset unum Ἀρμοδίου μέλος quam Ciceronis Philippicæ omnes*. Those who are dallying with the theory of Papal Supremacy in our day, who are fancying it means something very real and reconciling, may perhaps learn more of its true nature from a few cantoes of the *Inferno* than from the Treatise of Barrow."

NOTE Pa : p. 36, l. 27.

Coleridge's Treatise *On the Constitution of the Church and State* was published as a kind of apology for what was called Catholic Emancipation. It was his last work, written in the fullest maturity of his judgement, the result of the observation and meditation of his whole life; and in it he pronounces an opinion (p. 146) not unfavorable on the whole to the "rites and doctrines, the *agenda* and *credenda* of the Roman Catholics, could we separate them from the adulterating ingredients combined with them, and the use made of them by the sacerdotal Mamelukes of the Romish monarchy, for the support of the Papacy and Papal hierarchy." Hence, in such a book, we are not likely to find the expression of any blind, hasty, inconsiderate prejudices against Rome. Yet here he writes thus (p. 130): "As the mistaking of symbols and analogies for metaphors has been a main occasion and support of the worst errors in Protestantism, so the understanding the same symbols in a literal or phenomenal sense, notwithstanding the most earnest warnings against it, the most express declarations of the folly and danger of interpreting sensually what was delivered of objects supersensual,—this was the rank wilding on which *the Prince of this world*, the lust of power and worldly aggrandizement, was

enabled to graft, one by one, the whole branchery of Papal superstition and imposture. A truth not less important might be conveyed by reversing the image,—by representing the Papal monarchy as the stem or trunk circulating a poison-sap through the branches successively grafted thereon, the previous and natural fruit of which was at worst only mawkish and innutritious. Yet among the dogmas or articles of belief that contradistinguish the Roman from the Reformed Churches, the most important, and in their practical effects and consequences the most pernicious, I cannot but regard as refracted and distorted truths, profound ideas sensualized into idols, or at the lowest rate lofty and affecting imaginations, safe while they remained general and indefinite, but debased and rendered noxious by their application in detail: for example, the doctrine of the Communion of Saints, or the sympathy between all the members of the Universal Church, which death itself doth not interrupt, exemplified in St Antony and the cure of sore eyes, St Boniface and success in brewing, and other such follies. What the same doctrines now are, used as the pretexts and shaped into the means and implements of priestly power and revenue,—or rather, what the whole scheme is of Romish rites, doctrines, institutions, and practices, in their combined and full operation, where it exists in undisputed sovereignty, neither repress by the prevalence, nor modified by the light, of a purer faith, nor holden in check by the consciousness of Protestant neighbours and lookers-on,—this is a question which cannot be kept too distinct from the former. And as, at the risk of passing for a secret favourer of superannuated superstitions, I have spoken out my thoughts of the Roman Theology, so, and at a far more serious risk of being denounced as an intolerant bigot, I will declare what, after a two years residence in exclusively Popish countries, and in situations and under circumstances that afforded more than ordinary means of acquainting myself with the workings and the proceeds of the machinery, was the impression left on my mind as to the effects and influences of the Romish (most uncatholic) religion,—as it actually and practically exists.—When I

contemplate the whole system, as it affects the great fundamental principles of morality, the *terra firma*, as it were, of our humanity,—then trace its operation on the sources and conditions of national strength and well-being,—and lastly consider its woful influences on the innocence and sanctity of the female mind and imagination, on the faith and happiness, the gentle fragranciness and unnoticed everpresent verdure of domestic life,—I can with difficulty avoid applying to it what the Rabbins fable of the fratricide Cain, after the curse,—that *the firm earth trembled wherever he strode, and the grass turned black beneath his feet.*”

In a subsequent passage (p. 147), Coleridge gives this as the result of a recent tour in the Romish provinces on the Rhine. “Every fresh opportunity of examining the Roman Catholic religion on the spot, every new fact that presents itself to my notice, increases my conviction that its immediate basis and the true grounds of its continuance are to be found in the wickedness, ignorance, and wretchedness of the many,—and that the producing and continuing cause of this deplorable state is, that it is the interest of the Romish priesthood that so it should remain, as the surest, and in fact only support of the Papal sovereignty and influence against the civil powers, and the reforms wisht for by the more enlightened Governments, as well as by all the better informed and wealthier class of Roman Catholics generally. And as parts of the same policy, and equally indispensable to the interests of the Papal Crown, are the ignorance, grossness, excessive number, and poverty of the lower ecclesiastics themselves, the religious orders included. When I say the Pope, I understand the Papal Hierarchy, which is in truth the dilated Pope: and in this sense only, and not of the individual priest or friar at Rome, can a wise man be supposed to use the word. I feel it as no small comfort and confirmation to know that the same view of the subject is taken, the same conviction entertained, by a large and increasing number in the Roman Catholic Communion itself, in Germany, France, Italy, and even in Spain; and that no inconsiderable portion of this number consists of men who are not only pious as Christians, but zealous as Roman Catholics.”

This testimony might be strengthened by that of a host of other witnesses, whose means of observation have been abundant, and whose veracity is indisputable.

Now the profest object of Dr Newman's eighth Lecture *On the Difficulties of Anglicanism* is to shew that "the Political state of Catholic Countries is no prejudice to the sanctity of the Church." His way of proving this is singular and characteristic. He ingeniously diverts his argument from what would seem to be the legitimate issue, the political and social condition of Romish and of Protestant countries, as compared with each other; and pushing aside what he could not deny, though he does not expressly acknowledge it, he contends that the aims of the Church are totally different from those of the world,—that the world desires and seeks to gain such ends as order, peace, tranquillity, national wealth and prosperity, social culture,—whereas the Church "contemplates, not the whole, but the parts,—not a nation, but the men who form it,—not society in the first place, but in the second place, and in the first place individuals: it looks beyond the outward act, on and into the thought, the motive, the intention, and the will: it looks beyond the world, and detects and moves against the devil, who is sitting in ambush behind it. It has then a foe in view, nay, it has a battle-field, to which the world is blind: its proper battle-field is the heart of the individual; and its true foe is Satan" (p. 196).

All this is true, and excellently said, as is much more to a like effect in the same Lecture. The strange thing is, that Dr Newman should speak of this as a novelty, as a truth which had only been "brought home to him closely and vividly," since he joined the Church of Rome. For surely the designation of the Gospel for the salvation of individual souls is not a truth unknown or unspoken of in the Church of England. Nay, is not this the central principle of our whole Evangelical Theology? and has it not often been a matter of complaint against that Theology, on the part of the School of which Dr Newman was the head, that it neglected every other view of the Gospel, to dwell solely on such as bore immediately on the salvation of

individual souls,—that it overlookt and neglected all the mysterious truths revealed to us concerning the Trinity, and the relations of the Divine Persons to each other, and the Incarnation, confining its attention exclusively to the work of Mediation and Redemption, and the manner in which that work is to be rendered effectual for as many as possible of those who are called to partake in its benefits? that it was too narrowminded to embrace any other end along with this, and thus cared not about nature or art, or learning or science, or the social and political relations of mankind?

When we read the common apologies for Romanism, we are wont to find it urged, that Protestantism, that Evangelicalism, may indeed have some power in their dealings with individual souls, but that they are utterly unfitted for dealing with nations and states, and that the Church of Rome alone possesses the power and the wisdom requisite for political action, for operating upon Governments and nations, and for moulding society in a Christian form. That she has utterly failed in this work, her great champion seems now to admit, though he chooses rather to transform his admission into an assertion that she never attempted it, that she deemed the affairs of this world unworthy of her attention, and felt bound to keep her eyes and thoughts ever fixt immovably on the affairs of another world. How precisely the evidence of History tallies with this account of the principles and practice of Rome, it remains for him to shew hereafter; when perhaps he will have occasion to renew his observation, that “historical facts are proof against the force of talent, and remain where they were, when it has expended itself.” At all events Coleridge’s statements just cited, which might be corroborated by hundreds of similar ones, hardly indicate that Rome has been very successful in fitting her members for another life, except so far as that end may be promoted by unfitting them for the chief duties of this life.

A sophism runs through this eighth Lecture: while its profest theme is to explain the grounds of the inferiority of Roman Catholic nations to Protestant, the argument turns on

the different ends aimed at by the Church and by the World; and it is assumed that the influences acting on the Romish side are purely religious, those on the Protestant or English side purely political. Thus we are brought to the conclusion that Godliness no longer *has the promise of the life that now is*, and that, as is especially exemplified in the Roman State, it is no longer true nowadays, that *happy is the people who have the Lord for their God*. If we keep watch against this sophism, we may readily acknowledge the truths which are set forth with such powerful eloquence in this Lecture; and yet we shall perceive that they no way impair the force of the argument against Romanism, drawn from the political and moral superiority of Protestant countries and nations.

Pb: p. 37, l. 18.

This has been urged by Barrow with tremendous force (p. 642), where he shews that "Christianity by the Papal influence—has been modeled to a system of politic devices—serving to exalt and enrich the Pope, with his Court and adherents, clients and vassals. What doctrine (he asks) of Christian Theology, as it is interpreted by their schools, hath not a direct aspect, or doth not squint that way? especially according to the opinions passant and in vogue among them. To pass over those concerning the Pope, (his universal pastorship, judgship in controversies, power to call councils, presidency in them, superiority over them, right to confirm or annull them, his infallibility, his double sword, and dominion, direct or indirect, over Princes, his dispensing in laws, in oaths, in vows, in matrimonial cases, with all other the monstrous prerogatives, which the sound Doctors of Rome with encouragement of that Chair do teach): what doth the doctrine concerning the exempting of the Clergy from secular jurisdiction and immunity of their goods from taxes signify, but their entire dependence on the Pope, and their being closely tied to his interests? What is the exemption of monastical places from the

jurisdiction of Bishops, but listing so many soldiers and advocates to defend and advance the Papal Empire? What meaneth the doctrine concerning that middle region of souls, or cloister of Purgatory, whereof the Pope holdeth the keys, opening and shutting it at his pleasure by dispensation of pardons and indulgences, but that he must be master of the people's condition, and of their purse? What meaneth the treasure of merits and supererogatory works whereof he is the steward, but a way of driving a trade, and drawing money from simple people to his treasury? Whither doth the entangling of folks in perpetual vows tend, but to assure them in a slavish dependence on their interests eternally, without evasion or remedy, except by favorable dispensation from the Pope? Why is the *opus operatum* in sacraments taught to confer Grace, but to breed a high opinion of the Priest, and all he doth? Whence did the monstrous doctrine of transubstantiation (urged with so furious zeal) issue, but from design to magnify the credit of those, who by saying of a few words can make our God and Saviour? and withal to exercise a notable instance of their power over men, in making them to renounce their reason and their senses? Whither doth tend the doctrine concerning the mass being a propitiatory sacrifice for the dead, but to engage men to leave in their wills good sums to offer in their behalf? Why is the cup withholden from the laity, but to lay it low, by so notable a distinction, in the principal mystery of our religion, from the Priesthood? Why is saying private mass or celebrating the communion in solitude allowed, but because priests are paid for it, and live by it? At what doth the doctrine concerning the necessity of auricular confession aim, but that thereby the priests may have a mighty awe on the consciences of all people, may dive into their secrets, may manage their lives as they please. And what doth a like necessary particular absolution intend, but to set the Priest in a lofty state of authority above the people, as a judge of their condition, and dispenser of their salvation? Why do they equal ecclesiastical traditions with Scripture, but that on the pretense of them they may obtrude



whatever doctrines advantageous to their designs? What drift hath the doctrine concerning the infallibility of Churches or Councils, but that, when opportunity doth invite, he may call a company of Bishops together to establish what he liketh, which ever after must pass for certain truth, to be contradicted by none; so enslaving the minds of all men to his dictates, which always suit to his interests? What doth the prohibition of Holy Scripture drive at, but a monopoly of knowledge to themselves, or a detaining of people in ignorance of truth and duty; so that they must be forced to rely on them for direction, must believe all they say, and blindly submit to their dictates, being disabled to detect their errors, or contest their opinions? Why must the sacraments be celebrated, and public devotions exercised, in an unknown tongue, but that the Priests may seem to have a peculiar interest in them, and ability for them? Why must the priesthood be so indispensably forbidden marriage, but that it may be wholly untackt from the state, and rest addicted to him, and governable by him? that the persons and wealth of priests may be purely at his devotion? To what end is the clogging Religion by multiplication of ceremonies and formalities, but to amuse the people and maintain in them a blind reverence toward the interpreters of the dark mysteries coucht in them, and by seeming to encourage an exterior show of piety (or form of godliness) to gain reputation and advantage, whereby they might oppress the interior virtue and reality of it, as the Scribes and Pharisees did, although with less designs? Why is the veneration of images and relics, the credence of miracles and legends, the undertaking of pilgrimages and voyages to Rome, and other places more holy than ordinary, sprinklings of holy water, consecrations of baubles (with innumerable foppish knacks and trinkets), so cherisht, but to keep the people in a slavish credulity and dotage, apt to be led by them whither they please, by any sleeveless pretence, and in the meanwhile to pick various gains from them by such trade? What do all such things mean, but obscuring the native simplicity of Christianity? whereas, its being represented intelligible to all men, would derogate from

that high admiration, which these men pretend to from their peculiar and profound wisdom. And what would men spend for these toys, if they understood they might be good Christians, and get to Heaven without them? What doth all that pomp of religion serve for, but for ostentation of the dignity of those who administer it? It may be pretended for the honour of religion; but it really conduceth to the glory of the Priesthood, who shine in those pageantries. Why is Monkery (although so very different from that which was in the ancient times) so cried up as a superlative state of perfection? but that it filleth all places with swarms of lusty people, who are vowed servants to him, and have little else to do but to advance that authority by which they subsist in that dronish way of life. In fine, pursuing the controversies of Bellarmine, or any other champion of Romanism, do but consider the nature and scope of each doctrine maintained by them; and you may easily discern that scarce any of them but doth tend to advance the interest of the Pope, or of his sworn vassals."

## NOTE Q: p. 37.

Among the many strange and startling assertions in Dr Newman's two recent courses of controversial Lectures, none is stranger or more startling than what he says in those delivered at Birmingham, when vindicating the enforcement of clerical celibacy. After a generous admission that the few married clergymen whom he has known, are "of such excellence and consistency of life, that he would feel it to be absurd to suspect them of any the slightest impropriety in their conduct," he adds: "but still the terrible instances of human frailty, of which one reads and hears in Protestant bodies, are quite enough to shew that the married state is no sort of warrant for moral correctness, no preventive, whether of scandalous offenses, or much less of minor forms of the same general sin. Purity is not a virtue which comes as a matter of course to the married any more than

to the single." Thus much no one will dispute. But he continues: "Though it is impossible to bring the matter fairly to an issue, yet for that very reason I have as much a right to my opinion as another to his, when I state my deliberate conviction that there are, to say the least, as many offenses against the marriage vow among Protestant Ministers, as there are against the vow of celibacy among Catholic Priests" (p. 129).

Dr Newman here resolves to set an example of moderation in his statements: he will only "say the least," the very least part of what he might have said, of what the history of the Church would of course have justified him in saying. At all events however he has a somewhat large notion of the rights of private judgement. "I have as much a right (he says) to my opinion, as another to his:" for the restriction implied in the conditional clause, that "it is impossible to bring the matter fairly to an issue," is just nothing. Though it is impossible to get an exact statistical enumeration of the offenses committed in the two cases, yet, where, as in all practical questions, absolute certainty and precision are unattainable, proximate conclusions are binding on the judgement. In fact it is rank scepticism to say, *I have as much a right to my opinion as another to his.* A *legal right* doubtless a man has to think that the moon is made of green cheese; inasmuch as the law has never prohibited such an opinion, and will not punish him for holding it, unless perhaps by a strait waistcoat. But morally no man has a *right* to any opinion, except it agree with the truth, or with the most correct estimate of the truth he can frame. *Right* has nothing to do with the matter. We have no *right*, except to think rightly; and this right is also a duty, imposed upon every being endowed with the faculty of thinking by his indefeasible allegiance to Truth. No wonder however that Dr Newman, having formed such notions of the right of private judgement, should entertain so inveterate a hostility to it.

But is it indeed so? Is the evidence of facts with regard to the moral effects of compulsory celibacy so scanty, or so ambiguous, that history has never been able to pronounce a positive verdict

on the subject? I had thought that we had the concurrent testimony of more than fifteen centuries, proceeding from divers countries, under divers social forms, express in divers ways, more copiously indeed at one time than at another, but without any variation as to the result; which throughout has confirmed the wisdom of St Paul's injunctions to the Corinthians (Ep. i. c. vii.), not to attempt to counteract the laws of Nature. I will not defile these pages with details of the revolting evils which have arisen from that attempt: but since this audacious assertion has been made, which the asserter himself at all events must believe, and which therefore may find some credulous hearers, in an age when the want of firm convictions disposes so many to seek support in prohibitive ordinances, it becomes a duty to point to certain heads of evidence, which at all events will shew that, in protesting against compulsory celibacy, we are not influenced by the vague traditions or the fables which Dr Newman declares to be the grounds of the English aversion to Rome.

The Councils, at least from the ninth century downward, bear witness by many of their Canons to the scandalous immorality of the Clergy, which hardly shrank from the most unutterable horrors. For instance, it had been ordained by several of the earlier Councils,—by that of Nicea, by those of Carthage in 348 and 398, by that of Tours in 567, by that of Lyons in 583, by that of Toledo in 633,—that no priest should have any woman living in his house, unless she was his mother, or sister, or aunt. But the Council of Mayence, in 888, makes the rule universal, on the ground of the incestuous acts which had arisen from the allowance of those exceptions: "*Ut clericis interdicatur mulieres in domo sua habere. Quamvis enim sacri canones quasdam personas feminarum simul cum clericis in una domo habitare permittant, tamen, quod multum dolendum est, saepe audivimus per illam concessionem plurima scelera esse commissa, ita ut quidam sacerdotum cum propriis sororibus concumbentes filios ex eis generassent.*" A like Canon was enacted at the Synod of Metz in the same year,—where the prohibition is expressly

extended to the mother,—and again, a few years after, at the Synod of Nantes, where it was forbidden that any priest should have any woman living in his house, “neque illas quas canones concedunt: (quia instigante diabolo etiam in illis scelus frequenter perpetratum reperitur, aut etiam in pedissequis illarum): scilicet matrem, amitam, sororem.”

Another subject of frequent legislation was the sons of the clergy, a large class of whom are designated by Benedict the Eighth in a preliminary address to the Council of Ticino about the year 1020, as *fili concubinari*. The same letter gives an awful picture of the licentiousness of the clergy: and his testimony might be confirmed by that of hundreds of unimpeachable witnesses speaking of the character of the clergy during the five centuries anterior to the Reformation. I will merely quote a passage from one of Petrarch's Letters, the 20th of his *Epistolae sine titulo*, in which he speaks of the Papal Court at Avignon: “Quis, oro, non irascatur et rideat illos senes, pueros coma candida, togis amplissimis, adeoque lascivientibus animis, ut nihil illuc falsius videatur, quam quod ait Maro: *Frigidus in Venerem senior*. Tam calidi tamque praecipites in Venerem senes sunt: tanta eos aetatis et status et virium cepit oblivio: sic in libidines inardescunt: sic in omne ruunt dedecus, quasi omnis eorum gloria non in cruce Christi sit, sed in comessationibus et ebrietatibus, et quae has sequuntur cubilibus impudicis. Sic fugientem manu retrahunt juventam; atque hoc unum senectutis ultimae lucrum putant, ea facere quae juvenes non auderent. Hos animos et hos nervos tribuit hic Bacchus indomitus, hic orientalium vis baccarum.—Spectat haec Sathanas ridens, atque impari tripudio delectatus, interque decrepitos ac puellas arbiter sedens, stupet plus illos agere quam se hortari.—Mitto stupra, raptus, incestus, adulteria, quae jam pontificalis lasciviae ludi sunt. Mitto raptarum viros, ne mutire audeant, non tantum avitis laribus, sed finibus patriis exturbatos, quaeque contumeliarum gravissima est, et violatas conjuges et externo semine gravidas rursus accipere, et post partum reddere ad alternam satietatem abutentium coactos. Quae omnia non unus ego, sed vulgus

novit." This sounds like an account of the Court of Commodus or of Elagabalus: it is that of the Court of a man who called himself the Vicar of Christ upon earth.

Dr Newman indeed contends that this licentiousness was no way connected with celibacy. "If matrimony does not prevent cases of immorality among Protestant ministers, it is not celibacy which causes them among Catholic priests. It is not what the Catholic Church imposes, but what human nature prompts, which leads any portion of her ecclesiastics into sin. Human nature will break out, like some wild and raging element, under any system: it bursts out under the Protestant system: it bursts out under the Catholic." This, alas! cannot be denied. But, though a river of itself may at times overflow its banks, a dam, which excludes it from its proper channel, will make it do so always. I believe there can be no question that, even among the laity, simple fornication is a far more frequent sin than adultery: and surely, were it not for this contra-natural institution, there is nothing in the character or office of the Christian ministry to increase man's proneness to fall into licentiousness, but on the contrary every motive, every inducement, every help to draw him away from it. Moreover, though I know of no ground, and have not the slightest wish, to impeach the moral character of the Romish priesthood now in England, — and though in this, as in other respects, the Church of Rome has derived much benefit from the influence of the Reformation, so that generally, where the two Churches have existed in juxtaposition, the priesthood has been delivered from the foul spots which previously stained it,—yet, I believe, no candid enquirer can come to any other conclusion, than that the increase of licentiousness of the clergy has generally been coincident with the stricter enforcement of celibacy, and that, where the ministers of the Gospel have been allowed, they have set a right example of the holy relations of family life to their people.

This coincidence has been pointed out repeatedly by Gieseler, in the sections in which he speaks of ecclesiastical discipline, — for instance, in the Second Portion of his Third Period (extending from 858 to 1073), §. 30. "The licentiousness

of the clergy, produced by their celibacy, (Die durch den Cölibat hervorgerufene Unkeuschkeit der Geistlichen), which had always been a standing subject of synodal legislation, rose in these ages of rudeness to the most unnatural crimes. The bishops set the example;—the lower clergy followed without scruple.” In the notes on this Section, Gieseler gives the most shocking evidence of the truth of his statement. Again, in the Third Portion of the same Third Period (from 1073 to 1305) §. 65: “The celibacy of the Clergy, which was now enforced still more extensively than before, could not be thoroughly carried out in many countries before the thirteenth century, but brought the grossest excesses in its train, the more so because many of the bishops overlookt them;” where again the notes supply terrific evidence of the facts. The same statement recurs, with evidence equally appalling, in the fourth Portion of the same Period (from 1305 to 1409) §. 108: where, among other things, it is stated that in several countries the laity, in order to preserve their wives and daughters from the impure solicitations of the clergy, compelled them to keep concubines. This is said to have happened in Spain, in Flanders, in Ireland, in Norway.\*

Of the general prevalence of this depravity in Scotland at the age of the Reformation, an awful account appeared in *the Quarterly Review* for June last. The writer, who seems well acquainted with the family history of that period, goes through a long list of the Bishops, and shews how, one after another, they lived openly and avowedly with concubines. “The most cultivated (he says), the most amiable among them, were in this respect not a whit purer than the others.—Such of them as were contented with one woman were esteemed virtuous; nay, ladies of good condition thought it no shame to live as their avowed

\* The same thing happened in parts of Switzerland. Sleidan, in the Third Book of his Commentaries, under the year 1522, tells us that Zwingli, in a Letter to the Swiss, “monet ne veræ doctrinæ cursum impediunt, neque sacerdotibus maritis ullam faciant molestiam: coelibatus enim præceptum auctorem habere Sathanam: nonnullis in ipsorum pagis hunc esse morem, cum novum quempiam ecclesie ministrum recipiunt, ut jubeant eum habere concubinam, ne pudicitiam alienam tentet.”

concubines, and found the sympathy of society not averse to such a departure from the celibacy which the Church pretended to enforce. These things are brought more home to us in the domestic history of a narrow kingdom : but the condition of the clergy was not materially different in other countries of Christendom, before the Reformation produced a change of morals far beyond the widest spread of its doctrines" (p. 42). Thus Cardinal Beaton "lived with a concubine, the daughter of an old baronial house, during the greater part of his life.—The offspring of that connexion were numerous : some of the sons were dignified churchmen, others laymen, who founded families in Fife and Angus. Three of these gentlemen had letters of legitimation under the Great Seal. For not less than four of their sisters, all taking their father's name, and all in recorded documents setting forth his style and rank as honorable to them, large dowers found matches among the best of the Scotch nobility and gentry." Again, Archbishop Hamilton, Beaton's successor in the See of St Andrews, "lived openly with the wife or widow of his kinsman, Hamilton of Stenhouse. That lady, known as *Lady Stenhouse*, or *Lady Gilstown*, affected no concealment. Among the goods and chattels inventoried in her testament, confirmed at Edinburgh in 1575, are specified three grants of legitimation in favour of as many bastard children by his Grace." Bishop Chisholm of Dumblane gave large portions "of the ecclesiastical patrimony of this church to his natural son and to his two natural daughters." Soon after (p. 46) we are told of Bishop Leslie, "the faithful servant of Queen Mary, and the elegant historian of his country, a person so admirable in all other respects, that his breach of his ordination vows shews both the sad effects of the example of a whole society, and the danger of making a law so hard upon human nature that the sympathies of mankind are in favour of breaking it." Hepburn Bishop of Moray "lived long enough to dilapidate his great Bishopric, and to provide for a very large family, whose several legitimations stand on record." In 1543 letters of legitimation were granted in favour of Michael, Robert, and Hugh Montgomerie, "bastard sons of the Reverend Father in



Christ Robert Bishop of Argyll." Alexander Gordon, Bishop of Galloway, "joined the Reformation, that he might marry Barbara Logie, his mistress, and make his children by her legitimate."

When this was the condition of the hierarchy, what must have been that of the inferior clergy! The fantastical delusions of our modern lovers of darkness have thrown such a gaudy haze around the evils of Rome, that people are forgetting how terrible was the curse from which they were delivered by the Reformation, and are calling upon the Pope to return and renew his withering despotism in England. Hence it becomes necessary to bring forward facts, which in a healthier state of the public mind one might gladly suffer to lie in oblivion. "The effect of the Reformation (the Reviewer concludes, p. 56) upon the manners of the clergy, whether of the old faith or of the new, was signal and immediate." Thus the Church of Rome herself owes an enormous debt of gratitude to the Reformation. For it was only through the shock of the Reformation that she was roused out of her deadly torpour, and that the efforts of the reformers, who continued within her pale, became less abortive than those of their predecessors in previous centuries.

I will merely hint at a part of the evidence to be drawn from general literature. Of the Italian *Novelle*, the main part seems to have been derived from anecdotes of real facts, either pertaining to earlier times or contemporaneous. At all events we may be sure that, in the representation of contemporary occurrences, they exhibit the opinions and the feelings of the age. Now the licentiousness of these *Novelle* is notorious; and a large portion of the grossest and most licentious stories are told of priests and monks. The same is the case in the French *Fabliaux*. Nor are these pictures set before us as monstrous violations of order and decency, but rather as ordinary occurrences, merely remarkable for some humorous peculiarity. Yet Dr Newman, after asserting his right to think what he chooses, states it as his deliberate conviction, "that there are, to say the least, as many offenses against the marriage vow among Protestant ministers, as there are against the vow of celibacy among Catholic priests."

How then does he account for this fact? Assuredly the general literature of the last three centuries has not been led, either in England or in Germany, to cover the sins of the clergy through any excessive reverence for their sacred office. If the facts had afforded a warrant for such representations, there would have been numbers to take advantage of them. But had such tales been written, the public mind would have revolted from their extravagant falsehood.\* Doubtless Dr Newman says truly: "Passion will carry away the married clergyman as well as the unmarried priest:" and this has been represented in fiction, for instance, in the tale of *Adam Blair*. Doubtless too there are many instances of grosser offenses among Protestant ministers, some of which acquire notoriety from proceedings in courts of justice: but, whatever the number may be, it is not such as to make licentiousness an ordinary characteristic of the Clergy in public estimation, as it used to be before the Reformation, in consequence of the institution of compulsory celibacy. Or does Dr Newman merely mean, as his words taken literally might be interpreted, to confine his assertion to the moral character of the Romish clergy in England, or generally, at the present day? If so, we certainly have not adequate grounds for deciding the question. I have no wish to impugn the moral character of the Romish priesthood, either in England or in Germany: in France it would seem to have improved greatly since the beginning of the Revolution: and though one hears evil rumours from Italy and Spain,—and these have received terrible confirmation from Scipio Ricci and from Blanco White,

\* This has been urged by Southey, in his *Letters to Butler* (p. 302). "Upon this point we may appeal to popular opinion, being one of the few points on which it may be trusted. Before the Reformation the Clergy in this country were as much the subjects of ribald tales and jests for the looseness of their lives, as they were in all other Roman Catholic countries, and still are in those wherever any freedom of speech can be indulged. Wherever the Reformation was established, this reproach has been done away. Amid all the efforts which are made to bring the Church of England into contempt and hatred, there is no attempt to revive it. The general decorum and respectability of the Clergy as a body of men is so well known and undeniable, that even slander and faction have not assailed them on that score."

whose statements are far from having been invalidated by Dr Newman's objections,—I know of no sufficient body of authentic evidence for building a stable conclusion upon. But when an institution has been tried during a dozen centuries in all parts of the world, and has uniformly been found productive of the same evil effects, there cannot well be a doubt what sentence ought to be pronounced on it: *Cut it down*. That the Papacy should have refrained from pronouncing this sentence,—that on the contrary it should have retained and upheld that institution with dogged pertinacity, notwithstanding the horrors which streamed in whelming torrents from it,—is perhaps the most damning proof how the Papacy recklessly sacrificed every moral consideration, recklessly sacrificed the souls of its ministers, for the sake of maintaining its own power by surrounding itself with an innumerable host of spiritual Mamelukes, bound to it by that which severed them from all social ties. And this is the Church for which our modern dreamers claim the exclusive title of Holy! a church headed by his Holiness Pope Alexander the Sixth!

This whole question of the celibacy of the Clergy has been treated in a masterly manner by Jeremy Taylor, in that wonderful book, his *Ductor Dubitantium* (B. iii. c. iv. Rule 20): where (in §. 28) he gives the following summary of his objections. "The law of the Church was an evil law, made by an authority violent and usurpt, insufficient as to that charge. It was not a law of God: it was against the rights, and against the necessities of Nature: it was unnatural and unreasonable: it was not for edification of the Church: it was no advantage to spiritual life. It is a law that is therefore against public honesty, because it did openly and secretly introduce dishonesty. It had nothing of the requisites of a good law, no consideration of human frailty, nor of human comforts: it was neither necessary, nor profitable, nor innocent, neither fitted to time, nor place, nor person: it was not accepted by them that could not bear it; it was complained of by them that could: it was never admitted in the East; it was fought against and declaimed and railed at in the West; and at last it is laid aside in the Churches, especially of the

North, as the most intolerable and most unreasonable tyranny in the world. For it was not to be endured, that, upon the pretense of an unseasonable perfection, so much impurity should be brought into the Church, and so many souls thrust down to hell."

That the North should have taken the lead in opposing it, not merely at the Reformation, but almost throughout, is easily understood, when we call to mind that the Northern and Teutonic nations have ever had a much deeper feeling of the moral and spiritual character of marriage,—though they did not turn it into a sacrament,—and that they could not find a compensation for the want of it in the sensual indulgences, to which Southern nations more readily abandon themselves.

NOTE R: p. 37.

There are divers questions connected with Confession, which are grievously troubling our Church, and urgently require the calmest, most thoughtful consideration. But I cannot enter upon them here; nor is this the place for them. I will merely quote another powerful passage of Jeremy Taylor (*Dissuasive*, P. i. c. ii. §. 2), where he enumerates some of the evils, which result from its practice when compulsory. "For confession, it is true, to them who are not used to it, as it is at the first time, and for that once, it is as troublesome, as for a bashful man to speak orations in public. But where it is so perpetual and universal, and done by companies and crowds at a solemn set time; and when it may be done to any one besides the parish priest, to a friar that begs, or to a monk in his dorter, done in the ear, it may be to a person that hath done worse, and therefore hath no awe upon me, but what his order imprints and his viciousness takes off; when we see women and boys, princes and prelates do the same every day, and, as oftentimes they are never the better, so they are not at all ashamed,—but men look upon it as a certain cure, like pulling off a man's clothes to go and wash in a river, and make it, by use and habit, by confidence and custom,

to be no certain pain,—and the women blush or smile, weep or are unmoved, as it happens, under their veil, and the men under the boldness of their sex; when we see that men and women confess to-day, and sin to-morrow, and are not affrighted from their sin the more for it,—because they know the worst of it, and have felt it often, and believe to be eased by it;—certain it is, that a little reason, and a little observation, will suffice to conclude that this practice of confession hath in it no affrightment, not so much as the horreur of the sin itself hath, to the conscience. For they who commit sins confidently, will with less regret, it may be, confess it in this manner where it is the fashion for every one to do it. And when all the world observes how loosely the Italians, Spaniards, and French do live in their carnivals,—giving to themselves all liberty and license to do the vilest things at that time, not only because they are for a while to take their leave of them, but because they are, as they suppose, to be so soon eased of their crimes by confession, and the circular and never failing hand of the priest,—they will have no reason to admire the severity of confession; which, as it was most certainly intended as a delectory of sin, and might do its first intention, if it were equally managed, so now certainly it gives confidence to many men to sin, and to most men to neglect the greater and more effective parts of essential repentance.”

Of the influence which such a system of discipline exercises in deadening the conscience, we have had a most lamentable example in Note I.

Note S: p. 37.

WE have seen Dr Newman's method of dealing with the argument concerning the moral effects of compulsory celibacy. There are some cases of sins against chastity in the members of a married ministry: we cannot tell what the number of these may be: therefore, he says, I have a right to exercise my private judgement in the matter, and to “state my deliberate conviction”

that these sins of licentiousness among Protestant ministers are, "to say the least," as numerous as those among Catholic priests. It matters not that these sins of Protestant ministers are pronounced by the public voice to be flagrantly heinous and exceptional, while those of the Romish priests and monks were deemed for several centuries in divers countries to be general, if not ordinary, and were often declared to be so by the chief teachers of the church, and even by popes, and by councils. Dr Newman is determined to make up for the restraint of his private judgement on other matters by letting it run riot on this, and asserts his right to "state a deliberate conviction" repugnant to all the evidence of history. So great too is the satisfaction he feels at the dexterity of this achievement, that, after boasting of his triumph at the beginning of his fifth Lecture, he sets about applying the same method to clear Rome from another stigma affixed to it by popular error, the charge of having been animated with, and of having fostered a persecuting spirit, of having persecuted, and encouraged persecution.

Here again he performs his favorite feat of turning white black, and black white. His method, as I have said, is the same which he adopts with such brilliant success in vindicating celibacy. He shews that Protestants also have persecuted, and do exercise certain modes of persecution; wherefore "Protestants are just the very last persons in the world who can with safety or consistency call Catholics persecutors, for the simple reason, that they should not throw stones, who live in glass houses" (p. 175). In this case however he is not content with *saying the least*. Emboldened by his previous victory, he resolves to annihilate his adversary, and to set up his client on a pinnacle of solitary glory. The tone of this whole Lecture is overbearing quite to a pitch of insolence against Protestants, of whom he declares at the conclusion (p. 211), that "they have persecuted whenever, wherever, and however they could, from Elizabeth down to Victoria, from the domestic circle up to the Legislature, from black looks to the extremity of the gibbet and the stake." With similar accuracy and impartiality he pronounces (p. 212):

“Far other is the wisdom of the Church [which with him of course means that of Rome]. It is plain, if only to prevent the occurrence of persecution, she must head a movement, which it is impossible to suppress. And in the course of eighteen hundred years, though her children have been guilty of various excesses, though she herself is responsible for isolated acts of most solemn import, yet for one deed of severity with which she can be charged, there have been a hundred of her acts repressive of the persecutor, and protective of his victims. She has been a never-failing fount of humanity, equity, forbearance, and compassion, in consequence of her very recognition of natural impulses and instincts, which Protestants would vainly deny and contradict: and this is the solution of the paradox stated by the distinguished author I just now quoted (Balmez), to the effect, that the religion which forbids private judgement in matters of Revelation, is historically more tolerant than the religions which uphold it. His words will bear repetition: ‘We find, in all parts of Europe, scaffolds prepared to punish crimes against religion: scenes which sadden the soul, were everywhere witness. Rome is one exception to the rule,—Rome, which it has been attempted to represent as a monster of intolerance and cruelty. It is true, that the Popes have not preached, like the Protestants, universal toleration; but the facts shew the difference between the Protestants and the Pope. The Popes, armed with a tribunal of intolerance, have scarce spilt a drop of blood: Protestants and philosophers have shed it in torrents.’”

It would take a volume to unravel all the entanglements, to straighten all the distortions, and to correct all the misrepresentations in this strange medley of confusion: but I cannot refrain from saying a few words on some of the steps by which Dr Newman arrives at his extraordinary conclusions. Both of them are equally at variance with our usual notions, and with the views taken by the whole body of the historians of the last three centuries: they both exemplify their author’s fondness for indulging in the most violent paradoxes: what else do they exemplify?

As the main part of the argument, according to the fashion of every man who has a desperate cause to defend, is that which is aggressive against Protestantism, let us begin by looking at the grounds for the charge which Dr Newman brings against us. We have persecuted (he tells us) "whenever, wherever, and however we could, from Elizabeth down to Victoria, from the domestic circle up to the Legislature, from black looks to the extremity of the gibbet and the stake." Now to this charge, we cannot hesitate to reply, the moment we hear it,—nor do we feel more hesitation after the most careful perusal of all the counts of Dr Newman's indictment,—that it is so enormously exaggerated, as to be utterly false; and whatever speciousness it may gain in his statement results from a series of fallacies.

In the first place the whole Lecture is pervaded by this fallacy, that, while the legitimate comparison ought to be between our Church and the Church of Rome, between the acts performed in each by the ecclesiastical authorities, or by the civil authorities under the direction or the influence of the ecclesiastical, the main part of the charges brought against us are grounded on the acts of private individuals, or of mobs in a state of ferment. Much of this argument is as though a person were to assert that all Englishmen talk the wildest nonsense, and are more than half mad, and then tried to substantiate his assertion by a record of conversations and actions in Bedlam and St Luke's. When we say that the Church of Rome is a persecuting Church, we mean that she is so by the acts of her rulers, by her principles embodied in her institutions, such as the Inquisition, by the acts of civil governments under her sanction and direction. There is no fair analogy between such acts and those of the mob in last November, or a father's casting off his son for going over to Rome. This confounding of totally different acts will never help us to form a correct judgement.

Dr Newman lays great stress on the treatment which persons quitting our Church for that of Rome receive, children from their parents, servants from their masters. "Protestants (he says, p. 177) have felt it right, just, and necessary to break the holiest



of earthly ties, and to inflict the acutest temporal suffering on those who have exercised their private judgement in the choice of a religion." This is a main proof and instance of the persecuting spirit that animates us. He has unluckily omitted to give us the opposite side of the picture, to contrast our cruelty with the mild, gentle, loving treatment of those who quit the Church of Rome, the caresses of the rack, the embraces of the *auto da fè*. Nor does he say anything as to the principle by which our conduct ought to be regulated in such a case. He merely describes certain scenes of parents scolding their children somewhat roughly, and turning them out of doors, with other expressions of individual passion. If we withdraw these things, which belong to peculiarities of temper, the gravamen of the offense seems to lie in this, that parents and masters of families deem it their duty to preserve their children and households from the influence of those who are likely to exert every kind of influence in drawing them over to Rome. And is not this their duty? Dr Newman is continually complaining that we look at everything exclusively from our own point of view, and will not conceive that any other can be taken by an honest, reasonable man. Now surely he must admit that a member of our Church may be honest and reasonable, and candid and tolerant to boot, and yet may feel that there are so great evils in Romanism,—even though he confine himself to those which Dr Newman pointed out in his Lectures fifteen years ago,—that he may desire most earnestly to secure his children and servants from being led into them. Surely such a desire is no indication of a persecuting spirit. Persecution is aggressive, attacks others, and is totally distinct from self-defense and self-protection. Most painful will be the wrench which the separation from an erring son will cause to the father's heart; and yet he may feel that it is a solemn duty to endure it for the sake of his other children. This Dr Newman leaves entirely out of sight. In his pictures of Protestant parents,—which are laughable enough, and shew his eminent talent for buffoonery,—he represents them as animated

solely by wilfulness, and implies that they cannot have any real principle, any reasonable conviction, to determine their conduct. Whereas, such is the wall of separation by which Rome has cut herself off from all the rest of Christendom, that the converts themselves,—as I have known happen in several cases, and as has doubtless happened in many others,—at the very time when they inform their parents of the change, have violently snapt the holy ties of nature and natural affection.

Dr Newman complains that parents, who would have allowed their children to join any form of sectarianism, cannot bear that they should join the Church of Rome. But is not this itself a proof that their conduct does not spring from a persecuting spirit, to which all modes of deviation from their own opinion would be almost equally offensive? that there must be something in Romanism, which renders its presence, in families as well as in states, especially in times of excitement, dangerous and alarming? Nor need we go far to seek for this. Dr Newman himself points it out, when, adopting an expression of Hume's (p. 188), he speaks of its "zeal of proselytism." Dr Newman indeed hails this expression exultingly: "we do surpass in zeal every other religion, and have done so from the first. But this surely ought to be no offense, but a praise." We have been admonisht however that it is of no slight moment, what is the nature of the cause in which zeal is shewn. Nor did those predecessors of Rome, who compast sea and land to make one proselyte, and made him twofold more the child of hell, obtain a blessing, but a woe.

Now this zeal of proselytism renders a person a dangerous inmate in a family. Dr Newman represents his proselytizer as a man who "cherishes zeal, and deals the blows of reason and argument," and speaks of him as highly to be commended. Yet he who does this, who troubles the peace and calm of domestic life by perpetually dealing about such blows, will be a pestilent nuisance in a family, as Dr Newman himself would have been the first to declare ten years ago, and as he would declare now, were it not for the sake of his argument. Not that we are afraid of

“the blows of reason and argument,” at their proper time and place. With the strength of our good cause, and with God to uphold it, I know not why we should dread the Goliath of Rome, with his helmet of brass, and his logical coat of mail, and the spear of his redoubtable rhetoric: we will not fear him even though he bring all his brother giants along with him. Yet we will not expose our women and children to them, or the simple members of our flock. The spirit of a convert makes him eager to win fresh converts. During his own change he will have gained some sort of familiarity with controversial topics. Besides there are other characteristics of Romanism, which make one shrink from exposing a person to its polemics. Its unscrupulousness is too notorious: so is its laxity with regard to truth, especially in dealing with heretics, and when the soul of a brother may be saved by the infusion of some drachms of falsehood into the potion that is to heal him. How sadly too is the feeling of personal responsibility paralysed by subjection to a ghostly counsellor! how does the conscience become deadened, when a priest at any time may put his extinguisher upon it!

Our assailant then proceeds to more general indications of our feelings toward the Church of Rome. He asks, whether we would not close all their churches and chapels tomorrow, if we could. Doubtless; most thankfully, if we could do it by legitimate means, by persuasion, through the power of the Spirit. He says (p. 183): “You know what an outcry is raised, because the Roman Government does not sell or give ground to Protestants to build a Protestant Church in the centre of Rome. That Government hinders them there, because it is able; Protestants do not hinder us here, because they are not able. Can they, in the face of day, deny this?” Rather may we ask, is Dr Newman so shortsighted, so incapable of seeing anything but the mere point he fixes his eyes on, that he cannot perceive how this very contrast implies a wide difference between our Church and theirs on this matter? For why are we not able to hinder the Romanists from building Churches? except because our Nation and Church has in this adopted the principles of an

enlightened toleration ; while Rome sticks to her old rule of suppressing and stifling every mode of opinion diverging from her own. It is true, our laws and institutions, in this, as in many other respects, are wiser than the great body of the people. The selfwill, the narrow-mindedness, the bigotry, the various elements of the persecuting spirit,—which Rome took up and embodied in her Inquisition, and still embodies in so many laws and institutions,—have not been eradicated from the hearts of Protestants. There is still too much of that spirit in all of us : in many its bitterness and fierceness are such as can hardly be surpast in the Church of Rome. Nay, perhaps it may be bitterer and fiercer with us than in Romish countries ; because, where freedom is greater, it is necessarily liable to greater abuses ; and religious controversies among Romanists are mostly confined to a few, while in England nowadays one can hardly find a family untroubled by them. Nevertheless that Freedom is favorable, not only to energy and activity, but also to peace and order, we have seen exemplified in the wonderful blessings granted to England, while so many despotical states have had to pass through such a series of convulsions. In like manner, notwithstanding the occasional excesses of our mobs, the principles of toleration are far better recognised in England, by the English Church and Nation, than in any Romish country. Dr Newman's own recent works are a proof of this. Before he dares talk again of the tolerant spirit of Rome, and of the persecuting spirit of England, let him produce a book printed and freely circulated at Rome, saying half as much evil of the Church of Rome, as he says of that of England.

Yet I do not mean to deny the enormity of our offenses against charity. Dr Newman himself had to endure their violence for years, before he left us, far more than since. For our domestic enemies, whether real or supposed, are those on whom we pour out the worst vials of our wrath. In fact almost every month furnishes some fresh proof that the evil spirit of religious hatred and jealousy has not been extinguisht or tamed, but will start up at every alarm as blind and rabid as ever. In the recent

anti-papal agitation these feelings were aggravated by the notion which was entertained, not without reason, that the Papal Bull was a wanton insult to the Crown and State of England. At such a season one cannot expect that mobs will always be careful not to overstep the bounds of decorum.

Of course Dr Newman makes the utmost of the laws against the Papists in the reign of Elizabeth ; and he enforces his argument by some harrowing accounts of the cruelties committed in the execution of those laws. For those cruelties I offer no apology, except that they were wofully in accordance with the whole spirit of the age, and that those who perpetrated them were incenst by the various acts, whereby the Papacy had assailed the English Crown and Commonwealth and Church. But I know not well how to account for Dr Newman's having omitted to state that these statutes were not enacted on religious grounds, but on political. Nor can I understand how, though he must have been aware of this, he could wind up his account of these cruelties with asking (p. 209) : " What will the Protestants bring against the Holy See comparable to atrocities such as these ? Not surely, with any fairness, the burnings in Queen Mary's reign, the acts, as they were, of an English party, inflamed with revenge against their enemies, and opposed by Cardinal Pole, the Pope's Legate, as well as by the ecclesiastics of Spain." For few facts in history can be more firmly establisht than that the martyrs in Queen Mary's time were put to death on account of their religious opinions,—which is persecution,—by the Romish party in the Church of England ; whereas Elizabeth, for the first twelve years of her reign, acted in a wise spirit of toleration, desiring to include all her subjects in the National Church. It was only after the Bull of Pius V. excommunicating and anathematizing the Queen, pretending to depose her, and to absolve her subjects from their oath of allegiance, and anathematizing all who thenceforward should obey her, that the Legislature, in consequence of this lawless and wicked act, found it necessary to enact certain penal statutes for the protection of the Government. Nor did any one suffer the loss of life by these statutes for more than six

years, until the insurrection in the North, Alva's cruel persecutions in the Netherlands, and those of the Huguenots in France, with the crowning crime of the massacre of St Bartholomew's, shewed what a Protestant nation and government had to expect from the Vicar of Satan and his subjects and tools. It is not to be wondered at, however it may be deplored, that the officers of justice, at such a time, should have exhibited too much of the ferocity of human nature in dealing with persons who, by violating the laws, incurred the suspicion of being parties to like crimes in England, crimes which excited the more indignation from being perpetrated under the mask of religion.

This important distinction was pointed out in the clearest manner by Bramhall in his *Just Vindication of the Church of England* (c. 3). "I have often wondered how any rational man could make the severity of our laws, or the rigour of our princes, since the Reformation, a motive to his revolt from our Church. Surely the Inquisition was quite out of his mind. But I meddle not with foreign affairs. He might have considered that more Protestants suffered death in the short reign of Queen Mary, men, women, and children, than Roman Catholics in all the longer reigns of all our princes since the Reformation put together,—the former merely and immediately for religion, because they would not be Roman Catholics, without any the least pretext of the violation of any political law,—the latter not merely and immediately for religion, because they were Roman Catholics. For many known Roman Catholics in England have lived and died in greater plenty and power and reputation in every prince's reign since the Reformation, than an English Protestant could live among the Irish Roman Catholics since their insurrection. If a subject was taken at mass itself in England, which was very rare, it was but a pecuniary mulct; no stranger was ever questioned about his religion. I may not here omit King James affirmation, that no man in his reign, or in the reign of his predecessor, Queen Elizabeth, did suffer death for conscience sake, or religion. But they suffered for the violation of civil laws; as either for not acknowledging the political supremacy of the king in

ecclesiastical causes over ecclesiastical persons, which is all that we assert, which the Roman Catholics themselves in Henry the Eighth's days did maintain as much, or perhaps more, than we; —or else for returning into the kingdom so qualified with forbidden orders, as the laws of the land do not allow (the state of Venice doth not, the kingdom of France hath not, abhorred from the like laws); or lastly, for attempting to seduce some of the king's subjects from the religion establisht in the land. In all these cases, besides religion there is something of election: he that loves danger doth often perish in it. The truth is this: a hard knot must have a heavy mall: dangerous and bloody positions and practices produce severe laws. No kingdom is destitute of necessary remedies for its own conservation. If all were of my mind,—I could wish that all seditious opinions and over-rigorous statutes, with the memory of them, were buried together in perpetual oblivion. I hold him scarce a good Christian that would not cast on one spadefull of earth toward their interment."

In his Replication to the Bishop of Chalcedon, c. 3, § 4, Bramhall states the reasons of these laws. "First let it be observed that, after the secession of the English Church from the Court of Rome, the succeeding Popes have for the most part lookt upon England with a very ill eye. Witness that terrible and unparalleled excommunication and interdiction of England and deprivation of Henry VIII. Witness the bull of anathematization and deprivation by Pius V. against Queen Elizabeth and all her adherents, absolving all her subjects from their oaths of allegiance.—Witness the Pope's negotiations with the English, Spanish, French, and Portuguese, to have Queen Elizabeth taken away by murder, and the frame of the government altered, publisht at Rome by Hieronymo Catena, secretary to Cardinal Alexandrino in the time and with the privilege of Sixtus V. Witness the Legantine authority given to Sanders, and the hallowed banner sent with him and Allen, two Romish priests, to countenance the Earl of Desmond in his rebellion, and the phenix plume sent to Ter Owen, to encourage him likewise in

his rebellion, and a plenary indulgence for him and all his adherents and assistants, from Clement the Eighth. Lastly witness the two briefs sent by the same Pope to exclude King James from the inheritance of the crown of England, unless he would take an oath to promote the Roman Catholic interest."

Bramhall proceeds to enumerate various other grounds which constrained the Government to look upon the Romanists with extreme suspicion. The Pope had sacrilegiously commanded them to commit treason. They would not deny his right to demand their obedience. Many of them were guilty of exciting and fomenting treason and rebellion; many took part therein. Their brother Romanists on the Continent were perpetrating acts of the basest perfidy, of the most atrocious cruelty, for the extermination of the Protestants, with the approbation and applause of the Popes. In such a state of things it is not to be wondered at if the people of England felt abhorrence for those whom they had cause to regard as the agents and instruments of similar crimes, or if the Legislature deemed it their duty forcibly to suppress the system which encouraged them, and endangered the life of the Queen and the very existence of the State. During such an internecine war, the enemy's spies cannot expect much mercy. At all events these penal statutes were not religious, but political. Men were not punished for their opinions, but as the servants and tools of the deadly foe of England, who was abusing his spiritual powers to overthrow and enslave her.

Were it not for the many instances we have seen of Dr Newman's Circean talent for metamorphosing historical facts, we should feel some astonishment that, in the passage where he details the cruelties inflicted on certain Romanists in the reign of her whom he calls "bloody Elizabeth," he speaks of them solely as examples of the persecuting spirit of Protestants, without the slightest intimation of the political grounds, which indeed were the only ones, of those punishments; while on the other hand he pleads that "the burnings in Queen Mary's reign" were "the acts of an English party inflamed with revenge



against their enemies, and opposed by Cardinal Pole, the Pope's Legate, as well as by the ecclesiastics of Spain." To wit: Elizabeth is called "*bloody*," because for twelve years she earnestly tried to conciliate the Romanist portion of her subjects, and did not take any penal measures against them, until she was compelled to do so by the fierce war waged against her by the Pope. "The English party" was the whole body of the English Romanists with the Queen and the chief Bishops at their head. Cardinal Pole, one of the wisest and best men of the age, did indeed advocate a sounder policy, as he had done previously at Trent: but, as at Trent he incurred suspicions of entertaining opinions too favorable to the Protestants on the great doctrinal questions there agitated, and was forced by these suspicions to quit the Council, so in England his milder policy was condemned by the Pope, who sent another legate to supersede him. As to "the Spanish ecclesiastics," if their opposition to the Marian persecutions is to be regarded as a proof that there were some among the Spanish clergy who had discovered that the flames of an *auto da fè* are not of the same kind as the flames which descended on the day of Pentecost, the general conduct of the Spanish Church and Government during the reign of Philip the Second shews that this conviction was confined to a very few.\*

But Dr Newman's boldness increases: *vires acquirit eundo*. Not content with proving Protestantism to be the main, if not

\* Southey's statement of this question, in his *Book of the Church* (c. xv), is incontrovertible. After speaking of Pius the Fifth's Bull of excommunication and deposition, he adds: "Hitherto the conduct of Elizabeth's government toward the Romanists had been tolerant and conciliatory, in accord with her own feelings, and with those of her statesmen and prelates.—Severer statutes were now made necessary. It was made treasonable to deny that Elizabeth was the lawful sovereign, —to affirm that she was a heretic, schismatic, or infidel,—and to procure or introduce bulls or briefs from the Pope. Still the Government continued its forbearance, till it was compelled, by the duty of self-preservation, to regard its Papistical subjects with suspicion, and treat them with severity.—Against the propagandists of such doctrine as was contained in the Bull of Pius V. and inculcated in the seminaries, Elizabeth was compelled, for self-preservation, to proceed severely. They were sought for and executed, not for believing in transubstantiation, nor for performing mass, but for teaching that the Queen of

the sole, principle of persecution in England, he thinks he may as well prove it to be the same over the whole world. And verily, according to his mode of reasoning, the proof does not take much trouble. Protestantism, he says (p. 209), has "ever shewn itself a persecuting power. It has persecuted in England, in Scotland, in Ireland, in Holland, in France, in Germany, in Geneva." To be sure! did not the Dutch burn Alva and his army in the Netherlands? did not the Huguenots massacre Charles the Ninth, and Catherine de Medici, and every Roman Catholic in Paris, on the famous night of St Bartholomew? Dr Newman is over-indulgent in selecting his poor, paltry examples of insulated acts of individuals, when, without much greater cost of truth, he might have brought forward such grand ones. He merely tells us, that "Calvin burnt a Socinian, Cranmer an Anabaptist, Luther advised the wholesale murder of the fanatical peasants, and Knox was party to bloody enactments and bloody deeds." It was said of old that one swallow does not make the spring: but, according to our Neo-catholic logic, one act of persecution is enough to brand a whole Church, and that too even though this act be no act of persecution at all. I will not discuss the question as to the degree of Calvin's complicity in the execution of Servetus: at all events his act, and Cranmer's, was one which the whole spirit of the age demanded, and which the mildest men approved, and only indicates that all must more or less be under the contagion of that spirit. As to the assertion about Luther, it exhibits the same strange ignorance of what Luther was and did, which I have had to remark in Dr Newman on former occasions. Whatever judgement we may form on Luther's writings during the Peasants War, the offenses of the peasants did not lie in their opinions, in their faith; which are the objects of persecution. They were

England ought to be deposed, that it was lawful to kill her, and that all Popish subjects who obeyed her commands were cut off from the communion of their Church for so doing." The same questions are discust with great clearness and impartiality by Bishop Short in his *History of the Church of England*, §§. 437—445.

committing the most outrageous crimes, burning, pillaging, murdering : they had risen in open insurrection against the laws and the government, and thus rightfully incurred civil punishment. But Dr Newman has been picking up one of those innumerable fabulous traditions, which are the main stay of the Romish hatred of Protestants.

Were it not for this blinding prejudice, he might have remembered that there were other acts in Germany, in Flanders, in France, which to vulgar eyes look more like persecution, and bear more of the character of proceeding from a nation or a Church. In Germany, it is calculated that thirty thousand Protestants were put to death before the year 1560. In the Netherlands, the Duke of Alva boasted that in six years he had put eighteen thousand persons to death by the hands of the executioner : Grotius, in his time, estimates the number of victims at a hundred thousand. In France, the Church recruited her strength by the massacre of fifty thousand Huguenots; for which massacre Pope Gregory the Thirteenth went in procession to St Mark's to return thanks to Almighty God.\* These

\* Strype, in his *Life of Parker* (Append. lxviii), gives the French version of the Pope's Bull, enjoining a jubilee "pour l'heureux succès du Roi Treschrestien contre les hérétiques," as well as for the preservation of Flanders, and the victory over the Turks. "Notre Saint Père le Pape Gregoire treziesme,—prenant peine, par la grace de Dieu, de veiller sur le troupeau des ouailles de Jesu Christ,—ayant esté bien adverty que nostre Seigneur Dieu, qui maine le cœur des roys et des princes comme bon luy semble, a magnifié sa grande miséricorde envers son Eglise par ce qu'il a excité son très cher fils en Jesu Christ Charles neufiesme Treschrestien Roy de France à venger les injures et outrages faitz à Dieu et à son Eglise Catholique par les hérétiques appelléz Huguenoz, et à punir les chefs principaux des rebelles, qui ces années passées, d'une raige sanglante et implacable, par meurdres, voleries, sacrilèges, et ravaiges, ont troublé, pillé, et degasté ce très florissant royaume de France.—Pour cette occasion lui accompaigné du college de tous Messieurs les Cardinaux en l'Eglise de S. Marc à Rome de la plus grande dévotion qui luy a esté possible a rendu action de graces à Dieu le Créateur pour ceste grande miséricorde envers son Eglise, le priant de donner grace et vertu audict Roy Treschrestien de poursuivre une tant salutaire et heureuse entreprise, et repurger son royaume jadis tant religieux et catholicque entre toutes nations, de toutes heuresies, et y remectre et restituer la religion Catholique en son integrité et splendeur encienne,"—wherefore he appoints a jubilee, that all Christians may give thanks to God for the happy success of the

wholesale massacres however,—and a score of similar ones might be enumerated,—are among the proofs, I suppose, that, as Dr Newman says (p. 212), “for one deed of severity with which the Church [of Rome] can be charged, there have been a hundred of her acts repressive of the persecutor, and protective of his victims;” and that “she has been a never-failing fount of humanity, equity, forbearance, and compassion.” To kill one man makes a murderer; to kill a million, they say, makes a hero. This is the scale on which we are henceforward to determine the difference between an ever-persecuting Church, and one that is a never-failing fount of humanity, equity, forbearance, and compassion. Alas for those who have to drink of that fount! It

most Christian King against the said heretics and rebels, and may pray to God to grant the King virtue and the means entirely to perfect the work which through God’s grace he has so happily commenced.

To bring out the full contrast between this “never-failing fount of humanity, equity, forbearance, and compassion,” and the “ever-persecuting Protestants,” I will add an extract from the prayers which were appointed to be offered up by our Church on hearing of the massacre of the Huguenots. “O Lord our God, and Heavenly Father, look down, we beseech Thee, with Thy Fatherly and Merciful Countenance, upon us, Thy people and poor humble servants, and upon all such Christians as are anywhere persecuted and sore afflicted for the true acknowledging of Thee to be our God, and Thy Son Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent, to be the Only Saviour of the world. Save them, O merciful Lord, who are as sheep appointed to the slaughter, and by hearty prayers do call and cry to Thee for Thy help and defense: hear their cry, O Lord, and our prayers for them and for ourselves. Deliver those that be oppressed; defend those that be in fear of cruelty; relieve them that be in misery; and comfort all that be in sorrow and heaviness; that by thy aid and strength they and we may obtain surety from our enemies, without shedding of Christian and innocent blood. And for that, O Lord, Thou hast commanded us to pray for our enemies, we do beseech Thee not only to abate their pride, and to stay the cruelty and fury of such as either of malice or ignorance do persecute them that put their trust in Thee and hate us, but also to mollify their hard hearts, to open their blind eyes, and to enlighten their ignorant minds, that they may see and understand, and truly turn to Thee, and embrace that holy word, and unfeignedly be converted to Thy Son Jesus Christ, the Only Saviour of the world, and believe and love His Gospel, and so eternally be saved.” (Strype’s Parker, iv. c. 11).

We may stake the whole question on the contrast between the Papal Bull, which calls on all people to pray for the destruction of their supposed enemies, and the Protestant prayer for their conversion and salvation. It will not be difficult to perceive which has most of the Spirit of Christ.

would have been happy for them had they never been born. The truth is, that, in this as in other respects, whatever good the Church of Rome has effected, has been effected by the spirit of Christianity, by the Spirit of God working in the Church, which the system of Popery has not wholly quencht and extinguisht, deplorably as it has hindered that Spirit, and perverted its operations.

I am not purposing to assert that Protestants generally, or that our own Church, are exempt from the guilt of religious persecution. The spirit, from which even the familiar intercourse with the Saviour could not deliver the sons of Zebedee, cannot be expelled from the heart of man by the clearest intellectual conviction of the evils of persecution. The English Church has persecuted, alas! lamentably, unjustifiably, inexcusably: but this spirit has been evinced more in her conduct to the various Nonconformist sects, than to the Romanists: nor has Nonconformity availed to suppress it. Even now hardly a month passes without some fresh eruption, or at least ebullition of it. But when Dr Newman charges us with the inconsistency that, while we boast of our toleration, we indulge in all modes of persecution, there seems to be some confusion in his view. The chief advocates and wisest upholders of religious liberty amongst us, from the author of *the Liberty of Propheying* downward, are in the main a distinct body from those who pamper their own pride and selfwill by persecuting their brethren on account of their religious opinions. The reverence for the liberty of the conscience is of slow growth in any heart, of still slower in a nation; though doubtless, as it gains in public estimation, many will profess it, who are totally devoid of it.

Dr Newman however has had the good luck to discover that there is one spot upon earth where a reverence for the liberty of conscience is a native growth, one heart in which it has always been inherent: and it is the very last place, the very last heart, in which one should have lookt for it,—at Rome, in the Pope. To the Pope has the glorious privilege been granted of transmitting the sacred principle of toleration from age to age. Nor has he

ever hid his light under a bushel : that which was whispered into his ear, he has proclaimed from the housetops. Such is the new fashion of ecclesiastical history, which the fathers of the Oratory are to teach us. The Popes are the highpriests of religious liberty ; and Satan is the angel of light. “Doubtless (Dr Newman admits, p. 203), in the long course of eighteen hundred years, there are events which need explanation, or which the world might wish otherwise : but the general tenour and tendency of the traditions of the Papacy have been mercy and humanity. It has ever been less fierce than the nations, and in advance of the age : it has ever moderated, not only the ferocity of barbarians, but the fanaticism of Catholic populations.”

Thus, for instance, was Cardinal Campeggio “repressive of the persecutor and protective of his victims,” when, being sent by Clement VII to the Diet of Augsburg, he represented to the Emperor, that “if there be some persons, which God forbid, who obstinately persevere in this diabolical way, your Majesty may make use of fire and the sword to extirpate this venomous plant by the root.” Thus did the Papacy “moderate, not only the ferocity of barbarians, but the fanaticism of Catholic populations,” when Pius the Fifth, on sending a body of troops to assist the French Catholics against the Huguenots, gave their commander, Count Santafiore, a special charge “not to take any Huguenot prisoner, but to kill every one immediately who fell into his hands.” In a like spirit, it must of course have been to reward Alva for his exceeding lenity in the Netherlands, that Pius sent him a consecrated hat and sword.\* And was it

\* Mr Mendham, in his *Life of Pius the Fifth* (pp. 65—69), gives some extracts from his Letters to Charles IX. to Catherine de Medici, and to the Duke of Anjou, written in the first years of the wars against the Huguenots. They shew how exemplarily he followed out “the general tenour and tendency of the traditions of the Papacy toward mercy and humanity,” with what gentle wisdom he “moderated the fanaticism of Catholic populations.” To the King, on occasion of the battle of Jarnac, he writes : “Quanto benignius tecum nobiscumque egit Deus, tanto diligentius hujus occasione victoriae enitendum est tibi, ut eorum qui restant hostium reliquias persequaris atque conficias, omnes tanti tamque corroborati mali radices, atque etiam radicum fibras, funditus evellas.—Hoc autem facies, si

not to inculcate loyalty, and a reverence for the sanctity of oaths, that he absolved the subjects of Queen Elizabeth from their allegiance, and commanded them not to obey her under pain of his anathema? So true too is it that "the general tenour and tendency of the traditions of the Papacy have been mercy and humanity," that Gregory XIII seized the torch of love which Pius V had clenched in his dying hand, and endeavoured for years to instigate France and Spain to invade England, and afford an occasion for the English Romanists to display their loyalty. Nor did the genius of Sixtus V discover any better mode of manifesting his mercy and humanity, than that which God confounded by the destruction of the Armada.

*nullarum personarum rerumque humanarum respectus te in eam mentem adducere poterit, ut Dei hostibus parcas, qui Deo neque tibi unquam pepercerunt. Non enim aliter Deum placare poteris quam si Dei injurias sceleratissimorum hominum debita poena severissime ulciscaris.*" He then reminds Charles how Saul forfeited his kingdom by sparing Agag.—Again, in another letter soon after, he repeats the same benign exhortations. "Si—ea de quibus Deus offenditur insectari atque ulcisci distuleris, certe ad irascendum ejus patientiam provocabis; qui quo tecum egit benignius, eo debes acrius illius injurias vindicare. Qua in re, nullius preces admittere, nihil cujusquam sanguini et propinquitati concedere, sed omnibus qui pro scelestissimis hominibus rogare audent, inexorabilem te praeber oportet." To the Queen Mother he writes: "Nullo modo, nullisque de causis hostibus Dei parcendum est: sed severe cum illis agendum, qui neque Deo neque filiis tuis unquam pepercerunt. Neque enim aliter Deus placari potest, nisi ipsius injurias justa ultione vindicaveris.—Qua de re eo studiosius—cum majestate tua agendum esse existimavimus, quod dari operam istic ab aliquibus audimus, ut ex eorum haereticorum qui capti sunt numero quidam liberentur, inultique abeant: quod ne fiat, atque homines sceleratissimi justis afficiantur suppliciis, curare te omni studio atque industria oportet." The Duke of Anjou he admonishes in the same strain. "Nihil in ea re indulgentia peccetur.—Nam si, in tot tantisque Dei omnipotentis offensis inultis omittendis, aliquid aut indulgendo, aut conivendo vel negligendo peccaretur, periculum esset ne, quemadmodum adversus Saulem, pro simili Amalecitarum justa animadversione ab eo omissa, sic adversus Christianissimum Regem, fratrem tuum, teque ipsum etiam, eo gravius ira Dei exardesceret, quo benignius atque clementius ad hanc usque diem cum utrisque vestrum divina sua bonitas egisset." When the Highpriest of Moloch, installed in the Vatican, kept on pouring such bloodthirsty blasphemies into the ears of his credulous worshipers, it is not to be wondered at that the fruit of these exhortations sprang up ere long in the general massacre of the Huguenots: and surely a large share in the guilt of that massacre falls on the pontiff who thus inflamed the perpetrators of it, or at least on the atrocious system which produced and fashioned him.

I must add a few words with regard to what Dr Newman says about the Inquisition (p. 201), "in proof of the utterly false view which Protestants take of it, and of the Holy See in connexion with it." He quotes Balmez, as asserting "that the Roman Inquisition has never been known to pronounce the execution of capital punishment, although the Apostolic See has been occupied, during that time, by Popes of extreme rigour and severity in all that relates to the civil administration." He then tells us that the "Spanish Inquisition, which really was bloody, is confest by great Protestant authorities, such as Ranke and Guizot, to have been a political, not an ecclesiastical institution. The Protestant Ranke distinctly maintains that it was even set up *against* the Pope and the Church." Now I have not seen the work of Balmez, and so can only judge of him by Dr Newman's extracts; from which he would appear to have just such a respect for historical truth as one may look for in a champion of the Papacy. The extract does not make it clear what is the period during which he asserts that the Roman Inquisition has never been known to pronounce the execution of capital punishment: but Dr Newman himself observes, that he is "rather surprised that this is stated so unrestrictedly," adding however, that "the fact is substantially as stated, even though there were some exceptions to the rule."

Dr Newman's quotation from "the Protestant Ranke" seems to have been taken from *the Dublin Review*. He does not give a reference to the passage; nor have I lighted upon it: but as the Protestant Ranke truly deserves that honorable name from his unswerving, indefatigable love of truth, I will give some of his statements concerning the Roman Inquisition, to shew the accuracy of that cited from the Romanist Balmez. He speaks on the subject in one of the latter sections of his Second Book.

Soon after the Conference at Ratisbon, Clement VII one day askt Cardinal Caraffa (who was afterward Pope Paul IV), what was to be done, to check the increase of heresy. Caraffa answered that an energetic Inquisition was the only method. Cardinal



Burgos concurred with him. The old Dominican Inquisition had long before fallen into decay. The monks had been allowed to choose the inquisitors; and it happened at times that they held the opinions which were to be suppressed. In Spain the original form was abandoned by the appointment of a supreme tribunal for that country. Caraffa and Burgos, both of them old Dominicans, gloomy zealots for pure Catholicism, severe in their own lives, inflexible in their opinions, advised the Pope to erect a supreme tribunal of the Inquisition at Rome, on which all others were to depend, after the model of the Spanish. The Bull was issued in 1542. It appointed six Cardinals to be general Inquisitors in matters of faith within and beyond the Alps. Everybody was to be subject to them. They were to imprison the suspected, to punish the guilty with loss of life and property. Caraffa lost no time in carrying this into effect. He took a house, out of his own means, fitted up the chambers and the prisons with bolts and locks, with blocks, chains, and bonds, and all that terrible furniture. Then he appointed general commissioners for different countries. The first at Rome was Teofilo di Tropea, of whose severity even cardinals, for instance Pole, had to complain.

Caraffa laid down the following rules: first, "that in matters of faith one must not delay a moment, but proceed immediately on the slightest suspicion of the heretical plague, and use all force and violence to extirpate it:—next, to pay no regard to any prince or prelate, however high he might stand:—thirdly, to proceed with more severity against those who tried to shelter themselves under the protection of any sovereign, and that none should be treated with mildness and fatherly mercy, except such as confess their error:—fourthly, that they must not disgrace themselves by any toleration toward heretics, especially Calvinists." Such are the rules laid down by that Church which is "a never-failing fount of humanity, equity, forbearance, and compassion." The Protestant Ranke's remarks do not exactly coincide with this. "Everything here (he says) is severity, uncompromising, absolute severity, until a confession has been

obtained. Terrible was this, especially at a moment when opinions were not yet fully developed, when many were seeking to reconcile the deeper doctrines of Christianity with the institutions of the existing Church. The weak gave way and submitted: the stronger-minded were driven into embracing the opposite opinions, and tried to withdraw from the reach of the Papal power."

Ochino left Italy. So did Pietro Martyre, Celio Secundo Curione, Filippo Valentino, and Castelvetri. For persecution and terror spread throughout Italy. *It is scarcely possible*, said Antonio dei Pagliarici, *to be a Christian, and to die in one's bed.* The Academies at Modena and Naples were dissolved. The whole of literature was subjected to the severest inspection. In 1543 Caraffa ordered that no book, ancient or modern, on whatever subject, should be published without the permit of the Inquisition. By degrees they came to the *Indices Librorum Prohibitorum*, of which the earliest in the present form appeared at Rome in 1559. This rule was enforced with incredible strictness. "Thus the stirrings of diverging religious opinions in Italy were forcibly stifled and destroyed. Almost the whole order of Franciscans was compelled to retract. The chief part of the followers of Valdez consented to recant. At Venice a degree of liberty was allowed to strangers, to Germans, who were living there for the sake of trade or of study: the natives on the contrary were compelled to abjure their opinions; their associations were destroyed. Many fled: in all the towns of Germany and Switzerland we meet with these fugitives. Those who would not yield, and could not escape, were punished. At Venice they were sent in two boats out of the lagunes into the sea. A plank was laid between the boats; they who had been condemned were placed on it: at the same moment the boats rowed away from each other: the plank fell into the sea: once more the unfortunates called on the name of Christ, and sank. At Rome the *autos da fé* were celebrated before San Maria alla Minerva in due form. Many persons fled from place to place with their wives and children. We can follow them for a while; then they disappear:

probably they fell into the nets of their merciless pursuers" (Book, ii. pp. 205-213). Such was the conduct of that Church which "has been a never-failing fount of humanity, equity, forbearance, and compassion." O how long shall these impostures circulate amongst us? Is the Father of lies about to regain his empire over the world? These men had committed no crime against the laws: they were arraigned for no moral guilt: they were merely charged with holding opinions at variance with those enjoined by the rulers of the Church: and this was their treatment. Never was there a more complete illustration of the truth, that *the tender mercies of the wicked are cruel.*

We may make out from this statement how it came to pass that the executions for heresy at Rome have not been numerous. It is true, the Papal Government has not been bloody during the last two centuries. Indeed it has become a prominent feature of the later Italian character, to abhor shedding blood, at least one's own blood, or running the risk of shedding it, whether in political conflicts, or in moral and religious: although that this is no sign of any improvement in humanity, is proved by the frequency of assassinations. Moreover the policy of the Conclave, and that of the foreign Governments that have exercised influence in it, has generally tended to the election of a mild Pope, and has shrunk from men of energy and vehemence. Nor has there been provocation to violent measures. A people that recoils from hazarding its life in battle, will not be over-ready to hazard it at the stake. Nay, why should it? how could it have such a spirit, when Truth was not a Divine reality, to be recognised by the Reason, and enshrined in the Conscience, but was fabricated by the word of a mere man. Thus Galileo's recantation became a national act. What mattered it what one said? when one might shrug up one's shoulders, and mutter aside, *E pur si muove.* But when the main stem of a man's mind has been cut off, it will not grow again. Hence the moral and spiritual life of the nation was stunted and dwarfed from the cradle upward; and when this is so, the intellectual life must partake in the

degradation. Above all has this been the case at Rome, as was set before us two years ago in the deeply interesting essay on Leopardi in *the Quarterly Review*, ascribed with evident justice to the accomplished translator of Farini. Hereby pettiness has become the characteristic of the countrymen of Michael Angelo and Dante. This is one of the precious boons conferred on Italy by the Papacy. Freedom of thought has been crushed, though with no diminution of licentiousness. False as the assertion is, that "the Popes, armed with a tribunal of intolerance, have not spilt a drop of blood," whatever semblance of truth there is in it, arises from their having drained all the blood from the hearts and souls of the Roman people, whose authors now write little beyond dissertations, sometimes ingenious ones, on petty archeological questions, — even on such matters scarcely venturing beyond details, — or folio volumes on the history of some church. Whatever might bring an author into the clutches of the Inquisition is carefully eschewed. How the effects of this jealousy cramp every branch of knowledge, appears from what the editor of Leopardi says, "that in Italy it would be almost hopeless to find a printer for a Greek book, and quite impossible to find five readers for it."

That the assertion of Balmez is untrue, unless it be limited very narrowly, would be proved by the history of Giordano Bruno, who, if his mighty intellect had not been driven awry by growing up under the blighting shadow of Popery, might have been one of the greatest of philosophers, and who was burnt at Rome in the year 1600, when his murder was celebrated with frantic yells of exultation by the genuine Papist Scioppius. But I will add a few more facts taken out of Ranke. When Caraffa became Pope Paul the Fourth, he was naturally zealous in supporting the Inquisition. He insisted on its being conducted with the utmost severity. He subjected new offenses to it: he gave it the cruel right of using the torture for the sake of discovering complices: cardinals, such as Morone and Foscarari, who had previously been employed in examining the contents of important books, he threw into prison, because he had

conceived doubts of their orthodoxy. He imprisoned, excommunicated, and held *autos da fè*. The people were so incensed by his severity, that, on his death, they pillaged the buildings of the Inquisition, and then set fire to them.

Pius the Fifth, who had himself been a zealous inquisitor, was not content with making the Inquisition punish recent offenses: he ordered that they should enquire into those committed ten or twenty years before. Carnesecchi was given up to him by the Duke of Florence, thrown into the dungeon of the Inquisition, and died at the stake. Guido Zanetti was given up to him by the Venetians. Carranza, Archbishop of Toledo, the first ecclesiastic in Spain, who had been a member of the Council of Trent, and who was Pole's chief assistant in establishing Catholicism in England under Queen Mary, could not escape the Inquisition. "I have never had any other view," he said, "than to fight against heresy. God has helped me in this matter. I myself have converted many heretics. I have had the bodies of some dug up and burnt. Catholics and Protestants have called me the chief defender of the faith." But this thoroughly Catholic declaration did not avail him against the Inquisition. Sixteen articles were found in his works, in which he seemed to approach to the opinions of the Protestants, especially in regard to justification. After he had been imprisoned a long time in Spain, he was brought to Rome and condemned.\*

It is true, the Roman Inquisition never attained to the unutterable atrocities of the Spanish. Dr Newman, following Balmez and other Roman apologists, pleads that the guilt of the latter falls solely on the civil Government, and not on the Popes, who at times tried to check its violence. Yet assuredly the acts of the Spanish Inquisition were those of the Spanish Church: and though a Pope of a milder disposition may now and then have

\* A fuller account of the crimes of the Inquisition at Rome and throughout Italy may be found in M'Crie's *History of the Progress and Suppression of the Reformation in Italy*, especially in the fifth Chapter; where we see that, if the Inquisition shed little blood at Rome in later years, it was because the spirit of the Reformation had been extinguished by the destruction or expulsion of all who held opinions favorable to it.

been shocked by its enormous cruelties, the Papal system, the system of the Romish Church, at all events, is justly answerable for them. This argument is well put by Southey in his Letters to Butler ; and as Southey's veracity and accuracy are equal to his immense learning, which on matters concerning the Spanish Peninsula is almost unrivaled, I will quote a few sentences from that work on the subject.

“ There is proof (he says, p. 418) that the Popes themselves, with few exceptions, thought this mode of dealing with the Jews unnecessary ; for they did not pursue the same course in their own dominions. There is evidence even that one of them thought it impolitic, at least, if not inhuman. But they never interposed to prevent it. We know from the most moderate calculations, founded upon authentic papers and sure data, that in Spain alone, from the year 1481 to 1808, more than 30,000 persons had been burnt by this tribunal, more than 17,000 burnt in effigy, more than 290,000 condemned to punishments short of death, but which involved utter ruin, and entailed perpetual infamy upon their families.—The Inquisition in Portugal was equally alert in the same Catholic pursuit. In the latter kingdom there were kings who would gladly have put a stop to these horrors, one especially, Joam IV. But the Clergy and the friars were too powerful. There was a Jesuit living at that same time, who possessed and deserved the friendship of that king, a man whose single virtues might almost redeem his order, whose single genius might alone ennoble his country, if it had no other boast : it is of Vieyra that I am speaking ; and for exerting himself in behalf of the New Christians, he was brought under the power of the Inquisition himself. Some fantastic notions connected with Sebastianism afforded a pretext ; but this was the cause.—The Popes might at any time have stopt this wickedness. At any time they might have put an end to the enormous evil, the unutterable cruelties, the incalculable sum of human sufferings, sufferings whereof the rack and the stake are the least part, which the Holy Office was producing. If any misunderstanding or dispute arose concerning the asserted privileges of the Papacy, the Popes were ready to

exert their power without delay. But when humanity was thus outraged, when religion was thus blasphemed and injured, when Christianity was thus perverted and made an object of hatred and horror, they were silent: not a whisper of disapprobation was heard from the Vatican, which was wont to express its displeasure in thunder; not a breath came from the brazen Bulls, which had breathed fire against the Waldenses, the Lollards, and the Protestants. The Popes acquiesced in these things; they suffered them to be done, to be approved, to be applauded, as the triumphs of the Holy Roman Catholic and Apostolic faith; they allowed the pictures of the victims in their *san benitos*, which had been displayed as part of the pageantry while those victims were in the flames, to be suspended as ornaments and trophies in the Churches. Year after year, and generation after generation, the Inquisition immured its victims in solitary dungeons, stretcht them on the rack, consumed them at the stake for a holiday spectacle,—for horrible as it may seem, an *auto-da-fé* was considered as a festival,—and scattered their ashes upon the winds and waters.—The Popes could have prevented these things; but they permitted them: a large portion of the guilt therefore is upon their heads; and the infamy is upon that Church, that Roman Catholic Church, whose principles made persecution a duty,—that Roman Catholic Church, which, till this hour, has neither retracted the principle, nor exprest its contrition for the practice.”\*

After reading such accounts as these, the correctness of which is indisputable, if we turn to De Maistre's *Letters on the Inquisition*, we can hardly help thinking that he must be mocking us, when he professes (p. 67), “pour nous faire connoître les procédés de l'Inquisition,” to cite a couple of stories from Townsend's *Travels in Spain*, as instances of these proceedings. One of them is of a

\* This was published in 1826. Southey had already written an exceedingly interesting account of the Spanish and Portuguese Inquisition fifteen years before in the twelfth number of *the Quarterly Review*.—It is to be hoped that we may soon have a collection, or at least a copious selection, of Southey's contributions to our Periodical Literature. It would contain a most valuable mass of solid, well-digested information, in a style which gives grace to whatever it touches, and in a spirit which delights in bringing out every form of human virtue.

beggar, who for administering philtres was condemned to be led through the streets of Madrid on an ass, and to be flogged, the latter part of which punishment was remitted.—This is gravely represented as a sample of the proceedings of the Inquisition. Can De Maistre then have been the one man of education in Europe ignorant of the truth in this matter? or did he too surrender his conscience to the maxim that any amount of misrepresentation is justifiable to serve the interests of the Church?

Nor is the rest of these Letters of greater value. He does not scruple to say (p. 6): “L’Inquisition est, de sa nature, bonne, douce, et conservatrice: c’est le caractère universel et ineffaçable de toute institution ecclésiastique. Vous le voyez à Rome; et vous le verrez partout où l’Eglise commandera. Mais si la puissance civile, adoptant cette institution, juge à propos, pour sa propre sûreté, de la rendre plus sévère, l’Eglise n’en répond plus.” Does our apologist really mean that a tribunal may pronounce a sentence, which in 30,000 cases is followed by the punishment of death, and yet may plead that it has not pronounced the sentence of death? that it has only given over the culprit to the secular arm? Surely the hypocrisy of such a pretense would render the act still more hateful. What could be baser, more disgraceful to the Church, than such a subserviency to the cruelty of the secular government? This however is one of the pervading evils of Popery, that it renders persons ready to shift their own individual responsibility on their neighbours, so that they care not what they spend, if others are to be the paymasters.

No less contrary to all sound principle is De Maistre’s declaration (p. 48), that it does not matter what a law is, provided it be executed without respect of persons,—that a sovereign has a right to impose any punishment he pleases, while nobody is entitled to ask him why he does so,—and that, if death be inflicted on any one for opposing the religion of a country, “*personne ne doit plaindre le coupable qui aura mérité ces peines; et lui-même n’a pas droit de se plaindre: car il y avoit pour lui un moyen bien simple de les éviter, celui de se taire.*” Such maxims would justify the most atrocious tyranny, the extreme



of persecution. We know a man who felt that it was *woe to him if he did not preach the Gospel*. Many others have had a like feeling. They cannot avail themselves of De Maistre's shift to escape death, "*celui de se taire :*" nor would he himself have done so : nor did he, when he felt that necessity in a time of danger. They must speak,—as he himself did. If in speaking they commit a civil wrong, they may of course be punished. But a positive law is not necessarily just : it is contrary to the principles of justice, if it renders that which is meritorious, or merely innocent in itself, illegal by a positive enactment. The principles here advocated by De Maistre would have extinguished Christianity in its cradle. Herod would have given thanks for them. There seems also to be a confusion in what he says about the irresponsibility of the supreme power. Its subjects cannot call it to account, except by a revolutionary earthquake. Nor is there any tribunal at present, by which Christendom can take cognisance of crimes committed by sovereigns against the primary laws of social morality. But surely the moral reason of mankind, and history are justified in condemning them ; and there is no wisdom in desiring to suppress or check these judicial voices.

The most extraordinary argument however in apology for the Inquisition is that express in these words (p. 89) : "*Voyez la guerre de trente ans allumée par les argumens de Luther, les excès inouis des Anabaptistes et des paysans, les guerres civiles de France, d'Angleterre, et de Flandres,—le massacre de la St Barthélemy, le massacre de Mérindal, le massacre des Cévennes, l'assassinat de Marie Stuart, de Henri III, de Henri IV, de Charles I, du prince d'Orange, etc. etc. Un vaisseau flotteroit sur le sang que vos novateurs ont fait répandre : l'Inquisition n'auroit versé que le leur.*" One is puzzled to make out whether this passage savours most of insanity or of imbecillity. Cain might as reasonably have protested that Abel, by offering up a more acceptable sacrifice than his, was the guilty cause of his own murder. The Reformers caused the Thirty Years war ! the massacre of the Cévennes ! the murder of Henry IV ! Even so He who came to reconcile man to God, declared of Himself that He

*came not to bring peace, but a sword.* The world will not hear truth, closes its ears and heart against truth, takes up fire and sword against it. So it did in the first ages of Christianity: so it did at the Reformation: and then, as the Prince of this world is also the father of lies, he exclaims that the preachers of truth are the disturbers of the peace of the world, the cause of all the bloodshed, of all the cruelty, of all the crimes, which the world has wrought to stifle and cast out the truth. Yet may we not ask, what would have been the state of Europe, if there had been no Reformation, or if the Papacy had been able to suppress it? Would there have been no wars then? Were there no wars anterior to the Reformation,—no crimes, no ambition, no lust, no cruelty? Surely too, when we compare the mass of the crimes committed, of the slaughter perpetrated, by the opponents and the supporters of the Reformation, justice requires us to make the latter party answerable only for their own share, for what they themselves did: and how small a portion does this embrace of the atrocities enumerated by De Maistre! Hence we are fully warranted in saying that the main part of these crimes arose, not from the Reformation, but from the obstinacy, the wilfulness, the recklessness of Popery in repudiating and trying to hinder the Reformation, by fair means and by foul. The contrary notion is one of the forms of that monstrous proposition, that the virtues of the good are the cause of the sins of the wicked; which is the intermediate step to that terrible summit of blasphemy, that God is the Author of evil.

Yet Dr Newman does not shrink from a proposition which is very nearly akin to this absurdity of De Maistre's. Not content with quoting the passage where Balmez says, "The Popes, armed with a tribunal of intolerance, have not spilt a drop of blood; Protestants and philosophers have shed torrents" (p. 201), he winds up his Lecture (p. 213) by repeating and appropriating the same words with a slight correction: "It is true, that the Popes have not preached, like the Protestants, universal toleration; but the facts shew the difference between the Protestants and the Popes. The Popes, armed with a tribunal of intolerance, have *scarce*

spilt a drop of blood ; Protestants and philosophers have shed it in torrents." This closing claptrap contains a double falsehood. The attempt to whitewash the Popes is as futile as that to whitewash an Ethiop. On the other hand the combination of Protestants and Philosophers in this same category is evidently meant to insinuate that there is a connexion between them of such a kind as to make Protestantism answerable for the torrents of bloodshed here imputed to Philosophy. Such an insinuation in the mouth of a Spaniard, whose acquaintance with modern literature may perhaps be limited by the national boundary, with the exception of that refuse of French literature, which, we learn from Blanco White and others, has made its way through the *cordon sanitaire* of the Inquisition, may in some degree be excusable. But in an Englishman, familiar with all that Oxford could teach in history and philosophy during the first half of the nineteenth century, this assertion implies that the author is determined to say whatever he chooses, in despite of facts and of reason. He, at all events, must know that the blood said to have been shed by Philosophy, was not shed in Protestant lands, but in lands from which Protestantism had been expelled by a series of massacres and other acts of cruel oppression, in generation after generation. The torrents of blood shed under the garb of Religion were not shed by Protestants, but by Papists, with the approbation, with the command, with the blasphemous blessing of the Popes. Whatever sins Philosophy may have been guilty of in Protestant countries, bloodshed is not one of them. But even Philosophy, when nurtured in the lair of the tiger, among those who deemed it lawful and holy to shed the blood of heretics, and to enforce truth by fire and the sword, caught the taint, and learnt to adopt the same course. Here too let me again ask what would have been the condition of Europe, if the Reformation had not burst the leprous crust which Popery had cast over it, had not roused it out of the slough in which it was sinking ? It would have gone on weltering in all manner of evil, rottenness and corruption within, hypocrisy and gaudy ceremonies without, until it had become as Sodom and like to Gomorrah.

Therefore, even if torrents of blood were the necessary price of the Reformation, even at that price it would not have been dearly purchast. Our bodily life is not to be secured at the cost of our moral and spiritual life, but to be given for it readily and cheerfully, if needful ; as is declared in the noble saying, that the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church.

With regard however to the main question discust in this Note, the comparison between Popery and Protestantism on the score of persecution, I know no arguments, among those brought forward by the modern champions of Rome, that should prevent our repeating what Southey exprest so grandly (p. 423), when Butler "adjured him as a Christian and a gentleman to say on which side the balance of religious persecution lies, the Roman Catholic or the Protestant: *Put the Inquisition in the scale; and nothing can be found to counterpoise it, unless Hell be pluckt up by the roots.*"

NOTE SA : p. 37. l. 25.

I cannot enter into any general discussion about the Jesuits : but there is a passage in the fifth of Dr Newman's Lectures at Birmingham, on which I wish to make a couple of remarks. In speaking about the Protestant inconsistencies, he says (p. 173): "When James II went out, and William came in, there were persons who refused to swear fidelity to William, because they had already sworn fidelity to James: and who was to dispense them from their oath? Yet these scrupulous men were the few: the many virtually decided that the oath had been conditional, depending on their old king's good behaviour, though there was nothing to shew it in the words in which it ran,—and that accordingly they had no need to keep it any longer than they liked. And so, in a similar way, should a Catholic priest, who has embraced the Protestant persuasion, come over to this country and marry a wife, who among his new co-religionists would dream of being shockt at it? Every one would think it

both natural and becoming, and reasonable too, as a protest against Romish superstition: yet the man has taken a vow; and the man has broken it. O but he had no business to make such a vow! he did it in ignorance; it was antichristian; it was unlawful. There are then, it seems, after all, such things as unlawful oaths; and unlawful oaths are not to be kept; and there are cases which require a dispensation: yet let a Catholic say this, and he says nothing more,—rather he says much less than the Protestant; for he strictly defines the limits of what is lawful and what is unlawful; he takes a scientific view of the matter, and forbids the man to be judge in his own case:—let a Catholic, I say, *assert* what the Protestant *practises*; he has furnisht matter for half a dozen platform speeches, and a whole set of Reformation tracts.”

This remark seems designed to point to the grounds of an apology for the Jesuit casuistry. But,—not to speak of the misrepresentation involved in the words that “they had no need to keep it any longer than they liked,”—the oath of allegiance taken by a subject implies a reciprocal obligation on the part of the sovereign, that he will observe his Coronation oath, and govern according to the laws and constitution of the realm. Thus in the marriage vow no express exception is made; yet adultery on either side is rightly held to absolve the other party from the vow. In this case, it being one of frequent occurrence, rules may be laid down to regulate the proceedings; and a court of law may pronounce accordingly. But in the contract between the sovereign and his subjects there is no arbiter. This is one of the cases in which the reason and conscience of the nation must pronounce for themselves, in which the *vox populi* must in a manner claim the authority of the *vox Dei*, even though it may in fact be more like a *vox diaboli*. In the middle ages the Pope assumed the right of acting as arbitrator in such cases: but then the old question recurred, *Quis custodiet ipsos Custodes?* The arbiter, it was found, himself needed a higher contrroll, could not resist the temptations held out by such a paramount, irresponsible power, and was a still less apt expounder of the voice

of God than the *vox populi*. Hence, however unsafe it may be for men to be judges in their own affairs, it is at all events far better than to have one universal judge seated a thousand miles off, and unable to take cognisance of the merits of the case. What acts shall constitute a breach of the sovereign's fealty and allegiance, it is difficult to determine generally. We have seen several glaring instances of such acts in the last few years, as might rightfully be deemed to have absolved the subjects from their allegiance and fealty: but what the issue may be, God alone can determine: and we may be sure that He will determine far more wisely and more righteously than the Pope; whom we have seen prodigal of his approbation of treason, when enacted by the possessor of authority.

Now the Jesuit casuistry, it is well known, has undertaken to lay down rules for all similar exceptional cases, the essential peculiarity of which is, that they do not recognise any rule, that they spring from some overpowering necessity, that they are cast up by some earthquake of the heart or the conscience. That there is a necessity which supersedes ordinary law, our Lord Himself has taught us, when He appeals to the example of David's eating the shewbread. But if David had set out with the determination of supplying the wants of his followers in this manner, the necessity would have been factitious, and would have been no justification of his conduct. In like manner we may argue how far Brutus was justified in putting Cesar to death. But the moral guilt or innocence of the act depends upon a number of imponderable circumstances, wholly personal and peculiar; and he who would set up to copy Brutus, would be a shallow and odious coxcomb. Indeed, in almost every man's life, there occur crises when he is called to dive into the innermost depths of his being, and to look beneath the moral law, into the central principles which on ordinary occasions it covers and conceals. The only safe guidance we can give to persons with regard to such crises, is by enlightening them on the principles of morality, by instilling that love on which the law depends, not by laying down rules; which is

as vain as trying to muzzle a thunderbolt, or to bind an earthquake with chains.

Pascal has exposed the absurdity and immorality of many of these moral paradoxes: but I will not go back to his Letters. The reader may find a sufficient number of instances in Mr Connelly's recent Letter to Lord Shrewsbury; where, among other things of the same kind, this horrible proposition is quoted (p. 15): "If a wife knows that in the night she is to be killed by her husband, if she cannot escape, she may anticipate him." What a wife, what a Christian wife would do in such a case, what she would think herself justified in doing, none can pronounce for her. In the horror of the moment, if attackt unawares, she might repell the attack by like violence, and her doing so might be forgiven. But if she did so of premeditation, she would be without excuse. It was a far deeper wisdom, however imperfect, that led the dying Desdemona to lie for the sake of saving her murderer. Surely the only resistance which a Christian wife could oppose in such a case, would be that of Christian love.

Having had occasion to cite Mr Connelly's most well-timed letter, I cannot refrain from expressing my thankfulness that one of our Romish renegades has been enabled to see through the impostures by which he was surrounded, and that, after fifteen years spent amidst them, under the most favorable circumstances for seeing them in no unfair light, he should have publisht this exposure as a warning to those who may be fascinated by the same delusions. In regard to what was said in Note Q about the purity of the present Romish Clergy, he gives a shocking testimony as to the licentiousness caused by compulsory celibacy (p. 21). "I have read to the pure and simple-minded Cardinal Prefect of the Propaganda a narrative, written to a pious lay friend by a respected Roman priest, of such enormities of lust in his fellow priests around him, that the reading of them took away my breath,—to be answered, *Caro mio, I know it, I know it all, and more and worse than all; but nothing can be done.*—I have seen priests of mean abilities, of coarse natures,

and gross breeding, practise upon pure and highly gifted women of the upper ranks, married and unmarried, the teachings of their treacherous and impure casuistry, with a success that seemed more than human. I have seen these priests impose their pretendedly divine authority, and sustain it by mock miracles, for ends that were simply devilish. I have had poured into my ears, what can never be uttered, and what ought not to be believed, but was only too plainly true. And I have seen that all that is most deplorable is not an accident, but a result, and an inevitable result, and a *confessedly* inevitable result of the working of the practical system of the Church of Rome with all its stupendous machinery of mischief."

The following assertion (in p. 24) shews that the abominable practice spoken of above (in p. 259), as having prevailed extensively in Europe in the 15th and 16th centuries, still prevails in America. "Were it not for the Protestant monarchy of England,—ostentatious concubinage would be in Europe, as it is in Mexico and parts of South America, a grateful and respected promise of moderation in the Clergy."

NOTE Sb. : p. 37. l. 27.

Chillingworth (c. ii. §. 1) has given an enumeration of the evils of the Romish system, of its anti-scriptural tenets, which may stand here as a body of reserve. "The Holy Scriptures being made, in effect, not your directors and judges (no further than you please), but your servants and instruments, always prest and in readiness to advance your designs, and disabled wholly with minds so qualified to prejudice or impeach them, it is safe for you to put a crown on their head, and a reed in their hands, and to bow before them, and cry *Hail King of the Jews!* to pretend a great deal of esteem and respect and reverence to them.—But to little purpose is verbal reverence without entire submission and sincere obedience; and as our Saviour said of some, so the Scripture could it speak,



I believe, would say to you, *Why call ye me Lord, Lord, and do not that which I command you?* Cast away the vain and arrogant pretense of Infallibility, which makes your errors incurable. Leave picturing God, and worshipping Him by pictures. *Teach not for doctrine the commandments of men.* Debar not the Laity of the testament of Christ's blood. Let your public prayers and psalms and hymns be in such language as is for the edification of the assistants. Take not from the Clergy that liberty of marriage which Christ hath left them. Do not impose upon men that *humility of worshipping angels* which St Paul condemns. Teach no more proper sacrifices of Christ but one. Acknowledge them *that die in Christ to be blessed, and to rest from their labours.* Acknowledge the sacrament after consecration to be Bread and Wine, as well as Christ's Body and Blood. Acknowledge the gift of continency without marriage not to be given to all. Let not the weapons of your warfare be carnal, such as are massacres, treasons, persecutions, and, in a word, all means either violent or fraudulent. These, and other things which the Scripture commands you, do; and then we shall willingly give you such testimony as you deserve: but till you do so, to talk of estimation, respect, and reverence to the Scripture, is nothing else but talk."

## NOTE T : p. 43.

I cannot forbear mentioning the great pleasure it gave me to find that the view which, in my Letter on the occasion, I ventured to express as to the operation of the Judgement given by the Committee of Council, was confirmed in all its parts by one of the most valuable pamphlets which that controversy elicited, the *Letter by a Layman to the Bishop of Exeter.* The writer of that Letter is well known to be one of the highest authorities on the Judicial Bench; and his theological opinions are shewn by it to be very remote from Mr Gorham's on the point in dispute: but his intellect is far too clear, and his knowledge of law too

masterly, for him to let himself be carried away by the delusions which blinded so many persons otherwise clearsighted : and this Letter of itself is enough to prove of what inestimable importance it is that our ecclesiastical Court of Appeal should contain a large admixture of legal minds. In opposition to all the persons, who, with the Bishop of Exeter at their head, raised such an outcry about the evils brought on our Church by that Judgement, he shews, with the utmost clearness, in a dozen pages, first that the decision, standing alone, scarcely affects the law of the Church, inasmuch as it might be overruled tomorrow by another decision of the same Court, or set aside even by an inferior Court,—and secondly, that the decision itself, whatever its authority may be, goes no further than to cover that form of opinion which the Court has given as a summary of Mr Gorham's doctrine ; which summary contains nothing incompatible with the teaching of our Church. To the argument, as here stated, I see not how any intelligent person can refuse his assent ; wherefore all the clamour about our Church as having forfeited her Catholicity, and about the violation of an Article of the Nicene Creed, vanishes into smoke. It is grievous to think how many wellmeaning men were carried away by these mere blunders, some even into quitting our Church, and throwing themselves into the arms of the Roman deceiver.

## NOTE U: p. 46.

When we look at our Lord's thrice-repeated charge to St Peter, to feed His lambs and His sheep, in connexion with the question which precedes it, and with what we know of Peter's previous conduct, we can hardly fail to perceive that its immediate purpose is personal, that the question refers to Peter's over-forward profession, that its triple repetition corresponds to his triple denial, and that by the triple charge he is at once reinstated in his ministry, and admonisht how he is to manifest his love for his Master, by a diligent fulfilment of his pastoral office.

In this last sense the charge bears in like manner on all ministers of the Gospel. But this triple charge, while its real meaning has been less attended to, has been interpreted so as to serve very different purposes. By the Church of Rome, as we have seen in Note J, it has been turned into a main prop of the Papal authority, and even of the claim to infallibility : and in our own Church also there are writers who strain this charge far beyond what the words convey. Thus, for instance, Mr Gladstone, in his Letter on the Royal Supremacy, after a very able, candid, and elaborate argument in defense of the view of the Supremacy taken by our Church at the Reformation, when he turns away from this general historical argument to its immediate occasion, the recent Judgement of the Court of Appeal, alledges this charge to Peter, as though it settled the question against the validity of the tribunal. It cannot be admitted, he says (p. 60), "that, if the justification of the Reformers is to rest on such grounds as the foregoing, their reputation can owe thanks to those who would now persuade the Church to acquiesce in a disgraceful servitude, and to surrender to the organs of the secular power the solemn charge which she has received from Christ, to feed His sheep and His lambs : for the real feeder of those sheep and those lambs is the Power that determines the doctrine with which they shall be fed."

Now surely it is a strange inference to draw from these three simple words, so beautifully fitted to convey consolation and comfort to the penitent Peter, that they were also designed to lay down with what body of men it would rest to determine the doctrine of the Church to the end of time. In one respect the Church of Rome might plead that her interpretation has more of speciousness, in that the words are evidently spoken to Peter individually, not to the body of the Apostles. So far as Peter was the representative of every minister of the Gospel, every minister may rightfully take them to himself : but there is nothing in them indicating with what body, what tribunal, it should rest in after ages to determine questions of doctrine. Doubtless the Church is to determine her own doctrine : but who shall form the

judicial tribunal must be settled by totally different considerations; nor does our Lord's charge to Peter throw any sort of light on the question.

NOTE V : p. 47.

In the feverish state of many minds at the time, the rejection of the Bishop of London's Bill excited a good deal of irritation; and that I might do what in me lay toward abating it, I published my *Few Words* on the subject. It is probable that some, who at the moment were pained by the decision of the House of Lords, will have recognised ere this that it was just and wise. The Bishop of Salisbury, in his last Charge, after stating that he had "concurred with the great majority of the Bishops in supporting the Bill," adds, with his usual candour: "I am free to confess that some of the objections urged against that Bill were very grave: and I should myself be disposed to look rather to some other solution of the question, than to the re-introduction of a precisely similar measure in a future Session of Parliament."

The Session of 1852, it is evident, will pass away without any enactment on this point. But I cannot refrain from expressing my regret, that from the notice which the Bishop of London has just given, on the 10th of May, of his intention to bring in a Bill next year, it would appear, according to the report in the newspapers, that he still adheres to his plan of referring theological points to the Bench of Bishops, or to the Upper House of Convocation, with the proviso however that "the opinion of the Bishops is not to be binding on the Court, but merely to be communicated to them in the way of advice." It is to be hoped that this statement may be incorrect, or at all events that the scheme may undergo further alterations before it is brought forward. For it does not escape from the objection, that we shall thus be liable to have frequent definitions of doctrine emanating from a mere casual majority of the Episcopal Bench, which, without having

any real authority, will be assumed to have it by those who agree with them. Besides it seems derogatory to the dignity of the Bench, that a formal opinion pronounced by it on a theological question is to be treated by a body of lawyers as a mere piece of advice, which they may adopt or reject as they please. Surely this is not the way to allay the jealousies entertained by so many about having questions of doctrine decided by a lay tribunal.

## NOTE W : p. 50.

Even those who are most strenuous in asserting the true idea of Baptism, and of the Church, as comprehending all its baptized members, are often misled by the unconscious influence of the delusion, which restricts the Church to the Clergy. This delusion seems to have been operating secretly in Mr Gladstone's mind, when he wrote the passage cited in Note U, complaining of the Church as acquiescing in a disgraceful servitude, if it surrendered to the organs of the secular power the solemn charge it had received from Christ. For the secular power also in a Christian nation is a portion of the Church, no less than the ecclesiastical: and any tribunal lawfully appointed by the Government of a state, with the concurrence of the secular power and of the ecclesiastical, according to the existing forms of the constitution, would be a Church-tribunal, even if it did not comprise a single ecclesiastic among its members.

In like manner Archdeacon Wilberforce, in his *History of Erastianism*, after having stated that a certain degree of spiritual power had been ascribed ever since the Reformation to Christian kings, remarks (p. 47): "This would seem to imply that a Christian king was not, strictly speaking, a layman; but that his divine commission to rule transferred him in some way from the kingdom of nature to the kingdom of grace." One should have thought that Archdeacon Wilberforce would have been one of the last men to forget, for a single moment, that every baptized Christian,—and such the Christian king must needs be,—has

already been transferred by his baptism from the kingdom of nature to the kingdom of grace, and that there was no need of the supervening of his royal commission to effect that transfer. Yet this is not a mere casual oversight. For the same notion lies secretly at the bottom of his whole book, and runs as an under-current through it. The comparison which follows, with a scientific society, which "is amenable to the laws of the land for any contracts into which it enters," but does not recognise any such superintendence with regard to questions of science, is based on the supposition that the civil power is extrinsic to the Church, as it is to Scientific Associations. Again (in p. 77) he tells us that the question brought before the Committee of Council was not referred to "the Church," but to "the world ;" a distinction which, in this sense, if he had remembered his own view of Baptism, he must have deemed inadmissible, and which is no less mischievous practically, than it is theoretically false.

In fact this same confusion has been the main source of the irrational clamour that has been excited on this occasion. I do not mean that our Court of Appeal is rightly constituted. I have repeatedly expressed my persuasion, not only, as is admitted almost universally, that it ought to consist exclusively of members of our Church, but that greater care should have been taken to provide that there should be an adequate portion of the judges, of whom it might reasonably be expected that they would be duly qualified by professional learning for pronouncing on theological and ecclesiastical points. But this last matter, however important, is not one in which any vital principle is immediately concerned, and might be settled calmly and without much discrepancy of opinion, were it not for the prevalent confusion about the idea of the Church.

## NOTE X: p. 52.

The preceding Notes have swollen to such a bulk, that I must pass cursorily over the subjects to be toucht on in those which remain. In the paper referred to it is stated that "it is now made evident by the late appeal and sentence in the case of *Gorham v. the Bishop of Exeter*, and by the judgement of all the Courts of Common Law, that the Royal Supremacy, as defined and establisht by Statute Law, invests the Crown with a power of hearing and deciding in appeal all matters, howsoever purely spiritual, both of discipline and doctrine." Wherefore the Clergy are called upon to declare, that they "do not, and in conscience cannot acknowledge in the Crown the power recently exercised to hear and judge in appeal the internal state or merits of spiritual questions touching doctrine or discipline, the custody of which is committed to the Church alone by the law of Christ."

Here,—not to speak of the vague, erroneous notion of the Church, which peeps out in the concluding antithesis with the Crown, as though the Crown were not rightfully a part of it,—I cannot refrain from expressing my surprise that the eminent composers of this declaration should have taken upon themselves in this manner to pronounce that the Crown by its Court of Appeal has been exercising the power of "judging the internal state or merits of spiritual questions touching doctrine or discipline," and should not have hesitated to call upon the whole body of the Clergy to concur in this assertion; when the Court of Appeal itself had so positively and repeatedly disclaimed their right of doing so, and declared that they would not attempt it. Surely the Court of Appeal did not consist of such blockheads, that they should be supposed to be totally ignorant of what they were doing; although they were charged with this ignorance in a sermon which most indecorously applied our Lord's prayer to them, *Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do*. Nor will an intelligent person, who reads the *Letter to the Bishop of Exeter* referred to in

Note T, along with the Second Letter by the same *Layman*, question that they were quite right. If a Court, as now and then happens, has to decide a cause in which some geological or chemical question is involved, it will endeavour to collect the best information on that question, and will pronounce accordingly: but no sane person will accuse it of attempting to lay down the laws of chemistry or geology. Thus our learned *Layman* has shewn us that the effect of the sentence pronounced by the Court of Appeal was to remit the spiritual question to be decided by the Archbishop.

As to any usurpation on the part of the Crown, the constitution of the Court of Appeal was determined by the Legislature, in which, as the supreme organ and expounder of the national will, the real supremacy is vested. An oversight has indeed been made in the construction of the Court: but History does not teach us that monarchs are less fallible than a Legislature like ours. Though a good deal of outcry has been raised, because the power, originally vested in the Crown, is now exercised by the Prime Minister, much of this outcry seems to be mere childishness. For the power vested in the Crown was not vested in Edmund Ironside, or in Henry Plantagenet, or in George Guelph, personally and individually, but merely on the ground of his being the supreme impersonation of the national will. Now surely we have as good security for a wise exercise of discretion by a person who, after going through the probation of Parliament, comes forth as the man deemed worthy to be entrusted with the actual administration of the English Government, as by a person who wears the Crown by the mere title of birth; not to mention that under the latter also the power will often be exercised by some mere personal favorite. Of course, if the Prime Minister were not a Member of our Church, it would be requisite to make some fresh provision for the due exercise of the ecclesiastical power of the Crown. But there does not seem to be much likelihood of such an event at present; and it could hardly occur without other changes which would lead to a remodeling of the relations between the Church and the State.



On this subject I will merely cite the following passage from Bramhall's Answer to La Milletiere, which states the real nature of the Royal Supremacy very correctly and clearly. "It may be that two or three of our princes at the most (the greater part whereof were Roman Catholics), did style themselves, or give others leave to style them, the *Heads of the Church within their dominions*. But no man can be so simple as to conceive that they intended a spiritual Headship,—to infuse the life and motion of grace into the hearts of the faithful: such a Head is Christ alone: no, nor yet an ecclesiastical Headship: we did never believe that our Kings in their own persons could exercise any act pertaining either to the power of order or jurisdiction: nothing can give that to another, which it hath not itself. They meant only a civil or political Head, as Saul is called *the Head of the Tribes of Israel*,—to see that public peace be preserved,—to see that all subjects, as well ecclesiastics as others, do their duties in their several places,—to see that all things be managed for that great and architectonical end, that is, the weal and benefit of the whole body politic, both for soul and body. If you will not trust me, hear our Church itself: 'When we attribute the sovereign government of the Church to the King, we do not give him any power to administer the word or sacraments, but only that prerogative which God in Holy Scripture hath always allowed to godly princes, to see that all states and orders of their subjects, ecclesiastical and civil, do their duties, and to punish those who are delinquent with the civil sword.' Here is no power ascribed, no punishment inflicted, but merely political: and this is approved and justified by S. Clara, both by reason, and by the examples of the Parliament of Paris. Yet, by virtue of this political power, he is the keeper of both Tables, the preserver of true piety toward God, as well as right justice toward men, and is obliged to take care of the souls as well as the skins and carcasses of his subjects."

## NOTE Y : p. 54.

The Bishop of St David's, in his last Charge, has given some weighty reasons (pp. 51—60),—such as might be expected from one to whom the study of history has taught statesmanly wisdom and caution,—for checking over-sanguine anticipations of good from the meeting of Convocation, for which so many are calling : and he winds up by declaring, “ For my own part, I cheerfully accept my full share of all the obloquy incurred by those who shrink from the responsibility of exposing the Church to such a danger.” Now assuredly no soberminded man will venture to assert that the desired measure is one to be contemplated with unmixed confidence. Nor could much real good accrue from the assembling of Convocation in its present very defective form ; while the construction of a Synod, adapted to the circumstances of our age, after the lapse of centuries, during which such momentous changes have been wrought in the whole frame and order of society, must needs be a problem of no little difficulty. Nor is it to be questioned that a great part of the vehement cry for a Convocation proceeds from an ignorant and presumptuous impatience. Still, seeing that no one can deny the many evils of divers kinds which spring from our present anarchal condition, and for which, by reason of that anarchal condition, it is impossible to devise any remedy, we may justly entertain a wish, which the Bishop himself pronounces (p. 52) to be “ natural and reasonable,” and from which, he tells us, he “ cannot withhold his sympathy.” Seeing too that, as he admits, “ the power of deliberating on its own affairs seems inseparable from the very notion of a corporate body, which is not a mere machine or passive instrument of a higher will, and therefore most especially to belong of right to a Christian Church,” I should incline to hold that, even on prudential grounds, it would be best that our Church should be allowed to exercise this power, “ inseparable from the very notion of a corporate body.”

At the same time I should entirely concur with my honoured Friend in deprecating all attempts to narrow the pale of our Church by more precise and stringent dogmatical definitions of doctrine : and doubtless, as he says, it is to Councils convened for such a purpose that Gregory Nazianzen's well-known censure applies. Doubtless too dogmatism and metaphysical subtilty are natural parasites of the theological mind : but these grew much more rankly in Greece, than they do in England ; where, owing in great measure to the practical bent of our understanding, we have acquired the faculty of minimizing the evil and maximizing the good of deliberative assemblies. Hence I should not apprehend much mischief from the dogmatizing spirit in a Synod of our Church, at all events, if there be a corrective for it in the infusion of an adequate proportion of lay common sense. In fact it has rarely been mischievous in the Councils of the Latin Church, the working of which on the whole was beneficial, considering how they were hampered and opprest by the Papacy, and by false notions of priestly authority and sanctity. In every age indeed, while the vulgar and shallow are the slaves of its spirit, and are ever trying, bustlingly, and with clamorous self-importance, to drive on its wheels by shouting, *Get on ! Get on !* there is also a class of more valuable minds, that have gathered up the riches of the past, and are revolted by the vulgarity of their noisy, self-conceited contemporaries. These men perform an important task in reminding us that the present rests upon the past, and will topple over if its foundations are withdrawn from it. In this way the Oxford School has rendered much valuable service to our Church ; and in this way they would be very useful in a Synod. Nor have we reason to fear that they will exercise too much influence in such a body. The impulses which drive the age onward, are not likely to be overpowered by any attempts to drive it backward in a free general assembly of the Church.

I will not go over the questions which I have already discust at some length in Note J to my Charge for the year 1842, especially with reference to the necessity that the Laity should form an important element in a rightly constituted Synod. The

conviction of this necessity has been gaining ground every year since, and has recently been helpt on greatly by Mr Gladstone's valuable Letter to Bishop Skinner.

NOTE Z : p. 55.

In the *Times* of August the 15th 1851, there is a letter from Mr Conybeare, the Vicar of Axminster, contradicting a previous statement, that two representatives of each deanery had been elected for the Synod by an absolute majority of the beneficed and licenst clergy in each district. "Had this been really the case (Mr Conybeare very reasonably says), it would have made the unanimity of the 60 elected members of the Synod a very remarkable fact: but the very reverse was the truth; for the representatives were elected by an absolute minority of the clergy in each district, so far as I have been able to ascertain. In the Rural Deanery to which I myself belong (that of Honiton), the clergy present at the election were 10; and one proxy was sent: thus the representatives were elected by only 11 out of 27 clergy entitled to vote. The majority declined to take any part in the election, and left it in the hands of the minority. This was the case almost universally throughout the Diocese, except in those two Deaneries which refused to send any representatives at all."

Such loud songs of triumph have been chanted on account of the unanimity of the Exeter Synod, that it ought to be generally known how delusive that unanimity was. That the declaration on Baptism,—considering how that question has been contested for centuries, and how it is agitated nowadays,—should have been adopted without a single dissentient voice by the representatives of a whole Diocese, would indeed have been little short of a miracle. But when we know the mode in which the Synod was actually constituted, it loses the main part of whatever importance might else have attacht to it. That Mr Conybeare's statement is correct, I feel justified in assuming, not only from what I have heard of his high character as a fellow of my own

College, but also because, I believe, it has remained without contradiction.

Mr Conybeare adds : " The reason why the majority of the Clergy and the dignitaries of the Cathedral declined to take part in the Synod, was not, so far as I can learn, from disapproving of such assemblies in general, but because the Bishop of Exeter, in his *Pastoral Address* convoking the Synod, renounced communion with the Archbishop, to whom he had formerly taken an oath of canonical obedience. In the same Address he (not obscurely) intimated his wish that the Synod should support him in this course ; although, when it came to the point, he made no proposal to that effect."

NOTE AA : p. 57.

Grotius, in his Treatise *De Imperio Summarum Potestatum circa Sacra*, c. vi. § 9, wisely mentions this as the first caution to be observed in order to uphold the peace of the Church : " Prima, ut a definiendo abstinenceatur quantum fieri potest : hoc est salvis dogmatibus ad salutem necessariis, aut valde eo facientibus. Omnem in jure definitionem periculosam esse tradunt Juris auctores. De theologicis idem quis merito dixerit. Vetus enim est sententia : *De Deo etiam vera dicere periculosum est*. Huc illud Nazianzeni spectat monitum, τὸ ὅπως μὴ πολυπραγμύνηι. Multoque magis illud Augustini, *Sunt in quibus inter se aliquando etiam doctissimi atque optimi regulæ Catholicæ defensores salva fidei compage non consonant*. Hanc definiendi modestiam secuti sunt Patres in Nicaena et Constantinopolitana prima Synodo, et qui has Synodos moderati sunt Imperatores.—Dogmata ergo definienda sunt paucissima, et necessaria quidem sub anathemate, alia vero sine anathemate.—Plurimum vero ad retinendam Ecclesiae Catholicae concordiam primis istis saeculis valuit, quod dogmaticae definitiones nullae fieri solebant nisi in Conciliis Oecumenicis ; aut si quae factae essent in minoribus Synodis, eae non erant ratae antequam ad alias Ecclesias missae

atque ita communi judicio approbatae forent: quem morem si reducendum curarent, qui nunc in Christiano Orbe imperium habent, nullum sane possit ab illis beneficium majus exspectari."

The sagacity and importance of this remark will be imprest upon us, I fear, by grievous experience, if the practice of holding petty Synods gains ground. For assemblies are still less apt than individuals to acknowledge their own incompetence for any purpose: and what will be the confusion of the Church, if such declarations as that of the Exeter Synod on Baptism are scattered to and fro? The mere fact that a declaration of this sort, so explicit, so full, so positive, on a question which has agitated the Church for centuries, was adopted by the unanimous consent of sixty clergy, after a discussion which cannot have occupied much more than an hour, shews that the members of the Synod must have come with their minds previously made up, and ready to echo the dictates of the presiding Bishop. Nay, does it not also imply that they can hardly have had a proper sense of the many great difficulties in which the subject is involved? Yet, without such a sense, how can a person be qualified to pronounce judgement on any question whatever? In fact, this is the difference between a prejudice and a judgement: a prejudice is anterior to and without a previous thorough investigation of the subject matter: a judgement involves that previous investigation. We are informed indeed that the declaration had already been submitted to the members of the Synod for their consideration. Still their unanimous consent in such a decision will be regarded, by those who have reflected on the inevitable diversities of human thought and feelings, as materially detracting from the value of their voice.

It would take me much too far to examine that declaration in detail, and to discuss the various questionable propositions in it. But no one can look at it without perceiving that the Article of the Nicene Creed, which it professes to expound, has been enormously expanded, so that it rivals the prodigies which we sometimes see drawn out of a nutshell. A more careful examination will shew us that, though a large part of the

propositions may actually be latent in the Article, they only lie there along with their coordinate and liminary propositions ; the wisdom of the framers of the Article having manifested itself especially in this, that they contented themselves with asserting the primary, essential truth, the *ὅτι*, but did not *πολυπραγμαεῖν τὸ ὅπως*.

For my own part, if I may take leave to express an opinion, without entering into a detailed argument on the matter, while I am unable to adopt the notion of Archdeacon Sinclair, although supported by the high authority of the Bishop of St David's, that the assertion in the Creed concerning the unity of Baptism was intended to forbid its repetition, I am equally unable to find all that the Bishop of Exeter evolves from it. For, if the purpose of prohibiting the repetition of Baptism had stood distinctly forward in the mind of the Council, it would rather have found utterance in a disciplinary Canon, than in an Article of the universal Creed. Or, at all events, it would have been expressed in plainer, less ambiguous words. If they had spoken of the other sacrament, surely they might have said, *I believe in one Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ* ; but this would no way have implied a condemnation of frequent communion. Yet I am still less able to believe, with the Exeter Synod, that the assertion of the unity of Baptism was designed to imply that Baptism in all cases produces the same wonderful effects.

Surely in asserting the unity of Baptism, the Council was merely adopting St Paul's expression in the Epistle to the Ephesians, yet did not, any more than St Paul, distinctly purpose thereby to signify that Baptism must not be repeated, or that in all cases it will produce the same mighty spiritual effects. It is *One* especially as being the one appointed entrance into the Kingdom of Christ, whereby all who desire admission into that Kingdom are received through the power of the Holy Ghost. Moreover, as it is only through Christ, as members of His Church, through His all-prevailing sacrifice and intercession, that we become reconciled to the Father, and receive forgiveness of our sins, so this One Baptism is the One Baptism *for the*

*remission of sins.* But, as in all things there are diversities in the operations of the One Spirit, so is it in Baptism, where, though the gift conferred may be essentially the same, it is modified diversely by the nature of the recipient. Hence there seems to be much confusion, when the Exeter Declaration goes on to say, "We hold, as implied in the aforesaid Article of the Creed, all the great graces ascribed to Baptism in our Catechism. For by *one Spirit we are all baptized into one Body*, even the body of Jesus Christ: we are made to be *His Body, Members in particular* of His Body, Members of Christ. And being thus *baptized unto Him, we were baptized into His death*, who died for our sins: we are *dead with Him,—dead unto sin,—buried with Him in Baptism,—wherein also we are risen with Him,—quicken together with Him,—made to sit together in Heavenly places in Christ Jesus:—our life is hid with Christ in God.*"

In this passage we have an example of the mischief of using words dogmatically, to assert positively what is, which, in the passage whence they are taken, are rather used rhetorically,—if I may be pardoned for the expression,—to exhort people to become what they ought to be, by telling them what God has called them and enabled them to be. All who have been baptized ought to be *dead to sin*, ought to be *buried with Christ*, ought to be *risen with Him*, ought to be *quicken together with Him*, and *made to sit together in heavenly places*. But are they so? all? how many of them are so? Alas! it is by this careless abuse of language, by the misapplication and perversion of the words of Scripture, by our asserting, as divine truths, what everybody, even the asserter himself, must know to be contradicted by universal experience, that men's consciences are sorely troubled, and nothing is fostered but infidelity, lurking in some, opened and avowed by others. This will ever be the effect of binding the human mind by absolute dogmas. As easily may you bind the strong man with withes. Even if you shave off his hair, and put out his eyes, he will rise and destroy you, and himself, in one tremendous convulsion. But let us all endeavour to walk in the light, and we shall have fellowship one with another.



In the Exeter Declaration indeed these words seem to be applied solely to "adults, with fit qualifications, duly baptized." Of such persons, if they avail themselves of their baptismal privileges, what St Paul says, and what is here said, will indeed be true. That is, they are true of him who is a true Christian in heart at the time of his Baptism, and from that time forward. But what is the number of these, even among the few who receive baptism as adults? and why, in explaining the power of baptismal grace, does the Declaration dwell chiefly on these rare and exceptional instances, about which there is no controversy, when the whole controversy turns upon the power of baptismal grace in infants? Besides the terms which our Catechism applies to children,—*members of Christ, children of God, and inheritors of the Kingdom of Heaven*,—are included among those applied in the Declaration to adults: nor is it hinted which of the others belong to infants also. In our service, both for infant and for adult Baptism, St Paul's words about the baptismal death to sin, are rightly used in the concluding exhortation as setting forth what the baptized ought to be, not what they are: *so should we, who are baptized, die from sin and rise again to righteousness.*

These arguments may suffice to shew how unwise and hazardous it is to attempt such explicit determinations of doctrine as those contained in the Exeter Declaration on Baptism. At all events that Declaration is totally at variance with the practice of the early Councils. Jeremy Taylor, in the second Part of his *Dissuasive* (B 1. § 4), shews how carefully the Nicene Fathers refrained from dogmatical definitions: still, he adds, "the Council's adding something to the Creed of the Church, which had been the *αὐθεντία* of the Christian faith for three hundred years together, was so strange a thing, that they would not easily bear that yoke.—That the inconvenience might be cut off, which came in upon the occasion of the Nicene addition,—(for it produced thirty explicative Creeds more in a short time, as Marcus Ephesius openly affirmed in the Council of Florence),—in the Council of Ephesus, which was the third General, it was forbidden that ever there should be any addition to the Nicene

Faith,— ‘ that it should not be lawful from thenceforward for any one to produce, to write, or to compose any other Creed, besides that which was defined by the holy Fathers meeting at Nice in the Holy Spirit.’—This canon was renewed in the next General Council, that of Chalcedon.—The case is here, as in Scripture, to which no addition is to be made, nothing to be diminished from it. But yet every doctor is permitted to expound, to enlarge the expressions, to deliver the sense, and to declare, as well as they can, the meaning of it. And much more might the doctors of the Church do to the Creed ; to which although something was added at Nice and Constantinople, yet from thenceforward they might, in private or in public, declare what they thought was the meaning, and what were the consequents, and what was virtually contained in the Articles ; but nothing of this, by any authority whatsoever, was to be put into the Creed. For in Articles of Belief simplicity is part of its excellency and sacredness ; and those mysteriousnesses and life-giving Articles, which are fit to be put into Creeds, are, as Philistion said of hellebore, medicinal when it is in great pieces, but dangerous or deadly when it is in powder.—For if that faith be sufficient,—whatsoever is added to it is either contained in the Article virtually, or it is not. If not, then it is no part of the faith.—But if it be, then he that believes the Article, does virtually believe all that is virtually contained in it : but no man is to be prest with the consequents drawn from thence, unless the transcript be drawn by the same hand that wrote the original. For we are sure it came in the simplicity of it from an infallible Spirit ; but he that bids me believe his deductions under pain of damnation, bids me, under pain of damnation, believe that he is an unerring logician : for which, because God hath given me no command, and himself can give me no security,—if I can defend myself from that man’s pride, God will defend me from damnation. — We find by experience that a long Act of Parliament, or an indenture and covenant that is of great length, ends none, but causes many contentions ; and when many things are defined, and definitions spun out into *declarations*, men believe less, and know nothing

more." In these last words our admirable Bishop has in a manner pronounced judgement by anticipation on the Declaration of the Exeter Synod.

Note AB : p. 61.

Our own part of England has been visited with the misfortune of having what is called a South Church Union established in it ; which, though it contains a few eminent names, does not seem likely, from such of its acts as have come under my observation, to be more beneficial to the Church than similar associations elsewhere. In the Report of this Body adopted in July 1851, I am taxed with having been, most unintentionally and unwittingly, the cause of its establishment. "A requisition (it is said) for a General Meeting of the Archdeaconry [on occasion of the Judgement of the Court of Appeal], signed by about 70 of the Clergy, was forwarded to the Archdeacon, and was refused ! This refusal seemed to have the effect of opening the eyes of some to the utterly defenseless state in which they were placed (by the want of Synodical action); and in default of a more Ecclesiastical organization, the more irregular form of a Church Union was decided upon. It was considered at the time as an evil, but a necessary one. The more regular synodical proceeding being by such an unwonted stretch of arbitrary power refused, what wonder if the first weapon at hand were seized for defense !"

Perhaps a reasonable man will think that I do not need any better justification of my conduct than this statement. For if the party who desired a Public Meeting were in such a state of irritation, that, when they could not obtain it, they resorted to a measure which they themselves regarded as irregular and "an evil," what prospect was there that, supposing I had convened the Meeting, it would have been conducted with the calmness and temperance and decorum befitting an assembly of the Clergy? more especially as I knew of a good many

clergymen, who, if a Meeting had been summoned to condemn the Judgement, would have been no less vehement in vindicating, and even extolling it. What good would have resulted from such a conflict, I know not, whatever the issue might have been. As far as I could judge, from my acquaintance with the Clergy of the Archdeaconry, the condemners of the Judgement would have been in a minority; which would hardly have pleased them more than my refusal, or left them less prone to take up the irregular, evil course which they adopted. I do not mean that a majority of the Clergy concurred in Mr Gorham's views: very few did so: but I believe that a considerable majority had been grieved by the proceedings against him, had dreaded a condemnatory sentence, and were thankful for the Judgement which averted a disruption of the Church.

With regard to the censure of my conduct as "an unwonted stretch of arbitrary power," the writers of the Report must have been aware, I should think, of a letter which I was compelled, by certain gross misrepresentations, to write about a year before to the seventy Petitioners, explaining the reasons of my refusal. In that letter I stated that I had good reason for believing that my decision was in accordance with the wishes of the great majority of the Clergy of the Diocese. For I had heard from divers quarters that the utmost activity had been exercised during several weeks in canvassing the Clergy, in order to get every attainable signature to the Petition, with the view of forcing the reluctant Archdeacon to call the Meeting. Yet after all the signers only amounted to about a fourth of the Clergy of the Archdeaconry. Among them were only two out of the twelve Rural Deans, by whose counsel, in a question of difficulty, I should chiefly desire to be guided. Of the excellent body of Clergy at Brighton, whose position gives them a considerable advantage for forming a correct judgement on practical questions, only two, the two youngest, out of twenty, signed the petition; of the Hastings and St Leonard's Clergy not one. On the other hand almost every Clergyman I had seen or corresponded with since the question had been started, had concurred

with me in deprecating a Meeting, from apprehension of the almost inevitable collision, which would only have afforded triumph to the enemies, while it saddened the friends of the Church. I had been informed too by one of our Rural Deans that at his recent Chapter, when the Requisition was brought forward, eleven out of the twelve Clergy present thought it desirable that the peace of the Archdeaconry should not be disturbed.

Hence I cannot admit that the South Church Union are justified in accusing me of "an unwonted stretch of arbitrary power," or in charging me with the sin of having driven them to take that evil course, which they adopted solely out of their own impatience and irritation.

NOTE AC : p. 63.

We resolved to send up an Address from the Clergy of the Archdeaconry to the Queen, and one to the Bishop of the Diocese. The former was as follows :—

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR MAJESTY :

WE, the undersigned Clergymen of the Archdeaconry of Lewes, humbly crave permission to approach your Majesty with the expression of our loyal attachment to your Person, and our faithful allegiance to the British Crown.

We deem it our duty to give utterance to the indignation excited in us by the act of the Bishop of Rome, whereby, in violation of your Majesty's Prerogative, and of the ancient principles and laws of our Constitution, he has taken upon himself to parcel out your Majesty's Kingdom of England into a number of Dioceses, and to bestow those Dioceses, designated from certain cities and towns situate therein, on divers Ecclesiastics, who recognise him as their spiritual head. By this act he has attempted to exercise a jurisdiction within this realm, altogether without a parallel since England became a Christian State. None of your Majesty's Royal Predecessors would have submitted to such an

intrusion, even in the ages anterior to the Reformation : the whole nation would have risen up in arms against it. No Sovereign of any other European State would brook it. No Bishop of Rome since the Reformation has dared thus to insult the Crown and Church of England. It has been reserved for these days, as a return for the manifold concessions and privileges granted by your Majesty, and by your Majesty's immediate Predecessors, to your subjects of the Romish persuasion. We humbly hope and pray that your Majesty will not allow the rights of your Crown, and of that Church, of which your Majesty is the supreme temporal Head, to be thus openly assailed and infringed.

Under a deep conviction that, among the many blessings granted by Almighty God to this highly favoured nation, the Reformation of Religion in the sixteenth century, whereby we were delivered from the unscriptural doctrines and idolatrous practices of the Church of Rome, is second only to the original introduction of Christianity into this land,—while we desire that a full toleration may be extended to every form of Religion, so far as is consistent with morality and social order,—we pray your Majesty to take such measures as may seem best calculated to repel this aggression, by which the Bishop of Rome has assumed the exercise of absolute ecclesiastical dominion in this realm, and to uphold that pure scriptural Faith, which is the only living source, not merely of individual virtue and wellbeing, but also of national greatness and prosperity.

And we beseech Almighty God to enrich you abundantly with His grace, that in all your thoughts, words, and works, you may ever seek His honour and glory, and study to preserve His people committed to your charge in wealth, peace, and godliness.

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This Address was sent to the Bishop of the Diocese, along with the following to himself :—

We, the undersigned Clergymen of the Archdeaconry of Lewes, in your Lordship's Diocese, feel called upon by the attack which

has recently been made on your spiritual rights, as well as on the whole Church of England, to express our dutiful affection to your Lordship personally, and our reverence for your sacred Apostolical Office.

In consequence of this unprecedented aggression of the Bishop of Rome, we have deemed it our duty to draw up and sign an Address to our most Gracious Queen, the Prerogative of whose Crown has been thus invaded; and we place our Address in your Lordship's hands, requesting that you will present it to her Majesty at such time and in such manner as you may think fit.

To her Majesty we have exprest our conviction that this act is a direct violation of her Royal Prerogative, and of the fundamental principles of our Constitution,—that it is an assumption of authority such as no Bishop of Rome has attempted to exercise, unless at the first introduction of Christianity, in this or any other European Nation. Our ancestors, even in ages long anterior to the Reformation, found themselves under the necessity of guarding jealously against the introduction of Papal Bulls, touching the rights of the Crown, without the consent of the Government; and this act proves that such precautions are no less necessary now than ever. Moreover it is expressly provided in the Act of the 10th of George IV, for the Relief of the Roman Catholics, whereby they were admitted to the highest offices of the State, that no person should assume the name or title of Archbishop of any Province, or Bishop of any Bishopric in England or Ireland. The wisdom of this provision is clear, as by it alone can the ecclesiastical Supremacy of the Crown be preserved unimpaired. Without it, the declaration in the Oath of Supremacy, “that no forein prince, person, prelate, state, or potentate, hath or ought to have, any jurisdiction, power, superiority, preeminence, or authority, ecclesiastical or spiritual, within her Majesty's realms, dominions, or countries,”—a declaration the principle of which is indispensable to our national independence,—becomes a mere mockery. It has been attempted to evade this provision by the adoption of the names of other

towns than those belonging to our ancient Sees. But, though we cannot feel certain in what manner the Courts of Law may interpret this provision, it seems manifest to us that the purpose of the Legislature was to prevent the occupation of any territorial Sees in England. We therefore hope that your Lordship will take counsel with your Right Reverend Brethren, and with her Majesty's Government, concerning the best mode of repelling this attack on the rights of the Crown, as the sole Fountain of Honour in this Kingdom.

To your Lordship we would further submit that this act is an attack on our Church, such as no previous Bishop of Rome has dared to commit. It has been represented indeed, in some quarters, as a mere matter of harmless internal arrangement and administration, whereby no one, except the members of the Romish Communion, is anywise affected. These representations however are directly refuted by the tone in which the intrusive ecclesiastic, usurping the title of Archbishop of Westminster, has declared that he will govern, and continue to govern, divers counties, among others that of Sussex, which forms your Lordship's Diocese of Chichester. So too are they refuted by the triumphant notes with which this act has been hailed as annulling and annihilating the Church of England. That such is its real intent and purpose, will hardly be questioned by those who remember how carefully it was provided in the ancient Canons of the Church, sanctioned in Council after Council, that no second Bishop should intrude into a Diocese already occupied by another. Such an intrusion was ever regarded as a schismatical act, and condemned as such: wherefore the Bishops of Rome have shrunk till now from sending any Bishops as occupants of English Sees to England. Their authority has hitherto been exercised with greater deference to the Crown of England, and with a kind of tacit recognition of the validity of the succession in her Church: and it can hardly be unknown to the very persons who are denying the importance of the recent act, that it must either be a gross schismatical violation of the fundamental Laws of the Church, or else that it is an



implicit declaration by which the Church of England is set aside as non-existent. In our eyes it is the former, and, as such, a consummation of the schismatical acts by which the Bishops of Rome in the sixteenth century cut themselves off from the pure Apostolical Church of this land; and as He, who then purified us, has ever since wonderfully holpen and upheld us through the manifold conflicts and perils of the last three centuries, and of late years especially has been shewing forth His grace by strengthening and deepening our spiritual life at home, and by spreading out our branches from East to West, and from the sea to the end of the world, we feel a humble reliance that, as there are still such great works which He calls us to perform, He will prosper our endeavours to perform them.

Under this persuasion, we desire to assure your Lordship that we are no way troubled by this attack upon our Church. She who is in God's hands cannot fear. She whom the Heavenly Bridegroom is preparing in such manifold ways, and calling to such glorious tasks, cannot be afraid, unless of her own weakness and unworthiness. We would fain hope that, as a forein invasion has so often caused the various parties in a nation to unite heartily in repelling the common enemy, so, in this case likewise, the attack upon our Church may prove a signal blessing to us, by healing our divisions, by calling on us and impelling us to unite against those who are striving to destroy her, by opening the eyes of those who, from whatsoever motive, have been led to look favorably on our assailant, by proving to them that the spirit of Rome is still as ambitious, as grasping, as imperious and overweening as ever, and that none can safely dally with her, or with any of her superstitious practices. We earnestly hope and pray that we may not be defrauded of this blessing by ebullitions of intemperate violence on any side, but that we may all be directed, under God's guidance, to exercise mutual forbearance in the spirit of love; that we may be led, each of us, to examine our own faith, the ground of our hope, and the manner of our lives; and that we may

become more earnest in fulfilling our own pastoral duties, and in waging war against evil, under all its terrible forms of unbelief, ignorance, and vice, as it spreads in such huge masses through the length and breadth of the land. This, we feel assured, will, under God's blessing, be the best mode of contending against Rome, of resisting her emissaries, and of preserving the hearts of our people in the pure faith of Christ, as established amongst us at our blessed Reformation.

May God grant your Lordship a long life, with health and strength, bodily and spiritual, to lead and guide us in this holy warfare.

NOTE AD : p. 63.

Had the time allowed, I should have wished to express my thankfulness that the attempts made to procure the admission of Jews into the House of Commons had again been frustrated : but, as I have not noticed any fresh arguments in favour of their admission requiring refutation, I will not renew the discussion of this question, which has already been treated at sufficient length in my Charges for 1848 and 1850, and the Notes appended to the former.

The other subject on which I wished to touch, was the rejection of the Bill for legalizing marriages with a deceased wife's sister. By a judicious arrangement the Bill was brought this time in the first instance before the House of Peers, so that it might have the advantage of being discussed by the Spiritual and the Law Lords. The debate was a very able one ; and the majority was such, including every English and Irish Bishop present, that we may trust the question is set at rest for many years to come. For this being a matter in which the social and moral feelings of the nation, if they can be clearly ascertained, ought to exercise a paramount influence, — it being now indubitable that an enormous majority of the educated classes, who are the only safe expounders of that feeling, view the alteration of the existing law with intense repugnance,—it is plainly desirable that these feelings, on questions touching the very heart of our social life,

should not be liable to perpetual disturbance and assault. As it is, they have been confirmed and strengthened by the shock they have received.

On this subject however, the opinions which I express in my last Charge and the Notes to it, have been so strangely misunderstood and misrepresented, that I am compelled to make a few remarks in explanation of them. Owing to these perversions of my meaning, I have had to sustain several attacks, the virulence of which would have surprised me, if anything of that kind could surprise one amid the present confusions in our Church.

Of my opponents the fiercest, who has come forward with his name, is Mr Forster, the Rector of Stisted, who has denounced me in a Sermon preacht in Canterbury Cathedral, and in some twenty pages of Notes subjoined to it, wherein he would fain cut me to pieces and throw me to the dogs, but, luckily for me, has only been lavishing his blows on a man of straw of his own construction. I conceive that he must be the author of a work on Mahometanism publisht a score of years ago, and of some recent Essays on primeval languages; and I have heard the former work spoken of as able. If it be so, he would seem to have sadly impaired his logical faculty, as many have done before, in his etymological researches; and whatever capacity he may have acquired in deciphering the primitive tongues, he must have lost his insight into his own language, while poring over them. At all events, whether it be this, or his indignation that has blinded him, there are but few of the sentences he has extracted from me, the meaning of which he has been able to make out. To be sure, this may be my fault: but still, when I compare my words with the meaning he ascribes to them, it sometimes passes my ingenuity to discover by what mode of interpretation he has extorted it. Hence, were it not that he has a name of some respectability, I might dispense with further notice of his attack. As it is, I am led to give a few samples of it; since few are likely to take the trouble of ascertaining whether I have really been guilty of all the wickedness he imputes to me.

To his Notes he prefixes the first words of my Dedication to the Clergy: "In publishing this Charge, in compliance with your wishes, I feel bound to state that there are some opinions express in it, *from which many of you* STRONGLY DISSENT." The meaning of these words seems plain, and hardly needs to be brought out by the grand rhetorical emphasis of italics and capitals: but one thing at all events Mr Forster might have learnt from them, that, in publishing my Charge, I acted in deference to the wishes of the Clergy. In that case he would hardly have said, in p. 40: "I especially allude to Mr Hare's Archidiaconal Charge, *publisht apparently for the purpose of advocating the Marriage Bill.* I speak advisedly when I say that this appears to have been his chief object in publishing his Charge; for, although he states at the opening 'that he has not seen his way clearly to any satisfactory conclusion,' and assigns this confession as a sufficient reason for 'neither himself taking a part in the agitation, nor inciting his brethren to do so, in the way of petitioning the Legislature, or *otherwise*' yet his conduct has been exactly the reverse of this statement. He has not indeed given his Clergy an opportunity of expressing their *condemnation* of the Bill; but he himself has taken a most earnest part in the agitation in *favour* of the Bill, if not by petitioning the Legislature, at all events *otherwise* by every means in his power. For, just at the critical time when the Legislature is discussing the Bill, and about to decide upon it, he has publisht a very long and elaborate treatise in its favour, employing whatever may be the weight of his name, and all the influence of his office in the Church, to persuade men that the proposed change is right and holy."

Now, if the confusion in my opponent's mind were not so evident as to exempt him from a large part of the responsibility for what he says, I should tax this paragraph with a series of misstatements. Having himself cited my reason, a very simple and ordinary one, for publishing the Charge, what right has he to assert, and that too "advisedly," that my purpose was something totally different? though, if it had been, I cannot perceive what is the evil of bringing out a discussion on a legislative measure

“just at the critical time when the Legislature is discussing it.” A reasonable man would have thought that this was the very time when a person who fancied he could throw any light on the question, or on any branch of it, was bound so to do. Mr Forster however tells us that he is “an Irish Churchman :” and in Ireland, it is said, the custom is to look after you leap, first to decide on a matter, and then to discuss it. How again, unless through a like interchange of the past and the future, was my conduct “the reverse of my statement?” I stated what my conduct had been up to the delivery of the Charge. Was it inconsistent with this statement, that I published the Charge subsequently? How too does the publication of my Charge, with a somewhat laborious enquiry into the meaning of a verse of Scripture, and into the manner in which that verse had been interpreted in various ages, deserve to be stigmatized with the name of *agitation*, and that too “by every means in my power?”

In fine I have to protest against the description of my arguments as an “elaborate treatise *in favour of the Bill*,” and an attempt “to persuade men that the proposed change is right and holy.” If Mr Forster had done me the honour,—the justice I may say, seeing that he was about to make such an onslaught upon me,—to read what I have written on the subject connectedly to the end, he must have seen that I pronounce no positive opinion, one way or the other, on the proposed change of the marriage-law,—that the main part of my discussion is on the meaning of the passage in Leviticus, xviii. 18, and its bearing on our question; though I do indeed express my conviction that this text does not forbid the marriage of two sisters, except contemporaneously, and that therefore we are no way bound by this text to prohibit such a marriage to a Christian people. My desire was to clear the controversy from this irrelevant topic, so that the argument might rest on its proper grounds, the social and moral expediency or in expediency of the law. I am aware that this is contrary to the practice of our ordinary partisans, who scrape together whatever they can find to make a show in favour of their cause, seldom

scrupling about distorting it to serve them, when there is need ; wherefore, if they see a person discarding a bad argument, they fancy he must be an adversary: but I have learnt to believe that nothing can yield any lasting strength, save truth,—that this will be stronger in proportion to its purity,—and that every particle of falsehood, helpful as it may appear at the moment, is rottenness to the bones. On the main subject itself, the expediency or in expediency of the Law, I declared repeatedly that I did not feel qualified to pronounce a judgement: it did not seem to me that we had sufficiently precise information for legislating: but, so far as I could form a conclusion, I say, that “the bias of my mind would incline strongly to maintain the existing law, with its sanctions of ancient usage and moral opinion, and whereby we are made partakers of great blessings,—while it is impossible to estimate the mischiefs of a change” (p. 31);—that, “with regard to the higher classes—the present state of the law may justly be esteemed a great blessing” (p. 30);—that, “were it allowable to look at the question with reference to the higher classes solely, I should wish that the present law should be retained, both on account of the precious domestic blessings which we derive from it, and because, in matters concerning the primary relations of family life, the course of wisdom is *quieta non movere*, unless under the pressure of some strong, manifest, urgent cause” (p. 90). Now surely, if Mr Forster had vouchsafed to read the writer whom he was attacking,—unless he had left his understanding swampt in the morass of some antediluvian language,—he could never have said of a writer who summed up his opinion in this manner, even though he acknowledged that there were other elements to be taken into account, which might modify his conclusion, that he “has taken a most earnest part in the agitation in favour of the Bill by every means in his power,” and that he was “hotly advocating” (p. 33) the marriage with a wife’s sister.

Let me cite another instance of the same intellectual offuscation. The first Note (p. 29) opens with the following extract from my Charge. “The main argument of all, that which has

been drawn from the injunctions of the Levitical Law, has seemed to me wholly untenable; and that too, without any need of enquiring how far, and in what parts, and in what manner and degree, the Levitical Law is to be regarded as still binding upon Christians, after our having been expressly releast from it by the Apostolic Council at Jerusalem." In these words, which, as they stand in the context, seem to me perfectly clear, I meant to say, that the argument, on which so much stress had been laid, from Leviticus xviii. 18, seemed to me quite untenable, as I try to shew immediately after, from the very wording of that verse, without any necessity for our entering into the wider argument on the mode and extent of the obligatoriness of the Levitical Law upon Christians. The reader may judge then of my surprise, when I found it stated: "The passage here quoted presents a fair specimen of certain very grave defects, which run through the whole of that portion of Mr. H's Charge, which relates to the marriage question. I mean that he too generally ignores the arguments of the opposite side; either assuming that none such exist, or barely inferring that opinions opposed to his own are unworthy of notice; and, on the other hand, equally without an attempt at proof, he endeavours to convince by bold, undoubting, and reiterated assertion. Thus the passage of his Charge referred to, put into a logical form, contains the following syllogism:—1. The prohibitions in Lev. xviii. form part of the Levitical, as distinguisht from the moral Law of God.—2. The Council of Jerusalem releast Christians from all parts of the Levitical Law, as distinguisht from the moral law of God.—3. Therefore, the Council of Jerusalem releast Christians from the prohibitions of Lev. xviii."

It has been said that we only find in a book what we put into it,—an assertion which, though quite false in its ordinary application, has found its realization in Mr Forster, whose grafts are strangely different from the original stock. How this sentence can shew that I "ignore the arguments of the opposite side," it is difficult to understand. I could not make mention of them parenthetically in the sentence itself; but they are

cited and examined in the Notes, such of them at least as my library enabled me to discover. In the Notes I have tried to weigh what seemed most important in the arguments used by Dr Pusey and Mr Keble, by Jewel,\* by Willet, by Basil, by Hammond and Patrick. Indeed, so far was I from ignoring them in that very sentence, the words which Mr Forster italicizes,—I suppose, to mark the egotisticalness of my way of speaking, which others have reprovèd on the same ground,—*it seemed to me*,—were adopted because this mode of speech appeared to me to convey less of assumption than a naked assertion would, on a matter on which certain eminent persons had held a different opinion. Nor is it much easier to detect how the sentence quoted exemplifies the practice laid to my charge of “endeavouring to convince by bold, undoubting, and reiterated assertion;” seeing that the only thing like an assertion in it is exprest as a mere personal opinion. As to the syllogism spun out of my sentence, the minor is the only part to which there is anything corresponding. I decline enquiring into the validity of the major, and so draw no conclusion.

My castigator’s next accusation (p. 31) is; that I have said, “The rendering (of Levit. xviii. 18) adopted by the Caraites, ‘one wife to another,’ is not only destitute of all authority, but discordant with the spirit of the sacred language:” and he complains that I have “settled the matter in this off-hand positive way.” Now I grant I should justly have been liable to his censure, if, without having the slightest pretensions to Hebrew scholarship, I had taken upon myself so to speak. But the words are not mine. If Mr Forster’s irritation had allowed

\* From a letter publisht in the new Edition of Jewel (vol. iv. p. 1262), it appears that the good Bishop had changed his mind on this question, a year and a half after he delivered the opinion given by Strype in his Life of him. Writing to Archbishop Parker about a case, which had come before him and the Archbishop, and which had been carried by appeal before the Court of Delegates, he says: “I would they would decree it were lawful to marry two sisters; so should the world be out of doubt: as now it is past away in a mockery.” The last words seem to mean that the habitual violation of the prohibition rendered it “a mockery.”



him to look beyond the sentence which offended him, he would have seen that it is part of the opinion of Dr Adler, the chief Rabbi, given in the Appendix to the Report by the Commissioners, who justly thought that his opinion on a question of Jewish law and usage was entitled to high consideration.

Again Mr Forster reproves me (p. 35) for wishing to introduce these "two elements into our new national morals, the one as a substitute, the other as a superseder of law, namely 'the conscience of individuals' (p. 66), and 'the self-relying will'" (p. 71), and pronounces that "once admitted into play they would open the flood-gates to antinomianism." I will not lengthen this discussion by quoting the passages in which these expressions stand, but will merely remark, that it is strange to find a person, who has ever reflected on any moral question, ignorant of the important part which the conscience of individuals must act in the whole regulation of their moral life, and unable to perceive how this is implied in those words of St Paul, which enunciate one of the primary principles of all morality, *Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind.* As to "the self-relying will," instead of introducing it as an element of social morality, I merely use the expression in the way of warning, when urging the necessity of bringing positive ordinances into agreement with the conscience of a nation, as else "they will be undermined by the encroachments of the sceptical reason, and the self-relying will."

There is a good deal more of the same sort of stuff, coloured with more or less invective: but these samples are quite enough to shew the value of my castigator's censure; and I should waste no more words on him, but that he accuses me (in p. 46) of "a libel on the village-poor of England," because I have said that, in the present condition of the lower classes, which we can hardly hope to see materially changed, "while a widower, when left with young children, will naturally and rightly invite his wife's sister to replace their mother's care over them, the intimacy thus bred will have a strong tendency to terminate in concubinage, if it may not in marriage." This

passage Mr Forster denounces with the utmost vehemence : nor has anything in his pamphlet surprised me more than his doing so. For he tells us he has had "the charge of two large village parishes : " and I have been informed on good authority that he has distinguisht himself in them most honorably by his zealous endeavours to suppress the sins of the flesh. Therefore he, of all persons, one should think, cannot be ignorant of the terrible evils which arise from the smallness of our cottages, and the want of a proper separation between the sexes. At all events, they have been set forth over and over again in various recent publications concerning the condition of our lower classes : and if one converses with the clergymen who go about much amongst them in London, one is almost sure to hear shocking accounts of cases of incest even between the nearest blood-relations. Now I did not deem it an improbable supposition that a widower, left with young children, would be likely to invite his wife's sister, if she had an unmarried one, to come and take charge of them. Nor did it seem a violent presumption, considering the circumstances, to infer that such an intimacy must have a tendency to terminate in concubinage, if it may not in marriage. That it does at times terminate in marriage, I have reason to know from several cases that have come before me, some of them officially through presentments made at the Visitation ; though no proceedings have ensued from those presentments, owing partly to the illregulated state of our Diocesan Courts, and partly to the unwillingness of the presenters to incur the inevitable expense of a prosecution. This is the reason that made those exemplary parish ministers, Dr Hook, Dr Dale, Mr Champneys, Mr Villiers, Mr Gurney, come forward in support of the late Bill. They had so deep a sense of the evils they found around them, that they did not shrink from encountering the fury of the Pharisees, who would burn and crucify all such as deem truth and righteousness more precious in God's sight than their traditions. If such be the state of the case, I cannot see how there is any reverence toward God in concealing it, or anything like impiety in speaking of a great social evil with the view of having it remedied. Mr Forster indeed calls my remark

“a fearful proposition;” because “it asserts that the law which forbids a man from marrying his wife’s sister must, in the nature of things, universally have a strong tendency to lead to immorality and improper intercourse among the poor, *i. e.*, among the immense majority of mankind.” Of course it asserts nothing of the kind. If the law be a law of God, and the horror of incest, which protects a sister, cannot be aroused to protect a sister-in-law, the consequence is plain: people must beware of exposing themselves to avoidable temptations. Hence I am no way dismayed by the assertion, that my “conclusion would involve an impiety from which I should shrink with horror.” My conviction that God is the author of all good, that His law is good and holy, and that whatever of evil may arise from its application, springs solely from man’s corruptions and perversions of it, is far too strong, for me to fear anything that can result from an honest search after truth. Only let us seek it strenuously and singleheartedly, and, though He may allow us to stray and stumble for a while, He will bring us out at length to a spot where the way will spread out before our eyes; and He will help us to contend against evil, even against that which we ourselves may unwittingly have occasioned.

The strain of Mr Forster’s invective had scarcely ceast, when it was taken up by a writer in the 69th number of *the Christian Remembrancer*, who has more vigour and smartness and knowledge, but displays his gifts with that flippancy and insolence and unscrupulousness which often characterize the writers in that Review. If he is superior to my previous castigator in cleverness, he makes up for this by his inferiority in honesty: for while the former, as I have said, is only half responsible for his misrepresentations, those of the latter bear an evident stamp of malice. Of course I shall not think of replying to an anonymous assailant. The same general misrepresentations of my purpose, which I have noticed in Mr Forster’s Notes, run through the Review: and if any one will compare the passages quoted with the originals, he will find that in almost every instance they are distorted in one way or other, and that what may seem reprehensible in them is stuck in by the Reviewer.

On one point only will I add a word. In the Charge I have said (p. 29), that we are not "to be overruled and fettered in the interpretation of a passage like this (Levit. xviii. 18), by any alledged consent of the Church. For in the first place there is no such consent, as may be ascertained without much trouble." In the Notes I have shewn that the prohibition in this verse was interpreted as applying solely to the lifetime of the first wife by Philo, by Augustin, by Nicolaus de Lyra, whose authority is the more valuable from his having been a Jew, by Cornelius a Lapide, by Caietan and Bellarmin, by Fagius, by Tostatus and Lorinus, by Selden and Grotius, men whose combination of legal with theological and philological learning fitted them especially to pronounce on this question, by Jeremy Taylor, by Le Clerc, by Rosenmüller and Baumgarten, by Chalmers, and by the two most eminent jurists of our age in Germany. I have contended too, on the authority of Grotius, that the Apostolic Canon, as it merely prohibits a man who marries two sisters from becoming a clergyman, seems to imply that laymen in that age were not precluded from such marriages. Surely this is a sufficient body of evidence that there is no general consent in the interpretation of this passage as prohibiting such marriages. Yet on the strength of this denial the Reviewer thinks himself warranted in discharging several pages at me full of flippant and insolent abuse: meanwhile he himself adopts an interpretation very different from the received one, and then, some time after, says (in p. 168), "Had Archdeacon Hare's negative of general consent been applied to this verse, he would be right." Yet to this verse I did apply it, and to this verse solely; except so far as the number of authorities for interpreting this verse as sanctioning the marriage of a wife's sister implies that there was no consent in holding that the Levitical Law forbid it. This is the verse which, from the beginning of my argument, I profest to discuss, and the only verse with regard to which I have attempted to collect the opinions of divines and jurists. The general question as to the obligatoriness of the Levitical law I have not argued; though I have quoted Jeremy Taylor to shew that it is not a point to be

taken for granted. With regard to Levit. xviii. 18, I have been glad to find my opinion confirmed in the House of Lords in the excellent speeches of the Bishops of St David's and Norwich.

Note AE : p. 64.

In earlier ages, before the love and dutifulness of the Christian Bishop was swallowed up by the ambition of the Pope, the presence of the Bishop of Rome,—for instance, that of Gregory the Great and of Leo the Great,—was an inestimable blessing to the imperial city. For the last ten centuries it has rather been a curse. The earth itself bears witness to it, as every traveler feels on passing from the bright and rich fields of Tuscany to the dreary wastes of the patrimony of St Peter. The aspect of the people, in whom the same contrast is seen, bears a like testimony : and the reports of those who have had opportunities of knowing them, declare that their intellectual and moral and spiritual character is too aptly typified by their outward appearance. This is the case in our days : it has been so more or less for centuries : and there appear to be the strongest reasons for believing that the character of the people has been moulded in great measure by that of the Government.

How deeply this conviction had imprest itself on the great Italians of the fourteenth century, we see from a number of passages in Petrarch's Letters, especially in those *sine titulo*. I will quote an extract from the 15th, in which he also speaks of the manner in which the Papacy had carried its train of abominations along with it in its migration to Avignon, making that still worse than Rome. He is writing to a friend who was going from the former place to the latter ; and he thus describes the two seats of the Papacy : “ Ecce jam oculis vides, jam manibus palpas, qualis est Babylon illa novissima, fervens, aestuans, obscena, terribilis, quam nec Cambysis opus Babylon Niliaca, nec illa vetustior regia Semiramidis Babylon aequet Assyria : Nilum et Euphratem Rhodanus vincit, nempe qui Tartarea flumina, Cocytum vincit et Acherontem. Quicquid uspiam perfidiae et doli, quicquid inclementiae

superbiaeque, quicquid impudicitiae effrenataeque libidinis audisti aut legisti, quicquid denique impietatis et morum pessimorum sparsim habet aut habuit orbis terrae, totum istic cumulatim videas acervatimque reperias. Nam de avaritia deque ambitione supervacuum est loqui; quarum alteram ibi regni sui solum posuisse, unde orbem totum populetur ac spoliet, alteram vero alibi nusquam habitare compertum est." Such is Avignon: thence he carries his friend to Rome. "Vides en populum non modo Christi adversarium, sed, quod est gravius, sub Christi vexillo rebellantem Christo, militantem Sathanae, et Christi sanguine tumidum atque lascivientem, et dicentem, *Labia nostra a nobis sunt: quis noster dominus est?* — populum duricordem et impium, superbum, famelicum, sitientem, hianti rostro, acutis dentibus, praecurvis unguibus, pedibus lubricis, pectore saxeo, corde chalybeo, plumbea voluntate, voce melliflua; — populum, cui non modo proprie convenire dixeris evangelicum illud atque propheticum, *Populus hic labiis me honorat, cor autem eorum longe est a me;* — sed illud etiam Judae Scariothis, qui Dominum suum prodens et exosculans aiebat, *Ave Rabbi*, et Judaeorum, qui indutum purpura, coronatum spinis, percutientes et conspuentes, illusionem amarissimam flexis poplitibus adorabant, et salutabant *Ave Rex Judaeorum!* — Quid enim, quid, oro, aliud assidue geritur hos inter Christi hostes et nostri temporis Pharisaeos? Nonne etenim Christum ipsum, cujus nomen die ac nocte altissimis laudibus attollunt, quem purpura atque auro vestiunt, quem gemmis onerant, quem salutant et adorant cernui, eundem in terra emunt, vendunt, nundinantur, eundem quasi velatis oculis non visurum et impiarum opum vepribus coronant, et impurissimi oris sputis inquinant, et vipereis sibilis insectantur, et venenatorum actuum cuspidem feriunt, et, quantum in eis est, illud nudum, inopem, flagellatum iterum atque iterum in Calvariam trahunt, ac nefandis assensibus cruci rursus affigunt? Et O pudor! O dolor! O indignitas! talium hodie, ut dicitur, Roma est.—De qua non illepide jocans quidam ait:

Roma, tibi fuerant servi domini dominorum,  
 Servorum servi nunc tibi sunt domini."

Let us come down now from the fourteenth century to the nineteenth. I will give a few extracts from Niebuhr's Letters, shewing what that great observer saw in Italy, and especially at Rome, where he spent so many years. On the 24th of September 1816 he writes: "I have become acquainted with two or three literary men of real ability; but they are old men, who have only a few years longer to live; and when they are gone, Italy will be, as they say themselves, in a state of barbarism. No one feels himself a citizen. Not only are the people destitute of hope, they have not even wishes respecting the affairs of the world, except as they concern their several cabinets; and all the springs of great and noble thoughts and feelings are choked up. The three genuine and intellectual scholars of my acquaintance are all ecclesiastics; they are however only ecclesiastics by profession; for I have not found in them the slightest trace, either of a belief in the dogmas of Catholicism, or of the pietism which you meet with in Germany. When an Italian has once ceased to be a slave of the Church, he never seems to trouble his head about such matters at all."

Again, on the 30th of October: "Rome is a terrible place for any one who is melancholy; because it contains no living present, to relieve the sense of sadness. The present is revolting; and there are not even any remains of the Church of the Middle Ages.—There is only one man of talent and mental activity here, at least among the philologers and historians,—an old ex-Jesuit on the borders of the grave: and he repeats the verdict which I have already heard from the lips of the few old men, in whom I have become acquainted with the relics of a more intellectual age: *Italia e spenta, e un corpo morto*: and I find it so."

Again, on the 7th of February 1817:—"Today begins the wild buffoonery of the Carnival, to us a melancholy spectacle. It is a question whether even the Romans will enact it with any real gaiety of heart.—A people of utterly vacant mind is capable of childish enjoyment, as long as it has outward comforts; but when a period of agitation and calamity comes, when its playthings are broken, and it has to go hungry, it must inevitably become heavy and stupid."

On the 16th of February, 1817 :—" The old Greeks were pretty near the mark, when they pictured our coasts (*i.e.* those of Italy) as the land of Cimmerian darkness, and fabled Apollo as wandering between Delphi and the noble Hyperboreans. It has already come to this with me, that I feel I am growing as superficial and ignorant as a modern Italian, and look up to all that you can send me with sorrowful humility. The genuine native Italians would indeed have to look up to it from the depths, those here I mean, for whom I always feel angry that there is no other name than the shamefully profaned one of Romans. For the old men at Venice, Bologna, and Florence, said with bleeding hearts, that all was over with their nation and their literature, and that their departed greatness was but an agonizing remembrance."

On the 26th of June 1818 :—" About the Italians you will have heard Ringseis testimony : [He was an enthusiastic and pious Roman Catholic :] and we Protestants can leave it to him to paint the clergy and the state of religion in this country. In fact we are all cold and dead, compared to his indignation.— The most superficial prophet of so-called illumination cannot have a more sincere aversion to enthusiasm than the Roman priesthood : their superstition bears no trace of it. I know that I am perfectly correct in saying that even among the laity you cannot discover a vestige of piety. The life of the Italian is little more than an animal one ; and he is not much better than an ape endowed with speech. There is nowhere a spark of originality or truthfulness. Slavery and misery have even extinguished all acute susceptibility to sensual enjoyments ; and there is, I am sure, no people upon earth more thoroughly *ennuyé*, and oppressed with the burthen of their own existence, than the Romans. Their whole life is a vegetation.—While whole families sleep round the charcoal pans in winter, and often get suffocated out of sheer idleness, the nobles carry on *conversazioni*, which are not much better, and in which most are neither speakers nor listeners. The universal knavishness and thievishness are also the effect of laziness : people must



eat and clothe themselves ; and this must be done without interruption to their sloth. The present government has undertaken the task of introducing tolerable civil security by a police, in the midst of ever increasing wickedness and degradation,—a system of constraint and terrour that may impose fetters on the wild passions of the animal man. They never think of making him comfortable : he may sink deeper and deeper into wretchedness ; but he shall fear blows and the gallies, rather than follow his own lusts. Surrounded by an incalculable body of spies, and knowing how he himself would be ready to accuse and betray any one for gold, Fear is to be his highest deity. There is no criminal code ; the punishments are quite arbitrary. Cardinal Ruffo is dead ; and a historical personage, who equals any of the commissioners of the Convention, relates with lively chuckling how his Calabrians treated the towns, and even the convents, which had been Jacobinical. Even the murder of a wife is very lightly punisht.—The effect of this severity is seen in the absolute inertness of the common people. The nobles, who have nothing to fear, spend their days in lifeless inaction, and in glutting their lowest lusts.—The destruction of Bonaparte's rule, —you know how I hate it elsewhere,—has been the greatest misfortune for Rome. To extirpate priestcraft, as it was and is, was a necessary amputation ; and on the whole it was performed with discretion, forbearance, and moderation. The people were employed and cared for : the number of births increast rapidly ; the priests were no longer able to command or permit abortion : the number of deaths diminisht incredibly. The conscription was disliked, but did good. A French regiment was a school of honour and morality for an Italian, as it was of corruption for a German. Some life was awakened among the higher classes : people began to take an interest in something ; and very much, perhaps all that is possible for a Roman, would be gained, if he recovered animation. There were a good number of criminals executed without the attendance of a priest, consequently condemned to eternal damnation ; whereas now, in the opinion of the common people, every criminal who is executed goes fully

absolved into Heaven. The officials set the Romans a pattern of liberality and conscientiousness; and the purveyors were models of strict integrity and humanity to the managers of hospitals: all this you will not misunderstand."

On the 21st of May 1819, he writes thus from Tivoli: "The priests are generally very poor, and incredibly bad. In Rome there are parish priests who go about begging. The monks are unquestionably nearly all good for nothing, although I know one very estimable Franciscan. Learning and literature are at a lower ebb than perhaps in any other country. Devotion is merely external; and this has much diminished. I have been assured by Italians themselves that the young men have scarcely any faith at all. From the highest to the lowest, all unite in hating and despising the Government.—I have been talking here with an intelligent landowner about the city and its inhabitants; and he drew a frightful picture of one after another of the most eminent men, which had quite an air of truth. As he had just been blaming the Government, unhappily with too much reason, I asked him, what good he hoped for, if those who would come into power on the fall of the priestly domination were so bad. He acknowledged that no improvement could be expected."

On the 14th of October 1820, after having been four years at Rome, Niebuhr writes: "It is impossible but that the coquetting with Catholicism, which is now in fashion among a certain class, should come to an end: it is altogether too untruthful and revolting a comedy. Here in Italy the faith of the Church has so died out, that the mummy would fall into dust at the first hard blow. But what will replace it, God knows; since there is not a human throb in the heart of the people, nor is any want felt beyond those of the animal nature. It is just the same among the educated classes in Spain, where religion is regarded as an insupportable yoke." Niebuhr's prophecy has not been fulfilled so soon as he probably expected; though, to be sure, now that the coquetting with Romanism in Germany has reached its acme in the Countess of Hahn-Hahn, we

may trust that the boil is on the point of bursting. But he would never have thought that the English mind would have caught the infection.

From Florence, after finally leaving Rome, he wrote on the 22nd of May 1823: "Here in Tuscany the traveler is gladdened by the general aspect of prosperity and cheerfulness. The people appear to be in the very condition best suited to their character and temperament. Their moral superiority to the Romans strikes you immediately, above all, their piety, as contrasted with the utter want of it at Rome. You must not take it ill of us Protestants, if, after spending seven years at Rome (though many people go to church there every day), we fancied that this virtue was quite extinct among the Italians, because it is so absolutely at Rome. We were much edified here on Whit-Tuesday, by the real devotion of an immense multitude. It is not difficult to explain why at Rome, above all places, religious services are now become a painful taskwork."

There cannot be a completer refutation than these extracts give to Dr Newman's sophistical attempt to prove, in the Lecture cited in Note I, that the moral and social debasement of the Roman people is the natural result of the exclusive power which Religion exercises at Rome. Rather is it the natural, the inevitable result of a corrupt religion, of a hollow religion, of religion worn as a mask. A mass of evidence to the same effect has recently been set before us in Farini's History of the Roman State. I cannot stop here to collect even a tithe or a scantling of that evidence, but will merely transcribe the conclusions drawn from it by an able writer in the 74th Number of *the Christian Remembrancer*, who, from the character of that Journal, cannot be suspected of any ultra-protestant rancour.

Speaking of the moderate and religious class of Italian liberals, he says (p. 364): "Good Catholics as they are, and because they are such, their moral sense has been deeply shockt by that absence of morality, both in what is neglected, and in what is done, or allowed to be done, by authorities which claim most

loudly the sanction of religion. In the home and centre of Roman Catholicism, in that Italy whose faith has never been shaken in the traditions of antiquity, and under the eye of the guardian of that faith, the methods of governing are the by-word of Christendom. And this is no mere question of political philosophy or party ; it is something much more elementary than a comparison of different theories or models of government. It means that such is the system which has grown up and taken root in many parts of that country, in the employment of political power, that neither truth, nor fairness, nor mercy, nor honour, nor justice, nor integrity, are reckoned among its essential and indispensable laws and conditions. It means that no one *expects* these, as a matter of course, at the hands of those in authority ; and that rulers never shew any hesitation, or scruple, when it is convenient, in departing from them. It means that, where religion is alledged to be purest and most influential, fraud, falsehood, corruption, and every form of loathsome and base villany, vex and pollute the civil and social relations of men, more widely, more systematically, and more hopelessly than in any other Christian people ; because those who have the welfare of their fellows in their hands, cannot, after many attempts, be divested of the idea that these disgraceful expedients are lawful and justifiable. It means further, that those who, in times of difficulty, meet discontent and resistance with vindictive and cruel measures, cannot be got to take the trouble, in times of peace, to consult seriously for the happiness and improvement of their subjects. This is what is meant by the political degradation of Italy ; that authority, in a race of so much intelligence and such high cultivation, is without dignity and without principle ; that the very ideas of truth and justice between the governors and the governed have been obliterated by the immemorial and incurable contempt of them ; this, and not the mere admiration of constitutions and representatives,—this it is which makes men liberals in Italy ; not only the violent and impetuous, but the religious, the temperate, and the well judging ; those who know how the Bible speaks of cruelty

and oppression, of treachery and denial of justice ; and that these are not the less sins against religion, because contrary to a civilization itself not always religious."

## NOTE AF, p. 66.

I know not whether it has been remarkt, that Coleridge, in his invaluable *Essay On the Constitution of the Church and State*,—a work which arose out of a correspondence on the expediency of what was termed Catholic Emancipation, and which especially treats of the securities requisite to justify that measure,—lays a main stress on the very enactment, which the Papal Bull, appointing the Romish hierarchy in England, violated. After saying that "the principle, the solemn recognition of which he deemed indispensable as a security, and would be willing to receive as the only security, is not formally recognised in the Bill," he adds, (p. 10) : "It may, perhaps, be implied in one of the clauses,—that which forbids the assumption of local titles by the Romish bishops ;—but this implication, even if really contained in the clause, and actually intended by its framers, is not calculated to answer the ends, and utterly inadequate to supply the place, of the solemn and formal declaration which I required."

From Sir James Graham's speech on the late Bill, it would appear that neither Sir Robert Peel, nor even the Duke of Wellington, attacht any great importance to the clause in their own Act ; and I remember how Coleridge at the time was derided as a mere visionary, who always magnified his molehills into mountains, and made so much of what every reasonable practical man must needs deem insignificant. Well ! after twenty years the Papacy attacks England on this very point. The Government, the Church, the Nation, from one end to the other, are exasperated by the attack : they all feel its enormous importance : and lo ! what was called a molehill, now proves to be a mountain, the magnitude of which the prophetic seer discerned in the distance, while from others it was hidden, even from the Duke of Wellington. Thus, among the freaks of Time, it now and then comes out, that the

unpractical philosopher, looking into the heart of things, sees far beyond the vision of all his practical contemporaries.

Of the late Bill I will not speak. He who questions its justice or its necessity will find a very able and complete vindication of both in the Bishop of Ossory's late Charge.

AG. p. 70.

On these Schools for the Middle Classes, I have already spoken so much, and so earnestly, in my Charge for 1849, and in my Sermon on *Education the Necessity of Mankind*, and the Dedication prefixt to it, that I will content myself here with commending them again to the help and support of all who love England and her Church. A noble work was never undertaken in a nobler spirit ; and, though it has had many jealousies and suspicions to contend with, a blessing has rested upon it ; so that there is good reason to believe that a large building, capable of holding three hundred boys, will be completed before the end of 1852, and will have its full complement of pupils. Ere long, I trust, the suspicions and jealousies will be in great measure allayed, through the manifest benefits conferred by the school ; and we may hope to see others like it rising in every county in England.

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In p. 78 I have erroneously followed Dr. Newman in mentioning Mr. Hallam among the repeaters of the story about Eligius, not having his work at hand to refer to, nor having noticed that Dr. Newman at the end of his volume states that Mr. Hallam in a later edition had corrected the mistake. To the list of Protestants who have taken pains to expose it, I should have added Dr. Arnold : see his first Lecture on Modern History, p. 102.

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